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Abstract 
The growing literature on organisational change, organisational learning and the role of 
the top team prompted the question: what is the relationship between top teams and 
organisational leaming? It seemed that role of the top team was important to attain 
successful change and ultimately learning. Yet how this was achieved seemed to be 
poorly understood in the literature. 
Thus, the thesis focused attention on the dynamics of the top team, its organisational 
context and the state of the external environment to gain a clearer understanding of these 
relationships. In order to deepen that understanding, the thesis took a systemic and 
psychoanalytical approach and a clinical research methodology, which provided a 
different perspective and seemed to be more suited to this type of inquiry on 
organisational dynamics. 
The 'findings' from the three, in-depth, public sector case studies suggested that while the 
dynamics of the top team could impact negatively on the group task, its impact on 
strategic organisational learning was less significant. 
The main conclusion drawn from the study was that strategic organisational learning was 
impaired not so much by the top team's dynamics, but by organisational and systemic 
defensive routines. 
The source of these recursive pattems was threefold: 
psychodynamic ego and social defenses among top team members, within the top 
team's group and within the dynamics of the Board 
A poor 'holding environment' so that these organisational dynamics were not 
sufficiently contained and thus each strategic subsystem was less 'task' focused 
an underbounded strategic apex that reinforced the dysfunctional dynamics already in 
play 
The implication from these public sector, case studies was that while the external 
environment and the dynamics of the top team were not insignificant, it was the poor 
quality and instability of the internal organisational context that inhibited learning. The 
role of the Board or elected officials was particularly significant in contributing to this 
outcome. 
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Chapter I- Introduction 
1. The aims and purposes of this work 
The aim of this research is to explore the relationships that exist between the 
dynamics of the 'top team' in organisations and the impact of their behaviour on the 
organisation's capacity to learn from their experience, especially that which arises 
from the necessity to change. It seeks to increase our understanding of the nature of 
learning in organisations and to develop theoretical postulates that arise from that 
understanding. 
The research is based on the notion that, for organisations to be able to change to the 
ever increasing demands of their business environment, they need to be able to change 
not just once, but that they should possess the capacity to manage multiple changes, of 
varying degrees, over long periods of time and see such changes as strategic. This, by 
definition, requires organisational development, which means that organisations are 
able to continuously learn and develop from their experience. Tbus, a central feature 
of the capability for organisational development is the capacity for organisational 
learning. 
Whereas change refers to externally or internally driven discontinuities, such as 
greater competition from an emerging market, legislation, or the appointment of a new 
CEO, development refers to enhancing the capacity of the system's performance, 
however defined. Learning refers to the ability of the organisation to respond to the 
environment and to absorb and replicate processes within the system. This argument 
is developed in chapters 2 and 5, where the terms are also discussed in more detail. 
However, the point being made here is that learning, development and change are 
similar but not the same. 
It is argued in this thesis that change and organisational learning need to be managed 
and that the 'top team' has a leading role to play as part of the process. The 'top 
team' may be very positive and active in promoting the change, or they could 
sabotage change and engage in dysfunctional and political maneuvers to resist change. 
While the role ot"top tearns' cannot and should not be overestimated, tllcN' do work 
across multiple boundaries and within a broader context ofthe organisation's staff, 
customers, key stockholders, and environment. Thus, the impact ol'sonle ofthese 
contextual issues will also form part ofthe analysis to be conducted in this Nvork. 
The implication of this argument is that organisations with 'top tcarns' that arc 
Tunctional' will be able to managc tlicir Icarning better. Thus. their organisations 
should be more responsive to environmental demands and be able to adapt and change 
accordingly lor better pullormaricc vis a vIs their stated goals. In particular, the 
outcomes that this study addresses are less conccrncd with OLItpLIt goals. hUt more 
process goals in the t1orm of'organisational learning'. 
The focus of the research is to understand the conditions that promote or hinder 
functional 'top team' dynamics and its attendant capacity to achieve or 
undermine organisational learning at a strategic level. 
In particular, this thesis explores the t'actors and dynamics that relate to the *top 
tcam's' management ofboundaries and what impact these have on learning. (See 
figure 1.1 below) 
Fig 1.1 
The dynamics of top teams, change and organistional learning 
TOPTC11111 
Organisa 
Learning 
i1sational 
Challoc 
Orpnisational 
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2. The scope of this work 
This scope of this work is on the links between the top team, its internal dynamics and 
organisational learning in the context of change, It is informed by three main 
domains: 
* Perceived gaps in current theory 
* The focus of inquiry 
* Organisational context 
This thesis first and foremost contributes to the discipline of organisational behaviour 
and aims to provide some new insights and perspectives to understanding the 
dynamics of organisational life. This goal is being explored in the context of broader 
economic, social, technical and political changes that are facing organisations and 
institutions. 
3. Perceived gaps in current theory 
Current theory in the domain of leadership, organisational learning and change 
appears to have a gap in three areas: a lack of integration; incomplete models and 
needing more depth. 
Shifting the focus of inquiry on the 'management of change' 
Organisations are experiencing considerable change in their environments and these 
changes, in many cases, have become an impetus for change. Theories in organisation 
(see chapters 2 and 3) suggest that organisational survival and growth require 
organisations to change their strategies, internal structures, culture and relationships to 
meet strategic goals. Thus, we see the strategic management of change as extremely 
topical in business and management literature. There are a variety of normative and 
descriptive analyses on the process of change with fewer being analytic in nature. 
Business magazines and some academic j oumals provide prescriptive approaches to 
change with the six steps, seven steps or ten steps that are required to manage change. 
These models are useful. However, their emphasis implies change can be controlled 
and they tend to be rooted in a modernist position of organisation and management 
where reality is seen as'objective', and organisations are seen as'things' or machines 
to be controlled, rather than people and processes to be understood. 
The implication is that change interventions may be misdiagnosed due to an 
inadequate understanding of the system. Such approaches tend to be dominant with 
fewer contributors taking a perspective that seeks to understand the internal processes, 
dynamics and meaning of the key actors or stockholders (Hatch (1997), Kilduff 
(1993), Wamer(1994)). This research aims to contribute to the latter perspective of 
understanding internal processes and to provide another perspective on organisational 
dynamics. 
Exploring the role of leadership 
Much of the literature on organisational development and change emphasises the role 
of leadership. This is particularly explored in chapter S. It suggests that it is 
important to gain the support of top managers otherwise change will not occur. This 
notion by itself is not contentious. However, our understanding of what it means is 
constrained by a number of factors. 
No theory offered 
Firstly, there are prescriptive models of change that state the importance of leadership 
but do not offer theories or explanations about how they take up their roles and enact 
change. It is 'as if they assume that by managers being present and saying that they 
support change, then it will happen: as if by magic. Notable exceptions include 
Schein (1985), Kets De Vries and Miller (1984) and Smith and Peterson (1988). 
These provide socio-cultural or contingency approaches; they are not in the realms of 
rational models. A fuller discussion on this topic is in chapter 5. 
The charismatic leader 
Where leadership is considered in organisational change management, a great deal of 
emphasis is placed upon the personal qualities or'traits' of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO). Such changes tend to be reliant on the charismatic leader and an implied 
dependency assumption about the 'followers' (Beckhard, R and Pritchard, W (1992), 
Kanter et al (1992), Kouzes and Posner (1987)). These approaches suggest that 
leaders are born but they are not supported by empirical evidence and have been 
criticiscd for being misleading as they do not take into account the context and 
complexity of the organisation. 
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Leadership in context 
A contextual perspective on organisational life suggests that we see leadership as a 
role within the organisation more generally. There are contextual or contingency 
approaches to leadership but the explanatory link between leadership behaviour and 
organisational learning, as opposed to team behaviour or task competency, tends to be 
low. Secondly, these theoretical approaches and studies tend to focus upon the sole 
leader and their particular style or personality, with less attention being given to the 
influence of culture. Thirdly, few studies look at the broader leadership role of the 
'top team', which is the collective mechanism for real change in terms of 
implementation and learning. The works of Katzenbach & Smith (1992,1994 & 
1997) are notable exceptions. Furthermore, where a strategic team is considered, it 
tends to look at qualities or even behaviour, without looking at possible dynamics and 
motives that inform. the group's effectiveness. This latter category is a gap in the 
literature that this research will address. 
Putting learning at the centre of change 
The relationship between learning and change is not always clear in the literature. 
Change does not necessarily mean development or learning, especially when the 
change is forced upon an organisation or any part of it. However, learning is usually 
associated with development. These assumptions about the relationships between 
change, development and learning are tested and explored, especially the contention 
that, for organisations to be able to meet the demands of a rapidly changing 
environment, they need to engage in learning across the whole system in order to 
survive and thrive. These issues are discussed in more detail in the following 
chapters. 
There are many benefits that arise from organisational learning. Organisational 
leaming provides a strategy for sustainable and continuous development. Much of the 
interest in this area is because it offers a number of benefits that affect both the 
bottom-line and the dynamics of the organisation. 
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Firstly, in pursuing organisational learning, the system is expected to be more open to 
the signals and trends in its environment and read what is going on before it's too late. 
IBM's misdiagnosis of its environment in the late 1980's and the subsequent losses of 
over $420bn is an example of strategic organisational learning not happening. 
Secondly, organisational learning provides a wider and deeper range of options in 
response to problems and difficulties. Thus, one can move beyond seeing things 
simply as a crisis, but possibly identify the 'root' problem that can be tackled 
corporately. This is a better option than addressing the 'presenting' organisational 
problem and the waste of time, money and emotional energy that goes into damage 
limitation. For example, documented material from the inquest into the Challenger 
disaster suggests that one of the root problems was "a tendency to manage isolation" 
and thus not see things holistically across the whole system (Hirschhorn (198 8)). 
Thirdly, increases in organisational learning can reduce mistakes, if the learning is 
shared. Fourthly, organisational learning can increase the competitive edge of the 
business through increasing creativity and innovation. Examples of this can be found 
in the software field, such as Microsoft. Finally, increases in organisational learning 
facilitate further individual and group learning and thus the process can be generative. 
Thus, understanding the way in which the system learris, or fails to learn, provides us 
with information about some of its internal processes. 
A lack of integration 
Theories about the relationship between leadership groups as 'top teams', their 
internal dynamics, organisational change and organisational learning are not fully 
integrated as a perspective on understanding organisational behaviour and dynamics. 
Thus, it is these key areas that draw the initial boundaries around this work. 
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Incomplete models 
There are theories of leadership, such as Fielder's (1967) contingency model that 
covers a discussion on context but not organisational change. Alternatively, there are 
models of transformational leadership, such as Bennis and Nanus (1985), that cover 
change and leadership but do not cover the group phenomena in depth. In short, each 
of the areas has a body of knowledge in their own right but they tend to stand in 
isolation or in partial relationship to each other. There is a lack of integration. Thus, 
this thesis aims to synthesis the key aspects of these areas of interest and provide a 
framework for understanding the impact of 'top teams' on strategic organisational 
learning. 
Insufficient depth 
It was suggested earlier that dominant theories of organisation were in a'modernist' 
tradition and that such an analysis may miss some of the complexity of understanding 
organisations. As this thesis takes a different perspective, which gets behind the 
external face of systems and understands the complexity from inside the system, it is 
more likely to provide a greater and deeper level of understanding of the dynamics 
that take place. Thus, an analysis that takes into account the subjective experience 
and motives of the people involved in the 'top team', organisational learning and their 
immediate context will also be a feature of this work. In developing a deeper 
understanding, this thesis will apply psychoanalytic theory to organisational and 
group life as a tool of cultural inquiry. 
Thus, in examining the role of the 'top team' we are interested not only in their 
context - the organisation - but also in their internal world and subjective experience. 
How do their actions and thinking impact on the organisation's learning at the 
strategic apex of the organisation? This sets the limits of the inquiry. The thesis is 
not an examination of the strategy process, nor is it an in-depth analysis of 
organisational culture. It also falls outside the domain of organisational consultancy 
interventions. These areas are relevant in that the research work will be influenced by 
these factors and have implications for them. However, they do not form the centre- 
piece of this analysis. 
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4. The focus of inquiry: the research questions 
What is the main question that the thesis work aims to address? What is it seeking to 
explore and understand as a contribution to our understanding of organisational 
behaviour and organisational dynamics in particular? 
The broad research question is: 
"What is the impact of the 'top tcam's' internal dynamics on the task of strategic 
organisational Icarning? " 
This breaks down into four sub-questions, which aim to explore: 
* The team's task effectiveness 
* The team's internal dynamics 
* The nature and quality of strategic organisational learning 
* The impact of the team's context on its boundary management and thus ifs 
capability to leam. 
Thus, the four sub-research questions are: 
Task effectiveness 
"How does the 'top team' see its effectiveness as reflected in its ability to manage its 
task and boundaries? " 
The nature and quality of the internal dynamics 
"How far are the internal dynamics of the 'top team' dysfunctional? " 
Organisational learning 
"To what extent is there strategic organisational learning? " 
The impact of context 
"How far does the context of the team - including the relationship with the Board - 
impact on its process of boundary management and the space that provides for 
successful learning? " 
These four questions provide the framework for furthering this inquiry. 
5. An organisational context of change: the public sector 
The context for exploring these issues is the UK public sector. In the United 
Kingdom there have been many company lay offs and liquidations with a resultant 
depression in the housing market, and unemployment at around 10% at the time of 
study'. A sector where the impact of these changes has had to be actively managed is 
the public sector. 
Government cuts and a philosophy of competition and minimal intervention for the 
public sector mean its nature and role has been challenged. No longer are public 
sector organisations to be the sole or direct provider of services and goods, but they 
are expected to compete with the private sector, contract out their services and reduce 
cost while improving effectiveness and efficiency. 
The challenge for the UK public sector organisations is that they still have to exist, 
but they are required to manage their resources more effectively, with new cultural 
imperatives, structures and working practices. They are organisations in transition, 
currently undergoing change. How far is this change, development and learning? An 
examination of these fairly long established organisations will provide a context to 
examine the relationship between the dynamics of 'top teams' and organisational 
leaming at a strategic level. 
6. The research approach 
The research approach' will reflect the nature of the inquiry. Namely, it will seek to 
understand the complexity of the organisation not only from a body of established 
research and knowledge, but also from the experiences and reality of the people 
within the organisation. In taking such a perspective the research lies within the 
realms of a 'qualitative' perspective that draws upon and treats as valid the subjective 
experience of those involved in the system or organisation. Thus, a qualitative 
approach will be the main research strategy with quantitative analysis added to 
support triangulation of data sources where possible. In addition, a case study 
approach will also be taken so that the depth of each of the systems, processes and 
dynamics can be fully analysed. Three 'top team' cases are studies. 
I Economist, Jan 1996 
2 The research approach is discussed in further detail in chapters 9, 
10 and 11. 
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7. An overview of the rest of this thesis 
The work that follows is developed under five main parts or headings: setting the 
scene; review of the literature and the emergent analytical model; the research process 
that follows; the case studies and finally, their interpretations and wider learning. 
Part one, this chapter, sets the scene and defines the purpose, rationale, scope and 
approach to the work. 
Part two has seven chapters. It reviews the literature and concludes with an emerging 
model for understanding strategic organisational learning. It is a review of the 
literature in five areas: theories of organisational change; organisation; organisational 
learning and the dynamics of groups and teams. These frameworks are used to 
provide an integrated understanding of 'top teams' and their relatedness to 
organisations, change and organisational leaming and they suggest a deeper 
framework of analysis based on the application of psychoanalytic principles to 
organisational behaviour. 
Chapters 2 and 3 look at the concepts and understanding of organisational 
development and change. They take a systemic conflict approach to understanding 
change for this thesis. Chapter 4 explores our understanding and models of 
organisations based on a review of organisational theory. It takes an integrated 
approach that uses an open systems theory approach to understanding organisations, 
along with an integration of the social, psychological and political aspects of 
organisational life. Chapter 5 briefly reviews the notion of organisational learning 
and defines its meaning and relatedness to 'top teams' for this thesis. Chapter 6 puts 
forward the case for the application of psychoanalytic thinking to organisations and 
provides a brief overview of psychoanalytic thought. An object relations approach to 
psychoanalysis is developed and this is applied to groups and organisational social 
systems in chapter 7. Chapter 8 provides a summary of Part two and an identification 
of the gaps in the literature leading to an emergent model for understanding the 
relationship between 'top teams' and strategic organisational learning. 
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Part three addresses the research process. It starts with a discussion on the research 
orientation and philosophy (chapter 9), which is followed by the research strategy and 
the actual techniques (chapter 10) as they relate to the research hypotheses. Finally, in 
chapter 11, there is a discussion about the selection, preparation and context of the 
case studies so that the limits of the study are made explicit. 
Part four provides an account and analysis of three case studies (chapters 12 - 14). 
They are reported in a common format for comparability but each case has an analysis 
and interpretation section in its own right so that the complexity of each system is 
valued. 
It also has the findings and conclusions. Comparative and generic themes that arise 
from all of the cases are reported and summarised in chapter 15, concluding with 
recommendations and a closing commentary of wider implications that arise from the 
research. A summary of the chapters is in figure 1.2 below 
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Part two 
1. Introductory remarks 
Research by Pettigrew and Whipp (199 1) concluded that the central factors in 
successfully managing change were: constant environmental assessment; leading the 
change; linking strategy with operations; having a human resource strategy and, that 
these factors together should have coherence. These findings are relevant to the scope 
of this thesis, which falls within the domain of organisational learning and change 
through strategic leadership in the public sector. It specifically aims to address the 
question: What is the impact of the 'top team's' dynamics on the task of strategic 
learning? 
Part two makes a case for taking a psychoanalytic approach to understanding the key 
internal and unconscious processes of 'top teams' and organisational life. It examines 
the literature in the key areas of inquiry for this thesis which are organisational 
change, organisational theory, theories of groups and organisational learning. Each of 
these bodies of knowledge is briefly examined, critiqued and developed by applying a 
psychoanalytic perspective. 
In addition, this part of the thesis puts forward the argument that the role of the 'top 
team' is critical to the success of learning from change and that their behaviour will 
have an impact on the process. It is recognised that the organisational and 
environmental context will also have an impact and that these variables must be 
considered as contingent to an organisation's learning processes. Studies show (see 
chapter 4 on organisation theory) that, where the environment is rapidly changing, the 
organisation needs to have complex and integrated systems to manage successfully 
otherwise it will become overloaded and congested. The ability to manage the 
boundary of the environment and create the opportunity to manage internally will 
impact on organisational learning for the strategic apex. 
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2. Theoretical areas of inquiry 
Four topics forni the literature review and these seek to gain a greater understanding 
of the key inter-relationships of this area of inquiry. These are: 
Organisational change 
Organisations are expected to go through the process of change as they successfully 
adapt and learn from change. Organisational models of change are rooted in the work 
of Kurt Lewin (1947, a and b). Such models need to be appraised and evaluated in 
relationship to current thinking in organisational theory and business practice. Are 
such models still appropriate? What developments should be incorporated into the 
analysis to increase our understanding of organisational life? These issues are 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
The nature of organisations 
If we are to capture learning from the process of change in organisations, then we 
have to examine our assumptions, constructions and theories of organisations and the 
relationships we would expect to find within them based on those abstractions. Thus, 
the first main section of chapter 4 takes a historic and critical look at the main 
developments in organisation theory and the implications for this work. It then moves 
to look at open systems theory and its boundaries with symbolic interactionist 
theories. 
The role of the 'top team' 
The literature on high performance teams (Hannah, 1987) and the role of senior 
managers' (Beckhard et al, 1992) impact on change, form a dominant view of how 
'top teams' should take up their roles. Yet there are many views on what makes 
teams really work. This thesis will explore some of these in relationship to the 
research aims'and distil from the review what frameworks are able to meet the criteria 
of depth of understanding in their analysis (chapter 5). 
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Organisational leaming 
The works of Chris Argyris (1977,1985) and his works with Donald Schon (1978 and 
1996) have a significant influence concerning the current thinking on organisational 
learning. Are these the only approaches to understanding organisational Icarning? 
Are there other perspectives and what can we learn from them as a way of informing 
our understanding on organisational. learning (chapter 5)? 
These four subject areas are large in themselves and cannot be reviewed in depth 
within the scope of this thesis. It is not the purpose of this work to undertake a meta- 
analysis of all the work in these areas. Instead, the review is far more selective 
concentrating on each of the areas as they relate to constructing a logical argument 
which increasing our depth of understanding and as they relate to each other. As a 
consequence there may be some areas that are excluded in the following review as 
they fall outside the scope of this work. 
A psychoanalytic approach 
A more comprehensive understanding of a psychoanalytical approach will be 
developed in the context of this thesis in chapters 6 and 7. However, as an initial 
primer, a working understanding is briefly put forward at this stage. 
Psychoanalysis is a systematic and interpretative study of the unconscious process. It 
is both a body of theory and practice in the development of social understanding. Its 
underlying theory suggests that behaviours are driven by motives that are outside 
normal cognitive awareness and that these are a product of unresolved conflicts and 
relations that arise from childhood. These 'tensions' become unconsciously mobilised 
in adulthood in our multiple roles - father, child, manager, consultant, friend - as part 
of the stresses and anxiety-provoking situations of everyday life. Thus, they impact 
upon managers taking up their roles and the functioning of groups and larger systems 
as organisations. There are cases where these anxieties are so excessive that they lead 
to character disorders and long term psycho pathology. It is not the intention of this 
work to address such clinical issues. The purpose of drawing on this body of 
knowledge is to gain a deeper understanding of organisational dynamics and to use it 
as a tool for organisational analysis. 
A map of the key areas of inquiry is shown as a summary in figure 2.1. below 
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3. Organisational development 
The study of organisational development (OD) has its origins in the 1960's and aims 
to increase the 'effectiveness' of organisations through planned change. 
"OD is a response to change, a complex educational strategy intended to change the 
beliefs, attitudes, values and structure so that they can better adapt to new 
technologies, markets and challenges and the dizzying rate of change itself. " Bennis 
(1969) p2. 
"Organisation development is an effort (I) planned, (2) organisation-wide and (3) 
managed from the top, to (4) increase organisation effectiveness and health through 
(5) planned intervention in the organisation's "processes", using behaviour-science 
knowledge. " Beckhard (1969) p9. 
"Organisation development is a long range effort to improve an organisation's 
problem-solving and renewal processes particularly through a more effective and 
collaborative management of organisation culture - with emphasis on the culture of 
the formal work teams - with the assistance of a change agent and the use of the 
theory and technology of applied behavioural science, including action research. " 
French and Bell (1978) 
"Organisational development is a system wide application of knowledge to the 
planned development and reinforcement of the organisational strategies, structures, 
and processes for improving organisations' effectiveness" Cummings and Worley 
(1993) p2. 
There is a high level of common agreement about what constitutes organisational 
development. It is seen as part of the change agenda and it is incremental, planned, 
strategic and managed. This contrasts with organisational change. 
Organisational. change is a process of 'movement' that impacts upon the body 
corporate. It may be evolutionary or incremental, partial, system-wide or, 
transformational (Dunphy and Stace (1993)). Where it is driven from inside and is 
planned, it shares several elements of OD: it is planned, managed, may use behaviour 
technologies and shares an assumption that the environment is stable or 
unproblematic. Where it is not planned and driven by the demands of the environment 
there are a wider range of possibilities other than OD. 
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The other end of the organisational change spectrum is 'transformational' change. 
Here, the context of a rapidly changing and often uncertain environment makes 
planned change difficult to sustain. Pettigrew and Whipp (1991, p174) have pointed 
out that, "A crisis provides the space and legitimacy to effect major strategic re- 
orientations. " 
Transformational change requires organisations to take a quantum leap, a radical 
perspective and operate on new norms and values. It requires organisations to 
transform and take on a new paradigm (Gouillart and Kelly (1995), B eckhard and 
Pritchard (1992)). 
Dunphy and Stace (1993), suggest that, "Organisational development and 
organisational. transformation represent two different approaches to the understanding 
of organisational change. " They go on to say that the two approaches are compatible 
and when considered jointly can "inform the larger understanding of change. " (p908) 
Essentially we have different orders of change, genesis, levels of control and 
influence, and predictability of outcome. 
Finally, organisational learning is mentioned here in that both organisational change 
and development will have an impact on learning. OD has an explicit learning agenda 
but not all change will lead to learning. A working definition of learning within 
organisations is: those organisations that are able to learn from their experiences, 
intemalise and communicate these and develop new insights and routines to deal with 
new situations in the future. Leaming in organisations is mentioned here as it 
provides the context of our discussion on change and a fuller discussion on 
organisational learning is provided in chapter 5. 
Thus, there are important links between organisational change, OD and organisational. 
learning. The implication is that those organisations that can respond and adapt to a 
changing environment, so that ' 
there is congruence between the external demands and 
the internal processes, will also be organisations that engage in functional learning. 
The extent of this link is the focus of this thesis: what is the relationship between 
managing organisational change, the role of the strategic leadership and the ability of 
the organisation to learn? 
The next section looks at one of the earliest, comprehensive and most influential, 
theoretical contributions to organisational change. 
19 
4. Kurt Lewin and beyond 
Kurt Lewin's contributions 
Kurt Lewin was a psychologist who was influenced by the philosopher Ernst Cassirer 
and his colleagues in Gestalt psychology at the Psychological Institute at Berlin 
University in pre-Nazi Germany (DeBoard (1978) p50). In 1933, he left Germany and 
was part of a group in the United States who contributed to the foundations of 
organisational development and change. As a Jewish dmigrd in the US he was 
interested in social issues and notions of conflict between groups of different racial 
origins and communities (Lewin, 1948). This, along with other interests, led to his 
main contributions to the field of organisational. development. Lewin was also 
instrumental in developing the laboratory method of learning now instituted at the 
National Training Laboratory; the action research approach and the data feedback 
methodology (Cummings and Worley, 1993). It is his work on groups in the literature 
that is of particular interest as it informs the principles that have been applied to 
change management. 
Lewin on change 
Lewin's work on change is encapsulated in his two seminal articles in the first two 
volumes of Human Relations in 1947, "Frontiers in Group Dynamics". 
These two articles form the basis of LewiWs original thinking - both initial and new 
thinking - on change and development. His work also acknowledges and engages 
with the notion of the unconscious. Lewin incorporates the unconscious explicitly 
from an ego psychology perspective by looking at the work of Freud and the role of 
the Id (Lewin, 1948), and philosophically in exploring the notion of 'existence'. 
"Beliefs regarding 'existence' in social science have changed in regard to the degree to 
which 'full reality' is attributed to psychological and social phenomena, and the reality 
of their'deeper' dynamic properties. " 
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In social science, he continues, "Emotions were declared as something too 'fluid' and 
'intangible' to be pinned down by scientific analysis or by experimental procedure. 
Such a methodological argument does not deny existence but it has the same effect of 
keeping the topic outside of the realm of empirical science. " (Lewin (1947) a, p7. ) 
However, while he continually acknowledged the importance of the emotional factor, 
his theory of field life space or social field is based on perception psychology and is 
taken analogously from the world of physics. His model is akin to a magnet's sphere 
of attraction and influence and is compared to the limits and subjective goals of the 
individual's life space. This theory suggests that individuals and groups operate in a 
psychological field, called'life space', which is a highly subjective space of how the 
individual sees their world and thus how they may act upon it (Lewin, 1972). 
"In specific terms, the life space for a person will consist of his conscious and 
unconscious goals, his dreams, hopes, fears, his past experience and his future 
expectations. The physical and the social conditions will also be important, limiting 
as they do the variety of possible life spaces and creating the boundary conditions of 
the psychological field. " (DeBoard (1978) p53. ) 
This central concept is then used to examine the'quasi-stationary equilibria! in group 
life and the problems of organisational change. Lewin argues that groups and systems 
are resistant to change and an understanding of this is important to understand why 
change might not occur. The mechanisms of resistance are found in the social field 
and field spaces of individuals whose drives and aspirations are focused on stability 
and away from change. Lewin gives as an example the motivational 'forces' for racial 
discrimination reflected in jobs for whites, self idealisation and stereotypes against the 
'coloured' population. Countervailing forces are also said to be operating: too much 
discrimination may be seen as unfair, it may spark rebellions etc. These opposite 
forces lead to the notion of the status quo or what Lewin calls 'quasi-stationary 
equilibrium'. These resting points are so called because if the forces are changed in 
strength (for or against discrimination, for example through new legislation) then the 
point of equilibrium will shift and there will be change. Lewin illustrates his case 
through a variety of case examples. 
Tho key point is that socio-emotional and unconscious dynamics are seen as central to 
understanding the organisational and social dynamics of change. 
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Generalising Lewinian models 
These conceptual tools have been popularised and developed in the organisational 
development literature in many guises - for example the change management phases, 
force field analysis and the change equation. The point here is to highlight the 
influential nature of this work on change management theory. 
All of these models are used as principles for change. They have a shared theoretical 
foundation and have informed change models in the field of organisational behaviour, 
OD and organisational consultancy - see Burke (1987), DeBoard (1978), Beckhard 
and Harris (1987), French and Bell (1978), Carnell (1990) and Scott and Jaffe (1989) 
as examples of LewiWs work being generalised. 
In addition, the work of Lewin was influential in the inter-disciplinary "Tavistock" 
approach to organisational intervention and change (see Neumann, 1997). 
However, there are some tensions within the use of these models that remain 
untapped. 
Some tensions in the model 
The reason there is a discussion of Lewin's work is because of the considerable 
influence and impact it has had on the basic theory and practice of organisational 
development, systems based approaches and change (Cummings and Worley (1993), 
Burke (1987), Bennis (1969), Beckhard (1969)). In considering change and learning, 
a systems approach is critical as it provides a feedback loop for learning, development 
and 'planned' change. 
The frameworks outlined continue to be used as models for managers to apply and are 
taught by organisational behaviour, human resource management and strategy faculty 
in management schools across the UK and Europe (see Johnson and Scholes (1993), 
chapter 10 as an example). Yet, there are some unresolved tensions in the axioms, 
assumptions and framework of the models that are open to criticism. 
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The context for this thesis is one of considerable and on-going change in the 
environment. One implication of this is that systems of organisations will be in a state 
of continual transition, where it will no longer be operating on the notion of 'stability' 
but will be like the white water of'shooting the rapids'. Thus, Vaill (1989) would 
argue that traditional models of organisations, which are based on the underlying 
assumptions of the military model are inappropriate. Instead, a flexible and creative 
mindset, based on management as a performance art, is suggested which means the 
notion of flexibility, involvement, passion and insight become the new qualities of 
change. Learning too would be essential for long-term survival and growth. 
Secondly, Lewin! s topological and'physics' based model of human behaviour has all 
the characteristics of economic models of "rational" man and woman. The 
assumption is that people have objective functions that can be mapped and understood 
in 'quasi-mechanical' terms. Like economic models, these abstractions and the axioms 
can only be approximate and will not be able to take account of the unpredictable 
nature of human beings. At least in econometric models there is an acknowledgment 
that some factors are 'unexplained' in the residual variable. Thus, the approach has its 
limitations and a multidisciplinary approach provides a broader framework to 
understand the complexity of organisations (Neumann, 1997) and by implication its 
systems of learning. 
This takes us to the third point; Lewin articulates both an objective and subjective 
aspect on the nature of human being. He talks about and acknowledges the 
unconscious but continues to work in a framework of perceptional psychology. Thus, 
he never really reconciles or fully explores the nature and consequences of this divide 
in an organisational context. It appears that this omission or lack of integration has 
been passed on to other generations of theorists and practitioners, with people being in 
one camp or the other. It is doubtful whether this was an intention. However, it is 
this tension and splitting between the emotional, subjective and irrational side of 
change and the so-called objective and planned side of change that will be explored 
within the following sections of this thesis. The aim is to examine both the conscious 
and unconscious side of change and learning to see what they offer in terms of 
increasing our understanding and how there may be greater integration between these 
different realms of'reality'. The re-integration of these two elements may increase our 
understanding of organisational systems and clarify what organisations learn and how 
they do it - especially as managed by 'top teams' at the strategic apex. 
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Understanding the relationship between'top team' dynamics and organisational 
learning as a consequence of change requires a deep understanding, and therefore 
analysis, of how organisations work. A framework for doing so is one that draws 
upon a range of perspectives which allows a greater level of complexity to be 
explored. The following chapters (3-7) review the literature on understanding 
organisations and the relationship between these two organisational phenomena. 
Chapter 8 concludes with a framework that helps develop that analysis. 
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Chapter 3- The tensions between rational and 
subjective analysis 
1. Introduction 
Can organisations learn from change? An understanding of the dynamics of change and 
its implications for those that manage change and learning may help to draw some 
conclusions to this question. This chapter explores the seeming tensions that exist 
between 'rational' and 'subjective' aspects of change. It seeks to understand why this 
divide persists and the loss in our understanding because of it. Tbus, an integrated and 
multidisciplinary approach is advocated. 
The tensions between the 'objective' and'subjective' schools of thought on change are 
clearly seen in the 'orientations' that are taken by various contributors. There are several 
frameworks one could use. Robert Chin and Kenneth Benne (1985), consider the change 
agenda under three main schools of thought: 
'empirical-rational' strategies, which are those that assume self interest and rational 
plans provide a basis for change 
'normative re-educative' strategies are a second set of approaches which examine the 
socio-cultural norms of people and groups in a system 
the third perspective is described as 'power-coercive' which is based on an 
examination of political and power relationships 
Bolman and Deal (199 1) consider four ways of reframing organisations: the structural 
framework; the human resource one; the political analysis and, the symbolic framework. 
Wilson (1992) explores change issues covering the domain of 'strategic choice' compared 
with'systemic theories of conflicV and these are sub-divided into planned change versus 
emergent change and, process versus implementation. Thus, we see a tension in the 
literature between different perspectives and it is hard to draw firm lines between them 
(Warner, 1994). The rest of this section will explore these in more detail. 
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2. Strategies for managing change 
Chin and Benne provide an initial starting point for discussing the main differences in 
approach to understanding and managing change. They see three approaches: empirical 
rational; normative re-educative and, power and coercive. 
Their framework is one of the most comprehensive, historically based schemas of the 
relationships between the different approaches to understanding change. It recognises the 
complexity of the nature of change and again graphically highlights the tensions between 
different approaches. (Burrell and Morgan's (1979) schema, or Morgan's (1986) schema, 
are more about the development of organisational thought and perspectives on 
organisations than organisational change. ) 
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Using Chin and Benne (1985) will provide an initial framework for organising an 
analysis of theories of change. A short account of their work followed by other more 
recent work and critique will be the approach used for this section. Chin and Benne 
identify three main fields of contribution to change: empirical rational; normative re- 
educative and, power and coercive. 
Empirical rational strategies 
These strategies were based on the assumption of rational enlightemnent, western 
liberalism and a belief that people will change through their own efforts once presented 
with rational data. The strategies themselves included: basic and applied research and 
data feedback; personnel and psychometric devices for selection; systems analysis of 
large organisations and bureaucracies and, the use of mental processes in inferring the 
future from the past. 
The authors suggest that these strategies are useful in periods of relative stability and 
when used with other approaches. On their own such strategies have been know to fail, 
particularly used in complex situation, (Chin & Benne (1985)). In particular, the authors 
note that the context of the organisation and its socio-cultural norms may need to be 
revealed if improvement through change is to take place. Thus, rational approaches on 
their own do not work. There are similarities between rational approaches and the 
normative re-educative approach, when the influence of the culture and context have an 
impact. 
Examples of such limitations can be found in three current areas of rational-empirical 
methods of change. These are strategic management, business process re-engineering and 
organisational transformation. Traditional models of strategic management are based on 
a planned approach and a rational-empirical one. With large strategic planning units 
being used during the 1970's (Faulkner, 1993), such limitations are also found in the 
rational and incremental models of strategic change as discussed by Quinn (1978), 
Johnson (1987) and Quinn (1988). The notions of context, behaviour and political power 
and culture are all acknowledged as important factors in understanding the process of 
strategic change. It is a generally held view now that rationality alone is insufficient 
(Johnson and Scholes, 1993). In the field of business process re-engineering (BPR), a 
process is essentially based on a rational-empirical approach to change. 
Michael Hammer, a BPR guru, suggested that over 80% of BPR initiatives fail due to 
issues of implementation and the impact of cultural on change (Economist, w/e 
November 5,1994). BPR is the fundamental rethinking and radical design of business 
processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of 
performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed (Hammer and Champy, 1993). 
BPR has been defined as the analysis and redesign of business and manufacturing 
processes to eliminate that which adds no value (Parker, 1992). 
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Another study on BPR, Ascari, Rock and Dutta (1995), also attempts to examine what 
works and what the pitfalls are in gaining the benefits of BPR. They undertook a meta- 
analysis of 35 well-known case examples of BPR implementation. While the 
organisations' structure and technology were important factors, the other elements that 
made for success or failure were the organisational processes and the organizational 
culture. "Change in the culture of the company is a common theme in most of the 
BPR/change efforts studied. Some organisations, such as Taco Bell, underwent a radical 
shift in their culture. " (p4. ) 'Successful' cultures needed to be: flexible and adaptable; 
coherent; customer focused and, clear about their strategic intent and how their culture 
related to the strategy. Thus, the normative and cultural aspects of the organisation play a 
significant part and the individualist and rational model alone is insufficient. 
Finally, Gouillart and Kelly (1995) argue in their work on transformation that, in order to 
transform, organisations have to move beyond 'mechanistic' models of business. "Bom in 
the Industrial Age, our model of business has been a mechanistic one. Corporations have 
been economic agents in an efficient market system, parts of an ever expanding, ever 
complex machine. " 
It is time to replace our mechanistic view of business with a more organic one, and to 
endow the recently discovered biological nature of our corporations with a new 
spirituality that recognises the sanctity of individual human life and has compassion for 
individuals. " p3/4. To transform organisations for the 21 st century, they propose four 
processes. These are the four 'Rs' of reframing, restructuring, revitalising and renewal. 
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Refraining aims to shift the corporate mind or mindset so it can see things in a new light 
beyond what the data presents and seeks to have meaning and new insight. Restructuring 
is the changes in the body of the organisation and is the more familiar aspect of change. 
Revitalising is linking the corporate body with the environment and it seeks to be 
generative. Renewal deals with the spirit of the organisation and human relations. On 
this point, Gouillart and Kelly (1995) state: 
"Renewal is the most subtle and difficult, the least explored, and potentially the most 
powerful of transformation dimensions. " P7. 
What these three areas illustrate is the limitation of a perspective that sees change only 
from a rational empirical view and that cultural, spiritual and normative features of 
organisational systems are indeed relevant and do impinge. 
Normative re-educative strategies of change 
The assumption of this way of thinking is that people are social agents, as opposed to 
being individualistic. Here, people influence and interact with their environment and 
others in forming relations and that people have needs, habits and motives: they are not 
automatic machines. Thus, actions are influenced by social norms and commonly held 
beliefs about the nature of human interaction. 
Lewin's contribution is greatest in this domain and it stems from his vision of the inter- 
relationship between research, training and action and the need for collaborative 
relationships in solving human problems. However, Freud's influence is also noted. 
"Freud's main contributions to normative re-educative strategies are two. First, he sought 
to demonstrate the unconscious and preconscious bases of man's actions. Only as a man 
finds ways of becoming aware of these non conscious wellsprings of his attitudes and 
actions will he be able to bring them into conscious self control. 
"Second, in developing therapeutic methods, he discovered and developed ways of 
utilising the relationship between change agent (therapist) and client (patient) as a major 
tool in re-educating the client toward expanded self awareness, self understanding and 
self control. Emphasis upon the collaborative relationship in the therapeutic change was 
a major contribution by Freud and his students and colleagues to normative re-educative 
strategies of changing human affairs. " Chin and Benne (1985) p32. 
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This infers an active and essential role for a change agent in assisting the system - 
individual, group or organisation - to effect change through a series of interventions based 
on theories of change. 
Thus, many of the features of the collaborative 'therapeutic alliance' are suggested as 
important guidelines for the relationship between the client and consultant (be the latter 
researcher, trainer or friend). These include addressing underlying and systemic causes, 
addressing resistance, timing, building a relationship on positive regard for the client and 
jointly supporting problem solving for self analysis, learning, insight and renewal. Thus, 
the approach focuses on the human dimension of change - the human relations (Coch and 
French, 1948). 
The two goals of the normative re-educative approach were to improve the problem- 
solving capabilities of the system and release the growth and potential of people in the 
organisational system. These two goals included a number of behavioural science 
methodologies. It is not important at this stage to give a detailed account of such 
methodologies but they include approaches that address both the technical and social 
aspects of change . Examples cover the areas of diagnosis, data feedback, discussion and 
action through action research, group work, counselling and psychotherapy. 
The underlying assumption of this approach to change is that human systems are 
collaborative, that they are essentially functional and, that change in such systems can be 
planned. The banner of a 'normative perspective' is what brings these threads together. 
The normative aspect of the change agenda is reflected in the work of Burke (1987), 
Beckhard (1969), Beckhard and Harris (1987), Beckhard and Pritchard (1992), Bennis 
(1969) and much of the dominant organisational development literature (see Robbins, 
1991). 
In Beckhard's model we see the case for the need to manage the transition between the 
stagesofchange. Beckhard (1969) and Beckhard and Harris (1987) concur with the basic 
Lewinian principle of taking change in stages. There are three key stages in their model: 
take account of the present state; the transition state and, the change state. The approach 
includes having a clear view of the future, assessing the readiness for change, being clear 
of and ready for resistance to change, force field analysis and strategies for change 
ranging from education and training through to political strategies. 
The group dynamics of change are seen in the work of Lippet (1990) in Cartwright and 
Zander, (1960), Lewin (1947, a and b), Argyris (1962) and the work of Wilfred Bion 
(1961). These will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7. We also see the emotional 
side of change in its comparison to bereavement, loss and change as reflected in the 
'transition curve', Marris (1974) and Camell (1986 and 1990) (see figure 3.1 below). 
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FIG 3.1 
The Transition Curve - the emotional journey of change 
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The organisational and systems elements of understanding change are reflected in the 
works of Likert (196 1), Katz and Kahn (1978) and open systems and contingency theory. 
These organisational theories will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Thus, we see the normative re-educative approach operating at several levels: the 
individual; the group and, the organisation. These are all informed by different but 
related theories of change and the linkages are discussed through the remainder of Part 
two. The normative aspect of organisational change appears to be underlying and 
dominant in the work at the individual, group and organisational level. This suggests a 
series of systems seeking harmony, conflict free and smoothly adjusting transitions, along 
with the right level of support. Perhaps we can see whether such a picture is valid when 
we examine the third strand of looking at strategies for change when looking at the 
political change strategies. 
31 
Power-coercive approaches to effecting change 
These approaches to effecting change emphasize the political and economic sanctions 
used in the exercise of power. They include a range of approaches from naked power, 
persuasion, manipulation and the use of the moral injunctive such as shame or guilt. 
This emphasis acknowledges that the power of influence of one person over the other 
does exist and is endemic in any change process (Dahl, 1961). In the rational strategies 
information is power; in the normative strategies emotional intelligence, resilience and 
ego strength are sources of power and influence. 
This approach to power rests on the coercive nature of power as exercised and enforced 
through the application of law, rules and regulations and through the use of economic 
sanctions. In the international arena we saw clear examples of this in the defunct 
sanctions against South African goods to put pressure on the apartheid regime to 
dismantle. Currently, the international community has invoked sanctions against Iraq to 
demobilise its rocket weapons. 
In an organisational. context, this dynamic between legitimised power and countervailing 
groups, was reflected in the management-union relations in the UK during the 1970's 
(Maclnnes, 1987). The power and conflicts over legitimacy led to negotiation or 
compromise between the different interests. Again, the accord between the Irish 
Government, the UK and the various para-military groups reflects this same dynamic. In 
organisational. terms these power relations can be played out in gender or race dynamics 
(Bell et al (1993), Kanter (1977), Marshall (1995), and Jarrett et al (199 1)). 
Three broad strategies are identified within this approach: non-violence, the use of 
political institutions and the manipulation of power elites. 
Gandhi and Martin Luther King provide models of non-violent strategies, which aim to 
use the moral argument and highlight the injustice or inequalities exercised through the 
dominant agents of social control. In organisational settings an awareness, or conscious 
raising, of gender issues are raised as a way of breaking the stereotypes, or the 'glass 
ceiling', that women experience in their promotion prospects. Fagenson (1993) and 
Vinnicombe and Colwill (1995) provide more discussion of the key issues and other 
strategies used in this realm of organisational life. A critical review of the debate is alsc 
given in Marshall (1995). 
The second coercive strategy is using political institutions to achieve change by'working 
the rules'to one's interests. This may be explicit and non-oppressive. 
"Changes enforced by political coercion need not be oppressive if the quality of our 
democratic processes can be maintained and improved. " Chin and Benne (1985) p4 I. 
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However, this view is open to scrutiny. First, while accepting the value of changing the 
rules, this may give legitimacy to those already in power. The individual, group or 
organisation needs re-education to change behaviours and attitudes. This was certainly 
the case in the race relations field in the UK following the Race Relations Act 1976. 
Enforcements were hard to obtain and training and education were also a necessary part 
of the strategy of change, as were organisation and systemic interventions (Jarrett et al, 
1991). Furthermore, policy changes maybe a reflection of the system incorporating the 
political challenge as a way of reducing the impact of change (Luxemburg, 1989). 
The dynamics of such changes are taken to be explicit. Lukes (1974) argues that this may 
not always be the case and that coercive strategies may operate outside of the public arena 
and through manipulation. Lukes also suggests that the implicit and private agenda 
setting leads to the manipulation of others, unbeknown to them and probably is the most 
powerful form of political enactment. This takes us to the third possibility argued by 
Chin and Benne: changes through the recomposition and manipulation of power elites. 
Change through the recomposition and manipulation of power elites is based upon a 
Marxian view of the social relations between the power elites who own and control the 
means of production, and the dispossessed 'proletariat' . The former exploit and reap 
surplus labour efforts and thus accumulate capital from profits (Fine and Harris (1979), 
Catephores(1989)). This class divide could not be broken through 'enlightening' the 
ruling classes as rational self-interest would favour the 'invisible hand' of the market over 
collective social enhancement. Neither would the use of normative re-educative 
approaches alone be sufficient. The development of charitable foundations as a response 
to social needs beyond industrial development proved to be inadequate and thus the 
development of the welfare state (Barr (1987)). It was the mobilisation of the 'working 
class'that provided pressure and political involvement from'below' and Chin and Berme 
(1985) suggest this movement provided the basis for new social and political 
engagement. Whether a Marxian perspective to change is taken or not, the point the 
authors aim to make is that countervailing power bases provide a focus for change or for 
influence. Two quotations draw out the salient points of their case: 
46 * normative re-educative strategies of change must 
include power elites among their 
target of changing as they seek to defuse their ways of progress within contemporary 
society. " 
"Those committed to normative re-educative strategies of changing must take account of 
present actual concentrations of power wherever they work. This does not mean that 
they must develop a commitment to power-coercive strategies to change the distribution 
of power except when these may be necessary to effect the spread of their own 
democratically and scientifically oriented methods of changing within society. " Chin and 
Benne, p43. 
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The coercive-power strategies as presented provide a valuable point of discussing power 
relationships and the emphasis on the coercive approach is helpful as it acknowledges 
other power sources through the other strategies. However, its conceptualisation is weak 
on several grounds. First, a clear definition of politics is not defined; it is implied as 
behaviour and activity. Yet it could also include ideology, which they touch upon; a 
'Marxian' perspective. In the quoted case example of Floyd Hunter's study on power 
elites and decision-making in an American city, we see a clear case of structural power 
dynamics. The reluctance to acknowledge a Marxian analysis in the authors' account of 
the case leaves one with the impression that the ideology of politics is not open for 
serious discussion. Furthermore, ascribing a'normative re-educative' value to Marx's 
values denies the importance of those values and ideology as reflected in the Marxian 
debate between Hegallian Classicism and Materialism. Thus, in the final analysis, it 
appears that it is behaviour that matters. 
It is argued here that both ideology and behaviour impact on political outcome (see too 
Baddeley (1995). Extremist groups, driven and motivated by ideology, demonstrate the 
importance of ideals which inform their actions. They work outside the realms put 
forward by Chin and Benne. 
Secondly, the work continues to gravitate towards a normative and collaborative stance. 
Pluralist and conflict notions of change (Rex (198 1), Dahrendorf (1967), Marx (1976)) 
exist and the dynamic equilibrium that is suggested is not always attainable or even 
desirable. These frames of reference are omitted. 
Thirdly, an outcome of coercive models of legitimate power can be seen in bouts of 
organisational authoritarianism. The 'authoritarian popularism' of, now, Baroness 
Thatcher provided a rallying point for the UK in its period of economic despair (Hall, 
1985). Dunphy and Stace (1993) argue that in periods of transformational change the 
authoritarian leader may be as valuable and appropriate for the organisation to survive as 
the incrementalist models are for stable environments where fine tuning may be more 
congruent. 
Thus, Chin and Benne's (1985) framework for considering political coercion is limited to 
a normative and stable outcome. Other forms of political enactments take place and these 
need to be recognised. More explicitly we see the role of power and politics sustained 
from a number of positions. 
These may reflect the personal and perceptual roles of politics (Baddeley and James 
(1989), Ferris and Kacmar (1992)). Power can be ascribed to others or it maybe based 
more on behavioural relations and interactions through alliances and coalitions 
(Mangham, 1979). At the systems and rational end we have the political enactment 
through the organisational structure (Bacharach and Lawler (1980), Hinings et al (1974), 
Hickson et al (197 1), Mintzberg (1983), Zaleznik (1970), Pfeffer (1978 and 1992)) or 
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more subtley through the cultural management of meaning and symbols (Pfeffer (198 1), 
Morgan (1986), Bolman and Deal (1991)). 
The political role of the external change agent also features in considering organisational. 
change (Pettigrew (1975), Kakabadse (1991b), Kakabadse and Parker (1984)). Social 
differences and role status can get played out in organisational relations (Dahl (195 7), 
French and Raven (1959), Brown (1983), Jermier, Knights and Nord (1994)) and the 
nature of conflict and a plurality of interests is more likely to be the case, leading to a 
processual change agenda that recognises a political agenda and conflict as the norm 
(Pettigrew (1985), Dawson (1994)). The management of uncertainty and the degree of 
dependency on other systems is also included as a way of exploring power relations 
(Hickson et al (1971), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)). 
3. Further developments 
Later works reflect some of the same conflicts. The work of Dunphy and Stace (1993) 
and Wilson (1992) provide the final analysis here on the tensions that exist between the 
different schools of thought in the field of managing change. 
"A review of the diverse literature on organisational change shows that the field is at an 
early stage of theoretical development. There is no one, all embracing, widely-accepted 
theory of organisational change. " Dunphy (1996) p541. 
Moreover, literature on organisational. change has been seen as being characterised by an 
atheoretical pragmatism over-emphasising the political aspects of change, Hendry (1996). 
Wilson (1992) also notes that there are a variety of frameworks to understanding and 
theorising about the management of strategic change. He identifies two broad categories: 
the 'strategic choice' framework and the 'systemic conflict' framework. 
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The strategic choke and entrepreneurial framework 
Here the organisation is viewed as a social system and the focus of analysis is based upon 
the premise that managers have 'strategic choice'. It sees answers to problems as lying 
outside the organisation, and all managers have to do is to scan the environment and 
import the most relevant solution. Managers are 'doers' and all they have to do is follow 
the recipe and they can make things happen. It is a'can do'message. 
The 'strategic choice' framework underpins much that might be described in the HR and 
training field and has a lot in common with the 'leaders of transformation! literature which 
is available for managers and in the popular management literature. It includes theories 
in the field of. organisational development; planned incrementalism; entreprenueralism; 
leaming from 'best practice' (e. g. Japanisation); the use of external consultants and change 
agents and, the enterprise culture as normative practice (Wilson, 1992). These, again, 
broadly fall, within a normative or pragmatic paradigm and in some ways deny the reality 
of organisational life. 
Wilson notes: "In contrast, there appears to have been relative neglect of the systemic 
conflict framework in which the context, history and antecedents of change are 
fundamental pieces of the jigsaw of evidence and understanding. Such analyses are both 
rare in number and inherently more difficult to research, in contrast to studies of 
managerial entreprenueralism, management training and strategic choice. " p22. 
The systemic conflict framework 
Here the organisation is seen as a social system. However, this is characterised by 
conflict, politicking and inherent tensions. These tensions can operate at the individual, 
group or organisational level, but it is these tensions and contradictions that provide the 
impetus for change. 
"Energy to support the change comes from within the single organisational unit, the 
ultimate goal being to achieve a new balance between the current set of conflicts. " p2l. 
Some authors argue that conflict can be a healthy process that provides a competitive 
edge within an organisation (Pascale, 1990). 
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Examples of the systemic conflict framework include the following theories of 
organisation: contextualism; population ecology models; organisational. life cycles; 
general market and sector approaches; power in organisations and, political models of 
change and social action theories. At the extreme the two frameworks or paradigms are 
different in orientation, their theories in use and the nature of evidence. Yet they share 
the view that the environment is important. Contingency theories that relate the 
organisation with environment also straddle the two orientations. Wilson comments that 
the distinction between theory (which framework is chosen) and theorising (the manner in 
which the theory is used) allows us to make the differences clearer where the boundaries 
might be blurred. 
Working within a systemic conflict framework provides an opportunity to understand the 
processes of organisational change. It can meet the criteria of a processual approach. It 
is a more realistic account of organisational life and it aims to build understanding in an 
area of organisational analysis that has been neglected. 
Furthermore, in understanding a systemic approach, it sees social systems as a complex 
and dynamic whole. Thus, it takes a holistic perspective and is interested in the inter- 
relationships between sub-systems and events: nothing is taken in isolation. In addition, 
a systemic approach recognises the import of unconscious or parallel processes that take 
place within subsystems. Thus, an event in a team or between a pair of people may 
reflect a dynamic that is representative of, or enacted on behalf of, the organisation, 
Bateson (1972), McCaughan and Palmer (1994), Tosey (1993). 
"So systems thinking is a way of describing and explaining patterns of behaviour that we 
encounter in the life of organisations: the regularities of individual behaviour, which we 
describe as a role; the characteristic ways of doing things in organisations which we refer 
to as their culture; the repeating patterns of sterile conflict or mistakes or absenteeism or 
failure to delegate, we define as problems and try to solve. " McCaughan and Palmer 
(1994), p12. 
Taking a systemic framework is in keeping with the aims of this research compared with 
one of strategic choice. A 'systemic conflict' framework provides the paradigm for 
understanding the dynamics of organisations and the more specific phenomena of 'top 
team' dynamics and 'strategic organisational learning'. 
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A processual approach 
The processual. approach is included as it provides a new departure from the dominance 
of the normative approach or the structural class analysis of organisations. It builds on 
the notion of context and not just the environment. 
The term processual was coined by Pettigrew in his case study of ICL (1985). He 
commented that much of the management research was ahistorical, a contextual and 
apolitical. He sought to move away from the quick-fix, five or six point plan offered by 
the works of Peters and Waterman (1982), Pugh (1978), Nadler (1980) and critiqued by 
Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990). 
A processual approach requires a systemic analysis but it also argues that context, politics 
and history should be included as part of the analysis of organisational dynamics. Nadler 
and Tushm&s (1979), congruency model is processual. in its analysis. It looks at the 
environment, historical and contextual nature of organisations as inputs and the impact 
this has on strategy and task. The power and politics are discussed within the internal and 
transformatory boundaries of the system - particularly in the 'informal organisation' and 
its relationship to the other systems, boundaries of task, formal organisational 
arrangements and individual. (See figure 3.2 below). 
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Figure 3.2 
A Systemic and contextual model 
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I I'lius, it ineets the criteria oftaking a processual viewpoint. It does not meet the systemic 
conflict paradigm as it stands, beCaLISC insufficient attention is given to the riature of 
conflict, dissonance and latent differcriccs within organisations. Thus. the application of 
the suggested propositions above would be the basis lor developirig in integrated 
approach - examples are seen in the works ofMiller and Ricc (1967) and Nadler and 
Tushman (1979). This conceptual integration is discussed further in chapters 4,7 and 8. 
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In drawing on the benefits of a processual approach, there are parallels between Lewin's 
and Beckhard's three stages of transition model and Dawson's (1994) three timeframes: 
the conception of a need to change; the process of organisational transition and the 
operation of new work practices and procedures. However, he develops and builds on 
Pettigrew's work in considering three determinants for analysing change: the substance of 
change - the type and scale of organisational change; the politics of change - i. e. political 
activity in terms of negotiation, conflict and resistance that occurs at various levels of the 
organisation; the context of change refers to the past, present and future of the 
organisation and some of the internal and external operating environments that impact on 
current practice. 
The processual approach provides another point of reference that aims to incorporate the 
messy dynamics of change and crosses the divide between the 'rational' and 'subj ective' 
aspects of change. It also falls within the paradigm of a'systemic conflict' framework 
and therefore will be incorporated into this analysis. 
In addition, the advantage of this analytical approach to organisations is that it provides a 
framework for understanding the nature of organisational. life from a broader perspective. 
It goes beyond an instrumental or rationalist approach. It does not address political 
ideology explicitly but it can be incorporated. While it provides a framework for 
understanding organisational life, it seems to lack the deeper level of understanding that 
we seek and the application of that is discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
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4. The application of a psychoanalytic perspective 
The incorporation of a psychoanalytic perspective addresses a number of the issues 
we have discussed so far about the split between the different positions, including the 
'subjective' and'objective' approaches, to organisational. change. What the psychoanalytic 
perspective provides is the additional level of depth to our analysis of the subjective and 
is consistent with Lewin's original ideas and thinking on this aspect of change. In 
addition, it falls within the chosen analytical framework of 'systemic conflict', as the very 
nature of psychoanalysis is to examine and understand the internal and intra-psychic 
conflicts that people experience as yet another system. Within this framework there are a 
number of traditions of and contributions to psychoanalysis that provide an opportunity to 
understand the possible reasons behind the conflicts at the small unit of analysis, the 
individual. These intra-psychic conflicts can then also be understood in relationship to 
pairs, groups and organisations as systems as well. These are discussed in more detail in 
chapters 6 and 7. 
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What does psychoanalysis add to our understanding of managing change? 
A psychoanalytic perspective can be used as a tool to enhance our understanding of 
organisational dynamics within social systems. It has a number of advantages that fulfil 
the aims of this research. 
These include the following: 
It provides a deeper analysis of social systems and cover areas that are usually 
missing or only treated in a cursory way 
It provides an analysis at the smallest unit of analysis in the organisation and that is 
the individual, who form groups and make up the organisation. 
A psychoanalytical perspective can be used as a tool of organisational analysis as its 
principles can be applied to role holders in organisations, groups and large social 
systems within the organisation 
Such a perspective is consistent and fits with a'systemic conflict' paradigm and a 
processual approach in that history, context and in the politics of internal conflict 
within social systems as groups and individual all fall within its remit of application 
It can be integrated with other systemic approaches to understanding organisations, 
and there are many authors who have contributed to this developing area of 
knowledge - examples include: Miller & Rice, (1967), Miller, (1993), Hirschhorn, 
(1988), Czander, (1993). (See chapter 7 for further examples). 
Thus a psychoanalytical perspective will provide an additional lens to increase our 
understanding of the complexity of organisations. 
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3. Summary and conclusion 
The dynamics of organisations are a complex interplay of external and internal factors. A 
review of the literature on change has provided a series of lens that help focus the 
analytical approach and identify the key relationship between change and the dynamics of 
organisations. 
The work of Kurt Lewin has underpinned much of our understanding of organisational 
change (and development) as currently taught and practiced in western management 
education (Dawson, 1994). Lewids personal and theoretical insights put forward the 
view that both 'objective' and 'subjective' parts of the dynamics of change should be 
considered in managing the process. However, while Lewin (I 947a and b) acknowledged 
the importance of the deeper and unconscious dynamics of change, and even considered 
the works of Freud explicitly, Lewin (1952). These elements are essentially excluded 
from his wider analysis of change. This leaves some ambiguity and unresolved 
differences between the approaches and suggests a multidisciplinary approach to enhance 
understanding (see Neumann, 1997) 
The difference of perspectives is continued in other contributors' frames of reference. 
We see this in the accounts above. Yet from the literature we see at least three, rather 
than two (objective vs. subjective), frames of reference constantly emerging. These are 
rational, normative, and political models of change. On closer inspection they still 
gravitate towards a normative bias. The underpinning nature of these falls within what 
Wilson (1992) calls the 'strategic choice framework'. The historical, political and 
conflictual nature of organisational life and the emotional, intra-personal dilemmas are 
missing in such analyses. Thus, WilsoWs other framework, the 'systemic conflict 
framework' Provides a basis for analysis that is more relevant to the aims of this research. 
It provides a theoretical basis to explore and enhance our understanding of the dynamics 
of change and its impact on learning and further helps to build theoretical postulates. 
The chosen nest of perspectives within this thesis does not aim to be prescriptive nor over 
- emphasis the rational approach. However, it multi-disciplinary approach seeks to work 
beyond the current, dominant paradigms of organisational development. It is able to 
address social and technical systems while taking politics and conflict as given. The 
human relations side of the system as explained in deeper and psychological models of 
organisation can also be incorporated as the added contribution to this analytical 
framework. 
Thus, in understanding organisations the implications are that any theory should be able 
to work within a'systernic conflict framework' where a plurality of interests exist and 
where the conflict and uncertainty are considered as normal. Secondly, our analysis of 
organisations should also be within a processual perspective where the history, context 
and political dimensions of organisational enactments are included. 
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Finally, in developing theory about organisations, this thesis should also take account of 
the deeper, psychological and emotional side of people in organisations. 
The conclusion is that each of these approaches of understanding organisations is 
inadequate on their own. They can impact on each other thus on their own provide a 
partial and inaccurate analysis. However, together they share an in-depth, process- 
orientation which is fundamentally concerned with understanding the nature and 
dynamics of conflict. Thus a greater understanding of these and their relationships with 
one another is critical to developing an integrated approach. These areas form the basis 
of the next chapter in reviewing the literature on organisational. theory, taking a systemic 
approach as common point of departure. 
Table 3.1: 
A Summary of the Analytical perspectives 
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Chapter 4- Theories of organisation 
1. Introduction 
In chapter 3, the common framework for understanding organisations in the context of 
change was a'systemic' one. As Wilson (1992) suggests, it is important to 
differentiate theory from theorising, but we have to understand the theory to do the 
theorising. 
This chapter gives an account of systems theory and suggests why it might provide a 
theoretical basis for understanding organisations. The difficulties and problems of its 
framework are explored and some additional elements are put forward so that we can 
begin to develop theory and theorise, within the context of the systemic conflict 
framework. 
There are five main sections: 
1. The position of systems theory in relationship to other views of organisational 
theory and why it provides a valuable framework for this work 
2. An account of the history and theoretical axioms of system theory 
3. A description of the application of systems theory to organisations and the 
development of contingency theory 
4. A critique of systemic theories as described 
5. Theorising and developing a systemic theory of organisations within the 'systemic 
conflict frameworle 
In undertaking a review of organisational theory, we shall limit the review to 
organisational theory that has been developed since the industrialisation and 
institutionalisation processes of western economic development at the turn of the 
century. Secondly, by the nature of the dominant contributors and ideology, these 
theories are based on western principles and notions of reality. These are by no means 
lacking in their richness and diversity. However, the cultural bias of this work needs 
to be acknowledged and accepted. 
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2. An overview of the main schools of organisational theory 
In looking at organisational theory it is useful to start with a shared meaning of what 
is being addressed. 
"Organisational theory is a set of inter-related constructs (concepts), definitions and 
propositions that present a systematic view of individuals, groups, and subgroups 
interacting in some relatively patterned sequences of activity, the intent of which is 
goal oriented. " Tosi (1984), pl3. 
Hatch (1997) takes a broader view, "A theory is an explanation, that is, it is an 
attempt to explain a segment of the experience of the world. The particular thing that 
a theory explains is called the phenomenon of interest. In organisation theory the 
primary phenomenon of interest is the organisation, however, organisations can be 
defined in many different ways, for instance, as a social structure, a technology, a 
culture, a physical structure, or as a part of the environment. Organisations can also 
be studied in terms of the central issues and recurring themes or organising including 
control, conflict, decision-making, power and politics, and change. " P. 9. 
Thus, there are a number of perspectives that can be taken to look at organisational 
theory. Broadly speaking these approaches fall into two categories; a historical look 
at the development of organisational theory and, a thematic approach to understanding 
organisations. 
The thematic approach 
This approach aims to cluster aspects of organisational life into a common heading. 
In such cases, organisations are being conceptualised or theorised within a particular 
set of characteristics or dominant phenomena of interests. For example, Bolman and 
Deal (199 1) look at organisations from four perspectives: a structural frame; a human 
resource frame; a political frame and, a symbolic frame. These show the multiplicity 
and complexity of organisations and, depending upon which analytical frame used, it 
will inform ideas about cause and effect, interventions and realities of organisational 
life. Vaill (1989) also sees organisations in a range of metaphors from the militaristic 
axioms, which he suggests underpins most organisational theory to a more liberating 
one of seeing within the context of a performance art. 
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Gareth Morgan (1986) has eight images of organisations and these are described in 
metaphors: organisations as machines; organisations as organisms; organisations as 
brains; organisations as constructs of social reality and culture; organisations as 
political systems; organisations as reflections of our inner psyche; organisations as 
flux and transformation and, organisations as instruments of domination. 
He concludes, "Our discussion brings us to a very important point: that there is a close 
relationship between the way we think and the way we act and the many 
organisational problems are embedded in our thinking. 
"One of the major strengths of the different metaphors explored in this book is that 
they open numerous avenues for the way we attempt to organise in practice. " (Morgan 
(1986), p335. ) 
The strength of the metaphor is that it provides an easy association between 
organisations and everyday experience; it makes concrete the abstract and provides 
simplicity to complexity. 
However, it can also be misleading. Hatch (1997) reminds us that metaphors form a 
partial analysis and that they tend to focus on the similarities rather than the 
differences inherent in the phenomenon of interest and the metaphor itself. 
"For instance, the machine metaphor depends upon the similarities between machines 
and organisations and under-emphasizes their differences. Many aspects of 
organisations are not machine-like, such as organisational commitment or culture. 
Over extension of the machine metaphor has led some theorists to talk about how to 
engineer commitment or culture, a use of metaphor that produces a simplistic and 
possibly misleading understanding of what management entails. " Hatch(1997), 
Chapter 2, p30. 
Thus, in using the thematic or metaphoric approach a degree of caution is advised. 
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The historical approach 
This schema take the historical development of organisational theory, starting with 
what is usually called the 'classical' school of management, followed by the Human 
Relations or Modernist view, and ending with systems theory/contingency theory 
(Tyson and Jackson (1992), Hodge and Anthony (1984), Tosi (1984), Burrell and 
Morgan (1979), Warner (1994)). 
Within each of these we see the classical theories viewing organisations as rule bound, 
efficient and hierarchical bureaucracies (Weber (1947), Fayol (1949), Crozier (1964)). 
These rational and instrumental models while providing early analytical constructs for 
understanding organisations, became limited and unhelpful and thus the focus shifted 
to the human side of the enterprise. 
"By the 1930's and 1940's the prevailing ideas of scientific 'management' were 
discredited by many in the West, where there was a growing awareness of the non- 
ration factors which govem relationships stemming from the work of Freud and 
Pareto. " Tyson and Jackson (1992), p137. 
The studies by Roethlisberger and Dickson (193 9) and the raft of 'experiments' by 
Elton Mayo started an interest in the human side of work. This suggested that people 
cannot be treated as machines and that they have their own incentives, motives and 
feelings and these need to be taken into account (Cyert and March (195 8), March and 
Simon (195 8), Katz and Kahn (1978), Likert (196 1), McGregor (1960)). 
An early critic described classical theories of organisation as inadequate on a number 
of grounds: 
"(1) The motivational assumptions underlying the theories are incomplete and 
consequently inaccurate. (2) There is little appreciation of the role of intra- 
organisation conflict of interests in defining limits of organisational behaviour. (3) 
The constraints placed on human beings by his limitations as a complex information- 
processing system are given little consideration. (4) Little attention is given to the 
role cognition in task identification and classification as well as in decision. (5) The 
phenomenon of program elaboration receives little emphasis. " March and Simon 
(1958) p33. 
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Thus, we see the recurring theme of rationality ignoring the human and subjective 
experience of organisations. While much of the methodology and research process of 
the much quoted "Hawthome-effect" studies have been discredited, they brought 
squarely to the fore the importance of the social and emotional side of the work place. 
The'Quality of Work Life'movement also took hold as the need to meet and 
understand the motivations and relationships of workers became the focus of many 
works in organisational theory (Likert (1961), McGregor (1960), see too Burrell and 
Morgan (1979)). 
Finally, system models of organisation were offered as a way of looking at the inter- 
relationships that existed within the organisation and in relationship to its 
environment. The approach was founded in biological models of systems and then 
applied to organisations as 'open systems'. The theory was then developed and it 
suggested that open system functionality was 'contingent' upon other external factors. 
These included the environment, the technology and the social systems. These 
derivatives of open systems theory were collectively known as 'contingency theory'. 
This approach suggested that there was no one best way to achieve the task but a 
number of ways to get to the same point. This acknowledged the discretionary and 
informal parts of systems and went beyond the simple identification of system 
relations. This approach was not without its critics and both theory and criticisms will 
be discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter. It is presented here as a 
way of positioning it in relationship to the historical development of organisational. 
theory. 
Two new developments have been added to organisational theory and these are 
developed in the framework presented by Hatch (1997). In her analytical framework 
the 'Classical' and 'Modernist' perspectives follow the discussion so far with 
'Modernists' incorporating both the human relations movement and systems theory. 
Two further frameworks are offered: 'symbolic-interpretative' and 'post-modemisf 
perspectives. 
The symbolic and interpretative approach comes from a belief that rational and linear 
assumptions about organisations and human being are false and that the way that 
meaning is found is in the rituals, initiation rites, symbols, myths and stories of the 
organisational culture. 
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The term comes from Mead's works (see Mead, 1956) where he drew a distinction 
between'non-symbolic' and 'symbolic'. 
"In non-symbolic interactions human beings respond directly to one another's gestures 
or action; in symbolic interaction they interpret each others gestures and act on the 
basis of the meaning yielded by the interpretation. " Blumer (1966) p537. 
This orientation comes from several sources: organisation theory and work on culture; 
the discipline of sociology and, psychoanalysis and ego-depth psychology. 
The focus and interest in culture is seen in the fields of strategy (Johnson (1987), 
Peters and Waterman (1982, Deal and Kennedy (1982)), organisational change 
(Hampden-Tumer, 1990), leadership (Schein, 1983 and 1985), power (Pfeffer, 1981) 
and as a lens for examining the dynamics of organisational life (Hatch (1993), 
Pettigrew (19 8 6)). 
Schein (1985) defines culture as: "The deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs 
that are shared by members of an organisation, that operate unconsciously, and that 
define in a basic'taken for granted' fashion an organisation's view of itself and its 
environment. These assumptions and beliefs are learned responses to a group's 
problem of survival in its external environment and its problems of internal 
integration. That come to be taken for granted because they solve those problems 
repeatedly and reliably. " p6/7 
Schein acknowledges that organisations are themselves "open systems in constant 
interaction with their many environments. " 
The methodological and conceptual roots of the work on the symbolic nature of 
culture are founded upon the work of anthropologists such as Geertz (1973 and 1983) 
and the 'Chicago school' of sociology that applied anthropological techniques back 
home in their own cultures under the banner of field work (see Kirk and Miller, 1986). 
Sociologists Berger and Luckmann (1966) were also influential in putting forward the 
view that reality was socially constructed. They argued that social order was a 
product of interpersonal negotiation and implicitly shared meaning based on shared 
experiences of patterns of actions and interpretations. 
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"Culture denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, 
a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which 
men (and women) communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge and 
attitudes towards life. " Geertz (1973) p89. 
The development of this approach in organisational analysis is also influenced by 
work such as Goffman (195 9 and 196 1) who examined both personal and institutional 
enactments. 
Karl Weick (1979) takes the debate further in introducing 'enactment theory', which 
focuses on the'subjective origin of organisational realities'. Weick uses the term: 
it ... enactment to emphasise that managers construct, rearrange, single out, and 
demolish many 'objective' features of their surroundings. When people act they un- 
randomize variables, insert vestiges of orderliness, and literally create their own 
constraints. " p164. 
The nature of these symbolic registers can also be found in psychoanalysis through 
the work of Freud generally, Jung (1968), Long (1992), and Foulkes and Anthony 
(1984). However, the application of psychoanalysis to field work is still under- 
developed (see Hunt (1989), Menzies (1960), Long (1992) and Schein (I 987b and 
1991)). This point is covered further in chapter 9 (and to a lesser extent in chapter 10) 
in considering the research approach. 
The importance of this observation is that the development of such theory takes a 
more subjectivist position where meaning and understanding of the social system are 
central. This concurs with the analytical approach taken thus far in this thesis. 
Finally, Hatch (1997) discusses the contribution of post-modemism. This is a recent 
and developing area in organisation theory. Its roots are in post-modem architecture, 
art and literature. 
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Postmodernism argues that the assumptions and axioms of knowledge as a unified 
body of thought are to be challenged and that the source and validity of knowledge is 
multiple and fragmented. This means that diversity and difference should be valued 
and that all sections of the 'community' should be given a voice, as they too hold a 
piece of the truth. Knowledge is not all found in the dominant ideologues, power 
groups or relationships. In addition, in a world of decentralisation, informal and 
flexible organisations, a post-modernist perspective may have something to contribute 
to that debate. Further discussion in this field can be found in Clegg (1990), Cooper 
and Gibson (198 8), Hatch (1997), Parker (1992), Hassard and Parker (1993) and 
Kilduff (1993). 
In summarising, the 'classical', 'modem', 'symbolic-interpretative' and 'post-modern' 
categorisations provide a comprehensive view of organisational theory. The Modem 
and the symbolic interpretative work provide a way to integrate and begin to theorise 
about the relationship between the 'hard' and 'soft' aspects of change. At the same 
time, it holds on to the broader conceptual frameworks that this thesis has ascribed to 
in a systemic conflict framework and a processual view that takes into account the 
context, history and politics. The particular slant that will be developed in what 
follows is the symbolic nature of meaning as understood by psychoanalytic theory and 
how these different parts of theory contribute to our understanding. 
To begin we shall look at the systems theory in more detail. 
3. Systems theory 
A systemic perspective provides the overall framework for understanding 
organisational, learning and change as 'learning' through feedback is inherent in 
systems thinking. How systems theory relates to that approach is the focus of this 
section. It starts by outlining the origins and development of systems theory. 
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The early origins of systems theory were to be found in the work of Von Bertalanffy 
(1968). He drew upon his work in the field of the natural sciences to observe the 
systemic nature of living organisms and noted that their existence and survival were 
dependent upon the broader systems of which they were a part. They took in food 
from the system, processed it internally and exported matter, which was in turn used 
by the system. This process operated for systems within systems and Von BertalanfFy 
put forward the notion that most phenomena could be explained within this 
framework, which was later to be called General Systems Theory (GST). He further 
resolved the contradiction of the physical laws of thermo-dynamics which suggested 
that systems were self-depleting. The latter case, Von Bertalanffy argued, was to be 
found in'closed systems', whereas those that developed and drew from their 
envirom-nent were denoted as'open systems'. GST was concerned with open systems. 
It is the generality and relative simplicity of GST that makes it both appealing and a 
commonly used basis for understanding relationships and phenomena of interests. 
However, generality can also be misleading, inaccurate and open to different 
interpretations, thus, several contributors aimed to qualify and elaborate upon the 
GST. 
Among the first of these was the economist Kenneth Boulding (1956) who argued that 
there were several levels of systems that increased in complexity from the simple 
amoebae to the more complex structures of the double helix of DNA. He identified 
nine levels. This hierarchy of systems is useful in understanding and applying such an 
analysis to organisations, its subsystems or context, where the system is an individual, 
a group, a product of inter group relations, the organisation, the organisation in its 
industrial environment and the broader socio-political and economic environment. 
How the boundaries are drawn and managed determine the next system. The 
hierarchy of levels and relationships between systems of inquiry, their subsystems and 
context is followed in this thesis. 
Early theorists developed some common agreements about the nature of systems and 
these almost became codified as a set of system rules (Boulding (195 6), Katz and 
Kahn (1978), Kast and Rosenzweig (1973)). They included: 
* Systems are holistic 
* They are a series of inter-related objects, parts or events that each will have an 
impact on each other 
* Systems are goal seeking, self-regulating entities that seek equilibrium via 
feedback, adjustment and control 
* The notion of homeostasis and stable equilibrium was seen as important 
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* They meet the notion of a'minimum critical specification', which challenges the 
bureaucratic imperative of the 'Classical' school and the need to have everything 
defined. Instead, there is a suggestion that the system needs a'minimum enabling 
structure' to help it to self-organise and learn 
* There are no blueprints or a single master plan in systems theory as there are many 
paths to the same end - the principle of 'equifinality' 
* There is the 'law of requisite variety' which suggests that there must be enough 
variety in a system to absorb the variety in the environment if it is to be able to 
address external demands. We see this notion particularly in later contingency 
theories that examine the relationship between the environment and system's 
structures. The implication being: where there are insufficient options of internal 
configurations, the system will become congested or breakdown. This impacts 
negatively on organisational learning. 
Thus, GST sees organisations as learning systems that have various levels of 
complexity and capability to learn, depending upon the environment (and later, other 
contingencies). 
These cannons of system theory are still very much in evidence (Morgan, 1986). 
However, there are further developments which move away from the notion of system 
stability to the notion of 'autopoiesis'. Here it is suggested that the system is not only 
continuously leaming, but it is also self-designing and has a tendency to become more 
complex as it tries to absorb more variety from the environment (Maturana and 
Varela, 1980). Taken ftirther the system may not be stable and may have features of 
chaos (randomised process) (Bahlmann (1990), Goldstein (198 8), Stacey (1993)). 
However, such developments may have 'convergent' outcomes in which case the 
outcome is unknown but the destination is stable, however temporary. The other 
possibility is that the outcomes are unknown and the destination unattainable because 
of divergent and unstable processes. These features have implications for leaming 
and the system's ability to learn from its environment and the limits to which the 
system can be exposed before it is unable to cope or learn in an untenable systemic 
environment. The issue of leaming as a system is prime to this thesis and will be 
explored in much more detail in Chapter 5. However, it is strongly suggested that 
organisations in excessively turbulent environments will find it difficult to learn. 
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These assumptions and principles of system theory provide the basis of our 
understanding of how organisations work. Yet further developments to theory were to 
follow and these were in the form of 'contingency theory'. While keeping a systemetic 
approach as the first building block of a model of organisation, it does not stop there. 
Later contingency theories basically rejected the implied packaging of systems theory 
and the simple and predictable nature of systems. They aimed to reflect the diversity 
and complexity of organisations. 
Contingency theory has been described in the following way, "In general, there is a 
rejection of universal principles appropriate to all situations. There is no 'one best 
way'to organise or to manage. Decentralisation is not necessarily better than 
centralisation; bureaucracy is not all bad; explicit objectives are not always good; a 
democratic-participative leadership style may not suit certain situations and, tight 
control may be appropriate at times. In short'it all depends'on a number of 
interrelated external and internal variables. " Kast and Rosenzweig (1974) p507. 
The'dependent' factors varied from theorist to theorist. There seem to be five factors 
of greatest interest: the environment; task and boundaries; structure; technology and 
the psycho-social dimensions. 
The environment 
Organisations operate as open systems and the impact of the environment is suggested 
to be significant. Two influential studies contributed to this view. 
The work of Bums and Stalker (196 1) examined the relationship between the 
environment, structure and innovation. They found that organisations operating in a 
stable environment took on traditional, 'mechanistic' structures. These tended to be 
bureaucratic in their operating procedures and role relationship and tended to have 
relatively routine tasks. These were not the centres of innovation. In contrast, 
organisations that were innovative were more flexible, responsive and more likely to 
be working in a dynamic and changing environment. In such cases the structure that 
served their organisational. needs was 'organic' - loosely defined, open and adaptable. 
Thus, structure was contingent upon the environment. 
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Similarly the study by Lawrence and Lorsch (1976) looked at the performance of 
organisations' different environments: in steady state; random placid and turbulent 
environments. They concluded that in rapidly changing environments, in their study 
the plastics' industry, where internal integration and co-ordination were complex 
(complex structures), then organisations had better bottom-line performance. In low 
technology industries, making metal containers, routine structures and stable 
environment appeared to generate low returns. Again, the study aimed to show the 
importance and contingent nature of the environment. (See too Emery and Trist, 
1965. ) Later contingency theorists, such as Burke and Litwin (1992), Nadler and 
Tushman (1979), Kast and Rosenzweig (1973), would agree that the most significant 
variable in terms of influence on the system, is the environment and in their 
estimation it is given the greatest weight. Tbus, the implication is that if difficult 
environments are not well managed then the impact on internal systems, and therefore 
learning, will be negative. 
Task and boundaries 
Most contingency theorists agree the importance of the environment. The next area 
that shares some common ascent is the nature of the task and boundaries. In the 
context of open systems, each system relating to other systems, then the contingent 
variable that identifies one system from another is the nature of the system's task and 
the boundaries that are drawn around the task and the system itself. Miller and Rice 
(1967) probably articulate the importance of the task most explicitly. 
"... The optimum form of organisation is that which best fits the requirements of 
primary task performance. " p33. 
Tbe'primary task' may be defined as that which the system is created to perform (Rice 
(1958) p32-3). 
Miller and Rice (1967) argue that in open systems, the'primary task'provides the 
main input, transformation and export relationship: the method or strategy that the 
system takes to fulfil its aims. 
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This conceptualisation of the system as task and boundaries within its environment is 
represented in the diagram shown below 
Figure 4.1 
An Open System: A Simple Model 
Input Output 
The management of systems' boundary with the environment, or other systems at 
lower levels, provides a role for managers at the strategic interface between the 
organisation and its environment. There is a balance between which has the greatest 
sway. There are those that suggest the internal dynarnics of the people have more 
sway (Kets De Vries (1980), Kets De Vries and Miller (1984 and 1986), Kets De 
Vries, Miller and Noel (1993) and Zaleznik and Kets De Vries (19 84)). 
Others would argue that it is the environment that has the greatest impact, and that 
informs the strategy and the structure of the organisation (Miles and Snow (1978), 
Miller (1990), Pfeffer and Salancik(1978)). The key issue here is that the strategic 
task provides the focus for the system and that is how the boundaries are managed 
through a complex interplay of internal and external factors. However, the conclusion 
can be drawn that poor management of task and boundaries can undermine strategic 
organisational learning because it creates distortions in the system. 
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Technology 
Structure continued to be part of the subtext in contingency theory: its relationship 
with the environment; its relationship to strategy and then, its relationship with 
technology. Joan Woodward's (1961) study of 100 manufacturing companies in the 
south of England aimed to identify the relationship between performance and 
structure as defined in terms of spans of control, hierarchy, the degree of 
centralisation and management style (Child, 1984). In collecting her data she found 
no obvious relationships. A further analysis of the data by complexity of technology 
identified the relationship between structure, as embodied in technology and 
performance. There were three broad 'types' of technology: simple or small batch 
production; large batch or mass production and, continuous production. 
Woodward found that mass production with mechanistic organisational forms and 
small batch, or continuous processes, with organic configurations had better 
performance over other combinations. While useful in understanding the impact of 
technology, the actual study was less generalisable to larger and more complex 
systems than the ones in the original studies that tended to be small to medium-sized 
firms. Technology was also seen as a key variable in looking at task interdependence 
and the complexity and analysability of work processes (Perrow, 1967). 
Psycho-social elements 
People also form part of the organisational system and while the organisation has a 
primary task, it also provides a container for the formation of human relations. 
"A task system is a system of activities plus the human and physical resources 
required to perform the activities. " Miller and Rice (1967) p6. They acknowledge, as 
do others (Kast and Rosenzweig (1973 and 1974), Katz and Kahn (1978), Nadler and 
Tushman (1979)), the importance of the human side of organisation and they describe 
this as the 'sentience' of the work group. The sentience is the ties and emotional 
relations that exist within a system, be it a small team or an organisation. The impact 
or contingent nature of the emotional side within a system framework is identified in 
relationship to technology, the informal side of systems and the psychodynamics of 
these relationships in organisation systems and subsystems. 
The work of Trist and Barnforth (195 1) shows the psychological and social impact on 
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technology. Their study on British Coal was an action research project on the 
introduction of new coal mining methods from small, multi-skilled teams and 
affiliates, to a technically advanced method where new roles, specialisation, working 
patterns, and temporal relations were all changed to improve productivity. Despite 
the investment in new technology and coal mining methods, productivity surprisingly 
fell. On closer inspection the researchers realised that deep and lasting social relations 
had been broken in the new regime and that this affected performance. The system 
was changed to account for both the social and the technical side of the organisation 
and this approach was referred to as the Socio-Technical System approach (STS) 
(Emery and Trist (1965), Kast and Rosenzweig (1973 and 1974)). A similar project 
examining the relationships between social and technical relations was also carried 
out in the cotton-mill re-organisations in the Ahmedabad experiment in India (Rice, 
1958). 
A further development of the psycho-social side of organisations is the role of 
politics. Hickson et al (1971) and Hinings et al (1974) do consider political processes 
from a systems view, be it implicitly based upon structural relationships. Nadler and 
Tushman (1979) talk about the informal side of organisational life where informal 
leadership and power bases are explicitly discussed. However, the analysis is not 
deepened beyond the notion of 'congruency' but politics in change is overtly 
accounted for in that framework (see Nadler, 1980). 
Finally, the role of the unconscious and psychodynamic aspects of the organisation is 
discussed most fully in Miller and Rice (1967). Others who follow that tradition 
include Hirschhorn (198 8), Obholzer and Roberts (1994), Diamond (1994), Ket De 
Vries et al (1991) and De Board (1978). 
Miller and Rice (1967) suggest that: "The tendency for most human beings to 'split' 
the good from the bad in themselves and to project their resultant feelings onto others 
is one of the major barriers to understanding and control of the relationships between 
human resources and the task which they contribute. " p16. 
"The resulting pattern is one of co-operation and conflict between members as 
individuals and between them and the group culture they produce. " p18. 
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In other words, intra-psychic and inner conflicts in the minds of the individual are not 
kept within the boundaries of the individual and these are unconsciously projected 
onto other members in the group, managers, the organisational structure and roles. 
Thus, the manager may be seen as a mother or father figure in the unconscious. Or, 
the organisation becomes a place to work out past conflicts that were in one's family 
(Czander (1993), Obholzer and Roberts (1994)). The key factor here is that there are 
several human dynamics that are unconscious, outside normal awareness, unspoken 
and misunderstood. In increasing our understanding, this area may provide some 
further insights within the context of this thesis and the role of the unconscious in 
understanding the deeper psychological aspects of change - that which is often 
ignored or misunderstood. A deeper analysis of the psychoanalytical perspective of 
organisations follows a short discussion on the limitations of systems theory. Thus, it 
can be concluded that where psycho-social dynamics are discordant, then this will 
reduce the attainment of task and the ability of the system to learn. 
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4. Difficulties in system theories 
Systems theory is a robust framework for analysis but it has some weaknesses. There 
is an assumption of equilibrium and harmony that is taken for granted in many 
discussions of systems theory. Conflict is seen'as absent, equilibrium and 
homeostasis as the norm and there is an assumption of a single primary task. Thus, it 
is oversimplified. 
Woodward (1980), Hodge and Anthony (1984) and Zey-Ferrell and Atkin (198 1) 
argue that the analysis is static and instrumental in its managerial and centralist view 
of organisational decision making. They also argue that its application may be 
difficult to operationalise and concepts have been said to be too abstract. 
Miller (1976) acknowledges that sociologists charge the psychoanalytic perspective as 
not seeing the wider context and putting every thing down to intra-psychic anxiety. 
The primary task may not be easily identified or stated as a single task. However, it is 
unlikely to be a large number. The significance of the primary task is that it helps 
make decisions about how to allocate resources among different and competing 
demands on the system. Another way of looking at it is that a system with a vague, 
poorly specified, ambiguous task or having multiple 'tasks' may be a reflection of 
underlying and unresolved conflicts within the system. Thus the notion of the 
primary task does not preclude conflict, complexity, multiple agendas and the need 
for these processes to be resolved. 
Miller and Rice (1967) add: "The primary task is essentially a heuristic concept, 
which allows us to explore the ordering of multiple activities (and of constituent 
systems of activities where these exist). It makes it possible to construct and compare 
different organisation models of an enterprise based on different definitions of its 
primary task; and to compare the organisations of different enterprises with the same 
or different primary tasks. The definition of primary task determines the dominant 
import-conversion-export system... " p25. 
Thus, it is a starting point for organisational analysis. It is not a property of an 
organisation but an exploratory tool between consultant and client (Miller (1993) 
p18). 
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The 'concept' of the primary task is an analytical tool. Itcanalsobeunderstoodasa 
product of different interests at stake, social bargaining or psycho-social dynamics 
(Miller, 1993). 
The latter point is further elaborated by the criticism that the term 'primary task' was 
sometimes used as a'should' statement, or an'is' statement without clarity of 
definition. Lawrence and Robinson (1975) help clarify the point in making the 
following distinction. 
They identify three 'types' of task which are often confused: 
1. The normative primary task, which is the task that people in an organisation ought 
to pursue (usually according to the definition of a super-ordinate authority); 
2. The existential primary task is that which they believe they are carrying out; 
3. The phenomenal primary task is that which is hypothesised, they are engaged in 
and of which they may not be consciously aware. 
The analytical issue about which task the system is addressing is helpful in examining 
'espoused' or intended actions in the organisation (the normative task) and how these 
compare with the organisations' actual behaviour (existential primary task). Where 
these are incongruent there is an opportunity for the organisation to learn. The 
differences may be explained in examining the phenomenal task as the organisation 
takes up the challenge of change. It is this distinction of system task and the role of 
the psycho-social relationships that is put forward in this thesis as an approach to 
further deepening our understanding of organisational dynamics of change. A fuller 
discussion of these themes in relation to leaming within the system of the organisation 
is in chapters 5 and 7. 
For this thesis the usefulness of systems theory has to be judged for theoretical 
development on three main criteria. Can it be understood within a'systemic conflict 
framework'? Does it reflect a processual perspective? Can we develop a deeper 
psychological analysis of the interactions, dynamics, relationships and outcomes? 
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5. A conflict systemic paradigm 
Miller and Rice (1967) understand and recognise that conflict is inherent. However, it 
is a second order consideration and it is implicit that differences in interests are barely 
recognised and'power is largely ignored'. Social systems theory still falls within a 
dominant framework of homeostasis and a'unitary' position. 
"The unitary view of organisations regards conflict within organisations as a rare and 
transient phenomena which, when present, can easily be eradicated or controlled 
through appropriate managerial action. Because interests are regarded as being 
characterised by a harmonious order, conflict within organisations is regarded as an 
alien, obtrusive and unwelcome force and one which is largely the creation of deviants 
or troublemakers. From a pluralist perspective, on the other hand, conflict within 
organisations is viewed as an inevitable and ineradicable feature of everyday life. " 
Burrell and Morgan, p203. 
The two views are surnmarised in Table 4.1 below 
Table 4.1 
Models of Conflict 
The Unitary and Pluralist Views of Interest, Conflict and Power 
The Unitary View 
Interests 
Conflict 
Power 
Places emphasis upon the achievement 
of common objectives. The organisation 
is viewed as being united under the 
umbrella of common goals, and striving 
towards their achievement in the manner 
of a well integrated team 
Regards conflict as a rare and transient 
phenomenon which can be removed 
through appropriate managerial action. 
Where it does arise it is usually attributed 
to the activities of deviants and 
trouble-shooters 
Largely ignores the role of power in 
organisational life. Concepts such as 
authority, leadership and control tend 
to be preferred means of describing the 
managerial prerogative of guiding the 
organisation towards the achievement 
of common interests. 
Source: Burrell& Morgan, 1979 
The Pluralist View 
Places emphasis upon the diversity 
of individual and group interests. 
The organisation is regarded as a 
loose coalition which has but a 
remote interest in the formal 
goals of the organisation 
Regards conflict as an inherent 
and ineradicable characteristic of 
organisational affairs and stresses 
its potentially positive or functional 
aspects 
Regards power as a variable crucial to 
the activities of an organisation. Power 
is the medium through which conflicts 
of interest are alleviated and resolved. 
The organisation is viewed as a 
plurality of power holders drawing 
their power from a plurality of sources 
This thesis takes conflict as a central axiom for understanding systemic dynamics. 
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Lewin (1948) saw conflict as a phenomenon to be understood within social systems 
and incorporated it into his thinking. Conflict can arise from a difference in ideology, 
or a difference in interests and these arc enacted in social differences or power 
relationships. Thus, 'conflict' is also about politics in this thesis (Bums (1961), 
Zalemik (1970)). In dominant, classical and some modemist theories of organisation 
and rational models of organisational change, we see conflict as something to be 
avoided. Harmony and equilibrium are the norm and conflict is seen as dysfunctional 
(see Mintzberg, 1983). There are those who take the position that conflict is normal 
and it reflects a plurality of interests that are worked out through social bargaining and 
negotiation (Crozier, 1964). While Pascale (1990) and Brown (1983) would argue 
that conflict is functional and necessary to generate innovation. The issue is that if 
there is not enough conflict then the organisation can become moribund; if there is too 
much then it can be pulled apart. The level of conflict needs to be optimum and this 
can be due to differences in position power, social status and interest group (Brown, 
1983). 
Therefore, in thinking about systems theory within a systemic conflict framework, it 
is necessary to reconsider some of the assumptions and axioms. Within such a 
framework, organisations maybe described as complex, social systems and some 
further assumptions maybe posited. 
There are four: 
I. The system is inherently in conflict as it attempts to seek 'dynamic equilibrium' 
rather than some goal seeking, homeostatic point. The nature of conflict 
recognises the differences between the formal and informal organisation; their 
relationship to the task and, differences between individual, group and 
organisational task, needs and motives. 
2. The notion of 'whole system congruence' may not be attainable and second-best 
solutions provide'good enough' system functionality for the greater complexity of 
operating within a changing environment. The implication of this is that systems 
will tend to be operating at a sub-optimal level and the idea that the whole system 
can learn is rejected. Instead partial learning in systemic terms will be possible and 
it is the level and significance of the sub-system that may determine the importance 
of the leaming for the whole system. 
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3. The psycho-social dimension may have greater weight than has hitherto been 
acknowledged and much of the theories of change argue the importance of such 
elements. This proposition does not reduce the importance of the impact of the 
environment. However, it suggests, of all the factors of influence within the 
internal boundaries of the system, this one continually resurfaces and insufficient 
treatment is given or understanding attributed to the impact of this phenomenon. 
Even in the nature of how the 'enviromnent is seen' and the nature of the 
phenomenal task illustrates this aspect of the system's dynamics: i. e. intrapersonal, 
interpersonal and group conflicts. 
4. Finally, this suggests that the system is limited in task attainment and learning by 
the dynamics of the psycho-social system, after environment and task, over other 
contingent variables. 
6. A psychoanalytical perspective 
The psycho-social basis of social systems theory provides a sufficient base for this 
aspect of the work to be developed further. It is the integration of the 
psychoanalytical approach to the notion of the 'complex systems' framework, rather 
than a psychoanalytical perspective per se that will help in deepening understanding. 
Thus, a reformulation of a complex, dynamic systems framework may be reflected in 
the following summary statements: 
I. Organisations, are complex systems that are based on the assumption of conflict and 
differences of interest. Thus, it is in a state of continual dynamic tension or points 
of'quasi-equilibrium'. 
2. The organisatiods configuration is a feature of external and historical features as 
well as internal dynamics. The internal dynamics are power relations, a psycho- 
social dimension, task and formal organisational arrangements. 
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The literature suggests that the environment and task are the most important factors to 
impact on a system's attainment of its goals and on learning. It is hypothesised that 
subsequent to the influence of environmental context and task the most significant 
factor to consider in understanding the dynamics of strategic organisational learning 
are the psycho-social dynamic. This is shown to impact on how managers respond to 
the environment, task attainment, systemic learning, formal organisational 
arrangements and political enactment. Thus, the focus for the thesis is on the role of 
the 'top team'. 
From the review of literature there is also a case that can be put forward that suggests 
that social and political forces impact on the task of organisations and on their 
learning as social systems. Explicitly examining this aspect of the organisation may 
help to explain and deepen understanding of what happens in subsystems like 'top 
teams' and how that affects that system's learning. 
The technical, rational, political, and systemic nature of organisations has been the 
subject of the discussion so far. A fuller discussion of the socio-psychological 
dimension is required to see the links between a systemic conflict framework for 
understanding change and its impact on learning. The latter is provided in chapter 7. 
Power and politics are endemic and these are features that operate throughout the 
system. They are reflected in both power relations and social interest groups and 
worked out through social bargaining and relationships. These additional dynamics 
are discussed as they relate to the research question and are not themselves a focus of 
this thesis. 
These assumptions form the basis of our understanding of complex systems and the 
following chapters explore the contribution of psychoanalysis to this perspective in 
more detail. 
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7. Summary 
An overview of systems theory suggests that, as a tricans ofconceptualising 
organisations, it can represent many of the complexities of'orgailisatiolls. It is 
holistic, contingent, it incorporates social proccsses and has feedback and learning as 
central to its understanding and tlieorisation oforganisations. I lowever, it has 
limitations in some of its assumptions, axiorns and application to orgarusational 
analysis. Furthermore, it highlights the difficulties ot'systern learning. Tlicrc are 
three criteria that the theory needs to satisfy tor the purpose and interest ol'this thesis. 
These are: that the theory falls within a conflict systemic framework; that it takes a 
processual perspective and, that it addresses deeper psycho-social dynamics. This has 
led to reframing and theorising about the nature ofsystcrns against these criteria and 
exploring the notion of'complex systerns theory'. Thus, some ot'the principle axioms 
of systems theory have been redrawri in a series of additional propositions. The use of 
later contingency theorists - e. g. Miller and Rice (1967) and Nadler and TUS11111all, 
(1979) - is a point of departure. 
Figure 4.2 
A Systems Model for Examining Organisational Change 
Inp I as hapill, 
Fnvironnicia 
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The Nadler-lushman Co"gruence Vodelfi)r Diagnosing 
Organisational Behaviour, 1979 
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The new assumptions are: 
* The system is inherently in conflict as it attempts to seek'dynamic equilibrium' 
rather than some goal seeking, homeostatic point 
* The notion of congruence may not be attainable and second-best solutions may 
provide 'good enough' system functionality for complexity 
* The psycho-social dimension has greater weight than has hitherto been 
acknowledged and much of the theories of change argued the importance of such 
elements 
* The system is limited in its task attainment and learning by the dynamics of the 
psycho-social system, after environment and boundary management, over other 
contingent variables 
These axioms are the result of reviewing the theory and they meet the requirements of 
the paradigm - systemic conflict framework - that was argued to help understand 
organisational dynamics at a deeper level. This model of conceptualising 
organisations is now applied to understanding organisational learning in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5- Organ'isational learning and the role of 
'top teams' 
1. Introduction 
"... If we wish to learn more about the conditions that facilitate or inhibit 
organisational learning, we must explore the ways in which the behavioural worlds of 
organisations affect the capacity for inquiry into organisational theory in use. " Argyris 
and Schon (1978) p28. 
This chapter pulls together the relationship between change, organisations, 
organisational learning and the role of the 'top tearn!. It takes the organisation as an 
open, dynamic and complex social system and considers the role of one of the most 
important boundary managers: the 'top team'. This subsystem operates at the 
boundary between the utilisation of internal resources and the external market and, 
between the inner world of the organisation and the external demands of the 
environment. They are thus at the strategic apex of the organisation. 
Argyris and Schon (1978), Bessant and Buckingham (1993), Senge (1990), suggest 
that there is a strong relationship between the effectiveness of the 'top team' and the 
organisation! s ability to learn. In this chapter these links are explored and from the 
literature a working definition is developed of what constitutes organisational 
learning. The focus of the inquiry will be'strategic organisational learning', that is 
learning that takes place at the interface between the organisation and its environment. 
The strategic apex is the critical subsystem of this inquiry. 
2. What is organisational learning and why is it so important? 
Organisational. learning is the capacity for an organisation - that is its members and 
the system as a whole - to respond, adapt, transform and learn from changes in its 
environment. 
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Definitions 
The term 'organisational leaming' is used in this work based on the theoretical roots to 
be found in a systems approach (March and Simon (1958), Argyris and Schon (1978), 
Senge (1990)) which is coherent and consistent with the foundations of the theoretical 
framework. Some authors (Pedler et al (1989 and 1991), Garrett (1989)) use the term 
'the leaming organisation'. While valid, the distinction is based upon focus. The term 
organisational. leaming is concerned with the how: development and process, which 
again relates to the theoretical ground of this inquiry. The concept of 'the learning 
organisation' is concerned with direction and implies a normative goal (Jones and 
Hendry (1994), DiBella et al (1996)). The implied relationship between the two is 
that there needs to be organisational learning for there to be a leaming organisation. 
The focus for this thesis is organisational leaming. That is, how can we understand 
the nature of organisations, rather than just a descriptive and normative account of 
how organisations should be, or some idealised special case. 
The use of the term 'organisatiod is used in preference to 'company' as the latter has a 
private sector association and may be unduly restrictive (Jones and Hendry, 1994). 
Furthermore, this research covers public sector agencies and thus the term 
'organisation' tends to be more inclusive. Pedler ct al (1991) stay with the term 
'company' for philosophical reasons as they say that it implies collaboration, or'in 
company'. Few commentators share the latter view and, given the public sector 
context of this thesis, it will take the pragmatic position and focus on the 
Porganisatiorf. 
Argyris and Schon (1978) define organisational learning as a "process of detecting 
and correcting error". Fiol and Lyles (1985) see 'Organisational learning' as the 
process of improving through better knowledge and understanding. 
Senge (1990) goes further and describes a learning organisation as one that is 
continually expanding its capacity to create the future. Pedler, Burgoyne and Boydell 
(1989 and 1991) define it as an organisation that facilitates the leaming of all its 
members and continually transforms itself. Stata (1989) suggests that organisational 
learning occurs through shared insights, knowledge, mental models... (and) builds on 
past experience and knowledge - that is, on memory. Finally, Garvin (1993) states 
that a learning organisation is an organisation skilled at creating, acquiring and 
transferring knowledge and, at modifying its behaviour to reflect new knowledge and 
insights. 
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The literature seems to confirm four elements to organisational. leaming: the 
acquisition of knowledge; the transference and sharing of knowledge; the utilisation 
of knowledge as evidenced in action and feedback (see Garvin (1993), Nevis et al. 
(1993), Kim (1993)). 
3. The context of organisational learning 
In a rapidly changing environment, the capacity for social systems to engage in 
learning provides the basis for a number of benefits. These include: a competitive 
edge for getting ideas into the market quicker; gaining profitability from being able to 
exploit innovations and new processes that add value over alternative service 
techniques; improvements in the service or value chain and, better ways of reducing 
costs. These all make the organisation's capacity to learn increasingly important for 
its survival, development and long term growth and transformation (Bahlmann 
(1990), Barrow and Loughlin (1992), Williams (1992), Hendry (1996)). Italso 
supports strategy implementation, Beer & Eisenstat (1996) and is argued to be central 
for organisation development (Flood (1993), Stata (1989)). 
In managing change, the opportunities for learning are great but these are not always 
realised. Change does not imply learning (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Argyris (1977) 
suggests that where change scenarios are driven by crisis or revolution, there are 
inhibiting forces that can reinforce the difficulties of change and prevent system 
learning. These inhibiting forces are referred to as 'defensive routines', which support 
dysfunctional behaviour, cover up mistakes and poor practice, by-pass conflict and 
difficulties and hide opportunities to do things better or in different ways (Argyris 
(1985), see too Ashford and Lee (1990) and Gersick and Hackman (1990)). Thus, 
while planned change may support organisational learning, organisational change 
does not per se support organisational leaming. It is more likely that where changes 
are environmental - that is, driven from the outside - organisational leaming will be 
more difficult to sustain (Bahlmann, 1990). In the current context of organisational 
flux and change much of this is driven by the environment and thus dysfunctional 
routines are likely to surface. 
In addition, in the context of change, organisations have to make difficult decisions 
between investing in development and exploration versus doing what they know best 
and exploiting their existing talents for short-term gain. It is suggested that 
organisations that tend to go for short term and 'exploitative' solutions do so at the risk 
of learning (March (1991), Levinthal and March (1993)). Thus, if leaming is to be 
sustainable it needs to be strategic. 
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4. The role of the 'top team': a strategic subsystem 
Strategic change and learning have to be managed and cannot be left to luck or the 
invisible hands of the market. The role of the 'top team! in managing change, the 
boundary with the environment and'organisational learning, is argued to be critical - 
Gouillart ct al (1995), Kanter et al (1992), Beckhard and Pritchard (1992), Pettigrew 
and Whipp (1991), Bessant and Buckingham (1993)). The leader and, more 
generally, the 'top team! have an impact on culture and strategy (Kakabadse (199 1 a), 
Schein (1983 and 1985), Miles and Snow (1978), Peters and Waterman (1982), Kets 
De Vries and Miller (1984), Miller (1990), Schneider (1997), Wasdell (1997)). They 
manage the boundaries between the policy of the Board, strategic formulation and 
strategic implementation. Burke and Litwin (1992), Katz and Khan (1978), Nadler 
and Tushman (1979), Kast and Rosenzweig (1973 and 1974), have all argued the 
importance of the environment and the management of the organisational boundary. 
The role of the 'top team' is to do this and do so in a way that maximises both 
performance and the process of learning. They have to manage the tensions of 
resource allocation and conflicting demands over timescales between short-term goal 
and long term investment. For the 'top tearn'to engage in efficiency and performance 
management only is to focus on learning within fairly restricted parameters about the 
nature of the learning task; 'single-loop' learning. Such an approach may lose sight, or 
even undermine, long term viability. 
Johnson and Scholes (1993) show the iterative nature of the strategy process as 
performance outcomes are not realised. The management process at first works 
harder within the existing boundaries and framework of the perceived problem; if 
nothing improves they re-look at the strategy. If things still remain unchecked, they 
look at the organisational paradigm - values, assumptions, beliefs and culture. It is at 
this point that the organisation is engaging in 'double-loop', strategic organisational 
learning. They move from 'primary' problem solving of the manifest issues to 
'secondary', which aims to uncover the latent and systemic difficulty (Tosey, 1993). 
Organisations can be easily stopped from exploring'their paradigms and fall into 
'single loop' or increasingly defensive routines (Argyris, 1985). Thus, the process of 
strategic learning needs to be managed and contained. The 'top team' is both best 
placed and has the authority to do so. The role of the 'top team' here is to provide a 
facilitative environment and to manage the organisational boundaries in order to 
support dialogue, team working and organisational learning. Thus, the 'top team' 
becomes increasingly paramount as an important subsystem in the process of strategic 
organisational systems learning. However, they are not always able to perform this 
task well and in part this may be explained by their own internal dynamics. 
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5. What does organisational learning mean in this thesis? 
The focus of this inquiry is strategic organisational learning, that which takes place at 
the boundary between the 'top team' , culture, strategy and the environment: at the 
strategic apex. This is opposed to learning that takes place at the operational level - 
further down the organisation. DiBella et al (1996) make a very useful distinction 
between strategic learning as compared with tactical and operational. Pedler et al 
(1989 and 199 1) also make a similar distinction between the realm of policy and that 
of operations in their model of learning. While strategic and operational learning are 
important, the focus for this thesis is the former. 
There are a number of issues that abound conceptually and operationally concerning 
the use of the term organisational learning. There are three areas that are briefly 
discussed: the philosophical orientation on learning; the components of learning and, 
the levels of learning. 
Orientation 
The concept of organisational learning is rooted in a number of different traditions of 
biology, social psychology, history, economics, learning theory and organisational 
studies (Morgan (1986), Ulrich, Von Glinow and Todd (1993), Dodgson (1993)). The 
latter concludes that a multi-disciplinary approach will improve the understanding of 
learning within organisations as they are such complex entities. 
The theoretical approach and paradigm of this research build on this conclusion as it 
is systemic and interpretative. This means that, while the approach is processual, 
where open systems are seen as complex and contingent upon context, it is also based 
upon internal and psycho-social relationships and meanings within organisations. 
Thus the latter also incorporates a psycho-cultural/ psychoanalytic approach. 
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It is the integration of these domains that underpins the orientation to organisational 
leaming in this thesis. Thus, organisations as social systems are seen as 'complex 
systems' where the relationships between structure, function, differentiation and 
integration are complex and are also influenced by context and time. In such systems, 
where they are able to operate effectively, they are characterised by many of the 
features of Argyris and Schon's (1978) 'model 11 type' of organisational learning. 
Here the organisational system is able to detect what is happening in the environment, 
detect errors and facilitate action to rectify them. However, there may be distortions 
in the system (of feedback) which prevent this process operating effectively. It is 
suggested that these distortions in the system reduce the capacity to learn and they are 
due to 'bounded rationality', dysfunctional organisational dynamics and defensive 
routines (Cyert and March (1958), Argyris (1985), Argyris and Schon (1978), 
Ashford and Lee (1990), Diamond (1986 and 1994)). Understanding these 
'distortions' in systemic dynamics and learning in terms of cultural and psycho-social 
frameworks helps identify the Iatent and deeper meaning behind such acts. 
Organisational learning: the components 
The notion of the'learning organisation' pertains to the whole organisation engaged in 
Icarning. All systems will have some element of organisational learning but not all 
organisations will be learning ones. There is conflicting evidence as to the reality of 
superior learning organisations and it may suggest that such an 'organisation' is a 
special case. However, the case of subsystem learning may be more feasible. 
It is the contention in this thesis that a 'container' (or framework) for systemic learning 
is more likely if learning takes place at a strategic level - within the strategic apex. 
This is the key subsystem that enacts, supports or undermines systemic learning. A 
systemic approach would suggest that such a subsystem would be a microcosm of the 
broader system and therefore is a valid unit of analysis (Alderfer and Smith (1982), 
Alderfer (1990) and Tosey (1993)). Furthermore, the importance of the 'top team' in 
managing the transformational variables of culture, strategy and its environment 
(Burke and Litwin, (1992)) has been established from the literature. Thus, the focus 
of this thesis is strategic organisational learning as enacted by the 'top team' as part of 
the strategic apex, a key subsystem. 
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What is it that constitutes organisational teaming? 
There are a number of debates about the nature of organisational leaming. The four 
components of acquiring knowledge, sharing it, taking action and undertaking 
reflection are the most commonly agreed. In addition, Nevis et al (1993) identified 
ten facilitating factors to enhance leaming. These included scanning, performance 
gap analysis, measurement, involved leadership, a climate of openness, initiators of 
leaming, experimental mindsets, a systems perspective, requisite variety and 
continuous education. Senge (1990) adds systemic problem-solving and working 
through teams. Schein (1993) also suggests that an important component of leaming 
is the value of 'dialogue', which literally means the mutual flow of 'logos' of meaning. 
He goes on to argue that the value of dialogue is that it facilitates problem solving in a 
way that builds on sufficient common ground and trust to really share what is in one's 
mind. Thus, he suggests that dialogue is essential for effective team working. 
Ulrich, Von Glinow and Jick's (1993) review article adds to the common reference 
points of organisational learning. They suggest that they are four (macro) 
components of organisational learning. These build on those identified earlier. 
'Acquisition' includes the gap analysis and scanning of Nevis et al (1993). 'Invention' 
includes the problem solving aspects of Senge (1990) as well as the sharing and 
institutionalisation of knowledge, practice, standards and process (see too McGill and 
Slocum, 1993). 'Production! is the implementation of solutions; it is the action. 
Finally, 'genemlisation' is the opportunity to evaluate the experience and encode it 
into organisational routines (policies), conceptual maps (strategic planning models), 
and norms (Ulrich, Von Glinow and Todd, 1993). These macro components are 
similar to the four building blocks that seem to be generally agreed from other 
sources. Huber (1991) also identifies four related constructs of knowledge 
acquisition, information distribution, information interpretation and organisational 
memory. They share many of the features of knowledge acquisition and transfer as 
opposed to action. 
These macro components can also be distinguished from the micro components of- 
dialogue, taking a systemic approach and team working, which are ways that can 
inform the macro-processes and which seem to run as themes in all of the macro- 
components. 
In this thesis it is intended to use those four building blocks of organisational 
learning, but qualify them by two further additions: understanding defensive routines 
and systemic problem solving. 
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Thus, the key macro components of organisational learning in this thesis are 
considered to be: scanning and interpreting; sharing information; taking action; 
reviewing and reflecting; understanding and countering defensive routines and, 
systemic problem solving. 
Scanning 
This is the organisation paying attention to the trends, information, knowledge and 
opportunities that exist in the 'external' world as opposed to the'inner world' of the 
organisation. It is part of the acquisition of learning. 
Interpreting 
Once the organisation has the information coming in, how it makes sense of it is 
critical to its leaming. This can be determined by management's belief about the 
environment and is associated with differences in organisational scanning, 
equivocality, strategy and decision-making (Daft and Weick, 1984). Organisations 
that are not in touch with the external reality will distort the external signals. For 
example, IBM in the mid 1980's totally mis-read the introduction of PCs into the 
computer market. IBM saw this innovation as a route to further develop the 
dominance of the main-frame market rather than the threat of powerful, desk-top and 
stand alone computers that became a new market. Organisations that are more able to 
hold a 'reality' perspective will see the world for what it is and decide how to engage 
with it. 
These first two components are features of 'acquisition'. 
Sharing information 
Organisational learning is more likely where there is an openness to sharing 
information, learning and practice: both for those that are sharing it and for those that 
are receiving it. Cohen (199 1) suggests that transfer of learning is the key to 
improving organisational effectiveness. It assumes that boundaries between 
subsystems are managed so that they are not too closed (over-bounded) or too open 
(under-bounded) and that there is a general climate of openness to sharing and debate 
- see too Alderfer (1980) on'under-bounded' systems. 
Taking action 
This is taking the learning and applying it to the situation. It calls upon teamwork, 
leadership and a general climate of openness and experimentation. It may also 
involve taking risks in order to learn. 
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Reviewing and reflection 
This is having a mechanism for receiving feedback in the system, being able to make 
sense of it and generalising from the experience into institutionalised practices, 
policies and mind maps - strategy. It implies a systems perspective. 
Countering defenses 
Organisational defenses and defensive routines are among the key 'distortions' in the 
learning process. Where these are excessive it is expected that very little systemic 
learning will take place. Strategies and codified practices to inhibit such processes 
will facilitate and support organisational learning (Arygris, 1985 and 1990). Thus, 
conflict would be managed, difficulties understood rather than blame attributed and 
people and groups would 'own up' to their part in the problem rather than 'act out' and 
fuel already difficult processes. 
Systemic problem solving 
This approach views the organisation as a whole and aims to understand the recursive 
patterns of behaviour and actions that operate in the system. In addition, a systemic 
approach would aim to understand the 'symbolic' meaning of unconscious enactments 
based on the data and the development of working hypotheses (S enge (1990), Tosey 
(1993), McCaughan and Palmer (1994)). 
These are the seven components that will be used to identify the nature of strategic 
organisational leaming. 
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6. Levels of learning 
Gregory Bateson (1972) identified four levels of leaming: zero; one; two and three. 
He suggested that 'zero-leaming' is routine and habitual. There is no judgment on this 
but an acceptance that certain stimuli generate a 'soldered in! , unquestioning and 
unconscious response. Level one learning is that which comes from trial and error. 
From iterations of responses within a stable context, where the boundaries and 
parameters remain the same, there is a process of correcting errors within a set of 
alternatives. Bateson (1972) describes this as'proto-type'leaming. It is akin to 
Argyris and Schon! s (1978) 'single loop' leaming. Level two learning is leaming that 
re-examines the alternatives and parameters that make up the set of alternatives. It is 
re-evaluating the situation. It is, "[The] change in the way the individual construes his 
circumstances. " (Bateson (1972, p263f. ) Bateson and others that followed, e. g. 
Argyris and Schon (1978), described this a'deutero-leaming'. Finally, level three 
leaming is the ability to step outside the existing paradigm of experience and 
apperception and to re-interpret the experience. These levels of leaming have been 
influential on the theory of organisational learning. 
The possibility of having different levels of leaming is further represented in the 
literature by 'types' (Shrivastava, 1983). These include: two types - single versus 
double (Argyris and Schon, 1978); four types with eleven elements (Pedler et al, 
1991); four types - knowing, understanding, thinking and leaming organisations 
(McGill and Slocum, 1993); and five learning orientations (Nevis et al, 1993). These 
'types' seem to start with crude to ever complex operationalised modes of the key 
concepts in organisational learning. 
Bateson's original formulation of teaming provides a suitable framework that 
incorporates the thinking of later authors, while at the same time has theoretical 
clarity about the nature of each level of teaming. Thus, such a formulation is applied 
in this thesis to levels of organisational teaming. These are: 'zero' teaming where 
there are consistent habitual and sometimes dysfunctional routines that reduce the 
organisations capacity to learn; 'incremental' teaming which aims at doing things right 
within a given context and is akin to 'single-loop' teaming (level one); double-loop 
teaming (level two) where the organisation learns from failure and is able to challenge 
and change its own precepts and principles; 'generative' teaming where the 
organisation is able to step outside its current mind-set, assumptions, paradigm. The 
scope for creativity and innovation also lies in this place. This is level three teaming. 
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There may be other 'levels' of learning but at this stage these are the four proposed 
types that we would expect to see. Further, refinement of these would be an outcome 
of the research - see tables 5.1 - 5.3 on the following pages for examples of the 
practical differences between different 'types' of learning. 
The focus of this inquiry is the learning that takes place at the strategic apex and 
boundary of management and its implications on organisational learning. In this 
arena, the context is not stable and the inability to move beyond level one learning has 
negative implications for the organisation's development, performance and longer 
term survival. Thus, the focus of the research and use of the theoretical model will 
consider the management of the strategic boundary between the policy makers, 
strategy implementors and the environment. While other parts of the model provide a 
basis for inquiry these could be the basis of further research and papers. 
Within this framework, there are a number of hypothesised relationships between the 
components of learning and the level of leaming. 
Thus to understand organisational learning in this context we would expect to see the 
following relationships between levels of learning and the macro components. 
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Table 5.1 
Common Problems in Unsuccessful Systems 
Symptom Single loop characteristic 
Poor data integrity Lack of openness and information sharing. Unilateral 
view rather than global one. Information is power 
therefore keep it close to your chest. 
Integrated system used in a non-integrated Lack of shared vision of system or goals. Unilateral 
way - for example, only some modules of design, exclusion of some key user groups 
MRP2 used and confined to local areas only 
Lack of long-term flexibility in the face of Inability to revise goals and adapt to meet new 
changing environment challenges 
Continuing dependence on manual system is Lack of commitment and trust in the new system and 
parallel in the information provided by other functions 
Interdepartmental conflicts Unilateral views in design and lack of effective 
conflict resolution in implementation 
Inadequate skills to support implementation Lack of training, itself a symptom of lack of 
communication and involvement 
Where training does take place, it is only for the 
'what" rather than a broader understanding of 
why the system is implemented 
Source: Bessant & Buckingham, 1993 
Table 5.2 
Features of Successful Implementation 
Success factor Double loop characteristics 
Participative design Generate commitment and high quality solutions 
through participative of all those with valid 
information to contribute 
Multi-function project team s Shared perspective on system 
Top management commitment Shared strategic vision which is effectively 
communicated downwards throughout the 
Readiness to re-examine and change existing 
procedures 
Close working with system suppliers 
Cross-functional co-operation 
Extensive and widespread education and training 
Continuous monitoring and design input 
throughout project and on all aspects of the 
system - software, hardware, jobs, structures, etc. 
organisation 
Monitoring and adapting on a continuous basis 
Making use of all valid information inputs 
Effective conflict resolution as part of building a 
shared vision and agreeing a common blueprint 
Building and communicating a shared understanding 
of the project and its relevance to the business 
Monitoring and adapting on a continuous basis 
Source: Bessant & Buckingham, 1993 
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Table 5.3 
Success and Failure in CAPM Implementation 
(Derived from Mumford, 1975; Hughes et al., 1988 Gilllingwater, 1987; Voss, 1986; Callarman, 1987 and Trade Press) 
Success is associated with .... Failure is associated with 
Top management commitment at all stages Lack of commitment 
of the project 
Clear strategic vision, communicated 
throughout the organisation 
Shared views of project aims and implementation 
approach 
Multi-function project teams function perspective 
Effective conflict resolution within team 
Extensive user education to give understanding 
of broader implications and purpose of system 
User involvement in system design (of hardware/ 
software, jobs, structures roles, etc) 
Close involvement with suppliers 
Readiness to re-examine and change existing 
procedures 
Performance measures reflect broader 
organisational effectiveness 
Flexibility in design and continuous monitoring 
to adapt to unexpected changes 
Lack of clear strategy and/or its effective 
communication to the rest of the organisation 
Lack of shared view and unresolved conflicts 
regarding design and implementation 
Single function teams, unilateral with multi-perspective 
Unresolved conflicts over key implementation issues 
Minimal training for operation 
Unilateral design, organisation expected to adapt 
to systems rather than change system 
Minimal involvement 
Attempt to computerise what is already there 
Performance measures narrowly defined and related 
to efficiency at local level 
Inflexibility in system in response to unexpected 
changes in environment 
Source: Bessant & Buckingham, 1993 
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Scanning 
The first component of learning that needs to take place is'knowledge acquisition'. 
Organisations need to scan their environment and collect timely and relevant 
information to meet their strategic needs and to be competitive (Williams, 1992). 
Where organisations do not scan, or do so inadequately, they consign themselves to 
being closed systems. Closed systems by their nature work within a set of pre-defined 
parameters, lose touch with reality and reduce their capacity to learn to single loop 
learning. Crisis, failure or breakdown may challenge their'normal'way of working, 
but otherwise the system has a tendency to operate 'as if it were in isolation, the 
environment is stable or it is protected from the reality of the environment. In such 
cases it will at best achieve single loop learning. 
The process of scanning is necessary but not sufficient. Once the 'data' or knowledge 
is 'acquired' and is in the system, its interpretation, how it is perceived and made 
meaning of, will also be significant. The strategic and boundary management role of 
the 'top team' will be relevant here. 
Where organisations operate from a 'defensive' position then it is more likely that the 
'top team' will see the 'threaf element of changes in the environment compared to an 
organisation that is strategically more of a'prospector', which will be more likely see 
the opportunities (Miles and Snow (1978), Kets De Vries et al (1993), Kets De Vries 
and Miller (1984 and 1986), Pettigrew and Whipp (1991)). Thus, the interpretative 
nature and apperception will also influence the capacity to learn. Systems that protect 
themselves from the reality of the changes and context of the external environment 
will have less success in achieving higher levels of learning. Those able to take in 
and realistically assess - e. g. through bench-marking and other tools - are more likely 
to achieve higher levels of learning. 
It is argued here that these two components of scanning and interpretation are the 
most significant as they reflect the ability of the organisation to take in information, 
acquire knowledge and make use of the changes and opportunities for learning. It is 
also within this space, at this boundary between the organisation and its environment, 
that the system is either closed and'over-bounded' or too open and 'under-bounded' 
(Alderfer, 1980) - see table 5.4 below. 
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Table 5.4 
Properties of Overbounded and Underbounded Systems 
Overbounded systems Variable Underbounded systems 
Goals clear; priority unequivocal Goals Goals unclear, priority equivocal 
monolithic Authority relations multiple and competing 
minimal short-term stress Economic conditions impending economic crisis 
precise, detailed, restrictive Role definitions imprecise, incomplete, overlapping 
difficulties with openness Communication difficulties in determining 
when people meet patterns who can and should meet 
constrained, blocked Human energy diffuse, exhausting 
positive inside; Affect distribution negative inside; 
negative outside negative outside 
organisational groups dominate Intergroup dynamics identity groups dominate 
dependency Unconscious basic assumptions flight-fight 
long Time Span short 
single theory - ideology Congnitive work multiple or no theory - ideologies 
Source: Alderfer, C(1980) "Consulting to Underbounded Systems" in vol, 2ofSocial Processes pp267-29 
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In the first case learning will tend to be single-looped. In the latter, some learning 
will take place but its outcome is likely to be lost or fragmented unless actively 
harnessed. Thus, systems that are defensive will lose the value of scanning in their 
processes of organisational learning. Where boundaries are optimally managed by 
their top teams, it is expected that the opportunities for learning would be 
enhanced. Thus, the management of boundaries at the strategic apex is an 
important role for the top team to facilitate strategic organisational learning. 
This takes us to the next component. 
Sharing 
For systems to learn, there needs to be sharing of the acquired knowledge. Systems 
that are unable to do so may have to continually engage in level 'zero' or level one 
learning. Subsystem boundaries in such a case will tend to be closed. Thus we can 
see a downward spiral of lost opportunities for learning. 
Taking action 
Paulo Freire (1972) uses the term Traxis' to mean: taking action through reflection. 
This process of learning through taking action moves the cognitive learning into 
concrete behaviours and leads to changes in internal and systemic relations. Praxis 
involves both action and reflection. 
Review and reflection 
Leaming theory posits that reflection provides a basis for review and leaming (Kolb, 
1976). It allows members of the system to distil and understand their experiences 
(individually and collectively), share meaning about the context, including reframing 
it, institutionalise facilitators of leaming and combat defensive routines. Where there 
is no review process then leaming becomes 'soldered in' and tends to level zero 
leaming where it becomes habitual. Where the context is changing, zero level 
'leaming' may become a further defensive and collusive routine, preventing further 
scanning and promoting 'closed' interpretations of the environment. Thus, the 
recursive and systemic nature of zero' level leaming becomes apparent. These 
patterns are often referred to as 'defensive routines. 
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Defensive routines 
These are often embedded in social systems as level zero leaming: processes, 
practices and learned behaviours in the past that once provided some benefit to that 
social system. Interpretative approaches - psychoanalytical and cultural - would 
recognise this as 'taken for granted' mechanism for survival (Schein, 1985). In many 
ways these actions were once useful, learned responses to specific stimuli that became 
generalised and applied inappropriately to a wider set of stimuli and contexts. These 
actions are unrelated to the reality of the current situation and are a failed response to 
the environment and context. In psychoanalytic terms they may come from an 'ego- 
defense' for the individual, or a 'social defense' for the system or subsystem, which 
collectively generates defensive and collusive routines in the learning system. There 
is a tendency to compulsively repeat defensive mechanisms of the past as part of the 
characterology of individual and the systemic dynamic of groups and other social 
systems (see a fuller discussion in chapters 6 and 7). The tendency in such cases is to 
zero level learning. Thus, interpretative and systemic strategies to uncover and re- 
cover the impact of defensive routines and zero-learning would support organisational 
learning. The relative nature of defensive routines in supporting or undermining 
organisational learning is considered to be the next significant component of 
organisational learning. The reason this is argued to be the case is because defensive 
routines have a natural tendency to 'zero-leaming' and because they are often 'soldered 
in', it is unconscious and systemically embedded. Perceiving this level of learning 
and engaging in the interpretative strategies of 'combating' defensive routines is both 
long and difficult (Argyris (1985 and 1990), Diamond (1986), Hirschhorn (1988)). 
Systemic problem solving 
Members within organisations need to think systemically in order to understand, 
counter and intervene in defensive routines (Senge, 1990). This provides a holistic 
and logical framework that aims to provide a structure for managing complexity and 
identifying the recursive and dominant patterns within the organisation. It seeks to 
also understand the inter-relatedness of difficulties and not see them in isolation. 
Finally, it aims to uncover the implicit processes that undermine organisational 
learning (McCaughan and Palmer (1994) and Tosey (1993)). 
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7. A psychoanalytic perspective 
A psychoanalytic perspective helps to understand the latent meaning to manifest 
bchaviours. Its contribution can add to understanding organisational defenses, 
systemic dynamics and group processes and the impact on learning. Theories of 
groups and team dynamics suggest that they go through various stages of 
development, group members take on roles and performance will vary depending 
upon how critical stages of conflict and change are internally managed. 
A psychoanalytic approach to understanding groups and organisation is discussed in 
more detail in chapters 6 and 7. However, its relevance here is that it begins to help 
us understand why organisations do not learn and what gets in the way. Thus, an 
understanding and theory as to why organisational leaming is difficult to attain and 
sustain is developing in this thesis. 
It is suggested here that the key process that undermines organisational learning is the 
extent and nature of organisational defensive routines and an ability or inability to 
understand these through systemic process problem solving. This forms part of the 
process of interpretation of the organisation's internal context. 
Argyris acknowledges defensive routines in several of his works; 1978 (with Schon), 
1985,1990 and 1992. He sees these as cognitive and as behavioural difficulties. Yet 
he also acknowledges their continual persistence. It is also implied in Bateson's work 
(1972). 
A psychoanalytic perspective provides a deeper level of analysis as to the possible 
nature of these defensive routines (see Diamond (1985 and 1994), Schneider and 
Shrivastava (1988), Hirschhorn (1988,1989 and 1995), Hirschhorn and Barnett 
(1993), Menzies (1960)). The causes of the defensive are not only political and 
conscious, they are also unconscious, triggered by unpleasant and difficult situations. 
Defensive routines are understood from a psychoanalytic perspective as arising from 
the nature of 'anxiety' (see chapters 6 and 7). 
The nature of external change leads to organisational relationships being upset and 
destabilised and this is the first level of anxiety. The task of managing strategic 
change and learning for each member in top teams, also generate feelings of anxiety 
due to the task itself, the associated risk, the possibility of redundancies and further 
defensive routines. 
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The role of the 'top team' at the strategic apex is to manage both the changes and the 
anxiety in the system in order to facilitate learning and strategic development. The 
strategic role is also on the boundary of internal and external tensions and these are 
yet another source of conflict and anxiety. The strategic role is an exposed one and 
often brings with it isolation (Kets De Vries (1980), Kets De Vries et al (1993)). 
These defensive routines undermine learning at every level. They can lead to closed 
systems that cease to scan the environment, or once they receive information they 
'distort' it and are unable to hold on to the reality of the situation. They can either 
over or understate the problem from a basis of fear. Information is not shared and 
action becomes self serving and debilitating rather than organising around the tasks of 
the system. Finally, where defensive routines persist, the quality of thinking, strategic 
boundary management and learning deteriorates. These are some examples of how 
defensive routines can impact negatively on strategic organisational systems learning. 
8. Summary and focus on strategic learning 
This chapter has explored the nature and relationship of organisational systems 
learning to the strategic role of the 'top team'. It suggests that organisational. learning 
is systemic. The ability of the system to scan the environment, interpret realistically, 
share information, take action and review, counter defensive routines and engage in 
systemic problem-solving, will impact on the organisation's ability to learn. 
Organisational learning is undermined by defensive routines in each process. A 
psychoanalytic perspective on understanding defensive routines provides further 
depth as it helps to explain the underlying and latent meaning and processes of 
'resistance'to learning. 
These dynamics are explained in further detail in the two chapters that follow 
concluding with an emerging model which is discussed in chapter 8. 
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Chapter 6- Psychoanalytic perspectives: the role of 
the subjective in understanding the dynamics of 
social systems 
1. Introduction 
The thesis has argued that, in order to understand organisational change, an integrated 
approach is required that takes account of the rational and structural side of 
organisations as well as the subjective, messy and process side of organisational life. 
Much of the work on organisational change comes from the 'strategic choice 
framework' of analysis that is based on notions of rationality, equilibrium seeking and 
a pragmatist orientation. The irrational, conflict based and psycho-social domains are 
seen within a'systemic conflict framcwork' (Wilson, 1992). Such approaches receive 
less attention. Yet, in developing Lewin' s original thesis (1947, a and b) of 
understanding change, such an approach forms the crux of any analysis. The systemic 
conflict approach, which explores the deeper issues of change, provides greater 
understanding and insight into how one views and tackles the difficulties of change. 
The purpose of this chapter and the next is to take the analysis further. They aim to 
develop an integrated approach on two subjects: the dynamics of the 'top team' and 
strategic organisational. learning. They draw upon psychoanalytic theory to explain 
the role of the subjective in increasing our understanding of learning, the dynamics of 
'top teams' and the impact on strategic organisational. change. It argues that the 
application of a psychoanalytic perspective falls within a systemic conflict paradigm 
and thus increases our insight and understanding in changes to social systems. 
This chapter covers two areas. Firstly it provides an introduction to the key elements 
of psychoanalytic theory. Secondly, it applies these principles to individuals. This 
chapter emphasises the theoretical dimension with its application to individuals as an 
analytical foundation for the rest of the thesis. In the subsequent chapter, the 
psychoanalytical precepts are applied to groups and to organisations more broadly as 
social systems. These lead to the development of an integrated framework for 
analysing the dynamics of change at the different levels of the social system - 
individual, group and organisational. 
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Finally, chapter 8 concludes with a number of propositions about how these social 
dynamics may impact on strategic organisational learning. The chapter pulls together 
and summarises the discussion from the four areas of the review and draws the 
psychoanalytic component as the basis of an emerging systemic and interpretative 
theory of why organisations find it difficult to learn. 
2. The case for a psychoanalytic approach 
A psychoanalytic approach is valuable as it provides a deeper level of analysis of 
organisational processes and systems than dominant theories of organisation. It also 
addresses a gap in the research area on understanding the dynamics in the 'top team' as 
it addresses the issues of greater integration, depth and a theory of understanding (see 
points raised in chapter 1). This is because the theoretical frameworks of many of the 
earlier studies were laboratory based and did not inquire into the deeper level of group 
dynamics. The theoretical framework of this thesis, sees the organisation as complex 
and dynamic social systems where change itself is processual and dynamic rather than 
comparative static in its analysis. This framework shares some common elements 
with psychoanalysis and thus is applied to the domain of strategic organisational 
learning. 
In managing the strategic task and boundaries of the organisation there is often 
uncertainty, change and risk (Hirshhorn (1988 and 1995), Miller (1993), Jarrett and 
Kellner (1996)). Feelings of anxiety are also associated with many such changes. 
Examples might include the fear of not meeting deadlines or income targets, 
allocating resources to politically sensitive service areas, or managing large scale 
public investments on behalf of the community. The management of that anxiety is 
often located in the 'top team' of an organisation because this is the group that has to 
turn general political policies into strategies and operational plans for implementation. 
Thus, the role of that group and how they manage the task, boundaries and 
relationships will impact on the organisation's strategic leaming capacity (see too 
Diamond(1994)). The role and task of the 'leadership' in relationship to 
organisational learning is considered as important (Argyris and Schon, 1978) yet, 
again, this is an area that receives less attention along with the dynamic nature of the 
'top team' (see Kakabadse (199 1 a) for further discussion on the practice of top teams). 
Filling the gap and increasing our understanding of the role of the 'top team' and 
organisational leaming is the focus of this inquiry. A psychoanalytic approach 
provides a language and framework for understanding how anxiety can impact on 
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social systems be they individuals, groups or organisations. 
3. A psychoanalytical approach to social systems 
A psychoanalytic approach to social systems shares the same analytical paradigm as a 
'systemic conflict framework'. They both see individuals, groups and organisations as 
open, social systems. Thus, as described in more detail in chapter 4 above, social 
systems have inputs, internalise and process what is taken in and then exports its 
outputs. The system is more effective when it can manage its boundaries well. If it 
takes in too much it becomes swamped; whereas, if it takes in less than required, it 
can become starved or inadequately informed or nourished. Similarly, it can export or 
give away everything it has and feel depleted; on the other hand it can excessively 
hold on to its internal, processed material and becomes congested. The nature of 
biological systems, according to Von BertalanfFy (1968), is that they seek equilibrium 
and stability. In a conflict systemic framework, equilibrium, especially in the short 
term, may not be possible and in psychoanalysis it is the very internal systemic 
conflict that gives rise to anxiety and the actions and behaviours that follow. It is 
these dynamics that psychoanalysis is well equipped to understand. 
It has been argued, in chapter 4 above, that while the structures and systems of 
organisations provide a framework for understanding input and output relationships, 
they say less about what goes on in the middle - the intemalisation and processing of 
the inner world of that social system. From a psychoanalytic position, it is argued that 
in periods of change there is greater strategic risk, task complexity and uncertainty. 
Thus, the relational certainty of inputs and outputs falls down, as the combined impact 
of anxiety and uncertainty leads to the breakdown of this 'causal' relationship. Thus, 
in times of change, anxiety and collusive routines might hinder organisational 
learning if they are not appropriately managed through clarity of task, roles and 
boundaries. This is true at the individual, group and organisational level. A theory of 
how this takes place is what follows in the rest of this chapter. 
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4. The individual level 
Psychoanalysis was first and foremost applied to the individual. It has two sources: a 
body of theory and the personal 'analysis' in the consulting room, where a 
collaborative relationship exists between the psychoanalyst and the analysand. 
A psychoanalytic approach to understanding behaviour suggests that actions, motives 
and behaviours are driven by unconscious dynamics outside of normal awareness. 
These unconscious dynamics are a result of past conflicts that arise in childhood as 
part of the normal stages of development and maturation. Thus, in periods of stress 
and difficulty the concomitant anxiety causes the adult to regress and to act 'as if the 
(unresolved) conflicts were still alive. Moreover, these unresolved, unconscious 
conflicts (as well as fixed, poorly processed memories) at childhood express 
themselves in symptomatic behaviour. These form the repetitive and inadequate 
behaviours of unresolved motifs that feed rigidity and block the flexibility needed for 
effective thinking as part of individual and organisational learning (Silberman (1996), 
Freud (1955)). 
These actions are unconscious and act as a defense against re-experiencing the full 
effects and buried memories of the past. 
The management and systemic nature of the individual are carried out by the 'ego': the 
psychological boundary manager and reality tester. 
Freud described the ego as follows: "As regards external events it performs that task 
(of self preservation) by becoming aware of stimuli without, by storing experience of 
them (in the memory), by avoiding excessive stimuli (through flight), by dealing with 
moderate stimuli (through adaptation), and finally, by learning to bring about 
appropriate modifications in the external world to its own advantage (through 
activity). " Freud (1955) p2. 
Thus, the ego is a manager of a system - the individual - that takes inputs, internalises 
them, exports them and learns. The linkages between the notion of external change, 
systems theory, internal conflict, leaming and psychoanalysis are embedded in Freud's 
definition and it is these linkages that are the basis of inquiry for this thesis. 
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The ego manages the reality of the external world and the phantasy of the internal 
world. The ability to do so well and unravel internal conflicts that impact on the 
external world is the purpose of psychoanalysis. 
S. Freud: the father of psychoanalysis 
Freud put these conflicts down to unresolved difficulties during the psycho-sexual 
stages of development. He argued that there were five key stages of development. 
First was the oral phase which is the early stage of the infant where it is dependent 
and its preoccupation is with sucking the breast and oral gratification. The anal phase 
(1-3 years) follows and is said to be about control of faeces and development of 
autonomy. Phase three is the phallic stage (3-5 years) and this is the identification of 
sexual relations with the same sex in the form of rivalry and with the opposite sex in 
the form of desire. The resolution of these conflicts with parents and/or significant 
adults is referred to by Freud as the 'Oedipus complex' from the Greek tragedy where 
the'hero'kills his father and marries his mother. These are the qualities of the 
emotions that are said to exist during this phase of development. It is at this stage, if 
successftilly completed, that the ego is said to exist. 
The successful management of this phase constitutes healthy ego development in 
Freud's terms. The next stage is said to be a latent phase as the child physically 
matures into puberty. The process finally concludes with the genital phase with the 
resolution that sexual relations can take place with the opposite sex who are not the 
parents. The rivalry with the same sex parent/adult subsides and this is channelled 
into other activities. 
According to Freud, people can get unconsciously 'stuck' in any of these phases and 
thus have a predilection for certain types of normal neurosis or in extreme cases, 
psychosis. Cleaning obsessions may be associated with difficulties in the early infant 
days of development (the anal stage). The instinctive drives for life, and, later in his 
work, death (Freud, 1917), were the key drivers in his analysis. 
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Freud was undoubtedly the father of psychoanalysis as he original coined the word 
and contributed extensively through his life on the matter. However, not all 
psychoanalytical models agree with his analysis. The emphasis on the sexual and 
instinctual was a point of contention and other theories, based on Freud, were 
developed. There were three main developments from Freud in the psychoanalytic 
tradition in the UK, reflected in other parts of the world: the Neo Freudians led by his 
daughter Anna Freud; the Kleinians led by Melanie Klein and the independents 
(including the object relations group), see Kohon (1986). These other traditions are 
commented upon briefly. 
Neo-Freudians 
Anna Freud continued in her father's footsteps and retained a'classical' 
psychoanalytical stance. Her main contribution was in understanding children and 
reference here is to her work on ego defenses (Freud, 1966). It was accepted from 
Sigmund Freud's work and others that the way people managed their inner conflicts 
was to try to stop them from coming up and to generally 'repress' them, keep them 
down. This process was said to be unconscious and its purpose was to protect the 
'ego' from experiencing pain and emotional turmoil. 
Anna Freud's work argued that these mechanisms of defense were developed to 
protect the ego. They included 'splitting' off bad feelings from good ones, 'projection' 
of bad feelings of self onto others, 'denial' of painful memories and feelings, 
'sublimation' of difficult feelings into useful work and 'displacement' of these feelings 
into routines and other activities to avoid the difficulties of conflict and pain. These 
were essentially evasive strategies to avoid pain and anxiety while continuing an 
existence that was not entirely rooted in external reality. 
6. Melanie Klein and early object relations 
Another development during the same period was the work of Melanie Klein. Klein 
and her followers (Issacs, Riviere, Heiman - see Klein et al, 1989) argued that these 
inner conflicts arise from internal psychic pain or traumas that result from difficult 
'object relations'. This approach reformulated the 'instinctual drive theory' and 
suggested, as was implied in Freud's later work (1917) that the instinctual drive was 
directed to another - person, event, object - and was there to be gratified for its own 
sake. This difference was a revolution in psychoanalytic thinking at the time. 
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The revolution was literally led by Klein (see Kohon, 1986). Klein built on Freud, but 
her emphasis and analysis were different. Firstly, she was concerned with the early 
phases of development and particularly the sadistic oral phase and anal phases: the 
ambivalent phase. Secondly, she posited the view that the 'ego' was established at an 
earlier age than first suggested by Freud. He put ego development at the age of about 
5 at the phallic stage. Klein suggests the ego was developed by age 2 or earlier. 
"In early infancy anxieties characteristic of psychosis arise which drive the ego to 
develop specific defense-mechanisms. In this period the fixation points for all 
psychotic disorders are to be found... The psychotic anxieties, mechanisms and ego 
defenses of infancy have a profound influence in development in all its aspects, 
including the development of the ego, super-ego and object relations. " Klein (1946). 
Thus, to have ego defenses, there needed to be an ego and from her observations these 
began in'early infancy'. Klein could be mistaken as an anti-Freudian. This is not the 
case. She explicitly acknowledges and develops her hypotheses from his original 
theories and her own clinical psychoanalytic experience with patients. Moreover, the 
notion of object relations is implicit in Freud's later work on the separation of the self 
and the linkages between the Id (the unconscious and untrammelled), the ego and the 
super-ego, which includes the conscious and normative sense of self (intemalised 
parents) and the ego ideal that represented how people liked to see themselves. 
However, it is Klein who puts forward among the earliest and coherent ideas on object 
relations. 
Thirdly, Klein was not only a pupil and follower of Freud but she was also influenced 
by Ferenczi, Abrahams, Fairbairn and Jones (see Klein (1946), Segal (1979), Kohon 
(1986)). Abrahams and Jones encouraged her to develop her own independent 
thinking and it was Ernest Jones, an eminent British psychoanalyst of the time, who 
invited her to England. The logical development of Freud's work and the notion of 
'object relations' formed a new departure in the British psychoanalytical movement 
(Klein et al, 1989). 
Early object relations theory suggests that the development of the ego was a 
consequence of the way the inner world of the infant relates to both its internal reality 
and the external world of the parent, mainly the mother, or mother figure. 
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Klein states: "I have often expressed my view that object relations exist from the 
beginning of life, the first object being the mother's breast which to the child becomes 
split into good (gratifying) and bad (frustrating) breast; this splitting results in a 
severance of love and hate. I have further suggested that the relation to the first object 
implies its introjection and projection, and thus from the beginning object relations 
are moulded by an interaction between introjection and projection, between internal 
and external objects and situations. These processes participate in the building up of 
the ego and the superego and prepare the ground for the onset of the Oedipus complex 
in the second half of the first year. " Klein (1946), p2. 
This quotation reflects the key notions of Klein. The infant develops its first 
relationship with the mother, through its first primary object the breast. The breast, or 
object, is seen as separate from the mother but the infant is very dependent upon it. 
Thus, when it is receiving comfort, milk and warmth, the breast is seen as'good'. 
When the breast is withheld, or slow to appear, it is seen as 'bad'. The infant perceives 
the breast/object as good or bad through the process of 'projection' and 'introjection' 
Projection is a defensive strategy to protect the fragile ego in its development. It is 
the process that occurs when the person's inner world concerns and fears are 'split off 
from themselves and placed onto another person, or object, 'as if it was real to that 
external object. Thus, feelings of fear and inadequacy can be unconsciously 'denied' 
and be put onto others. Instead of acknowledging the butterflies and anxiety in one's 
own tummy, the owner of these feelings shouts at someone else for appearing weak. 
The purpose of this defense mechanism is to protect and relieve oneself from anxiety 
so that the other carries it on your behalf. 
'Introjection! is another unconscious process. It is an internalisation of the external 
world based on the internal pre-occupations of one's inner world. It can 'take in' and 
perceive the 'bad breast! as persecutoryand avaricious. Introjection can also be used 
to retain or'idealise'the good object so as to keep something good to hang onto. 
These processes are 'managed' by the ego. 
In order for the 'object' or other person to carry the anxiety, they must identify, 
unconsciously, with the projection and'intemalise'it. So the person or object then 
takes on the qualities of being fearful, when the source is external. This interplay 
between internalisation or'introjection! and projection forms the kernel of Klein's 
analysis and that is the process of 'projective identification'. 
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Wells (1980) agrees with the view that projective identification is an activity of the 
ego that modifies perception of the object and, in reciprocal fashion, alters the image 
of the self. These conjoined changes in perception influence and may, in fact, govern 
behaviour of the self toward the object. 
'Projective identification' refers to the projection onto the 'other' those split parts of 
ourselves that illicit in others, behaviours and feelings complementary to those left in 
the subject after the split and projection takes place. Thus, for example, sad feelings 
may be split off as a defense against loss and projected onto someone else or some 
psychological object. If the other person identifies with those feelings, then the 
person feels sad and the originator of the projections feels happy and relieved. This 
robs the recipient of their own happy feelings, as they introject the sadness and project 
idealised happiness onto the originator and concomitantly reinforces the originator's 
false sense of happiness. Thus, the conjoined changes in perception and behaviour 
establish a circular and recursive pattern between self and object. 
This process is explained by reference to early childhood development of the ego. In 
the early stages of the infant's life, the process of ego defenses is a combination of 
splitting, denial, projection, idealisation and introjection as it wards itself against 
anxiety in a struggle to protect a fragile ego and develop it at the same time. This 
early phase is termed as the 'paranoid schizoid' phase, mainly because the dominant 
experience of anxiety is paranoia and the defense is schizoid, represented by the 
extensive 'splitting' and 'projections' that take place during this phase. Characteristic 
neuroses for adults'stucle in this phase may be a'compulsive tie to certain objects', 
the fear of 'retaliation', 'artificiality' and feelings of loneliness as one fails to manage 
feelings appropriately and manage boundaries between splitting, projections and other 
defense mechanisms (Klein, 1946). 
Klein argues that, as part of the development process, the infant begins to introject 
and integrate the external object as a whole object and realises it is one and the same. 
On this realisation there is the fear of having damaged and possibly lost the 'good', 
loved object and there follows a sense of guilt. This sense of loss and guilt is called 
the 'depressive phase' by Klein and the infant seeks reparation in an attempt to make, 
good the damage. It is at this phase that the 'persecutory' nature of the early months 
has less of an impact. However, if the ego is unable to manage the continued process 
to 'repaie and the internal anxiety is too great, then the 'paranoid schizoid' phase will 
have to be worked through again and revisited. 
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In addition, it is at this phase where Klein suggests that'Oedipal complex' is 
confronted and the ego developed. However, in Klein' s model there are no clear 
stages of development. She argues that there are phases that people experience and 
re-experience in service of ego development. 
The role of the ego is to retain an appropriate management of the boundary between 
'introjections' and 'projections'. Otherwise as a system, the ego can be depleted, 
congested or swamped and this will weaken ego development and the capacity for 
learning. Projective identification is one instance of inappropriate management of the 
boundary. 
"As regards normal personality, it may be said that the course of ego-development and 
object-relations depends on the degree to which an optimal balance between 
introjection and projection in the early stages of development can be achieved. " Klein 
(1946), p 10/11. 
The object relations school 
The extension of the theory of object relations was developed further by Guntrip 
(1977), Kernberg (1980), Mahler et al (1975), Balint (1986), Bollas (1987), Winnicot 
(1990), Bowlby (1969,1973 and 1980) and Kohon (1986). To do the subjectjustice 
is not possible in this brief discussion and the reader is referred to the above 
references as well as Bacal and Newman (1990) for an extensive overview of object 
relations, Kohon (1986) for a sample of theoretical and clinical debates, Davies and 
Wallbridge (1987 on Winnicott's work, Holmes (1993) on the work of Bowlby and, 
Johnson (1987) on Mahler's work. 
There are four areas of some commonality and application to this inquiry that are 
discussed in a little more detail. These are: the clinical and theoretical disagreements 
with a Kleinian approach; the notion of inner conflict being understood in terms of 
early attachment, bonding and separation from the 'mother' figure; an agreement that 
there are clear stages in ego development and that difficulties in the development of 
the ego is a result of failures in the environment to provide sufficient support during 
the early phases of growing up. 
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Critique of Klein 
Kernberg's (1980) criticism of Kleinians rests on a number of clinical and theoretical 
issues. First, he argues that there is a lack of evidence in the consulting room that 
anxiety is really founded in the death instinct or in oedipal conflict. Johnson (1987) 
also suggests that such an approach does not'fiV with borderline patients. Clinical 
evidence is not unequivocal on this and while the point remains unresolved, it does 
suggest that other approaches may carry their own validity. Secondly, the veracity of 
infant phantasy and projective defenses is questioned. Kernberg (1980) suggests that 
Kleinians pay insufficient attention to "actual developmental factors in the first year 
of life, of the clinical evidence pointing to retrospective falsification of memories and 
to reinterpretation of the past. " Kernberg (1980), p42. 
Thirdly, Kleinians are said to neglect the developmental aspects of the formation of 
the ego. Bion's attempts (Symington and Symington, 1996) to provide a structural 
framework seem to fall outside of the traditional psychoanalytic framework and 
neither is this dilemma explicated by others such as Segal (1979). How does the 
'internal object! - the inner world or inner self - integrate the ego and super-ego? How 
does this explain fixation and regression in people's individual history of 
psychological development? It is felt by critics that Kleinian theory is not explicit 
about this. However, in all fairness, neither does the self psychology approach of 
object relations have much to add on this matter either. It is an issue that is side- 
stepped (Bacal and Newman (1990), p58). Finally, Kernberg (1980) suggests that 
Kleinian ambiguity in technical terms means that it is open to interpretation. 
Thus, differences and development in object relations theory seem to focus on the 
notion of self and the nature of inner conflict, the process of ego development and, 
later, the nature of the child's physical and emotional environment. The rest of this 
section briefly looks at theories of development that take a view that inner conflict 
arises from the nature of early object attachment, the issues that arise from the process 
of separation and the emotional space that either helps or undermines the success or 
failure of these difficult pcriods of transition in early childhood. It is these elements 
that are discussed in considering an object relations approach. 
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7. Post Klein 
Early psychological investment in the object - attachment and 
separation 
Later object relations theorists and psychoanalysts argued that based on their clinical 
experience with patients, Kleinian theory did not account for certain types of neurosis 
- for example those severely detached from their feelings (Johnson (1987), Kernberg 
(1980), Winnicott (1990)). They observed and theorised that the nature of anxiety and 
inner conflict did not stem from the death instinct but in fact was a result of the 
quality of early childhood experience of attachment to the mother (or mother figure) 
and the difficulties and anxiety of separation that took place as the infant developed 
physically. 
The themes that are present in their slightly different orientations start with a common 
base that there is an initial bond with the mother - 'attachment' and 'secure base' 
(Bowlby, 1969) 'symbiosis', (Mahler et al, 1975) and'subjective object' (Winnicott, 
1990). These are put forward based on clinical observations that the child is 
emotionally and physically enmeshed with the mother. 
Secondly, these theories do not present themselves as a new branch in psychoanalysis, 
like Klein, but were attempts to bridge relationships and ideas between Freudian 
stages of development model and Kleinian object relations. The stages of 
development are articulated clearly in Mahler et al 'phases of development', 
Winnicot's'maturatiorf process, Bowlby's trilogy (1969,1973 and 1980) and 
Kernberg (1980). 
Thirdly, the anxiety is said not to be a result of the death instinct but is due to 
transitional phases in development and particularly separation from the primary, 
'loved object'. The anxiety and fear of 'object loss' is what the infant struggles with: a 
fear that the love object will be destroyed or will leave them. 
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The anxiety, due to separation, is ameliorated or aggravated by the way in which the 
primary love object responds to the infant's needs. This provides the fourth element 
that is common to this collection of theories. They argue that the quality and 
constancy of the emotional and physical environment will impact on the ego 
development of the infant. Where parental or'matemal'enviromnent is inadequate 
this will impact negatively on ego development. Where the environment is positive, 
supporting a positive introjection of the good object, then this enhances the 
development of the ego. Such facilitating environments have been referred to as a 
'holding environment'. Thus, the focus of the analysis in explaining the excessive 
nature of ego defenses is found not in the inner world but in the external environment. 
Where the environment is unable to provide adequate containment, support or 
facilitation, then it will be a primary source of poor ego development and it provides 
an explanation as to the psychological difficulties and neuroses that people may re- 
experience in times of adulthood. 
A fuller explanation of each of the theories falls outside of this analysis. However, 
the theoretical and clinical work of Donald Winnicott is used for exposition as it 
provides a framework that shares many of the common elements of what is a broad 
church: it is within the British psychoanalytic tradition of object relations and it 
develops the thesis and inquiry of the dynamics of 'top team's in relationship to 
systemic organisational learning. 
The work of Donald Winnicott 
Donald Winnicott based his work partly on the theories of Melanie Klein but mainly 
on his own clinical observations. He identified that the early object attachment with 
the mother was significant and all embracing: whcre'not me'is not recognised. This 
intertwined relationship was called the 'self-obj ect' where self and other were 
indistinguishable. Winnicott puts it: "There is no such thing as a baby... only a 
couple. " That is the mother and child. 
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As the infant maturates, the management and separation of'self and 'object' occurs 
and the ability to manage this change is a critical stage in the developmental process. 
The ability to empathise, tolerate ambiguity and loss, manage one's own aggression 
are all said to take place at this stage. Winnicott stressed that the success of this 
process was the quality of the facilitating environment and the role of the mother as 
'object-mothee and 'environment mother'. It is the latter that "receives all that can be 
called affection and sensuous coexist; it is the object mother who becomes the target 
for excited experience backed by crude instinct-tension. " Winnicott (1990) p75/76 in 
Bacal p 18 8/189. 
The stage of development is thus seen as important as is the relationship between the 
primary love-object, the infant and the'holding environment'of the mother figure. 
During this early phase the infant's ego is enhanced by the mother's 'mirroring' and 
affirmation of themselves as separate and worthy. This 'space' is between the infant 
and the external reality and provides a healthy mechanism for managing reality. It 
provides a space for play and mastery. It is an illusion but one that holds the 
boundary between the inner world and external reality. It is an 'intermediate' space. 
In reality, the 'object' is often a soft toy or rag doll and the space is the space of 
phantasy. 
The 'successful' completion of these stages leads to the fulfilment of the 'true self - 
that part of us that is real, spontaneous and alive. It is there at birth and is possible 
from some initial 'good parenting'. The 'true self in actuality is harder to define but it 
enlightens our view of the 'false self, which is an ego defense. The 'false self hides 
the 'true self, provides a way of splitting off feeling and is often the result of a 
conditional external environment where the infant learns to adapt to the external 
demands and complies with these demands at the expense of their own needs. 
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A healthy'false self is polite and operates in socially accepted norms. When an issue 
is crucial the 'true self will come through and take up the issue. However, in cases of 
excessive development of the 'false self, it is split off from the 'true self and is 
unable to hold on to the notion of symbols and use transitional space. Instead there is 
no separation between reality and myth and, when out of a role, people with this 
structural defense, lose a sense of self and personal reality (Winnicott, 1990). 
Diamond (1985) suggests how the notion of the false self can undermine one fully 
taking up the role in organisational systems. Table 6.1 draws upon Diamond to 
illustrate the key differences between the 'true' and 'false' self. 
Thus, Winnicott's ideas on object relations take our theory of psychoanalysis a stage 
further. The concepts of attachment, stages of development, the'holding environment' 
and the concepts of 'self provide a comprehensive but different analysis to that of 
Klein. Yet while it is one that shares the same theoretical grounding - Freud - its 
implications are somewhat different. 
These psychoanalytic theories provide different explanations for neurosis and the 
origin of anxiety, which is based on how separation is managed and the response from 
the 'environment' rather than a focus on the inner world. Ego defenses are shared but 
their understanding is different. For example, Kleinians suggest that the infant's 
aggressive posture is part of its nature. A Freudian perspective may put it down to 
sadistic oral behaviour or an oedipal conflict. Whereas a Winnicottian analysis 
suggests it is a result of excessive frustration due to a poor 'environment. 
Furthermore, the concept of a 'false self requires additional caution on behalf of the 
analyst that they are not working with the 'actor' or 'false self rather than the real inner 
person. Excessive dependency may exist in the early stage of such a relationship as 
the transference in the relationship is initially replacing the 'false self with the analyst. 
The quality of the'good enough mother, or'devoted mother', also implies a different 
psychoanalytic intervention where a Kleinian bias for interpretation may need to be 
replaced with an'optimal responsiveness' to the patients needs - especially in the 
early stages. 
102 
Table 6.1 
Two Contrasting Roles for Personal Responsibility 
"As If Performer" "Participant Observer" 
"False self "True self' 
Cannot take personal responsibility Can take personal responsibility 
Lacks intentionally, "I can't attitude" Intentionally, "I can" attitude 
Disconnectedness from actions Connectedness to actions 
Maximum defensiveness Minimum defensiveness 
Engages in projections and distortions Counter-projective remarks 
Security oriented Competence oriented 
Compulsion to repeat mistakes Reflective, leams by experience 
Passive and submissive Collaborative and consensually - validating 
Adaptive to bureaucratic demands Non-adaptive to bureaucratic demands 
Narrow minded Open minded 
Closed to criticism Open to criticism 
Blind loyalty and conformity Questions authority 
Dependency-oriented Relatively independent 
Responds to external authority Responds to internal authority 
Form-oriented, stress formal Substance-oriented, stress informal 
organisational attributes and interpersonal attributes 
Reactive Proactive 
Source: Diamond, 1985 
The use of an object relations approach is favoured as it falls within the broader 
paradigm and model of incorporating the history, context and conflicts of the 
individual, who is also an intra-pyshic system. 
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8. Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of psychoanalytic thought within the British 
psychoanalytic movement. It has suggested that a Freudian analysis was criticised for 
being too instinctual based and the work of Melanie Klein too narrow: no stages of 
development and focused on the nature of the inner world. The works of the object 
relations school have tried, in varying degrees, to bridge some of the valuable aspects 
of both psychoanalytic traditions and address some of the difficulties in their 
formulations and counter-evidence in some cases of psychosis and neurosis. They 
share an agreement on: the importance of the quality of the early attachment; the 
process of development; the view that anxiety and defenses are being driven by 
difficulties in the developmental transition and that these defenses are a function of 
the quality and responsiveness of the primary external object - mother and subsequent 
parental support and, to the emotional support and containment that is provided by the 
'holding environment'. 
The implication for people taking up organisationally sanctioned roles is the ability to 
manage self may relate to their developmental experience and the level of attachment, 
degree and management of object loss and the degree of object constancy. It implies 
that the 'inner self engages in the archaic agenda rather than the reality of the present 
and external reality. Thus, to understand the role holder in organisations - i. e. 
members of the top team - as they engage in organisational change then an analysis of 
their past, object identification, context and role expectations and demands will 
provide some understanding of how these individually and collectively impact on 
learning in social systems. 
The implications of applying psychoanalytic thinking to organisations are extended in 
the next chapter, where it looks at individuals taking up their roles, the dynamics of 
groups and the implications for strategic organisational learning. 
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Chapter 7- The application of psychoanalysis to 
organisational social systems 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the discussion was focused upon the fundamentals of 
psychoanalytic theory in general and object relations in particular. In this chapter, the 
principles and precepts of that discussion are to be used and developed to wider social 
systems which include individuals in organisations, groups and organisations 
themselves. The chapter argues that psychoanalysis can be applied outside of the 
'therapeutic consulting'room to other social systems beyond individual analysis (see 
Stapley, 1996). In adopting such an approach, it does not hold the view that one is 
engaged in the psychoanalysis of organisations. On the contrary, organisations are 
not seen as possessing a'personality' in the strictest sense, nor are organisations to be 
reified. Instead, the organisation is seen as a collection of role holders whose 
systemic and emotional inter-relationships impact on the organisational task and who 
collectively make up the notion of the organisation. 
The areas of theoretical development and application in this chapter are to the 
individual, the group and the organisation as a social system. 
2. The application of psychoanalysis 
The application of psychoanalysis or 'applied psychoanalysis' is argued to be a 
legitimate development to assist our understanding of organisational life. In taking 
such a line of inquiry, it is important to be clear that it is psychoanalytic theory that is 
being applied. According to Edelson (1988): 
"Psychoanalytic knowledge may be usefully applied whenever a discipline faces 
deviations from its own laws, something it cannot explain given its own knowledge, 
and it suspects that its model of the world needs adjusting just where that model 
includes a model of the human mind. " p 164. 
Anzieu (1984) goes further and suggests that: "The task of applied psychoanalysis is 
to discover the specific effects of the unconscious in a given field and the necessary 
transposition of the general method when applied to this field. " p2. 
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Diamond (1994) also adds: "Psychoanalytic organisation theory is not only a 
framework for understanding organisational dynamics: it is a theory for practicing 
organisational. change and development. That is, it is concerned with changing the 
culture of organisations. " p20. 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the application of psychoanalytic theory to 
organisations. Psychoanalytic 'method' and a'clinical method'are also argued to be 
important (Armstrong (199 1) and Edelson (198 8)) and the relevant aspects of that 
approach are discussed in Part three on the research approach and methodology. 
Freud was among the first to recognise that psychoanalysis could be used in everyday 
life and other cultural phenomena (Freud (1901 and 1912), Lapierre (1994) and the 
debate between Amado (1995) and Jaques (I 995a and b)). 
Psychoanalysis helps us understand the component parts of social systems - 
individuals. There are intra-personal, interpersonal and transpersonal relationships 
and dynamics in these wider social systems of which psychoanalysis can ftirther our 
understanding. The key dynamics of 'transference', 'projective identificatiorf, 'ego 
defenses' and understanding the nature of anxiety provide greater insight into 
understanding human behaviour. Such an application to groups of people is readily 
understood and this is discussed in more detail in the next section. However, the 
difficulty is more often in understanding organisations as a whole from a 
psychoanalytic perspective. 
The analogy of the organisation as a person, with the organisation having a 
'personality' (Kets De Vries and Miller, 1984 and 1986) can often lead to 
misunderstandings about organisational life (Edelson (1988) p167 and Armstrong 
(1991)). 
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The notion of the organisation here is a social system which has task(s), roles, 
relationships, structure and boundaries and that these are influenced by the informal 
relationships, the sentient relationships in the group and psycho-social dynamics. 
The approach that is taken in this thesis is that, in addition to the external constructs of 
organisations, the organisation represents various objects of attachment in the minds 
of individuals. Thus, individuals refer to their unconscious constructs of organisations 
and hold these as internal representations. These attachments and internal 
representations (internal objects) are an apperception of the external world (external 
objects). The latter suggests that members of organisations hold unconscious 
organisations in their minds as they perceive their organisational environment and 
these will be based on their past experiences and process of maturation (Armstrong 
(199 1), Hosking and Morley (199 1), Stapley (1996)). In times of change the 
organisation may symbolise past change and transition and the regressive nature of the 
unconscious collectively interacts and impacts on the organisational culture and 
ability for the social system to learn. The dynamics of these psycho-social 
transactions and the impact on organisational learning are discussed in the rest of this 
chapter. 
Finally, in applying psychoanalytic knowledge to social systems, the thesis is 
informed by the 'methodological cannons'put forward by Edelson (1988), p167-170, 
which provide a safeguard and clear limits of the veracity of such an approach. These 
'cannons' are re-visited in the discussion on methodology (Part three, chapters 9-11). 
3. Taking up a role in organisations 
The notion of taking up a role was mooted by Mead in the 193 O's (see Mead (1956), 
Blumer(1966)). He argued from a sociological and subjectivist stance that notions of 
'self had to be seen as a complex interplay of environmental requirements and one's 
internal self image. Thus, the role of father, teacher, friend had attached to it notions 
of social expectations and identity. 
This concept of taking up a role, has a specific meaning in this thesis of the 
organisational roles and legitimate authority that managers are given. This defines 
role holders' tasks, boundaries, level and scope of authority and accountability. The 
role is not the individual. However, the inner world of that person can have an impact 
on the role. 
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Rice (1969) links the relationship between systems theory and the psychodynamics at 
the individual level. He states: "An individual may be seen as an open system. He 
exists and can only exist through processes of exchange with his environment. " p574 
He adds: "The mature ego is one that can define the boundary between what is inside 
and what is outside and can control the transactions between the one and the other. " 
p574. 
In other words the capacity to maintain boundaries, be in touch with reality and hold 
the demands of the role will provide the means to achieve tasks and engage in 
learning as a system. Thus, the management of the ego requires that the role holder 
maintains appropriate role behaviours, mobilises skills and emotions to perform the 
role, and control and suppress other activities that are irrelevant to the task. 
4. The implications for role 
It suggests that, to achieve role performance, the individual manages their'inner self, 
motives and drives. These, often unconscious, inner dialogues can be enacted in the 
form of ego defenses and can either support or undermine learning. 
As managers and organisational members take up their organisational role, there are 
implications for them when the psychoanalytic perspective is extended. It suggests 
that in the increasing flux and change there is more uncertainty, ambiguity and 
complexity. This often gives rise to risk and high levels of anxiety among 
organisational members. In such cases psychoanalytic theory suggests that ego 
defenses are mobilised and the role of the unconscious state of thinking takes a greater 
amount of attention. The inner world of the self is the source of unconscious material 
and it is here that the notion of the internal dialogue predominates and impacts upon 
people's ability to take up their role. Accordingly, the role becomes contaminated by 
the 'self establishing its unconscious and archaic agenda and people as a result 'act 
ouf, where they repeat patterns that belong in the past. They'act out' rather than 
engage in creative problem solving and this has negative implications both for the 
individual and for organisational learning (Diamond (19 8 5), Halton (1994) in 
Obholzer and Roberts, Czander (1993) and Shapiro and Carr (199 1)). 
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In other cases, such as in the workplace, transferential material may evoke strong 
referrals that they appear 'as if they were real and the role holder unconsciously 'acts 
out' the role of sibling, child, authoritarian father, or doting mother. In such cases 
there is a sense of being 'lost in a familiar place' in that the old, defensive routines are 
not applicable in the new, adult and work setting. Yet role holders may not be aware 
of the routines that they are in and, where they sense intuitively, they make the same 
mistakes or are unable to develop new functional and supportive routines (Shapiro and 
Carr, 1991). 
In terms of object relations, the primary object relationships and maturation 
environment would provide fruitful areas of inquiry to help explain the nature and 
cause of the difficulty. The impact on role would then be defined (most likely) by the 
specificity of the context and the demands on the role. This joint perspective links the 
psychodynarnic and the structural and external 'reality' into the analysis. 
Such an approach is developed further in the next section as it applies to group 
development and organisational malaise. 
5. The organisational group 
This section looks at groups from a psychoanalytic perspective and, using object 
relations theory, argues that dominant psychoanalytic models of groups do not 
encompass the whole gestalt of group life. It suggests that the internal dynamics of 
interactions are not enough to explain the dynamics of groups and that the structural 
relations, the stages of development and the environment also have an important part 
to play on the learning of social systems. 
What is a group? A group is a collection of three of more people who share a 
common task and have sense of its membership and boundaries. They can vary from 
large sizes, like a football crowd, to smaller groups of four to fifteen. The area of 
interest for this thesis is the small group which operates as an open social system. 
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There are numerous theories of group dynamics: Bales' interaction theory (1950,1970 
and 1980); Belbin's role approach (Belbin et al, 1976); Tuckman's (1965) stages of 
development are among the many approaches that can be and have been taken to 
understand groups. These include an understanding of the interpersonal nature of 
groups and provide a valuable approach to group dynamics. However, many of these 
approaches have been developed in experimental environments rather than natural 
settings and they fail to address the deeper question of why groups behave the way 
they do. West and Slater (1995) argue that a deeper meaning for understanding the 
group is necessary as many of the stated benefits of groups do not seem to accrue. 
The focus for this inquiry is more on psychoanalytic theories of groups as they 
provide that 'deeper' understanding. For a wider review of groups and other 
approaches readers are referred to Cartwright and Zander (1960), DeBoard (1978), 
Smith (1980), McLeish et al (1973), McGrath (1984), Wheelan et al (1994). 
Psychoanalytic theories of groups 
A short review of psychoanalytic approaches to groups suggests that the work has 
closely followed the developments in psychoanalysis more broadly, as outlined in the 
previous chapter. The work of Freud and Klein was very evident and the development 
of group analytic thinking is particularly influenced by Wilfred Bion. However, there 
are a number of areas that are not covered by Bion's work, which, if developed further 
from an object relations perspective, may deepen our understanding of group life and 
signal new implications for organisational, learning. 
A psychoanalytic approach to understanding groups has to be informed by Sigmund 
Freud's work (1912 and 1921). In Freud's earlier work, Totem and Taboo (1912), he 
applied psychoanalysis to anthropological material and examined the role of the group 
and the leader. He described the group dynamic as the 'primal horde', where a group 
was ruled by an autocratic leader that was killed and replaced by fraternal relations. 
The notion being explored was that of the 'primal fathee - and the omnipotent 
phantasy of castration anxiety. The group is suggested to eat the leader in order to 
gain the powers of the father so that each member has it, while at the same time 
destroy the threat and fear of the castrating and envied father. 
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Later, in Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (192 1), he uses his 
'instinct' driven theories of understanding unconscious motives to suggest that the 
'glue' to hold a group together were the emotional ties and bonds arising from the 
desire to meet'libidinal' needs. He gives the church and the army as examples. In 
both cases they have a clear leader or head; God and the Commander in Chief 
respectively. He argues that the group members 'identify' with and'introject' the 
leader as part of their ego-ideal and thus members share a libidinal tie with the leader 
and therefore with each other. Thus, the group exists from a process of 'introjective 
identification'. 
Freud (1921) summarises his views on groups thus: "A primary group is a number of 
individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal and have 
consequently identified themselves with one and another in their ego. " p80. 
Developments in psychoanalytic thinking on groups 
The key analytic building block that Freud put forward was that personal 
psychology was group psychology. To understand groups we therefore needed to 
understand the individual. This tenet allows a joint analysis of the group and the 
individual and it is an axiom that is incorporated into the analysis that follows. 
Such an approach to group behaviour within a psychoanalytic framework was 
continued by several contributors: Lewin (1947, a and b), Bennis and Shepard (1956), 
Schutz (1955). However, the difference in these models was that the individual drives 
were not 'instinctual', instead the drives were more to do with relatedness to others. 
They were essentially object relational models. Thus, unsurprisingly, given the 
assumption made between individual and group psychology, there is a parallel 
between the development of theory and practice of psychoanalysis at the individual 
and at the group level. The most influential of these psychoanalytic-orientated models 
of groups was that put forward by Wilfred Bion, who himself was in analysis with 
Melanie Klein. 
Bion's (1961) work was based on Melanie Klein's key concepts of anxiety, projective 
identification and ego defenses: for example denial, rationalisation, projections and 
transference of old events of 'hidden memories' and people from the past to the 
present, leading to inappropriate responses to here and now realities. These were seen 
as regressive behaviours, thoughts and feelings and formed the basic conceptual and 
analytical tools for understanding groups from a psychoanalytic perspective. 
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As a psychoanalyst, Bion observed that therapeutic groups operated in a functional 
and task related manner, which he denoted a'work group', and that they also worked 
in dysfunctional ways. The latter group he called 'basic assumption' groups. They 
were given this name because they operated'as if they came together to fulfill some 
other unconscious motif. 
Bion hypothesised three types of basic assumption groups: basic assumption 
dependency (BaD) where the leader was idealised, all powerful and omniscient and 
the 'followers' knew nothing - as no such leader exists the inevitable 'dethroning' of 
the basic assumption leader ensues; basic assumption fight/flight (BaF/F) is where the 
group operates on a war footing with the fight or withdrawal strategy the extreme 
options - the enemy may be seen as external but this may be a defense to the enemy 
being within, reflected in the scapegoat; basic assumption pairing (BaP) works'as if 
two members of the group will provide its salvation and mate to produce a new idea, 
project or leader/Messiah (see too Colman and Bext6n (1975), Symington and 
Symington (1996), Miller (1989), Pines (1987), Menzies (1969) and Lawrence, Bain 
and Gould (1996) for a fuller discussion on Bion's work on groups). 
Two further basic assumptions were later put forward. A fourth basic assumption of 
'Oneness' (BaO), orTusion, was posited by Turquet (1974). In such cases all 
individuality is subsumed by the group. The fifth basic assumption was'Me-ness' 
(BaM) where the group is driven by the opposite force to BaO and it is characterised 
by narcissism, selfishness and individuality (Lawrence, Bain and Gould, 1996). 
These motifs provide a deeper understanding and analysis of what happens in groups 
and suggests a range of other ways of explaining group behaviour and phenomena. 
However, while such an analysis may provide insights into learning groups or 
therapeutic groups, how do such ideas relate to organisations? 
The integration of Bion's work on groups and open systems theory can be seen as an 
attempt to re-integrate Lewin's aspirations for managing the rational and emotional 
sides of change (see too Neumann, 1997). This approach was developed through the 
work of the Tavistock Institute and is captured within the bounds of a socio-technical 
approach to organisational analysis and intervention (see chapter 3). The reader is 
also referred to Miller and Rice (1967), Trist and Bamforth (195 1), Miller (1993) for 
further work in this area. 
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Essentially such an approach regards both the structural and rational aspects of social 
systems and the emotional sides as important. 
The group is also a system, which is directed by a'primary task, a definition of 
boundaries and how they are managed, structured through leadership and authority 
relations and a group culture. The unconscious drives form the emotional and 
psychological text to the group and these either enhance or hinder the group's 
attainment of the 'primary task' and may be substituted by the 'dual' or unconscious 
task where the group takes on a'basic assumption' mentality. This'Tavistock' model 
is comprehensive, integrative and has been applied to organisations for fifty years. It 
has been the dominant one in understanding social systems from multiple 
perspectives. 
However, Bion's formulations may be problematic in their wider application and there 
are some additional factors that other psychoanalytic perspectives could add to current 
thinking. These are explored in the following section. 
Beyond Bion 
Bion's work has a long tradition and value in group relations and systemic 
organisational consultation (Miller (1959,1979,1989 and 1993), Obholzer and 
Roberts (1994), Czander(1993)). However, there area number of issues that arise 
from its Kleinian roots that weaken its application to groups generally and 
organisational settings in particular. 
Firstly, Biods analysis is of the group. Thus, it is not seen as an analysis of 
individuals in the group but of the group as a whole. Such an analysis is valid in its 
own right. Furthermore, Bion acknowledges that members in the group will be used 
by the group as a whole through the process of 'projective identification' and the 
members' individual 'valencies' can be hooked on certain regressive patterns (Bion, 
1961). The group will use the most foolish person in the group (Bion, 1961). 
However, this formulation sits uncomfortably with the notion that individual 
psychology is group psychology, where Bion! s emphasis is primarily on the group 
mentality and not the individual mentality. 
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Secondly, Bion's analysis starts with the'hcre and now'. This arises partly from its 
Kleinian roots that tend to focus on'here and noW projections and transference but 
then goes on to trace the roots of the difficulty to childhood. This compares starkly to 
a Freudian analysis, where a historical perspective is more central to the analysis. 
Furthermore, the brief group work that Bion did was developed in 'therapeutic' groups 
and'temporary learning institutions'. This contrasts with the broader analytic 
framework of a systemic conflict framework, where a historical and developmental 
perspective is essential. 
Thirdly, building on the last point, Bion's approach takes no account of the stages of 
development in a group. In Bion's work, the group goes through different states of 
'mentality' and thinking. Some have attributed the group development stages of 
'dependency', 'fight/flight, 'pairing' and 'work! to Bion (Rosenfeld (1988), Brown 
(1970) in Brown and Pedder (1991), McLeish et al (1973)). However, these are group 
mental 'states', some of which may co-exist. They are not stages of development and 
they tend to resemble the 'positions' of Melanie Klein's theory, rather than the 'phases' 
models of other psychoanalytic approaches. A review of psychoanalytic analysis of 
groups suggests that groups do seem to have phases of development (Rosenfeld 
(1988), McCollom (1990), Wheelan et al (1993), Bennis and Shepard (1956), Foulkes 
and Anthony (1984), Vella (1996) and Brown (1996)). (A fuller review can be found 
in Wheelan et al (1993)). Thus, a psychoanalytical model of groups would better 
inform us if it incorporated such a framework with phases of development. Long 
(1992) cautions that a 'stages of development' model may suffer the problem of 
generalisibility and it may need to be specific in terms of the actual group, and the 
meaning that a system attributes to history and development. Her point reinforces the 
value of bringing context into the analysis but Long (1992) is not conclusive. Foulkes 
and Anthony (1984) share that caution but concluded that every group begins and 
ends and there are a family of similarities among groups that can be seen in terms of 
phases. 
In this thesis these points about group development are well taken and thus'phases of 
transition' are sought as an explanatory feature of groups. The 'transition' phases are 
'spaces'of development and change as the group seeks to fulfill its'primary task!. 
Bion's formulation may be understood as accounting for micro and temporary process 
dynamics in a group rather than stages of structural development in a group (see 
Brown (1996), Stapley (1996)). 
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Fourthly, the nature and source of anxiety from a Klein-Bion axis are based on the 
internal object and insufficient treatment is given to external reality and the 
management of those boundaries. 
Finally, the context and environment are not adequately incorporated in the model. A 
Bioý-type model has been developed in therapeutic and group relations settings. 
Thus, in organisational settings, finther refinements may be necessary - especially 
developing the idea of the organisation as a'holding environmenf. In this thesis the 
context forms an important explanatory factor in helping to understand groups. 
The application of group analytic thinking to 'top teams' in 
organisational systems 
Many of these difficulties in Bion' s formulation of groups can be addressed within a 
psychoanalytic theoretical base, from an object relations perspective. Such an 
approach can be developed further by drawing upon the work of Steven Foulkes on 
group analysis. An account of object relations was discussed in the previous chapter, 
however, the theory and practice of group analysis needs further explanation. 
Briefly, group analysis is the theory and practice of psychoanalytic group 
psychotherapy. It is psychoanalytic psychotherapy of the group by the group; as 
opposed to individual analysis in the group or analysis of the group, as in the case of 
Bion. It shares a number of premises with object relations theory but is group specific 
(Foulkes, 1946,1968a, 1968b, 1968c and 1975). It starts with the assumption that the 
essence of a human being is social and that neurosis is caused by a breakdown in 
relationships. It takes the view that the individual psychology is the group 
psychology and it suggests that the construction of the group is a complex interplay of 
individual and shared transference and projections which form the 'group matri? e. The 
latter operates at multiple levels: the level of the current adult to adult relationships in 
the room; the level of individual transference relationships; the level of projected and 
shared feelings and fantasies, often from a pre-verbal stage of development and, the 
level of the archetypal universal images, reminiscent of Jung's Archetypes of the 
Unconscious (see table 7.1 below). 
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Table 7.1 
A Group Analytic Perspective: the 'group matrix' 
Presented by Group represents 
Current Level Experience in and outside the group Community, 
tr level Interrelationships Society, 
(-- transference in Public opinion, 
broad sense) Forum 
TR Level 
(-- transference in 
specific sense) 
Transference reactions 
Repetition compulsion 
Primary family, 
Present family and intimate 
network 
Projcctive Lcvcl 
(mirror phcnomcna) 
Body Level 
Primordial Level 
(Jung's collective 
unconscious) 
Primitive phantasies 
object relations 
the "intrapsychic" 
shared in the matrix 
Physical manifestations, illness etc. 
Universal symbols 
Inner objects, 
Part objects 
Body-image 
Archaic images 
(e. g. mother) 
Source: Foulkes (1990) 
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Finally, the individual and the group are seen as embedded in a wider social system of 
community and society. Thus, it shares many elements of an object relations 
approach: the notion of object relations, the source of anxiety is'dis-ease'or failure in 
early relationships for the individual, the individual and the group form the analysis 
and the importance of the environment is also recognised. Group analysis also has a 
stages of development model of group formation (Foulkes (1946), Brown and Pedder 
(199 1), Brown (1996), Long (1992) and Vella (1996)). 
Drawing on these two psychoanalytic frames - object relations and group analysis - an 
emerging theory of groups is offered. The following theoretical postulations are: 
1. The group psychology is individual psychology and the group is embedded in a 
wider social system which, for this thesis, is the organisation. 
2. The group operates in a number of modes and at a number of levels of expression 
simultaneously, from the notion of 'reality' in the external space, to deeper shared 
transference relationships. These form the'group matrix'. 
3. The notion of attachment may be explained also at these different levels. The 
'primary' level of attachment is rooted in the past and the experiences of 
individuals in their own process of maturation. Separation and individuation 
conflicts would be the source of anxiety and group members' attendant 
experiences of their'holding environment'. These would form the'primary 
process' thinking of the individuals in the group. The shared nature of this 
'primary process' thinking and the collective transference and projections would 
be the text that underpins the group. This would take the form of group 'basic 
assumption' motifs, group phantasies and the deeper levels of enactment, the 
'latent occupation! of the group in Foulkes' schema (see too Anzieu (1984) 
discussion on the psychoanalysis of groups). 
The 'secondary' attachment would be those that operate in the external reality of 
the present and group task, which brings them together, the group's manifest or 
explicit 'occupatioW. The attachment here would be the psychological investment 
in the task, the group and its boundaries. 
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4. Each group is predicted to go through development, 'transitional' phases in its 
pursuit of the task and personal and group 'maturity'. Drawing on object relations 
theory and group analytic theory, it is suggested that the group goes through 
fusion, attachment, the management of trauma and conflict, integration, 
separation and individuation. 'Maturity'is seen as a place of managing the 
boundary of the inner and external world. These phases are described in more 
detail below. 
5. The context and 'holding environment' for the group is important -where this is 
'good enough! then the group can manage its phases of transition and group 
development. Where the environment may be described as fragmented, turbulent 
or simply 'not there' then the impact will be negative. 
6. Holding environments that are not'good enough! perpetuate individual and 
organisational anxiety, and defensive and compulsively repetitious routines that 
are anti-task and anti-learning (Bion (1961) p86-91). 
6. Implications for groups in context of organisation 
In looking at the implications of this theoretical approach for this thesis it will be 
restricted to the dynamics of 'top teams' and their'holding environment'. Thus, it is 
essentially an analysis of the small group in context. 
The 'top team' is the 'leading' executive subsystem in an organisation. As argued in 
chapters 1,4 and 5, the 'top team's' influence is great and its impact on strategic 
organisational learning will also be significant. New organisational 'top teams' and 
strategic project or task groups may well experience some of the same uncertainty. 
Where groups 'perform' and are able to learn, hold a reality that is reflected of the 
external world and transfer experiences to other settings, it is suggested that the group 
is a learning group. However, the extent to which such development is able to take 
place is significantly influenced by the internal quality of thinking in the group and 
the 'holding environment' of the group. 
Thus, the implications for our understanding of groups is that the 'top team' has to be 
able to manage the boundaries between its internal life and the external demands of 
the environment in order to perform and provide the conditions for strategic 
organisational learning. 
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This analysis forms the theoretical framework for understanding small groups in an 
organisational context. However, before discussing the application of psychoanalytic 
knowledge to organisations, a brief comment is made on another group configuration: 
inter-group relations. 
Inter-group dynamics 
The importance of inter-group dynamics is that it forms the 'space and boundary' for 
larger social systems, like organisations, to manage the primary task of that system 
through smaller, inter-related systems. In considering inter-group dynamics there are 
different configurations that can exist. Reid and Palmer (1972) suggest that sub- 
systems or subgroups can form into diametrically opposing warring factions: 'group' 
and'anti-group'. Where the power basis is relatively equal, this inter-group dynamic 
provides, at an unconscious level, some stability as the rules of the game are well 
practiced. Where power bases are unequal the dynamic would be asymmetric and not 
necessarily as predictable as 'warring' strategies may become varied in scope and 
intensity. In terms of this thesis, the'holding environnient' would also be a factor to 
add to this analysis: either fuelling the war where the environment is 'not good 
enough', or facilitating mediation and negotiation of differences and conflict where it 
is'good enouglf. 
The second type of inter-group dynamic is when a group subdivides into smaller sub- 
groups. However, it is the third area where much of the analysis of inter-group 
dynamics has been undertaken and that relates to multiple groups, which recognises 
the system inter-dependency of most social institutions. 
Inter-group dynamics raise a number of issues. Each group will have its own internal 
dynamics as discussed above and they also have to relate to other'objects, other 
groups (Alderfer, 1987). Where groups are 'mature' or'independent groups'they will 
manage these boundary transactions much better than groups that have a greater 
preponderance of basic assumption activity. 
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The environmental context will have some bearing and this has been discussed at 
length in previous chapters. Yet, in addition to the quality of the'holding 
environment', there are some other facilitating structures that can help manage the 
complexity. Reid and Palmer (1972) conclude: "The management of the inter-group 
transactions therefore entails the exercise of control, through definition of tasks, roles, 
and authority, setting of time limits, allocation of territory, taking of minutes, and 
other activities. Such forms of organisation, like any other, constitute defenses 
against anxiety as well as a means of facilitating constructive activity. A measure of 
the strength of the anxieties which they are intended to control is the frequency with 
which the inter-group transactions degenerate into S-activity (basic assumptions) and 
produce bizarre results. " p 17. 
Reid and Palmer (1972) further suggest that members' ability to manage and accept 
change as part of the process and to tolerate the anxieties of decision-making and the 
attendant feelings of guilt, loss, depression and anger are all part of groups operating 
as 1worle groups. 
Thus clarity about task, time and territory (Miller, 1959) and authority relations can 
help facilitate and provide a good enough holding environment for inter-group 
dynamics to produce 'work' outputs as opposed to the inherent strong pulls for 
regressive, repetitive and collusive dynamics which are anti-task and anti-learning. 
In this thesis the main inter-group dynamic is between the 'top team' and its 'Board'. 
Other groups play a part, but this is the main area of inquiry for this research. 
Large group dynamics 
The concept of large group dynamics often means that members lose themselves in 
the fray of the 'primal hoard' and the individual is subsumed (Freud (192 1), Anzieu 
(1984), Turquet (1974), Gilmore (1997)). They tend to resemble larger social and 
societal dynamics and thus are very different from the small group. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the large group is not discussed as it is not central to our understanding 
in relationship to the focus of our inquiry. The references above provide a fuller 
discussion of this area. 
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7. Organisational level 
This final section looks at a psychoanalytic understanding of system-wide 
organisational dynamics. It argues that an object relations approach assists in 
understanding the difficulties of organisational culture change and the difficulties of 
organisational leaming. In understanding the dynamics of organisational systems 
from an object relations perceptive there are three main conceptual operands. The 
notion of attachment and its symbolic representation in the organisation, the 
organisation as a'holding enviromnenf and the concept of defensive routines at the 
organisational. level. 
The symbolic nature of the organisation 
The symbolic nature of organisations is part of the attachment process. The object 
attachment to the organisation is a feature of'projective identification' and 'introjective 
identification'. This process helps the individual to 'contain! the notion of the 
organisation and provides a symbolic representation of it. Thus, the process is both 
defensive and creative; for those members of the organisation that see the organisation 
as persecutory, such mechanisms are ego defenses. If it is seen in the creative state of 
'illusion' then, as Winnicott (1990) argues, it becomes a vehicle for development: both 
for the role holder and for the organisation as it can be seen as possible for change. 
The organisational culture is argued by Schein (1985) to mean: "... The deeper level 
of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an organisation, that 
operate unconsciously and that define a basic 'taken-for-granted' fashion an 
organisatiods view of itself and its environment. These assumptions and beliefs are 
learned responses to a group's problem of survival and in its external environment and 
its problems of internal integration. " p6. 
Thus, Schein concurs with this analysis that unconscious group processes inform 
organisational culture as the organisation adapts to its environment and addresses 
internal issues of identity. In addition, he suggests that the system has 'learned' 
responses to external stimuli and these by implication become the embedded and 
repetitive routines. 
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Diamond suggests that a psychoanalytical study of organisation can be developed 
from an analysis of the externalisation of these projections. These would be 
evidenced in the organisational history, its artefacts, use of space, espoused norms and 
practices, its groups, subgroups and organisational politics. These are considered for 
inclusion in the emerging model below (see chapter 8). 
However, it is the work of Stapley (1996) that takes this approach further and uses an 
object relations approach to increase our understanding. 
The holding environment 
We have argued that organisations are a function of individual apperceptions and 
social interactions. The notion of organisational culture is a feature of projective and 
introj ective processes and, by themselves, these are neither 'good' or 'bad'. Itiswhat 
these projections symbolise for organisational members and their collective meaning 
that will give them positive or negative attributes. 
Stapley (1996) argues that, as much as the 'mother' provides a'holding environment' 
for the individual, so does the organisation for its role holders. He states: "If the 
holding environment is 'good enouglf, that is (in simple terms), if the primary task is 
clear enough and achievable, the culture that develops will be task supportive. 
However, where for any variety of reasons, the holding environment is not'good 
enougif there may be regression or an anti-task culture. " p 148. 
By implication, where the'holding environmentis insufficient and anti-task, it is also 
anti-learning. 
Stapley goes on to make the distinction between the external and the internal holding 
environment. The external holding environment is essentially the social holding 
environment the real, external objects. Thus, it includes tasks, roles and structural 
assignments of authority and forms part of the open systems of organisations. This 
concords with the notion of the explicit agenda of the group (discussed above in this 
chapter), the 'rational' side of a socio-technical approach (see chapter 3), the 
'secondary process' thinking - all in all the external reality. 
122 
The internal holding environment is basically the psychological holding environment. 
It is the internal objects, phantasies and unconscious dynamics that form'primary 
process' thinking. It is the deeper level of 'latent' occupation for the group and basic 
assumptions that were discussed in the previous chapter and above. The internal 
objects of the internal holding environment form a cathexis with the external objects 
of the external holding environment so that they influence each other. It is here that 
Bion's (1963) notion of the container operates: the ability to psychologically hold the 
inner world. The process may be nurturing or it can be destructive. This concept is 
thus different from Winnicott's notion of the external 'holding environment'. 
Thus, in periods of change the attachment between the two is broken and they are 
subject to new object relating. It is this process that generates anxiety in the 
organisation and leads to a restimulation of poorly worked out past transitions which 
manifest themselves in resistance to leaming, acting out, politicking and dysfunctional 
routines. However, while the difficulty in the internal holding environment explains 
the individual and collective resistance for most members of the organisation, it is the 
failure in the external (and internal) holding environment to provide 'good enough' 
containment that appears to be the real source of perpetual difficulty. The lack of 
containment leads to 'acting out', anti-task and anti-leaming behaviour enacted as 
defensive and repetitive routines. 
Defensive routines 
Groups that have not reached 'independence' or 'maturity', will be more reliant upon 
the external environment (Silberman (1996), Diamond (1994)). The failure of agood 
enough! holding environment means that organisations are unable to contain the 
anxiety in the system and the internal objects of the regressed state of mind 
contaminate external objects. Thus, roles are compromised, there are regressive 
dynamics in the group, there are defensive rituals, collusive routines and the 
organisation is given to social defenses (Menzies (1960), Hirschhorn (1988), Jarrett 
and Kellner (1996)). 
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A'social defense' is a shared, collusive and collective method of dealing with a threat. 
It is a defense against the anxiety caused very much in the same way that an ego 
defense is against individual anxiety. In both cases the source of the anxiety is 
simultaneously past and present: the inability to elaborate and understand (think 
through) one's past often perpetuates the difficulty, leading to a vicious circle of 
unresolved inner systemic conflict and unconscious 'acting out'. This pattern reduces 
the potential for leaming. 
The term 'social defense' was originally coined by Jaques (195 3), using a Kleinian 
analytical framework and then again by Menzies (1960). The key point is that a social 
defense creates a distortion between the social system of the organisation and the 
environment - customers, clients, competitors, sponsors and stakeholders. The 
outside world can become the enemy and the inner world preserved in order to avoid 
confronting the problem. The inner object relations are separated from the external 
ones and the internal phantasies and collusive delusions continue (Hirschhorn (1988), 
Schneider and Shrivastava, (198 8) and Schneider and Dunbar (1992)). 
Menzies (1960) adds: "The needs of the members of the organisation to use it in the 
struggle against anxiety leads to the development of socially structured defense 
mechanisms which appear as elements in the structure, culture and mode of 
functioning of the organisation. A social defense system develops over time as the 
result of collusive interaction and agreement, often unconscious, between members of 
the organisation as to what form it will take. The socially structured defense 
mechanisms then tend to become an aspect of the external reality with which old and 
new members of the institution must come to terms. " p 10. 
These organisational defensive routines can be seen in "repetitive relational patterns 
along horizontal and vertical axes. " (Diamond (1994), p 186). The appearance and 
centrality of such organisational patterns highlight the avoidance of conflict and the 
continued enactment of dysfunctional organisational routines. In such cases, this 
thesis argues that they promote closed and defended systems and it becomes hard for 
individuals, groups and organisations to learn. 
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Thus, the implication for this thesis is that the presence of systemic defensive 
routines and the regressive dynamics in the 'top team' would suggest that 
double-loop, organisational learning at the strategic level is unlikely to be 
realised because the culture and dynamics would be anti-task and anti-learning 
as the social systems put more effort into collusive defensive routines. 
Thus, a psychoanalytical understanding of strategic organisational learning suggests 
that learning is inhibited by poor internal dynamics of the 'top team' and a holding 
environment. This sets up a vicious cycle of defensive routines that is hard to break 
and contain. It is these unconscious and repetitive defenses that are said to undermine 
learning for the individual, the group and the organisation. 
8. Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that a psychoanalytical perspective can be used to increase our 
understanding of the impact of 'top team' dynamics on organisational learning during 
periods of change. It has taken an object relations perceptive and has applied it to 
groups and wider organisational systems. In so doing it has provided different ways 
of conceiving the behaviours, and actions in groups and social institutions and these 
come together to form an emerging theory of social systems. A summary of this 
emerging theory and Part two as a whole is provided in the summary and concluding 
chapter that follows. 
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Chapter 8- An emerging model of organisational 
dynamics; summary chapter for Part two 
1. Introduction 
This thesis aims to understand the relationships that exist between the dynamics of the 
'top team' in organisations and the impact of their behaviour on the organisation's 
capacity to learn from their experience, especially that which arises from the necessity 
to change. In doing so it also aims to address some of the research gaps identified in 
the first chapter in understanding change, the role of the 'top team' and organisational 
learning. 
In addressing the main research questions the thesis has drawn upon a systemic 
approach to provide the language and analytical tools to increase understanding and 
depth in pursuit of the research aims. It suggests that defensive routines in the form of 
ego and social defenses are the features that undermine learning. These are tempered 
by the quality of the 'holding environment' and the group context. A number of 
axioms and propositions have been reformulated from this thesis and led to the 
emergence of a systemic and 'interpretative' model of understanding the relationships 
between change, the'top team'and leaming. A distillation of the argument so far is 
encapsulated in the model that follows. 
2. The key gaps 
The review of the literature, guided by the initial scope of the research, converged on 
a number of key areas of agreement and gaps in terms of understanding the 
relationship between 'top team' dynamics and organisational learning. These are 
briefly summarised from the preceding chapters. 
There was considerable agreement that organisations were a function of bothrational' 
and 'behavioural' dimensions but the emphasis tended to be towards the former, while 
acknowledging the latter. 
Furthermore, the importance of the environment was seen as significant, even though 
there were differences as to what aspects of the environment were important and how 
this impacted on the organisation as a system. 
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Many models followed a 'general systems theory' approach, but again with a 
considerable array of difference in emphasis; from very simple models to more 
complex ones. 
The role of the 'top team' was seen as important in understanding successful change 
and, to a lesser extent, leaming. 
The value of organisational learning was a constant theme in much of the literature, 
varying from implicit in nature to more explicit modelling. However, the definitions, 
'types' of learning, building blocks for leaming and practical outcomes did vary. 
The key theoretical and analytical gaps are as follows: 
* Most of the work on understanding change dynamics is within the'strategic 
choice' framework rather than the 'systemic conflict! framework. 
This means that the organisational dynamics of conflict, organisational politics, 
the subjective experience of uncertainty and the drives and reactions that are 
generated are often missed. 
While there has been much discussion on the important role of leadership in 
facilitating learning (and change) there has been little formalised theory on how 
these key parameters relate. 
Furthermore, there are fewer contributions that work outside of the mainstream 
approach to organisational analysis that takes a 'normative' and 'traditional' 
approach. Thus, there is a gap in looking at the deeper level of psycho-social 
dynamics within organisations and its impact on learning. 
Where there are contributions that cover these areas, there is a gap in looking at 
the group or organisation'in situ', or in context: where the dynamics under study 
arise out of an on-going, live organisation. The exceptions to this tend to be 
consultancy-based experiences with little, if any, formalised theory to support 
their observations, reflections or conclusions. 
In conclusion, there are few integrated, theoretical approaches that provide a 
deeper level analysis of the organisational. dynamics involved between 'top teams' 
and organisational. learning. 
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In focusing this thesis to address these areas there are three levels of frameworks that 
have been used. They are: 
A'systemic conflict' paradigm, which sees organisations as complex, social 
systems that are inherently conflictual and where they can be understood 
systemically in terms of internal inter-relationships, underlying dynamics and 
recursive pattems of behaviour. 
A processual model of understanding organisations, which falls within the 
systemic conflict framework, builds upon later (contingency) systems theories and 
sees context, history and politics as key elements of organisational identity and its 
dynamics. 
A psychoanaly-tical approach is a tool of cultural analysis to understand the latent 
and micro-dynamics of people in their organisational. roles as directors, within 'top 
teams' and, for larger systems, within the organisation as a whole. 
Together these three analytical lenses provide focus to addressing the issues of 
research gaps and some answers to the research question. 
3. The research question 
A brief reminder is provided of the research question before discussing the emergent 
theory and the working hypotheses that follow. 
The over-arching research question was: 
"What is the impact of the 'top team's' internal dynamics on the task of strategic 
organisational leaming? " 
Specifically, the question explores the following: 
* The team's task effectiveness 
The team's internal dynamics 
The nature and quality of strategic organisational learning 
The impact of the teanYs context on its boundary management and thus its capability 
to leam. 
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Thus, there were four sub-research questions: 
Task- effectiveness 
"How does the 'top team' see its effectiveness as reflected in its ability to manage its 
task and boundaries? " 
The nature and quality of the internal dynamics 
"How far are the internal dynamics of the 'top team' dysfunctional? " 
Organisational learning 
"To what extent is there strategic organisational learning? " 
The impact ofcontext 
"How far does the context of the team - including the relationship with the Board - 
impact on its process of boundary management and the space that provides for 
successful learning? " 
These were the questions that have framed the inquiry. An outcome from the review 
is that while behavioural and cognitive models are useful, 'interpretative' models 
provide greater depth. Depth of understanding is the goal of the research and thus the 
emerging model and subsequent methodology seeks to take that goal into account. 
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4. The emerging model 
This chapter goes on to make the links between the rational and the subjective 
dynamics of change and transition by applying psychoanalytic and systemic thinking 
to organisations as social systems. It has been argued in chapters 6 and 7 that the 
unconscious and psychological dynamics will impact on the 'primary' and explicit task 
of the system and, unless supported by a facilitative 'holding environmenf, it will lead 
to regressive defensive routines for individuals, groups and the systems as a whole. 
The impact of these routines is that they will impact negatively on the organisational 
task and reduce the capacity for double-loop learning at the strategic level. It is at this 
boundary that the notions of the 'top team' being a 'mature' or 'independent' group is 
critical for strategic learning. It requires that the group is able to manage the 
boundaries of the internal and external world, be in touch with reality, manage their 
collective anxieties and subsume these anxieties to 'work! in order that the 'top team' 
can be the container and 'holding environment' for themselves and the staff (see 
chapter 5). It requires the strategic subsystem, the 'top team', to provide optimum 
boundedness for there to be strategic organisational leaming. 
The task of the 'top team' is supported or hindered (or both) by their relationship with 
their external environment, including the Board. That authority not only provides and 
models a 'holding environment' for the group, but also forms the crux of an important 
strategic inter-group dynamic between policy on one hand and strategy and 
implementation on the other. The resultant impact on the 'top team' is argued to be 
significant in that it forms part of theliolding environment'. How these dynamics are 
inter-related are surarnarised under the following postulates. 
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5. The psychodynamics, of 'top teams' and their impact on 
strategic organisational learning 
The dynamics 
In this thesis, organisations are construed as complex and dynamic social 
systems. They have rational and psycho-social elements to them. In order to 
understand the process of change and transition both of these components need to 
be taken into account. 
2. The rational elements of task, structure, resources and constraints provide an 
initial understanding of organisations. However, these have been shown to be 
insufficient in helping to understand the dynamics of change in the post-industrial 
age of rapid change and a turbulent environment. These 'rational' models, 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4, tend to assume a steady state environment, where 
people's motives are less important and are thus incomplete. 
3. The rationalist 'strategic choice framework! is insufficient and the 
acknowledgement of the conflict, complexity and uncertainty of organisational life 
suggest that a'systemic conflict framework' provides a better paradigm to 
understand these organisational and social phenomena. A systemic framework 
also provides a framework which identifies how 'strategic learning' is inhibited by 
'defensive routines' and how these might be understood from a deeper 
psychological analysis 
4. Within that framework, the application of psychoanalysis provides another, 
deeper understanding of change and leaming. It goes beyond the manifest 
behaviours of organisational dynamics and seeks to understand the latent meaning 
and text of people's actions. It suggests that the role of the unconscious provides 
a deeper insight and understanding of organisational dynamics. 
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5. Psychoanalysis posits that the source of the unconscious motif is unresolved, un- 
worked through memories that are not fully elaborated and understood and that 
these are formed during the natural process of maturation. The more elaborated 
(cognitively) is the experience, the more there is for thinking and understanding. 
The less elaborated (and, in the general sense, traumatic), the more it fuels 
repetition at the expense of thought. There will always be an element of 
transferential and regressive enactments due to the quality of 'elaboration' 
(Silberman, 1996). As adults these past emotions and thoughts are unconsciously 
re-surfaced in periods of stress and anxiety provoking activities and the adult 
regresses. This process is unconscious and it is a functional ego defense to 
protect the person from 'pain' and 'unpleasant memories'. However, the impact 
can be negative as people use a variety of defense mechanisms, such as projection 
and transference, to avoid the pain and inner conflict. The result is often the 
problem lies with someone or something else; but not with them. 
6. There are a number of psychoanalytic theories proffered as to the source of this 
inner conflict. The psychoanalytical approach that is used in this thesis is based 
on object relations. Object relations suggests that the difficulties that people 
experienced in their child development were not just about their instinctual drives 
but were more about how they formed relationships with others and the 
development of their inner self. The failure or difficulty to form an attachment 
with the earliest maternal caretaker may be the result of a poor, matemal holding 
environment'. It was the interaction between the inner self and the failure of 
'good enough' care and emotional support that led to the inner conflict and 
difficulties. 
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7. The implication of this is that it helps to understand how people take up their role 
and manage their authority. Systems and structural roles can be undermined by 
the individual's inner world of doubt and personal projections of what it has to be 
like to be a manager - 'superman' or 'superwoman'. The reality of imperfection, 
managing one's own anxiety and operating from a well-developed ego, goes 
some way to reducing the regressive dynamics for people in organisational roles 
and helps them to take up the role and authority that the organisation invests in 
them. The wider implication for the group or institution is that, where the inner 
world dominates, it contaminates the role and distortions take place in 
organisational relationships. It can also undermine a'good enough'holding 
environment and the capacity for self-insight and learning because of excessive 
defensive routines and group or ego phantasies. 
8. Organisational groups are systems that have a task, boundaries and time horizons. 
Applying a psychoanalytic perspective to groups suggests that the group may be 
subject to collective projective and transferential relationships and dynamics. 
Groups will have ways of thinking and enacting these and they take place within 
the 'group matrix, the broader organisational dynamics which comprise the 
collective projections and introjections of its members. These can impact 
negatively both on the group task and on group learning if they are not supported 
by a good enough'holding environment'. It is taken in this thesis that a'good 
enough' holding environment is not a perfect environment, but one that 
minimally holds clear tasks and boundaries and provides a space that enables the 
group to look at processes and allows the group to think. 
9. The implication for groups, especially the top team, is that the strategic boundary 
is the place where that'top team's'intemal and systemic dynamics will impact on 
the organisation's strategic learning. It implies that if the dynamics as described 
are dysfunctional then we would expect learning to be impeded. Where the group 
was a 'mature' or independent group, then we would expect the likelihood of 
double-loop strategic organisational learning. In the latter case the boundaries 
would be'optimally bounded'. 
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10. Finally, the link between change, organisational dynamics and organisational 
learning is seen to be complete. The discontinuity in task and structure due to 
organisational change causes a disassociation and an object transitional phase for 
individuals and groups in the organisation. Where the environment is unable, for 
whatever reason, to provide a process to facilitate change or a transitional space, 
then collusive and recurring defense routines will be observed. These mask 
conflicts and serve the organisation as a collective defense against the object-loss 
of the old structure and culture and its meaning for those members. In such cases, 
the organisation is unable to engage in double-loop learning. 
These themes from the emerging model suggest a number of working hypotheses and 
these are presented in the next section of this summary chapter. 
6. Working hypotheses 
The literature review suggests that integrating the psycho-social dynamics into 
understanding organisational change and learning provides a greater understanding of 
what is happening and therefore has implications for how it is managed. Four initial 
propositions follow from the theory and are put forward for further development in 
Part four, where case studies are discussed. 
Simply stated the propositions being explored are: 
9 Organisations are influenced by the nature of their environment which, in the case 
of public sector organisations, was in a period of rapid change. 
The capacity for strategic organisational learning is a function of the 'top team's' 
ability to manage the boundaries between the internal systems and the external 
environment without being 'under-bounded' or'overbounded'. 
* The dynamics of the 'top team' are a feature of the psychodynamics of its 
members, reflected in the 'group matri)e. 
* Defensive routines are the underlying dynamics that undennine 'strategic 
organisational leaming' 
e The role effectiveness of individual'top team'members is a feature of their ego 
defenses, or defensive 'inner dialogue' 
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The impact of these five aspects is the specific areas of inquiry in understanding 
organisational learning. 
Organisations are influenced by the history of the organisation, its economic and 
socio-political context and the internal politics, or intra-group object relations. Thus 
there is an external and internal impact on the organisation. 
Working proposition 1- Organisation and the impact of the external 
environment 
If the environment is turbulent, then organisations' ability to learn will be reduced. 
Theory suggests that a turbulent environment impacts negatively on the organisation's 
ability to learn where the context is rapidly changing, because it impinges on the 
boundaries of task and territory and creates uncertainty and ambiguity. This generates 
anxiety and fear of object loss which in turn are perpetuated by a turbulent 
environment. At worse, a vicious cycle begins that makes it difficult for the system to 
scan, interpret and share its learning or take action to stop the downward spiral. The 
impact is to undermine task attainment and learning at the strategic level - the 
boundary between the organisation and its environment is diminished. Where 
organisations are 'over-bounded' they become closed to effective scanning and 
therefore learning. Where organisations are 'under-bounded'leaming may be lost or 
fragmented. 
Working proposition 2- Boundary management 
If the 'top team's' boundaries are poorly managed then its ability to achieve strategic 
organisational learning will be limited. 
The ability of the group to manage its own boundaries would impact on its capacity to 
learn. Where boundaries are poorly managed and are either too closed, or let others 
set the agenda, the system had less chances of leaming. 'Underbounded' systems are 
characterised by loose goals, multiple agendas, rivalry and difficulties with authority. 
They are more likely to be swamped by others' agendas and learn in a fragmented way 
- genius group, a bunch of idiots, or both. Groups that areoverbounded'are 
characterised by very specific goals, authoritarian authority relations and object 
identification and 'dependency' basic assumption motifs. 
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Such groups are likely to constrain their leaming to lower levels of leaming, if 
efficient or working in an excessively stable enviromnent; or in a defensive or 
dysfunctional, turbulent enviromnent. 
Working proposition 3- The dynamics of the group 
If there is a predominance of basic assumption thinking in the group, this is likely to 
impact negatively on strategic organisational. learning. 
Theory suggests that basic assumption thinking modes are both anti-task and anti- 
learning. These motifs interfere with the group's capacity to think and address the 
group task. Thus, in addition, the process of scanning, the mentality and fantasies the 
group uses to understand the external world, the process of sharing and 'learning' will 
be distorted. 'Learning' in such cases will be constrained, repetitive, or, in extreme 
cases, chronically dysfunctional. 
Working proposition 4- The individual and role in group 
If senior management role holders are unable to contain their anxieties and primal 
memories, this is likely to contaminate the role and its boundaries. This will reduce 
strategic organisational learning. 
In environments that do not provide sufficient 'holding' these form agroup matrix' 
which hook individual's inner worlds and make for rigid role definitions of members 
within the group. This occurs through a process of projective identification, 
transference and repetitive defensive routines. 
Psychoanalytic theory suggests that there is a relationship between one's past and how 
one behaves as an adult. In terms of the research question, it is how these internal 
histories and dynamics impact on how one exercises one's role in the workplace. 
The proposition is that past conflicts impact negatively on how members take up their 
role(s) in 'top teams' if they are unable to contain their own anxieties. In cases where 
the 'holding environment' is not good enough, this is more likely to spill over into the 
group and impact negatively on the dynamics of the group. 
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This is because the inner reality is not sufficiently contained and the external 
environment - the group - is not cohesive, or is in conflict. If team members are able 
to understand and have insights into their own'inner dialogue' and conflicts and still 
contain their anxieties, the impact of the external holding environment will be less, 
but indeterminable. 
These are the guidelines and basis for our further inquiry and are the questions that 
one seeks to address and understand in considering the case studies. 
This part of the thesis is now concluded and it provides a theoretical underpinning to 
exploring the research approach in Part three and the case material in Part four. 
7. Conclusion 
The thesis has developed a systemic model of understanding organisations and the 
relationship between 'top teams' and 'learning' based on psychoanalytic principles 
which provide greater insight and deeper understanding than current dominant 
theories of organisational. change and leaming, which tend to be behavioural or 
cognitive (Diamond (1986), Hendry (1996)). 
In many ways the emerging theory is one of why organisations do not learn at a 
'sophisticated' level. However, as a model within a systemic conflict framework, such 
an outcome is not unusual. Thus, we have a theory of why not. 
It suggests that these defensive mechanisms operate first at the individual level but 
that they are replicated also at the group and organisational level. There is an on- 
going interaction between all levels of the system and that is also influenced by the 
quality of the 'holding environmenf. The theory suggests that the system task and 
structure provide some containment but these can be undermined by defensive 
routines and a poor 'holding environment'. 
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The inquiry is focused on the 'top team' as a group in context as it addresses the 
strategic and learning domains of this research. It implies that the gr6ater the group's 
ability to work at and manage the boundaries of its task, the more likely it will achieve 
a higher level of strategic learning than those that do not. These are the features of an 
'independent' or 'mature' group. Thus, there is a link between how the group manages 
its 'boundedness', the psychodynamics of the team as a group and as individuals and 
its impact on strategic organisational learning. 
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Part Three - Undertaking the research 
Chapter 9- The research philosophy and approach 
1. Introduction 
This chapter proposes a research philosophy and orientation that is consistent with the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions implicit in the theoretical constructs of 
the organisation and the role of the social agents within it. After a brief recap of the 
key points in Part two, it goes on to argue that, given the theoretical underpinning of a 
'systemic conflict' and psychoanalytical approach, the philosophical orientation of this 
study falls essentially within a'constructivist' paradigm. Thus, the orientation of the 
thesis takes a phenomenological and qualitative approach using case studies. This 
orientation informs the strategy, design and methodology of the thesis, which seeks to 
understand, explain and develop further working hypotheses about the nature of 
organisational dynamics as reflected in'top team' process and their impact on strategic 
organisational. learning. 
Key points from Part two 
The argument thus far suggests that the 'subj cctive' element of organisational change 
has been neglected, poorly understood and under-researched and this represents a gap 
in the understanding of organisations as social systems (chapters 1-3). 
In understanding the dynamics of change and learning, this thesis has theorised 
organisations as a system of cultural, structural and social dynamics - both conscious 
and unconscious (chapters 4 and 5). It has been argued that these dynamics are 
influenced by the 'top team' and that opportunities for strategic organisational learning 
are hampered by defensive routines (chapter 5). A deepened understanding of 
defensive routines is offered from taking a psychoanalytic perspective. 
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Briefly, a psychodynamic approach perspective has its origins in psychoanalytical 
theory and its application to social systems was described in chapters 6 and 7. The 
main thrust of such an approach argues that the behaviour of adults is rooted in their 
childhood. The anxiety and neurosis that arises from difficult work situations and 
tasks induces an unconscious regression and a pattern of internal defense mechanisms 
are evoked to prevent re-experiencing those early developmental psychological 
emotions. There are a range of such defenses that operate unconsciously, e. g. denial, 
'splitting', projection, sublimation, repression. 
These defenses also generate unconscious group fantasies (Beres (1962), Anzieu 
(1984), Morgan (1986)) which lead to shared 'mindsets' and myths that form a 
'psychic' and social reality for those involved. These collusive, yet unconscious 
behaviours, protect the worker or manager from the 'pain' of 'reality' and can lead to 
apparently irrationally driven behaviours, which undermine task and learning (Bion, 
1963). 
An emergent model was put forward in chapter 8 that proffered a framework to 
understand systemic and unconscious dynamics for individuals, groups and larger 
social systems. A series of working hypotheses followed. 
A full discussion on each of the hypotheses are in chapter 8 but they are briefly 
reproduced here. The hypotheses were: 
Working hypothesis I- Organisation and the impact ofthe external environment 
If the envirorunent is turbulent, organisations' ability to learn will be reduced. 
o Working hypothesis 2- Boundary management 
If the 'top team's' boundaries are poorly managed then its ability to achieve 
strategic organisational learning will be limited. 
e Working hypothesis 3- The dynamics ofthe group 
If there is a predominance of basic assumption thinking in the group, then this is 
likely to impact negatively on strategic organisational learning. 
e Working hypothesis 4 -The individual and role in group 
If senior management role holders are unable to contain their anxieties and primal 
memories, this is likely to contaminate the role and its boundaries. This will 
reduce strategic organisational learning. 
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These are the guidelines and basis for our ftirther inquiry and are the questions that 
one seeks to address and understand in considering the case studies. These working 
hypotheses provide guidelines for further inquiry. Finally, they are also informed by a 
psychodynamic understanding of social systems. 
How one approaches the epistemological questions from such a theoretical 
underpinning is important as the response will influence the strategy, design and 
methods that are used. Thus, the next section looks at the orientation of the research 
and its epistemological implications. 
2. Research orientation: reality and frames of reference 
The role of the subjective 
The aim of this thesis to develop and deepen understanding of the dynamics that 
operate in social systems and particularly the relationship between 'top teams' and 
strategic organisational learning. This level of deepened understanding of these 
relationships was identified as a gap in the research (see chapter 1) and one that has 
been further neglected in literature in understanding change and organisations (see 
chapters 3 and 4). Thus, as suggested in Part two, the role of the subjective, the nature 
of conflict and the psycho-social dynamics are poorly understood. As a primary aim 
of this thesis is to understand and explain such dynamics, the research orientation 
should be congruent with the research purpose and those theoretical assumptions. 
The dynamics of social systems appear to have their own internal logic that needs to 
be understood from the point of view of its members. 
Czander comments on this point: "The efficiency and effectiveness of an organisation 
are influenced by the conscious and unconscious motivations or wishes that underlie 
the capacity to engage in the work involved in these three variables. " (Czander (1993) 
p 182. ) 
Michael Diamond goes further and likens the nature of understanding social systems 
to a psychoanalyst in relation to a patient. He argues it is notjust the application of 
the theory but it is also its practice. 
"Psychoanalysis is a theory of interpretation for understanding the significance of 
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human feelings and actions. Its application to examining organisational life moves us 
beyond the scientific search for observable facts and truths; rather it offers a theory 
and practice for ascertaining the meaning of human relations and experiences at work 
- meanings found in the unconscious and latent processes of social systems. 
"... (It) attempts to locate the intent of human experience by focusing on psychic 
reality in contrast to objective reality... referring to subjective and, especially, 
unconscious meaning. " (Diamond, 1994) 
The subjective experience of organisational. actors becomes all the more important 
when we try to understand the complex relationships, actions and dynamics in 
organisations. Why do people become 'blockers', or intransigent, when on the surface 
of things all is rational and logical? 
In order to understand and explain rather than predict, or simply describe, these social 
phenomena, the research orientation has to be able to surface the experience, latent 
meaning and reality of the social actors under study. 
The choice of research orientations 
There are a number of research orientations that can be taken to further the aims of 
this research. An initial dichotomy is one bctween'subjectivist' and 'objectivist' 
orientation. Morgan and Smircich (1980) suggest that the chosen approach is not 
simply based on matching the qualitative approach to the 'subjective' and a 
quantitative approach to the 'objective'; it is more complex than that. They state that 
such a debate, which has long plagued social scientists, has missed the mark. The 
nature of the research orientation, they argue, is the product of ontological 
assumptions, assumptions about human nature, the basic epistemological stance, the 
favoured metaphors and the resulting research methods. 
They follow a schema that is also adopted by Burrell and Morgan (1979) and both sets 
of authors concur on this point. The differences and implications of this are 
summarised from Morgan and Smircich (1980) in table 9.1 below. 
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Table 9.1 
The Underlying Assumptions Characterising the Subjective - Objective 
Debate in Social Science 
Subjectivist Objectivist 
Approaches to Approaches to 
d Social Science Social Science I 
Core reality as a reality as a reality as a reality as a reality as a reality as a 
Ontological projection of social realm ofsymbolic contextual field concrete concrete 
Assumptions human imagination construction discourse of information process structure 
Assumptions man as a pure man as a social man as an actor man as an man as an man as a 
About spirit, conscious. constructor the the symbol user information adaptor responder 
Human Nature ness being symbol creator processor 
Basic to obtain to understand how to understand to map to study systems to construct a 
Epistemological phenomenological social reality is patterns of contexts process, change positivist 
Stance insight revelation created symbolic discourse science 
Some transcendental language game, theatre, cybernetic organism machine 
Favoured accomplishment culture 
Metaphors text 
Research exploration of hermeneutics symbolic contextual historical lab experimcntsý 
Methods pure subjectivity analysis analysis of analysis surveys 
Gestalt 
Source: Morgan & Smirack, 1980 
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In comparing the theoretical discussion of Part two of this thesis and the research 
aims, this work falls far more in the subjectivist sphere than the 'objectivist' domain. 
The reason this follows is because the primary construct for understanding the 
defensive and systemic routines is psychodynamic. Such a process requires a deep 
understanding of the people involved and therefore the ontological assumption is that 
reality is socially constructed from individual's experience as represented especially in 
the 'group matrix'. 
The implied assumptions about human nature fall within the boundaries of people as 
social actors - interpreting symbols and their contextual culture - and as those who 
create their reality. An object relations model falls much more in the latter boundary 
and this is also true for understanding the manner in which social systems have been 
theorised as articulated in chapter 8. The notion of an 'external' reality is evident in 
the model. However, the approach to how that is constructed and managed by those 
within the system has tended to be a salient feature in this inquiry. 
The basic epistemological stance is that the thesis aims to understand how social 
reality is developed. While the extremes of the epistemological range are clear (see 
table 9.1), it is less defined in the centre and there may be grounds for difference. 
However, there is general agreement in discussing the philosophy of research inquiry 
that the notion of scientific rationality and order can be challenged as abstractions 
(and therefore mind creations) of reality. Thus, by simplifying theories to replace 
complexity, our understanding of the natural world becomes more opaque 
(Feyerabend (1993), Morgan and Smircich (1980), Blaikie (1993)). 
Blaikie (1993) further re-visits the argument over a decade later and argues that the 
choice between methods rests on ontological and epistemological assumptions. He 
extends the debate but comes down to two perspectives: a 'realist' orientation and a 
'constructivist' orientation. These tend to support an 'objectivist' and a'subjectivist' 
position respectively (see table 9.2 below). He develops and critiques the research 
approaches that can be taken and concludes that it depends on the nature and aims of 
the research. 
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Table 9.2 
Choices Between Methodological Issues 
Issue Alternative Positions 
Nature of reality Constructivist Realist 
Multiple Single 
Starting point Observation Theory 
Laylanguage Technical language 
Inside Outside 
Role of language Constitution of social activity 1: 1 correspondence with reality 
Lay accounts Fundamental Irrelevant 
Authentic Corrigible 
Situational Trans-situational 
Social science accounts Specific in time and space Generalizable across social contexts 
Researcher Subject-to-object Subject-to-object 
Involved Detached 
Reflective partner Outside expert 
Objectivity Relativist Absolutist 
Dynamic Static 
Theory of truth Consensus Correspondence 
Pragmatic Political 
Aim of research Understand Explain 
Change Evaluate 
urce: Blaikie (1995) 
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Some research can be purely exploratory and this is important as it is hard to start to 
predict before we can explore and understand the regularities of social phenomena; 
other research is more focused on prediction. The latter tends to be more in the 
crealist' realm, whereas the former is in the 'constructivist' frame of reference. 
Finally, Easton (1994) provides an axiology of research aims: exploration; 
description; explanation; prediction and control; and action. This thesis aims to build 
theory and using Easton's schema this thesis is focused on understanding and 
explanation, through the process of describing. It does not start without a theory, but 
the theory it puts forward is tentative and it develops a series of working hypotheses 
in order to understand the nature of social systems, rather than to test them for causal 
relationships. 
The work is not seeking to evaluate nor develop firmly held relationships between 
variables, such as in a causal study. Easton (1994) concludes that there are four 
epistemological orientations: positivism; conventionalism; realism and 
constructivism. 
Positivism is considered as purely descriptive and it is value free. Its ontological and 
epistemological assumptions are within the 'objectivist' realm and it sees no difference 
between the human and material world. This approach tends to be based on deductive 
testing of complex theory with a desired outcome of generalisation. 
Conventionalism suggests that reality and knowledge are based on convention. What 
these conventions should be (philosophy) or are (the sociology of knowledge) is not 
obvious says Easton (1994). He concludes, however, that such an approach holds 
only one view of the world and thus it shares a limited construct of the world. 
Realism suggests: "There is a reality out there to be discovered". The use of 
alternative theories to discover this 'trutIf is the epistemological stance. 
Constructivism is related to relativism. Human beings are different to each other and 
are central to the research inquiry. Easton (1994) suggests that: "The reason why 
relativism occurs is because reality is psychologically and socially constructed. " 
Finally, Burrell and Morgan (1979) have a schema of four orientations to research - 
again based on the ontological and epistemological assumptions. Their 'interprctisf 
paradigm supports the 'constuctivist' aims and theoretical assumptions of this thesis. 
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A constructivist orientation 
This short overview of research orientations has identified some common themes and 
has highlighted a broader set of considerations beyond the old debate among social 
scientists about the value of a quantitative versus qualitative approach. The latter 
tends to focus on methodological issues when in fact both types of methods can have 
a place within different traditions or orientations (Morgan and Smircich (1980), Lee 
(1989), Hassard (199 1) and Easton (1994)). 
From the above discussion it is concluded that the central factor that informs the 
choice of research orientation seems to depend on the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions that are held. A range of related orientations were briefly discussed and 
there is agreement about the extremes - positivist orientations at one end and 
constructivist at the other. Qualifications to these extremes are provided by Easton 
(1994), Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Hassard (199 1) who show different 
approaches can be used for different Purposes. It is not that one is better than the 
other, it is how the approach supports the purposes of the research. 
In this thesis, the ontological and epistemological assumptions fall essentially in the 
constructivist research orientation as it fulfils and supports the aims of the research 
and theoretical constructs over other approaches. It draws extensively upon that 
approach and as Blaikie (1993) suggests, it is the locus of the orientation that is the 
core to the positioning of any study. Thus, it is a constructivist orientation that is used 
and this influences and informs the research strategy and methodology. 
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3. Research approach and strategy 
Introduction 
The approach to the research seeks to retain the integrity of the theoretical framework 
and the research orientation of a 'constructivist' approach. It also seeks to address the 
over-arching research question, which is: 
"What is the impact of the 'top team's' internal dynamics on the task of strategic 
organisational learning? " 
The "causal" link between these was discussed in chapter I and in the working 
hypotheses of chapter 8. They suggested that both the environment and the dynamics 
of the 'top team' could impact on organisational leaming. Where the environment 
was turbulent, or internal dynamics 'poor', then strategic organisational learning 
would be lessened and the likelihood of achieving 'double-loop' leaming would be 
very low. 
The research questions were broken down into four sub-questions. These covered: 
Task effectiveness 
"How does the 'top team' see its effectiveness as reflected in its ability to manage its 
strategic task and boundaries? " 
The nature and quality of the internal dynamics 
"How far are the internal dynarnics of the 'top team' dysfunctional? " 
Organisational learning 
"To what extent is there strategic organisational learning? " 
The impact ofcontext 
"How far does the relationship with the Board and the environmental context 
constrain the learning opportunities? " 
In exploring these four questions the prime research interest is with the internal reality 
and meaning of those members of the 'top team'. Furthermore, we seek to compare 
their experiences with others in the system and to see how far aspects of their internal 
world relate to the externally shared 'reality' at the strategic level. 
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Research strategy 
The research strategy aims to provide a systematic way of gathering data, staying 
within a theoretical and epistemological framework and providing a boundary for the 
particular area of inquiry as argued in Part two and earlier in this chapter. 
There are a number of features that form the research strategy and these come as a 
natural process of the line of argument thus far. These are three in number: the 
research strategy takes a phenomenological epistemology; it is informed by a case 
study approach; and it is essentially a qualitative research strategy. These follow a 
6constructivist' orientation and seek a deeper level of analysis of the research 
questions as argued above. 
Phenomenological 
The research approach in this thesis aims to understand the deeper meaning and 
subjective experience of social agents in systems of organisation. It takes a 
phenomenological approach as knowledge is seen as the product of experience. While 
a purist position on this approach would suggest that all pre-thought, knowledge and 
theory should be abandoned, the reality is that people are not memory-less 
autornotives and frameworks and theories provide a basis for making sense of each 
person's experience both consciously and unconsciously. As Lapierre (1992) argues, 
even where such an approach exists, " (it) Aims to describe the phenomenon as it 
presents itself and to understand rather than explain it, it seems to us nonetheless 
impossible to wipe the slate entirely clean of all theory in any research approach even 
one that is phenomenological. " p3. 
He goes on to argue that psychoanalysis provides a body of knowledge, which holds 
assumptions and hypotheses about the nature of the workings of the unconscious and 
its impact on individuals and groups. 
He cautions: "The researcher must be aware not only of the theoretical choices he has 
made: he must also state them as explicitly as possible. A theory, even when it is in a 
hypothetical state, is the organising projection behind the research. " Lapierre (1992), 
p4. He goes on to quote from Zaleznik and Kets De Vries (I 984), "Without theory, 
there is no story and without a story, there is no text to decode or interpret. " This 
point is fully accepted in this thesis and the 'theoretical' background, discussed in Part 
two, is also an additional criterion for deciding upon the research approach. 
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Wertz (1986) also provides some useful guides on a phenomenological research 
approach that are congruent with the theoretical underpinning of psychoanalysis. He 
summarises points made by others (Hassard (1991), Kets De Vries et al (1993), Kets 
De Vries and Miller (1987)) and identifies the following fundamentals for this 
approach (See table 9.3 below). 
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Table 9.3 - Wertzs cannons of a phenomenological approach 
a) Empathetic, immersion in the world described by the people involved 
b) Dwelling and magnifying the issues that are important to the respondent. 
C) Turning from object to meaning and thus from description to interpretation 
d) Suspending belief and investigating the source or origins of what the respondent 
presents 
e) Distinguishing constituent parts or phases of the narrative - what are the sub- 
themes that are presented 
f) Explication of the relational whole so that the data can be related to other diverse 
data, temporal boundaries, context and relationships 
g) Identification of recurrent meanings, where themes are surfacing from many 
sources leading to some thematic unity 
h) Comparison of various real cases 
i) Comparisons involving imaginative variations and examples such that the 
researcher is not constrained in their thinking and analysis 
j) Retaining the language of analysis within the theoretical sphere. Thus, using the 
theoretical framework for understanding and analysing what is going on 
k) Verification according to this approach is found in the re-criactment of the 'very 
procedures we have already discussed'. Just as there are better or worse 
manipulations, controls and statistical instruments, there are better or worse 
descriptions, empathetic immersions, magnifications, empirical comparisons and 
command of the theoretical based language. Wertz (1986) argues that 
disconformation of hypotheses does not mean the abandonment of qualitative 
procedures but, "The extension and rigorous application" of all the procedures 
above(p589). 
1) Reflecting on one's experience in the process and applying the notion of 
'projections' and other dynamics that occur between the researcher and the social 
system in order to gain further data and insights about the system under inquiry 
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These twelve 'fundaments' provide a comprehensive basis for understanding the 
principles applied to a phenomenological approach, within a constructivist orientation. 
These points are noted and have been incorporated into the research approach of this 
thesis (see chapters 10 and 11). 
A case study approach 
A case study approach is to be used because it will increase understanding, help 
unravel social complexity and deepen knowledge of social systems under study (Yin 
(1993), Easton (1994), Ragin and Becker (1992), Sommer and Sommer (199 1), 
Bryman (1989)). In addition, the strength of a case study approach for this type of 
inquiry is that its aims are congruent to studying the organisational behaviour of a 
living social system: a phenomenon in context. 
"As a research strategy, the distinguishing characteristic of the case study is that it 
attempts to examine a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context. " (Lee 
(1989) p 119. ) 
Furthermore, "It consists of the entire configuration of individuals, group, and social 
structure in the setting of an organisation, and the case researcher passively observes 
the rich details of events in the way they naturally unfold in their natural, 
organisational setting. " (Lee (1989) pl 19/120. ) 
Thus, the case study approach is not contrived. It does not attempt to reduce 
complexity through controlled experimentation, or generalisations from a survey 
approach. Ragin and Becker (1992) argue that, in the limit, a survey after all is just a 
large number of 'incidences', or a series of case studies. Furthermore, it is argued by 
Yin (1993), the survey approach sacrifices detail and understanding for 
generalisability. , 
Proponents of the case study approach (e. g. Easton (1994), Yin (1993), Morgan and 
Smirich (1980)) suggest that there is still considerable misunderstanding about it. 
This misunderstanding is about how it is used; its benefits and the drawbacks tend to 
be understood in 'objectivist' terms rather than in a constuctivist one. 
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Lee (1989) argues that it is a commonly held view that case studies are all qualitative. 
While the qualitative nature is true as an approach, it is not true in tenns of research 
design or methodology. It is not simply a design based on a series of unstructured 
interviews - the common mis-perception. Easton (1994), Lee (1989), Kanter (1977) 
and Hassard (199 1) show that the case study approach is not by necessity qualitative 
or 'subjectivist, but it can be used to follow the nature of the research inquiry. 
For a study that seeks to increase understanding, as this thesis does, the case study 
approach would fall within a constructivist framework and aim to develop theoretical 
constructs and use case material within a specific contextual domain, rather than seek 
generality (Easton, 1994). 
Moreover, while there can be weak research design - both in case study and survey 
type research, the critical question is: does it provide us with a legitimate tool of 
inquiry? For the purpose of this study it does because the case study is good for 
situations where control is neither desired, nor possible. It covers depth and can use a 
multiplicity of methods for verification. It can manage the complexity of cases within 
cases, as well as multiple cases to establish the replicability of instances or 
phenomena under inquiry. It has a long and reputable history in ground-breaking 
work, such as medicine and psychoanalysis and many classic studies in organisational 
research were also based on such an approach - Mintzberg (1973) on managerial work 
(individual comparative), Jaques (1953) (organisational - single), Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1967) (organisational comparative). 
Its main limitations are that it is hard to generalise and secondly, the features under 
analysis may be untypical; while they help to understand and explain phenomena, 
they may not be generalisable. 
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The other approach that was considered that may help us understand the dynamics of 
'top teams' was an experimental approach. Such an approach has its strengths in 
trying to establish cause and effect relationships among clearly identified variables 
and a variety of competing explanations. In this work, the focus is on understanding, 
explaining and generating further hypotheses. Thus, the experimental approach falls 
outside of the epistemological boundaries discussed above. In addition, on theoretical 
grounds, it does not address the issue of context which is a key research question. An 
experimental approach is also less useful in design terms. Many of the original group 
findings were conducted under experimental conditions (see Cartwright and Zander 
(1960)). The difficulty of these was the limited nature of the actual population and 
broad generalisations that were made from them. Examples include the theories about 
leadership such as Lewin et al (193 9), which were based on work with delinquent 
school-aged boys on summer camp. The work on group consensus was based on the 
perceptional 'reading' of a beam of light (Sherif, 1936). Both were very far from the 
context and dynamics of a strategic working team. The point here is that many of 
these 'well known' contributions were taken out of their context and were based on a 
small data-pool. Thus, they may also be criticised for over-generalising. 
Finally, in experimental studies, control procedures can be difficult to maintain. For 
this thesis, which is concerned with change and learning, detailed control would be 
difficult to hold and, given context is important, controlling that variable may be 
undesirable. Although in the discussion on case selection some broad control 
variables are featured, these provide some boundaries while at the same time not 
restricting the natural dynamic that the study seeks to understand. 
The case study approach is chosen philosophically because of its fit/congruence with 
the epistemological approach. In strategic and operational terms it has sufficient 
flexibility to draw upon other traditions that will in fact strengthen it. Kanter's (1977) 
thesis on the dynamics of men and women in the workplace, regarding power, 
demonstrates how well a case study approach can be used when supported by other 
methodologies in the research design. 
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A qualitative approach 
The overall approach could also be described as a qualitative approach. 
"Qualitative research is a particular tradition in social science that fundamentally 
depends on watching people in their own territory and interaction with them in their 
own language, on their terms. " (Kirk and Miller (1986), p9. ) However, it is stressed 
that quantitative methods and systematic methods are used as rigorously as other 
approaches. In a desire to be 'objective', it does not mean only to 'objectify' and 
assume that all phenomena can be determined by causal relations. The qualitative 
approach is based on the argument that traditional, 'objectivist' approaches alone 
would not satisfy the demands of the research orientation and thus the research design 
and methods. Furthermore, a qualitative approach is often misunderstood, especially 
by those from a 'objectivist' persuasion, and its value is not fully utilised (see Morgan 
and Smircich (1980)). 
"To see qualitative research as strictly disengaged from any form of counting is to 
miss the point that its basic strategy depends on the reconciliation of diverse research 
tactics. " (Kirk and Miller (1986), p12). Thus, a qualitative approach can also be seen 
as pluralistic. 
Schneider and Shrivastava (1988) put forward the case that, when analysing the 
psychodynamic aspects of organisations, "Rational positivist paradigms are 
inappropriate for explaining these more difficult to measure phenomena. " p509. 
A 'clinical' research methodology 
It has been argued in this chapter that a constructivist approach provides alignment 
with the theoretical constructs of the thesis and its subject of inquiry. A 
phenomenological and qualitative approach both support a 'subjectivist' 
methodology. An ethnomethodological approach, a symbolic-interpretist approach, 
or even organisational anthropological approach, are all possibilities. However, the 
distinguishing feature for the approach chosen for this thesis is its task of 
understanding the subjective experience of those in organisational 'top teams'. 
Considering the theoretical discussion in chapters 5-8, it is the application of 
psychoanalytic concepts to broader social phenomena that provides some validity for 
what shall be used in this thesis: a clinical approach. Such an approach to social 
inquiry is not new and we shall build on the contributions of others (Freud (190 1), 
Kets De Vries (1991), Amado (1995)). 
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Psychoanalysis is both a body of theory and a therapeutic process. Kets De Vries 
(199 1) argues that with that combination: "Psychoanalysis can be looked at as a 
method of investigation of language, action, and imaginary productions such as 
dreams, fantasies, and delusions. " There is common ground between the theory and 
approach of psychoanalysis and a phenomenological approach (Wertz, 1986) and it 
further supports the case for a clinical approach to this research. 
What is a clinical methodological research approach? 
There appears to be no one specific definition. However, I would describe it as a 
research methodological approach that seeks to systematically gather data about the 
subjective experience of actors in organisational social systems. In this thesis, it is 
distinguished from the approach of Schein (1 987b, 199 1, and 1995), who sees it much 
more as a consultancy intervention to solve client's problems. 
It is most suited to the scope of this research because: it falls within a constructivist 
orientation; it is aligned with the theoretical framework which draws upon 
psychoanalysis; it is applied to the analysis and understanding of organisations; and it 
aims to gain a deeper understanding of the system of study using a broader range of 
'interpretative' techniques than used in the other subjectivist approaches. These 
qualities are discussed below. 
A 'clinical' methodological approach in organisational analysis engages the problems 
and issues of the 'respondent! and draws more on their reality and agenda (Lapieffe 
(1994), Berg and Smith (1985), Schein (199 1)). 
"A clinical inquiry model that stimulates real openness on the part of clients will 
reveal a set of variables and phenomena that will make it possible to build far better 
theories of organisational dynamics. " Schein (1995), pl8/19. This statement reflects 
the aims of this thesis. 
A 'clinical' methodological approach also falls within a constructivist paradigm and 
the proposed research strategy. It is generally associated with a phenomenological 
approach and is a scientific method that aims at acquiring a thorough understanding of 
individual cases (Lapierre, 1992). This approach sees the research process itself as a 
form of 'intervention' and the dynamics that arise from the research process are seen 
as contributing further value from analysing it, as well as the analysis of the content 
data (Berg and Smith (1985), Schein (1 987b, 1991 and 1995)). 
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Wertz (1986) argues that there is a convergence between a phenomenological 
approach and psychoanalytic psychology. He recognises the lack of rigour that has 
been exercised in some individual case material and studies but puts forward the case 
for the "possibility of relevant and valid protocol data" ftorn a clinical perspective, 
p569. 
Lapierre (1992) states that the clinical approach requires the researcher to provide a 
rich description of the social agents under study. 
"Through a phenomenological approach and through exhaustive efforts of description, 
the clinical researcher strives to get at the subjective experiences of his subject and to 
understand the meaning of this experience. " Lapierre (1992), p2. 
"The 'clinical approach', with its premise of not taking for granted what is directly 
observable, has been helped by contributions from other fields. " (Kets de Vries, 
1991). The work of Clifford Geertz (1973 and 1983) of looking below the surface and 
attempting to identify the underlying structure and themes has also influenced the 
'clinical approach'. Geertz suggests that a rich picture of the social system needs to 
be painted and makes the distinction between 'thin' and 'thick' description. Thin 
description concentrates on what is observable and simply relates to the facts. Thick 
description, however, is interpretative. He says that thick description is: 
"Guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions 
from the better guesses. " Geertz (1973) p20. 
This approach involves the study of organisational 'texts', which is the constellation 
of data that relates inter-connected groupings and themes which can be systernatised. 
The characteristics of the approach 
From the literature, there does appears to be some agreement on the main features of a 
clinical approach. 
a) A clinical approach includes a systematic, phenomenological approach to 
gathering 'rich' data from social agents in organisations and this can take a 
variety of torms. It also involves a description of social systems that is dense or 
'thick' and favours depth over breadth in any single undertaking. 
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b) A clinical approach is useful for exploring and understanding social processes. 
"Clinical methodologies worth developing are those that uniquely add to 
understanding and that have widespread applicability. They are perhaps most 
useful as exploratory devices for those aspects of a field of inquiry that are 
uncharted; for studying complex social systems as a whole that cannot be 
examined easily, if at all, by the traditionalist's scientific scrutiny; and as the 
methodology of choice for interpersonally based change strategies. " Lowman 
(1988), p176. 
It means that the researcher must be willing to adapt theory and develop or refute 
working hypotheses as part of the research process and output of building theory. 
Thus, the research process itself changes the dynamics of the system under study. 
Rather than ignore that 'intervention', as in a traditional research approach, the 
research is enriched by incorporating and understanding the impact of the 
interaction. This is the heart of a clinical approach. 
C) Thus, in such an approach, a relationship is established between the researcher 
and those involved in the research process. There is direct involvement with the 
social system that is being investigated and the researcher has first hand 
experience of the social system. This is unlike 'traditional' approaches where the 
research-agent relationship is distant, 'objective' and non-involving. A clinical 
approach argues that such an assumption is unrealistic as the Hawthorne Studies 
demonstrated (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939). Hunt (1989) goes further and 
puts forward the case that in field work settings the process of unconscious 
psychological 'projection', 'transference' and 'counter-transference' takes place 
between the researcher and the organisational agent. Kahn (1993) also illustrates 
how the 'unconscious process' draws the researcher into other unstated roles, 
which if captured and understood, provide an additional source of data of what 
might be taking place in the system. 
d) Thus, the researcher is not just observing but is part of the research process 
(Blanck and Turner, 1987). The researcher's subjective experience in the 
research setting of the 'projections', 'transference' and 'counter-transference' 
becomes a source of data for the researcher in their role and is explicitly captured. 
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"When using these methods, the researcher himself acts as an information- 
gathering instrument as well as the interpreter of the raw material he obtains, 
which must be organised and in which meaning must be found. " Lapierre (1992), 
p2. 
Such an approach makes additional emotional demands of the researcher and 
requires other experiences and skills in addition to traditional research skills. In 
using this approach: "Clinical researchers place themselves in the thick of the 
data-gathering process and place their person on the line in the process of 
collecting data or making interventions. " Lowman (1988), p182. 
Wertz (1986) states that a clinical approach: "Requires a special attitude on the 
part of the researcher, variously described as wonder (Fink), love (Laing), 
unprejudiced openness (Giorgi) and even hovering attention (Freud), within 
which the researcher moves back and forth from the whole to the part of the 
phenomenon. " p569. 
Hunt (1989) also comments on the unconscious dynamic of gathering data and 
the projections, transferences and countertransferences that operate in the role and 
in the research process itself (p52 et seq. ). 
"Reaching conclusions depends rather upon the clinical and sociological acumen 
of the consultant [term used for researcher] and on the soundness of the 
psychological and organisational theories he uses as a background to analysis and 
interpretation. " Menzies (1969), pl2l. 
Thus, the researcher must manage the boundary between self and the social 
system, and this requires a different range of attributes; they have to experience 
the social system while at the same time be separate from it. Lowman (1988) 
notes that these attributes are under-researched. However, if we draw from the 
training and development of psychoanalysts, there are a number of well- 
established practices for systematic clinical methodology. Smith (1990) also 
provides a detailed account of the 'self as instrument' in relationship to group 
dynamics, but the issues of role provide strong parallel (as discussed in chapter 
7). 
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Berg (1980) argues that all OB practitioners should have clinical field skills and 
proposes a training model to develop these qualities. The qualities that he sees as 
essential are: personal and emotional skills to understand the inter-sub ective 
nature of the dynamics between the researcher and the social system; relationship 
management skills to understand and work with complex relationships in the 
process with individuals, groups and larger social systems; and diagnostic skills - 
i. e. collecting data and drawing inferences from data while directly involved with 
the organisation. 
Lowman (198 8) also builds on that work and identifies three key areas for clinical 
researchers to have competence. There are: 
a Job skills 
* Organisational knowledge 
9 Personal attributes 
The skills outlined are primarily interpersonal and it is suggested these will make 
for a "successful clinical investigator. " (Lowman (1988) p183. ) Theseseernto 
focus on receiving training in applied psychoanalytical or clinical methodologies, 
supervision and peer support, self awareness and a willingness for self scrutiny. 
The researcher has undergone training and supervision in these areas. Lowman's 
(198 8) core competencies are listed in Appendix 6. 
e) A clinical approach is systemic in that it incorporates the multiple layers of 
systems (see Levinson, 1972). It is also about working at the conscious and 
unconscious process: the rational and emotional as put forward by Lewin 
(I 947a). 
"Recognising that behaviour is determined by both conscious and unconscious 
factors, and that it is typically overdetermined by multiple sources of causality, 
the clinician seeks an understanding of both the rational and irrational. 
"It is the unconscious processes that have largely been ignored by traditional 
researchers of organisations and social systems. " Lowman (1988), pl 81. 
160 
f) A clinical approach is developmental for the social system - individuals, groups 
or organisation - because they are involved in the research process. Thus, 
members of the social system are engaged in the contract of the research, worked 
with over a long time, rather than just a one-off snap shot, and have goals for 
themselves as part of the process. Observation alone will provide one source of 
data but the meaning comes from the involvement of the people in the system in 
the data gathering and diagnosis - akin to the patients being the key data source 
for doctors' diagnosis. Thus, participants in the process provide some 'insight' 
validity to interpretations and internal insight for themselves. 
Application to organisational analysis 
A clinical methodological approach can be applied to the study of organisational 
dynamics, a focus for this thesis. While the approach was seen as 'recent' at the 
Conference of the International Society for the Psychoanalytic Study of 
Organisations, 'Clinical Approaches to the Study of Managerial and Organisational 
Dynamics' (1990), the approach has a history which can be dated back to the late 
1950's. 
Menzies' (1960 and 1969) study of dysfunctional behaviour and collective 'social 
defenses' in her study of a London hospital uses a clinical approach to understanding 
the social systems. 
Berg and Smith (1985 and 1988) explore the issues, boundaries and methods of the 
clinical approach with other organisational researchers and interpretist thinkers and 
practitioners. The series of contributors suggest that, while it is not the easiest of 
approaches, it is both the research method and the complexity of the process itself that 
need to be incorporated into the analysis. Thus the role of the researcher, the actual 
methods used and the multiple complexity of social systems all impact on each other 
and these need to be commented upon explicitly as part of this approach. 
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Kets de Vries (19 8 0) also uses a clinical approach to understand the nature of 
managerial motivations and actions. In Kets de Vries' (1980) introductory remarks, 
he states: "In the search for supporting disciplines I have discovered that 
psychoanalytical orientated concepts can be of great help. They will add another 
dimension to organisational studies otherwise looked at from a purely descriptive 
angle. A psychoanalytical orientation, with its concern about empathy and its specific 
ability to distinguish between illness and health, can contribute substantially in 
conceptualising about the nature of work, the etiology of individual and organisational 
stress, the vicissitudes of power and leadership, human motivation, and the effects of 
career. " p4. 
He also uses this approach to understand the 'text' at an organisational level of 
analysis (Kets De Vries and Miller (1987) and again in Zaleznik and Kets De Vries 
(1984)) in understanding leadership. Diamond (1994) and Hirschhom(1988) use a 
clinical approach to understand the dynamics of the larger social systems; as does 
Kets De Vries and his associates (199 1) who look at clinical perspectives to 
understanding organisational behaviour and change. 
Thus, such a methodological approach is not new and has its own traditions. It is 
these traditions and norms that apply to this thesis. 
4. Summary and conclusion 
In conclusion, the research strategy is a phenomenological approach that will use the 
case study as its main vehicle for pursuing the research questions. Multiple-methods 
will be used within a qualitative and 'clinical' approach where greater validity, 
consistency and data collaboration may be ascertained. There may also be a 
developmental and learning element in this approach, but this is not to be undertaken 
as a piece of action research. The research, for example, is not seeking to evaluate 
consultancy interventions where action research would be valid. The research inquiry 
centres on 'understanding organisational phenornena. ' The details of the design and 
methods are discussed in the next chapter. 
Frantz Fanon's (1952) comments provide a useful summary of the research strategy. 
He argues: "What matters for us is not to collect facts and behaviour, but to find their 
meaning. " p168. He calls upon the words of Karl Jasper, from Psychopathologie 
Generale, to elaborate his point: 
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"Comprehension in the depth of a single instance will often enable us, 
phenomenologically, to apply this understanding in general to innumerable cases. 
Often what one has once grasped is soon met again. What is important is less the 
study of a large number of instances than the intuitive and deep understanding of the 
few individual cases. " p49. 
In using a clinical approach one may conclude that the validity of the interpretations 
are grounded within: the context of the theoretical framework, its working hypotheses, 
the rich data from the social system, the input and participation of the agents of the 
system and a dialogue with them in order to uncover meaning and self reflection, 
supervision and 'psychoanalytical' thinking by the researcher to uncover data from 
unconscious dynamics. The research design which holds to such an approach is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Finally, this chapter has argued that a constructivist orientation is valid for the nature 
of the inquiry and how it relates to the theoretical underpinning. The main elements 
of the research strategy are to take a phenomenological approach, draw upon a case 
study method and to have a qualitative approach. These provide considerable 
common ground of theoretical, ontological and epistemological unity and coherence. 
These guiding principles are used as signposts for the overall design of the research, 
the methodology and instruments. These are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 10 - The research design and methodology 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter on design is to operationalise the principles discussed in the 
previous chapter. It is the how, or the working principles, of the research process. 
The chapter identifies the key design features as the use of multiple case studies, the 
unit of analysis as the group and that embedded cases are also possible from the 
personalities and roles that 'top team' members bring and enact as part of the group. 
The detail of the methodologies, techniques and instruments is provided so that the 
reader can assess for themselves what level of confidence can be placed in the data 
gathering and the research process and whether it meets the objectives it seeks to 
attain within the context of the research orientation taken. 
Briefly, the research strategy discussed above has three main components. These are 
the research strategy takes a phenomenological epistemology; it is informed by a case 
study approach and, it essentially takes a qualitative orientation. These elements 
come together in a 'constuctivist' approach, which suggests a deeper look at a small 
number of cases in order to understand the internal dynamics of 'top teams'. 
2. The key elements of the design 
The elements of the design are as follows: 
a. The first feature of the design is that data gathering is to be through in-depth case 
studies. The single case provides significant depth and is useful for 'unusual' 
events, i. e. a freak flood, working with individuals, or piloting untested work. In 
looking at larger systems, with some 'regularity' to them, the use of more than 
one case study would provide some comparisons for making sense of the 
organisational 'text', ftirther validity of the themes uncovered and greater 
applicability, rather than generalisability, to other similar social settings (Yin, 
1993). Thus, a multiple case study approach is to be used. 
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On this approach Wertz (198 6) states: "It often serves the interest of the 
investigator not only to differentiate general themes with their variations in a 
given case, but to do the same between two or among more individual cases. 
Two sorts of discoveries follow from this procedure - those of difference and 
similarities between cases. These respectively reveal the unique, typical and 
general features of psychic lives. " p582. 
Three cases are used in this thesis as they provide sufficient differences for 
comparison, yet do not sacrifice the need for depth in each of the cases. The first 
case is the pilot case, where the original working hypotheses were applied and 
then developed. The other two cases explore the reformulation of the theory and 
hypotheses and develop the theory further. They provide more data sources as a 
consequence of the pilot work. 
b. The second feature of the design concerned the unit of analysis. In relationship to 
the research questions, the unit of analysis is the group - the 'top team'. 
However, the unit of analysis is placed in a context - the environment and history 
- and is made up of sub-units, the individual and subgroups. See figure 10.1 
below. Thus, the design also allows for examining cases within each main case. 
C. The third element of the design is to take on the role of a 'clinical researcher'. 
Thus, the need to engage in the research process, make sense of feelings and 
associations in the process, reflect and draw upon an interpretist understanding of 
some of the events in the research process is to be incorporated. These are 
reflected in the excerpts of file notes in the appendices and are used in the cases 
as a final commentary. 
d. Finally, the design draws upon a variety of methods to enable a degree of cross 
checking and triangulation in data collection. These methodologies are informed 
by a qualitative approach but are used with systematic and quantifications of 
behaviours, statements and 'texts' to provide meaning to the dynamics of the 
social system. 
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Figure 10.1 
The Embedded Relationship of the Group 
The Environment 
(context) 
The Group 
The Individuals 
Output 
task attainment 
learning process 
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These four elements make up the design of the research. The actual methods and 
instruments that were used are discussed in the next subsection. The linkage between 
the main research questions, the working hypotheses and the research methods is 
extended in chapter 11. 
The research orientation and strategy to addressing the working hypotheses are 
'constructivist' and qualitative and the orientation is developed from a psychoanalytic 
approach,. The reason for such an approach was outlined in chapter 9. Thus, as 
suggested by Schneider and Shrivastava. (1988), Ket De Vries and Miller (1987), Kets 
De Vries et al (199 1), Hatch (1993), the research methods will draw heavily on in- 
depth interview, non-participatory observation and the interpretation of themes or 
organisational text. Such methods are argued to increase understanding and have been 
used to provide feedback to top's team in assessing their impact (Beer & Eisenstat 
(1996)) 
Each hypothesis is therefore explored in relationship to the most relevant data 
collection method that would provide relevant, reliable and consistent data. In 
addition, the multiple use of different techniques provided the opportunity for cross 
checking, triangulation and the detection of recurring themes arising from different 
data sources. The result of the design is briefly described. Details about the methods 
and techniques follow in section 3 of this chapter. 
a) Three case studies were taken of strategic groups with the task of managing the 
organisation and its change. The groups were worked with for periods of over 
one year or more. 
b) Each of the groups were observed for a period of over 1000 minutes. These were 
observations of their strategic meetings held on their usual site and in their 
normal context. 
c) Twenty-one executive directors were interviewed from public sector 
organisations. Each director had an in-depth interview to gather information on 
the context and dynamic of the organisation, group and the role of group 
members. 
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d) A second in-depth interview was held with each of the same set of executive 
directors. Eighteen of these were held as some left during the period of study. 
FIRO-Bi Questionnaires were also used as part of that process to gather data on 
the issues of personal concern that may impact on the role of the interviewees. 
e) An organisational questionnaire was developed, designed and used in one of the 
cases to ascertain from those in the strategic domain what their shared view was 
about organisations' strategic learning abilities. This was administered to 100 
senior managers. 
These five elements made up the main processes for collecting data under this design. 
These are explored further in the following sections. 
3. Research methods 
In undertaking this type of research, a variety of methods are available. Schneider and 
Shrivastava (198 8) share the view that socio-analytic paradigms are more likely to be 
fruitful in analysing complex social processes such as 'basic assumptions' and 
unconscious collusive routines. They also recommend a 'clinical' approach, which 
they believe is both extensive and intensive. They say that: "This approach relies 
heavily on behavioural observation, unstructured interviewing and questionnaires, and 
subsequent interpretation of themes. Structured questionnaires are unlikely to reveal 
basic assumptions as they tend to reflect espoused theories as opposed to theories in 
use. " (Argyris and Schon, 1978) Schneider and Shrivastava (1988) p509. 
The authors go on to suggest that using this approach data can be gathered across and 
within multiple levels to reflect adequately the degree of organisational differentiation 
and this approach concurs with the one taken in this thesis, which also uses embedded 
cases. 
1 FIRO-13 is short for Fundamental Interpersonal Relationship Orientation - 
Behaviour). It is a behavioural questionnaire on how people relate to others based on 
the dimensions of affection, control and inclusion. 
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They propose six main ways of collecting data for this sort of study and approach: 
a. Behavioral observation 
b. 'Thick description' of the way processes are carried out in the social system 
including rituals, symbols, artifacts, rites and logos 
C. Stories of leaders, heroes, critical events or organisational. history should be 
incorporated 
d. Individual and group unstructured interviewing using techniques and methods to 
get behind the manifest meaning and tap the latent or unconscious meanings 
e. In-depth studies of strategic decision-making groups using Tavistock Institute 
socio-analytic approaches, which can surface underlying assumptions by 
interpreting group behaviour 
Annual reports, company newsletters, internal memos, speeches by leaders and 
press and news coverage can also provide useful data 
These methods provide data that can be content analysed and interpreted for recurrent 
and systemic themes, which in turn can be explored in further depth (Schneider and 
Shrivastava (198 8) p5 10). 
These methodologies are common to a 'clinical approach' (see Kcts De Vries and 
Miller (1987), Menzies (1969), Kets de Vries, Miller and Noel, (1993)) and will be 
discussed in more detail when looking at research instruments. 
Schneider and Shrivastava (198 8) conclude: "The extensiveness and intensiveness of 
the above procedure requires a case study approach. Issues of generalisability must 
therefore take on less importance while validity issues are explored thoroughly. At 
this stage of theory development, research should maintain an exploratory nature 
emphasising the generating of hypotheses as opposed to their testing. " p5 10. 
Thus, the theoretical underpinning, research strategy, approach, design and 
methodologies share a good fit. There is a prima facia case to suggest that the 
research should support and fulfill the aims of the research's focus of inquiry. 
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4. Research methods 
The actual methods used in the research follow the line of argument put forward so 
far, as summarised above in paragraphs by Schneider and Shrivastava, (1988). Table 
10.1 also surnmarises the relationship between the research questions and the methods 
used. These are now described in more detail below. The use of similar 
methodologies and techniques are also cited in assessing the final usage of data 
collection. 
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Table 10.1 
The Relationship between the Key Questions and the Methods 
Questions Methods 
a) Task Effectiveness First in-depth, semi-structured interview 
Secondary data management, reports and 
"How does the 'top team' see its minutes 
effectiveness as reflected in its ability to Conversations and observing 
manage its task and boundaries? " Rituals 
Non-participatory observations - use of 
group analysis grid 
b) The nature and quality of the internal First in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
dynamics Non-participatory observations - use of 
group analysis grid 
"How far are the internal dynamics of the Dialogue and interpretations 
top team dysfunctional? " Second in-depth, unstructured interview 
using FIRO-B 
Experience and observations of 
individuals in the group 
Non-participatory observations - use of 
the Group Analysis Grid 
c) The impact of context First in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
"How far does the relationship with the Analysis of symbols 
Board and the environmental context Dialogue through feedback 
constrain the learning opportimities? " 
d) Organisational learning First in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
Development of organisational. 
questionnaire 
"To what extent is there strategic Dialogue through interpretations 
organisational learning? " 
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Taking the methodology discussed by Schneider and Shrivastava (1998) the following 
were used for this thesis. 
a. Behavioral observations were made of the groups in their natural settings of 'top 
team' meetings. The protocol used for systematically gathering data on the group 
was based on a psychodynamic model of groups and was originally developed by 
Thelen etal (1954) and Stock and Thelen (1957). Further work by Karterud 
(1988 and 1989), Karterud and Foss (1989), Long (1992), Wheelan and Krasick 
(1993) and Guerin (1995) also adopt the same protocols. These procedures were 
used in all cases and slightly refined after the pilot. 
b. 'Thick description' was used to a lesser extent in the work because it was seen as 
contextual to the focus of inquiry - the group. However, its application to the 
entry process, the 'reception' process, where 'top team' meetings were held and 
significant symbols are commented upon in the context of the inquiry. 
c. Stories are used in the case studies particularly on historical events, leaders - past 
and present - cultural morass and organisational processes/rituals as these were 
argued to have a significant impact on groups from the theoretical discussion in 
Part two. 
d. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were undertaken with 'top team' members to 
understand how they saw themselves and each other in the group, the group's 
dynamics and its context. An interview schedule was used in all cases and this 
was slightly amended after the pilot. 
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A second in-depth interview was used to gather data on the internal dialogue and 
pre-conscious thought that managers held and to see how these impacted on the 
managers' role and contribution in the group. These interviews were started with 
data gathered from a personal inventory, FIRO-B, which was used in unstructured 
interviews to provide a contained session for exploration of self in role. A fuller 
discussion on the choice of this instrument is in the next section on research 
instruments. 
e. Group observation along with a 'critical analysis' of strategic decision-making 
and implementation through individual interviews were used to understand 
recurring themes in the strategic process of action, reflection and learning. This 
is also known as the 'critical incident' technique (Sommer and Sommer, 199 1). 
f, Annual reports, minutes, newspaper cuttings were also used, but to a lesser 
extent, as they provided data about context, of which there was considerable data 
available. 
These data together are presented in case studies and the underlying themes are 
considered at each level of analysis - context, group and individual. The 'text' 
and thematic, recurring dynamics were put forward to increase our understanding 
of 'top teams' and how they manage strategic learning during periods of change. 
Developing and reformulating hypotheses is used as an iterative process in order 
to aid our understanding as the inquiry unfolds. Furthermore, the involvement of 
the group in developing insight and further hypotheses through interpretations 
and dialogue provided additional learning both for the research and for the group 
involved in the study. This process is part of developing theory and is in line 
with the research orientation and strategy. 
9 r. The use of one's own experience in the role of researcher is also incorporated and 
captured in field notes. As part of a clinical approach this puts a responsibility on 
the researcher to reflect upon and make sense of the feelings, associations and 
multiple projections that might be experienced and to use these as an additional 
source of data. 
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h. Out of the research process the internal world of the 'top team' was compared 
with the notion of a broader experience of other actors in the strategic domain. 
This took the form of a short questionnaire which aimed to gather data on the 
nature and degree of strategic organisational learning perceived by others in the 
nascent social system. This was only used in one case study. 
Thus, in summary, the main research methods were a combination of observation of 
group behaviour, individual, in-depth interviews, the use of case history (stories), an 
analysis of strategic decision-making processes, the use of content analysis to surface 
recurrent themes, the use of the feelings and experience of the research process 
through field notes, the development and use of an organisational questionnaire, the 
continual development and interpretation of meaning through hypotheses and 
dialogue, plus other background data and information. 
5. Research instruments 
The research instruments used were the result of the discussion in the above sub- 
sections and the previous chapter. They aimed to collect the data in such a way that 
was consistent, provided validity in terms of what we were hoping to measure and 
some confidence and reliability in the research process. 
In simple terms, by validity we mean the degree to which a procedure or protocol 
measures what it is suppose to measure. External validity refers to the extent to which 
the results can be related to similar situations and this is likely to be greater in 
research undertaken in social settings. Internal validity is greater in laboratory 
research where the elimination of alternative hypotheses is greater and one can 
suggest stronger causal relationship between variables (Sommer and Sommer (199 1), 
Blanck and Turner (1987), Kirk and Miller (1986)). 
Face validity or content validity are terms that infer some prima facia validity which is 
not statistically validated, in such cases this would be called construct validity. In 
qualitative studies the notion of consensual validity is also useful as it provides 
another form of verification within the social systems of groups and organisations; 
(Wertz, 1986). Insight validity suggests that the social system derives some 
resonance, or 'insight' from the research process, but this on its own does not mean 
that the process validates the theoretical propositions. 
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By reliability we mean the repeatability and replicability of the findings. Thus it 
addresses the question: will the instruments produce the same results when applied to 
similar social settings? The simultaneous realisation of as much validity and 
reliability as possible gives the research 'objectivity'. It is possible to have reliability 
without validity; 'perfect validity' would assure reliability as every observation would 
yield the complete and exact 'truth'. The attainment of 'perfect validity' is rarely 
possible. Thus, most social science studies have relied on techniques where reliability 
has been assured over validity (Sommer and Sommer, 1991). In this thesis, both 
validity and reliability are discussed. 
Each instrument should demonstrate a degree of 'reliability' and where possible, 
(validity' in their use. There are some assumptions that have been made about the 
veracity of the respondents, who are assumed to be working from the basis of 'truth' 
as they know it. Thus, in cases where there may be different accounts in the narrative 
of respondents, it is less that one respondent is lying and the other is not, but more 
likely reflects the differences in experience and the meaning that each attributes to 
their experience. Thus, the research process seeks cross verification of events and 
common related experiences: consensual validation. 
Sommer and Sommer (199 1) make a number of Points on this matter in terms of 
research approach, methods and technique in seeking to gather data that can be relied 
upon. They say: "Inconsistencies in people's narratives can provide valuable leads. 
The researcher is a bit like the psychoanalyst who pays special attention to distortions 
and omissions. Asking for further elaboration is a better way of internally checking a 
story than challenging people as to their truthfulness or objectivity. Cross-verification 
is also possible through a multi-method approach. Perhaps better than all other 
techniques, the case study lends itself to the use of multiple sources and techniques for 
gathering data. " p 198/199. 
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6. A deeper look at the research instruments 
This section looks at each of the chosen instruments and comments briefly on their 
purpose, procedure, reliability and validity. 
The Group Analysis Grid (GAG) 
The purpose of this instrument was to systematically gather data on the behaviours 
and interactions of the group members based on psychodynamic models of groups. 
The procedure involved scoring behaviours and content analysis of the 'top team' 
meetings recorded by written notes. The actual behaviours scored and content 
analysed followed the theoretical constructs of 'work group behaviours', 'basic 
assumption behaviours', thematic conflict and socio-metric relationships in the group 
as discussed in chapter 6 above in Part two. Examples of these behaviours and the 
scoring grid are provided in Appendix 1. The use of a tape recorder was not permitted 
due to the strategic and confidential nature of the discussion of the meetings. 
The GAG was informed by previous researchers who had used this protocol. It was 
originally developed by Thelen et al (1954) and Stock and Thelen (1957) who 
identified 'work' and 'basic assumption' proxies as reflected in the discussion of 
teams in the US Navy. Further work by Karterud (1988 and 1989), Karterud and Foss 
(1989) applied the basis of the same protocol to therapeutic groups but focused much 
more on the dysfunctional side of group behaviour. Karterud (1989) also refined the 
instrument and its use to assist in the data analysis and consistent application through 
a researcher training programme. Long (1992) and Wheelan and Krasick (1993) used 
the same genesis for an analysis of Tavistock type group relations events and Guerin 
(1995) applies the same protocol to workplace teams. Guerin (1995) uses a variation 
of the protocol developed by Wheelan et al (1994) called the Group Development 
Observation System (GDOS). 
The original methodology (Thelen et al, 1954) undertook a co-relation test and an 
analysis of variance and it reported to "indicate that the theoretical constructs on 
which the test is based provide a useful and meaningful framework for describing 
individual behaviour in a group situation. " p 13 0. 
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The sample for this tentative conclusion was small and the methodology was not 
without criticism (see Karterud and Foss, 1989). However, it suggested that face 
validity was attainable and that construct validity was also possible. 
Karterud and Foss (1989) developed the work of Thelen et al but, particularly, had a 
greater number of reliability tests: pearson coefficient of correlation, 'overall 
agreement', 'specific agreement' and a 'Kappa' agreement (see Appendix 2 for further 
explanation). They found that inter-rater reliability was 0.77 for overall agreement, 
0.57 to 0.85 for 'specific agreement' and 0.58 to 0.93 for the correlation coefficient. 
Guerin (1995) quotes a reliability figure of 0.93 for the GDOS and 0.85 for her own 
study. The use of the GDOS requires attendance of their training programme in 
Philadelphia. 
Thus, an inter-rater reliability test was undertaken for the Group Analysis Grid based 
on the pilot study. The procedure was based on Schutz's (1952) overall agreement, 
reliability test on groups and used four 'expert' raters in group dynamics to compare 
the ratings on 36 useable observations. Using Schutz's reliability test a return of 0.76 
was obtained. 
Interview schedule 
The purpose of this instrument was to systematically gather data about the nature of 
the group, its context and the roles played by its members. This was through an in- 
depth interview (the 'first interview') for usually an hour and a halp with members of 
the 'top team'. As the purpose was to gain further information about their views of 
the organisation, a semi-structured interview was used with the aid of an interview 
schedule. There were key topics that the interviews were expected 
: 
to cover for 
systematic comparison and analysis. A copy of the final schedule is in Appendix I 
Each interviewee was reminded of the research area, the time slot together and invited 
to talk. Most (75%) preferred to be led through a schedule where they could then 
elaborate points. Their responses were recorded by written notes. 
Three of the 21 directors had 3 hour sessions 
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During the pilot stage, half of the group were interviewed using the pilot schedule and 
the others used an unstructured interview to find the balance between depth and 
comparability. The coverage of topic areas between the two approaches was about 
80%. The main difference was that the treatment of pet subject areas were much 
greater for the unstructured interviews. There was also a split between taped or un- 
taped interviews, in two of the four pilot interviews data was withheld because it was 
being taped and the tape had to be stopped. The decision was to use semi-structured 
interviews with a schedule and that these were untaped in order to get the data 
unimpeded by the use of a tape-recorder. 
The point in terms of reliability was that the use of an interview schedule provided 
comparability without the loss of depth and meaning that interviewees attributed to 
their organisational experience. 
Secondly, the 'consensual validity' from the commonality of agreement on key issues 
suggested that the interview schedules provided a degree of face validity and 
consistency in the gathering the data. 
Personal inventory 
The purpose of the personal inventory was to provide a common framework for 
understanding the issues that 'top team' members brought to the group and to explore 
these in a way that was containable within the ethic and boundaries of the research 
brief and the time frame of about an hour and half. A second in-depth interview was 
conducted to identify the intrapersonal dynamics of the Directors and this addressed 
the research question on the dynamics of the 'individual' in role. 
The procedure was to administer the Fundamental Inter-personal Relationship 
Orientation - Behaviour (FIRO-B) questionnaire in accordance with the 
developmental guidelines set down in Schutz (1978). The instrument was used under 
supervision of a qualified FIRO-B user and chartered psychologist. The data from the 
results was used as a developmental process to identify the key relationship issue, the 
source of this, the meaning and inner dialogue (pre-conscious) that this yielded and 
the impact this had on their role, especially in the group. FIRO-B was chosen because 
of its theoretical underpinning which is psychodynamic in origin (Schutz (1978,1984 
and 1992)). Two other personal inventories were used in the pilot (see below). 
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The content or face validity of the FIRO-B is reported to be at least 90% reproducible, 
whereas the construct validity is weak as it has non-independent scales, so some of the 
factors are inter-related (see Appendix 4 for figures). 
Reliability is relatively high for internal consistency (0.94) but lower for stability 
using test-retest procedures, with an average of 0.76. It should also be noted that the 
majority of test samples while large were less representative of the group under study. 
Thus, the FIRO-13 provided a manageable framework to discuss issues that were 
'under the surface' but in a way that held the integrity of the research's aims while 
also retaining an ethical and responsible stance in relationship to the respondents. 
The development of the organisational questionnaire 
The purpose of the organisational questionnaire was to gain further data about the 
organisation's strategic learning. The Strategic Organisational Leaming Inventory 
(SOLI) aimed to provide that data as a cross check of another reality outside of the 
'top team'. 
The genesis of the questionnaire initially came from the literature, with further 
refinements from the pilot study. The procedure requires those in the study to answer 
a Likert scale questionnaire that reflects a collective sense of organisational leaming. 
This is similar to other value or climate questionnaires that are used in culture surveys 
and the like. One of the more well-known proprietorial questionnaires is the'Pillars 
of Excellence' values questionnaire that is based on Peters and Waterman (1982). 
Other questionnaires are developed on the same principles, e. g. the Visionary 
Leadership Questionnaire and other unpublished cultural studies used in the 
consultancy field. These tend to be reliable but are weak on construct validity. 
The original questionnaire had 42 items, with some category questions for 
classification and comparison. These were 'scanning', 'interpreting', 'taking action', 
(sharing and dissemination', evaluation/review', 'counter-organisational defenses' and 
'systematic problem solving' (see chapter 5). 
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It was piloted with a group of 10 managers on a part-time, public sector-orientated 
Masters degree programme. Thus, it was applied to a sample group representative of 
the population to which it would be applied. It was a check for reliability using an 
item analysis (see Sommer and Sommer (1991) on rudiments of item analysis). The 
outcome of this analysis led to a reduction of the questionnaire to 35 items (see 
Appendix 5 for the results of item analysis). 
The item analysis and reduction of the questions improved the reliability of the 
questionnaire. Feedback from the users of the pilot questionnaire and an 'academic 
expert' in organisational learning suggested that the questionnaire had face validity 
but at this stage it was only indicative of the issues in the organisation and could not 
be relied upon beyond its scope. It was an area for further development and research. 
The self as a research instrument 
In a 'clinical' based approach to research there is considerable emphasis on the role of 
the researcher, their involvement with the social system and the dynamics of the 
research process itself and the impact that may have. Thus, the ability and willingness 
to engage in personal reflection is a critical part of the process. In so doing the 
researcher is able to gather more information about the system based on the 
4 projections' and 'transference' dynamics that operate in such settings. The 
objectivity - i. e. validity and reliability - of this 'instrument' rests on the ability of the 
researcher to disentangle their own feelings and subjectivity from the dynamics that 
are proj ected onto them from the social system (see Berg (1980), Lowman (198 8), 
Alderfer (1990), Smith (1990), Hunt (1989) and Hirschhorn (1995)). 
The procedures for engaging in such a process are premised on training and 
experience in psychoanalytic or clinical methods. This provides consistency of 
application, diagnostic protocol, the development of the role and professional and 
personal identity and continual development. (See Appendix 6 for an outline of the 
key elements of a clinical researcher, which fall within the researcher's experience, 
personal development and training) 
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The procedures involve 'clinical' supervision, personal development work, reflection 
and managing the social relationships. Clinical supervision is supervision that was 
informed by a psychoanalytic perspective and helped the researcher explore and 
separate their personal issues from the transference issues that arose out of the role. It 
provided another set of eyes and ears from someone outside of the research process. 
Often the dynamics of the research process were re-created in the supervision session 
to notice and study. Over and above the course of study of this dissertation, clinical 
supervision had been used by the author since September 1992. 
The use of psychotherapy or some personal 'work' on self-insight and development is 
also suggested and the author has been in group psychoanalytic psychotherapy. In the 
role of researcher, a series of field notes have been regularly diarised during all of the 
data collection periods of feelings, associations, thoughts of possible dynamics in the 
sessions, reflection and observations of minutia or more significant variations of 
behaviour experienced as unusual or curious (some of these notes are recorded in the 
case study Appendices 8- 10). 
Managing relationships has to be at the individual, group, inter-group and broader 
social level of the system and the process needs to be handled sensitively so as not to 
' collude' with some of the dynamics that are operating (see Jarrett and Kellner (1996), 
Kahn (1993)). Edmondson (1996) also highlights the tensions that exist in the 
researcher versus the consultant's role and plumbs for the latter if the goal is to effect 
organisational change, rather than simply understand. 
As part of managing the relationship the use of interpretation as a means of dialogue 
and further inquiry can be also valuable. 
Interpretation and dialogue 
These instruments are used to develop the individual, group and organisational 'text'. 
Each of the instruments provide a basis for further verification through the use of 
triangulation and can be developed further by the use of interpretations. The purpose 
of interpretation is to seek validation of understanding and glean further in-depth 
information about the social system involved in the study. It is akin to sharing a 
working hypotheses in order to gain more understanding. Interpretations are like 
hypotheses, and are used as a tool of inquiry in qualitative research, not as a 'truth' 
waiting to be disproved. 
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The combination of these instruments provided the main procedures and protocols for 
systematic data gathering. They have varying degrees of reliability but these are 
generally satisfactory, ranging from 0.6 to 0.99, where quantitatively attainable. For 
the qualitative processes there is the use of triangulation and 'consensual' validity that 
provides some validity. In terms of theoretical validity, with the exception of the 
framework of the Group Analysis Grid, the construct validity is weak or unknown. 
The implications of this and the wider research issues are discussed in the last section 
of the following chapter. 
7. Data analysis 
This section briefly comments upon the analysis of the data as it relates to the key area 
of inquiry and based on the instruments discussed above - see table 10.1 - that shows 
the linkages between the research areas and the research methods and instruments. 
After each area of inquiry is discussed, a comment on some of the research issues that 
arose from these are discussed in the next chapter. 
Secondly, the structuring of the data was also influenced by the theoretical 
relationships that were presented in the last chapter of Part two on the theoretical 
framework and the propositions that arose from the theory in relationship to the 
research questions. 
Task and 'top team' 
Information about the strategic task and boundary management competencies of the 
team came from both the observations of the group and the individual interviews. 
Content analysis of the observations and the coding of common themes provided the 
basis of analysis. These were not classified by the nature of the strategic task as it was 
felt that was a further development of the research inquiry and, while interesting, it 
was outside the scope of this thesis as defined. Common categories also emerged 
from the interview data and these were clustered under common themes relating to the 
area of inquiry. For example, issues concerning the environment focused on the 
reduction in public sector funds, the increase use of competition, the role of central 
government and the perception of public services by the public. 'NUD. IST', a 
computerised tool for categorising data from qualitative research, was also used. 
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The dynamics of the team 
Data about the 'top team's' interaction was analysed from two main sources: 
observations of the meetings using the GAG and the first and second round of 
interviews. The data from the GAG was scored and categorised according to an 
analysis of content of the discussions and informed by the theory of group dynamics. 
These were classified, counted and presented in summary, descriptive statistics. The 
content and themes of the narratives were further analysed for themes and areas of 
focus in the conversation using conflict focal analysis (Stock and Lieberman, 1962) 
and theme analysis (Long (1992), Guerin (1995), Wheelan and Krasick (1993)). 
Data concerning roles and relationships was gleaned from the interviews and this was 
coded along the areas of relevance for that group/individual but within the specific 
area of inquiry. Thus, information about childhood experiences, or statements about 
other colleagues in a group, were coded only as they related to the research questions 
and propositions. Some data is not relevant and thus is not used for this thesis. 
Organisational teaming 
Data was gathered both from the first interview with the Directors and through the 
organisational questionnaire. The structuring and coding of key features of critical 
incidents from the strategic decision-making process provided a format for analysis. 
Whereas the questionnaire was more quantitative and lent itself to a scale (Likert- 
type) analysis using a spreadsheet, the latter was piloted and used only in the third 
case study. It was a result of the research and requires further development as an 
instrument in its own right. 
Organisational context 
Data regarding the organisational context was analysed from the first interviews by 
coding key contextual features of the group. Content analysis of the group's fears, 
concerns, relationships and boundary management was also used along with 
secondary data including public sector reports, j oumal articles, local newspapers and 
the in-house magazine. Non-participatory observations were also used in the public 
places within the organisation e. g. the lifts, canteens, foyers 
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8. Summary 
This chapter has operationalised the implications of the argument that the theoretical 
and philosophical underpinning of the research inquiry suggests a research approach 
that is qualitative, takes a case study approach and uses a 'clinical' methodological 
approach for inquiry. These methods are largely observational and in-depth 
interviews with members of the groups being studied. The design allows embedded 
cases to be looked at and also uses multiple methods to support the verification of 
data. 
There is a high degree of face validity in the research approach but poor construct 
validity. The level of reliability is acceptable but some of the details of the 
methodology needs additional refining. Further research issues are discussed in the 
final chapter. 
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Chapter 11 - The case material 
1. Introduction 
Chapters 9 and 10 make the case for a research approach that builds on the theoretical 
constructs and aims of the research. The purpose of this chapter is to qualify the 
boundaries and limitations of the overall research process. It looks at the case 
material in terms of choice, approach and replicability instead of generalisability. As 
the case histories form such an important part of the epistemology of this thesis, this 
chapter describes and discusses the processes that led to the selection of the final 
cases. It provides a commentary about the final design and the way the research aims 
to systematically gather the data in order to develop the initial working hypotheses 
that arose from the theoretical underpinning. It concludes that, while the research 
approach was appropriate to the theoretical domain and area of inquiry, the 
methodological detail and degree of construct validity place limitations on the general 
applicability of the findings. Thus, the level of contribution is both specific and 
qualified with the opportunity to develop the areas of weakness in further research 
projects. 
2. Case selection criteria 
Groups in public sector organisations 
The area of inquiry was to examine the impact of the internal 'top team' dynamics on 
organisational learning at the strategic level. There are many sectors currently 
engaged in change. However, among those observed, change in the public sector was 
both significant and rapid. It was also an area familiar to the researcher and it 
provided a relevant context to explore and increase understanding in the process of 
strategic change and learning and the role of the 'top team'. Thus, the public sector 
was a context for exploring the issues and was not the area of inquiry per se. 
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Organisational scope - 'iocal' 
The organisations that were included were those that had sufficient resources and 
strategic significance and impact on the area of their jurisdiction. National public 
sector organisations were excluded as they were too closely tied with national politics 
and, it was felt, harder to trace relationships and dynamics. 'Local' or regional bodies 
provided a basis for considering the 'strategic' aspects of public sector organisations 
in a manageable and containable form for this work. They also had clearly defined, 
geographically self contained areas of responsibility with clear lines of authority, 
political and managerial roles defined, but each had varying degrees of exposure to 
the environment. 
Organisational types 
An initial involvement with ten public sector organisations between 1992 and 1994 
provided some preliminary information about the nature of change in local public 
sector organisations and the issues 'top teams' had to address. Of the organisations 
involved, one was a regional Probation Service, another was a City challenge 
organisation, the third was a London hospital trust and the others were local 
authorities. (For an overview of the local authorities see Appendix 7. ) The ideal was 
to have three cases from different organisational types. However, this was not 
possible, mainly due to the problems of identification, prima facie, of types of 
'learning organisations' (see section below). The final selection was one local 
authority and one health trust, with the pilot providing considerable information from 
a local authority. 
The selection process 
The selection process was informed by a variety of methods. Initially, the aim was to 
get three organisations that reflected various stages of 'organisational learning' - from 
dysfunctional to double-loop learning. This follows the typological case study 
approach advocated by Yin (1993). However, in reality, identifying such 
organisational 'types' 'a priori' was difficult as there was no comparative, published 
data. The possibility of a survey would provide a study in its own right (see Yin 
(1993), Flynn and Talbot (1996)) and even where 'types' were thought to exist these 
proved to be more complex than the simple formulation of 'type' allowed. 
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Another approach was needed. The working premise was that an organisation's 'top 
team's' ability to manage change was seen as a proxy variable to understanding 
learning at an organisational level. The assumption being applied was: if 
organisations were shown to be 'managing' change, then there was more likelihood 
that they may also be engaged in organisational learning. This rationale followed the 
discussion in chapters 1,3 and 5. 
Thus, a panel of experts were used from the field of public sector management to give 
their assessment on organisations who seemed to be managing change well. They 
included members from local government associations, associates and professionals 
from the medical profession, public sector consultants and other academics from well- 
known institutions with knowledge in the field. Three main criteria were used to 
assess public sector organisations: those able to manage their finances; those engaged 
in change and transition programmes and, those that had active diversity programmes. 
These were also based on a number of reference points in the literature (see Pettigrew 
and Whipp (199 1), Kanter (1983), Kanter et al (1992), Jarrett et al (199 1) and Peters 
and Waterman (1982)). 
Over sixty potential organisations were identified as representative of the changes 
being experienced and managed by public sector organisations. Of those targeted, 
based on the panel's assessment of these organisations, over half were unsuitable 
because of insufficient data, impressionist or contradictory assessment, too extreme or 
well known in the public arena. Thirteen were subjected to their CEO having left or 
about to leave, or with difficulties in the 'top team' appointments. Three were 
interested but replied 'not now! ' Three started the process but then decided to 
withdraw. In three cases the reason was there was too much change going on and 
there was reluctance by members of the 'top team'. Of the remaining eight or so, two 
met the general selection criteria and were 'managing' the changes, not being 
swamped by it, but nor were they leaders in the field. However, the point is that the 
actual dynamics, strategic leaming and internal processes were unknown at that stage 
of all the potential case organisations. 
Furthermore, as Wheelan et al (1994) explain, the research process for in-depth group 
work is both long and extensive. Thus, with the pilot and an additional two case 
studies it was felt that these were sufficient for the purpose of this thesis - to 
understand the relationship between the 'top team's' dynamics and strategic 
organisational learning. 
187 
Given the above difficulties, the other 'type' approach that was considered was to 
examine the nature of the teams as they emerged from the research process and 
examine what relationships and impact these had on the organisation's strategic 
capacity to learn. This approach provided a match between the research 
6constructivist' orientation, the case study approach and the need to have comparable 
sets of data that related to the research question. Thus, this study focuses on the 
dynamics of three 'top teams' and the impact on strategic organisational leaming. 
There were three teams: the team that fragments; the team that changes and, the team 
that stays the same in relationship to membership. 
3. The overall research process 
Introduction 
As argued in chapters 9 and 10, the research process followed a qualitative approach 
and thus relied mostly on interview data and non-participant observation using a 
systematic scoring method and content analysis. In addition, it required the researcher 
to take a 'clinical approach' and identify and use feelings and associated thoughts as a 
means of further data. The linkage between the theoretical framework and hypotheses 
developed in chapter 8 is drawn together with the research methods and summarised 
in table 11.1, which builds on table 10.1 and makes the links explicit. 
The research process had seven distinct phases: 
* Group observations 
* First interviews 
Group feedback and dialogue 
Personal interviews (second interviews) 
Organisational analysis 
Final feedback option 
Use of personal reflection 
A summary of the research questions, hypotheses, the data sources and the structure of 
the cases in represented in table 11.1 below. 
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Table 11.1 
An Overview of the Key Relationships between Research Interests, Methods and 
Propositions 
History Context Conflict Summary of 
Environment secondary data on past published articles - interviews (Q7-Qg) (1) rapidly changing interviews re g arding and secondary data - informal conversations environment impacts key issues in on public sector - non participating ne. g atively on 'learning' 
environment interviews re g. arding observations on areas of 
& task (Q4) questions in key issues conflict -ag.. with a (Q5 - Q7) central government agency 
Group interviews: question interviews: questions on - interviews (Q% 13) (2) underbounded 'top 
of how people saw the role; leadership and - non-participatory team' boundanes limit 
group's history relationship with 'Board' observations / GAG 'learning' 
(QIO-QI3 particularly) (Q6-8, Q14-16) - dialogue & interpretation (3) excessive basic assumptions 
secondary data - news from group feedback reduce learning 
paper cuttingsý internal iifter non-participatory 
magazine and minutes observations 
non-participative observation 
GAG on group phantasics 
Individual personal in-depth non-participatory non-participatory (4) role authority, 
interviews on personal observation of how acted observations insight and learning an 
history & significant in group - GAG dialogue & interpretation compromised if managers 
events or people Interviews-how people use of FIRO-B as a basis are unable to contain 
saw each other's role in for exploring 'inner their anxictics 
the group (Q 12-13) dialogue' and theories in 
personal interview & how action 
people saw themselves 
take up role authority 
Organisational critical incidents taken - in-depth personal - non-participatory 
Learning (Q 17-2 1) in interviews interviews observations 
- group analysis of key . interpretation of text 'occupations' 
14 The development and use oforganisational questionnaire 10 
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Key stages in the research 
Group observations 
The group observation was the first phase. It was important to do this piece of work 
first so that the meetings were as natural as possible and were not influenced by any 
other aspect of the research process such as the interviews. In the pilot the researcher 
attended over 23 hour sessions (3600 minutes) of the team meetings and this provided 
a wealth of data. In fact too much. It was excessive in relationship to other studies 
that had taken only three meetings; 540 minutes, Guerin (1995); 1200 minutes, Peck 
(1995) and 1260 minutes, Karterud and Foss (1989). Thus, data from six, two to three 
hour sessions was considered as reasonable for this research totalling approximately 
800 -1080 minutes. One of the criticisms and issues that Karterud and Foss (1989) 
makes of Stock and Thelen's (195 7) earlier work was the difficulty of scoring for long 
periods. Their approach was to observe in units of 20 minutes before resting and 
scoring again. In this thesis recording periods were typically for 40 minutes before 
resting. This seemed to provide the balance between consistent themes in the groups 
and a good quantity of data. 
First interviews 
After the group observations, individual interviews were conducted with each member 
of the group using the questionnaire discussed in the section on methodology and 
instruments below. These lasted between one and half hours with one member in the 
pilot taking over three hours. The optimum level of data collection, attention and 
relevance was about an hour and half before rapidly hitting diminishing marginal 
returns. The pilot provided the opportunity to identify the best timing for the 
interview and how to conduct the interview process effectively. 
Group feedback and dialogue 
The data from the first two phases was analysed and fed back to the group. This 
provided an opportunity to cross verify and clarify the findings, check points of 
information and detail and to see whether the observations had some meaning and 
reality to the group. As part of this process initial interpretations were made on the 
basis of the theory and in terms of identifying cycles of defensive routines or 
structures that impeded organisational leaming at the strategic level. In all of the 
cases the feedback was used as part of their away days and the researcher worked 
closely with the two different external consultants that helped the group through what 
were seen as relevant and important issues. Thus there was some content and 
consensual validity to the material as well. 
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Personal interviews (second interviews) 
The fourth stage of the research process was the individual interview using the FIRO- 
B questionnaire, observations from the group work and the interviewees' personal and 
role experiences to explore themselves in role. These interviews were deliberately 
placed later in the process as, by now, it was expected that the research relationship 
was sufficiently strong for the interviewees to have enough confidence in the process 
and the researcher to be open enough for the task. This yielded considerable 'personal' 
data about the research collaborators and ethical issues of disclosure have been 
wrestled with as part of the research. 
Organisational analysis 
In the pilot study, information about the organisation was gathered through 
observation, informal discussion and information in a comprehensive staff survey. 
While useful contextual data, it was not sufficiently geared to the issues of 
organisational leaming; much of this had to be inferred. Thus, from the pilot this gap 
was recognised. Considering this gap, a research need was met and, from the two 
subsequent cases, information and a questionnaire developed as a research output. 
This research tool was to provide a wider view of the organisational context and 
particularly how other agents in the organisation perceived its capacity to learn at a 
strategic level. 
This provided the final data gathering method for the purposes of the research but was 
only used in one of the case studies and is discussed in Appendix S. 
Final feedback option 
The groups were provided with the opportunity to receive final feedback from all of 
the research findings to date and to share with each other what they discovered, both 
about themselves and the system more generally. Each group had the opportunity to 
do something about it. This methodology was consistent with a clinical approach and 
provided further data to develop the group's understanding of itself. It also was one of 
the 'benefits' from agreeing to be involved in the research and an activity that was a 
healthy part of research relationship. Only one organisation took this opportunity. 
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4. Methodology and instruments: practice and issues 
The Group Analysis Grid 
The Group Analysis Grid was an instrument for consistently scoring discussions into 
theoretical constructs from a psychodynamic understanding of group behaviour. The 
work by Thelen and Stocks was the original base for the instrument and, from their 
work and others subsequently, there was a good degree of validity and reliability in 
the approach as discussed above in chapter 10. 
The practice of scoring was more developmental. The first difficulty was that a tape 
recorder was not permissible in the meetings. Thus, all the data collection was scored 
from hand-written notes. The decision to use notes rather than score in situ was made 
so that the narrative could be inspected by others and a inter-rater reliability test could 
be undertaken. It also allowed further content analysis of the groups' dialogue and to 
surface other themes, conflicts and meaning that emerged from the groups' internal 
dynamics. While the gathering of notes was valuable for the reasons stated, inability 
to use a tape recorder was the main weakness in this particular application of the 
research. 
Originally, verbatim notes were taken but these ranged from very good quality to poor 
notes. Material from the pilot was used for the inter-rater scoring. Of the 50 
statements that were taken from the extracts only 39 could be used. Thus, there was 
some data loss. This was compensated somewhat in three ways. Firstly, the emerging 
themes and conflicts were easier for the 'experts' to identify and agree upon. There 
was near 100% overall agreement on themes (see Kets De Vries et al, 1993) but the 
statement by statement analysis was more difficult - only 0.76 overall agreement. The 
second compensation was that subsequent teams each had the feedback session and 
discussion tape recorded. This was seen as legitimate and not crossing confidentiality 
of strategic information. These were rechecked with group experts. Finally, the third 
compensation was the sheer volume of notes taken and thus the ability to have a large 
'population of narrative' to use. 
Inevitably, selective attention and poor quality notes reduced the quality of the data 
collection. However, this was the trade-off that had to be struck in this work with the 
'top teams' and it highlights the difficulties of managing open access in such cases. 
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The pilot did provide some reliability in the thematic issues and the overall agreement 
on statements. Further checks were made from the later taped conversations. 
Revisions were made both to the categories of material scored and the manner in 
which the notes were taken to reflect the categorisation, but with notes of the data to 
support it. Thus, the final method was a compromise between a direct scoring method 
and a gathering of verbatim statements as additional data to back up the score. 
Thus the GAG had good validity and reliability as an instrument but was weakened by 
the method of data collection. 
The interview schedule 
The interview schedule attempted to capture information about the context of the 
organisation, the strategic issues, relationships between 'top team' members and the 
Board, the relationships among 'top team' members and the leader and among 
themselves, the capacity to manage change as an organisation and the culture and 
informal nature of the organisation - see Appendix 3. The original interview schedule 
was the result of the literature review, preliminary studies and interviews undertaken 
earlier. The schedule allowed interviewees to talk on topics of 'top team' dynamics, 
their context and their internal dynamic in a way that made sense to them, rather than 
following a structured questionnaire. Gathering data from taking notes was more 
efficient than a tape recorder and the researcher could summarisc and check their 
understanding from the notes. Notes could be cross referenced in the interview under 
cross headings and other thoughts and feelings could be recorded in situ (as marginal 
field notes) which also picked up the 'clinical' approach. 
The interview schedule proved to be a consistent and relatively reliable method of 
collecting data. It had no statistical test to verify its reliability but there was sufficient 
consensual validity regarding consistent core themes. 
The interview schedule changed with two or three minor amendments in questions on 
the following: the strategic task of the top team (Q6), the relationships with the Board 
(Q8) and the probing questions on some of the topics that seemed to arise and added 
clarity to the line of inquiry, without leading. 
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The major amendment to the interview schedule from the pilot was the introduction of 
a new section on how the organisation learned using a critical incident process on 
recent strategic issues (Q17-21). This was a result of the pilot where it was felt that 
insufficient attention was paid to systematically collecting information about the 
organisation's learning. The data that was collected was either inferred or was a result 
of anecdotes. The incorporation of this section ensured a greater degree of 
consistency. 
In summary, the interview schedule covered the theoretical areas of inquiry. It 
provided an instrument that allowed comparability of response and consensual 
validity on the key themes and issues that group members shared. It was not 
'validated' in any quantitative sense, but from a qualitative point of view, despite its 
limitations, it provided a basis for consistent data collection. 
Personal interviews 
These interviews differed in depth, nature and purpose from the earlier interviews. 
Data about the psychological dynamics and internal dialogue of the team members 
was sought. The use of a personality inventory was considered as a useful platform to 
have a contained conversation within the realms of the research aimed and the ethics 
of this sort of research. Thus, there was not a contract to provide psychotherapy, nor 
go beyond the realms of acceptance with each of the interviewees on their personal 
history or dynamic. 
Three personal profile questionnaires were used in the pilot. These were Catells 
16PF, Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and the Schutz Fundamental Inter- 
personal Relationship Orientation - Behaviours (FIRO-B) questionnaire. 
Discussion about each of the personal histories was very informative. MBTI was high 
in terms of construct validity and reliability but it is rooted in cognitive psychology 
and, while the results were generally informative for the individual, they did not 
strongly relate to the theoretical basis of the thesis. 
The Catell 16PF had a number of personality factors that seemed relevant to the 
research - for example emotional resilience. Yet, again while these were very high in 
reliability, it was not underpinned by a theoretical base and was not related to this 
thesis' theoretical orientation. 
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The use of FIRO-B was chosen in the final analysis because of its theoretical 
congruence and understanding of psychological defenses and inner realities (Schutz 
(1955,1984 and 1992)). It also meant that relationships could be established between 
interview material and the theory. However, as stated above, the construct validity 
was weak. The reliability was claimed to be good (Schutz, 1952 and 1978). Yet 
another study suggests that the results can be sensitive to context between home and 
work (Orlans and Georgiades (1983)). 
The instrument was useful for developing existential interviews with interviewees 
about what goes on for them in their minds and the impact of this on their role. It 
provided a consistent format for such interviews and some comparability of data. The 
instrument itself was used more as a basis for exploration and further inquiry rather 
than a means in its own right. It is felt that more on-going work with these Directors 
would be needed to draw further conclusions. 
The interviews were also supported by the use of clinical supervision where the 
researcher was able to untangle the issues faced by the interview from those arising 
from the research process. Supervision was provided in a group, led by an 
experienced 'clinical' orientated social scientist and such meetings. were held about 
once every two to three months during the period of study. These were also 
supplemented with three one-to-one supervisions with a 'clinical' mentor. 
Overall, the use of the personal questionnaire FIRO-B was chosen because of its 
theoretical congruence with the thesis, but its own validity and reliability was limited. 
Its greater use was to provide a consistent framework to explore some possibly 
difficult issues with people who operated in 'top teams'. 
The organisational questionnaire (SOLI) 
The organisational questionnaire aimed to identify the strategic organisational 
learning as seen by those involved in the strategic process - scanning, formulation, 
implementation and reviewing. This would typically involve the 'top team', some of 
the Board members and two or three levels of the top management group. In numeric 
terms it could represent as low as 60 managers to as much as 200 in larger public 
sector organisations. 
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The original questionnaire was developed as a further output from the pilot work. The 
questionnaire is not based on other or similar work, but follows the usual protocols of 
any Likert-type scale inventory. It is thus subject to the problems of such scales. 
These are that what people do and what they say can often be at variance, thus, it can 
be a poor predictor of behaviour. Furthermore, the words on the page may mean 
different things to different people and, finally, the assumption that people's ideas can 
be mapped on a single scale underscores the complexity of their opinions. Where 
items had a low correlation coefficient (below 0.5 or low relative to the other items in 
each factor) questions were reworked and clarified, or items were dropped (see 
appendix 5). 
The construct validity and reliability of this instrument were discussed above: where 
the former was low but its face validity and reliability based on an item analysis were 
acceptable. It was clear that the instrument needed further development, but as it was 
not the purpose of the research, it was used with an acceptance of its limitations. 
Clinical methodologies 
A 'clinical approach' has a variety of methodologies aimed to help gather data in a 
way that stops the researcher's valid and valuable subjective experience leading to 
bias or collusion in the research process. The main methods of supporting this 
process are through personal insight work by the researcher, supervision, training in 
clinical approaches and reflection. 
Each of these methods is discussed in either the above chapter or in the appendices. 
However, the learning from the pilot was that these were to be used consistently and 
regularly to constantly check what was happening in the organisational system. For 
example, as recorded in the field notes, the CEO of the pilot organisation was 
experienced by the researcher as all powerful, "A character to be attracted to". Yet the 
use of this as a clinical researcher is to understand "if that is how I feel, how do others 
feel? ". They may feel undermined, envious and that provides another perspective on 
understanding the relationships and comments in the 'top team' (See chapter 12, 
section 6 and appendix 8 for further details. ) 
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Another example is the rejection the researcher experienced after giving the hospital 
trust 'top team' feedback. In the field notes, the researcher acknowledges the great 
mistake of just giving the group feedback, which they welcomed, but not offering 
solutions - not part of the research contract (See chapter 13, section 6 and appendix 9 
for further details. ) This led to the group subsequently feeling very angry about the 
process and with the researcher. Once the researcher had understood this for what it 
was and its meaning, in terms of that team going through major change, he was able to 
broach the subject with the group and regain a relationship, but after losing several 
months' work. 
All the methods to retain the integrity of the 'self as instrument' were used by the 
researcher. It cannot guarantee 100% reliability but provides an opportunity for self 
scrutiny and personal and professional development in service of a 'clinical' 
approach. 
5. Conclusions 
The use of a case study and 'clinical' approach was used to understand the internal 
dynamics of a 'top team' in its context of rapid change in three public sector 
organisations. The nature of the research itself and the process have meant that there 
may have been some selective commonality about the final cases - for example an 
openness to inquiry - and that other organisations have not been included. Case 
studies, by their very nature, are not generalisable but aim to understand what might 
be the dynamics of internal systems that make them how they are. Thus, the 
conclusions that one might draw from the research are only applicable to area-based 
public sector organisations with some openness to exposure and the three that dropped 
out, or the other organisations that just said no, may be more typical of this group of 
organisations. 
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Secondly, the research instruments and design were compatible with the 'clinical' 
approach. The extensive nature of the design meant that the quality of data was 
reduced for group data and a trade-off was made between access (and no data) or 
some data. This applies particularly to the group observation material but not to the 
interview data, the personal interviews, the organisational questionnaire or other 
secondary sources. While measures were taken to retain the quality of the data, it 
would have been better had audio-cquipment been used. Thus, for the group data, 
while the score of statements against Bion-type activities is reliable - inter-rater 
reliability 0.76 and the thematic issues are agreed - the detailed content analysis of 
deeper analysis is less reliable. 
The next part uses the research approach discussed in the last three chapters to 
examine three case studies. 
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Part four - Cases in organisational 'learning' 
1. Introduction 
This part of the thesis applies the theoretical framework to three public sector 
organisations and explores and refines the working hypotheses that were developed in 
chapter 8 and reiterated in chapter II- see too table 11.1. 
Each of the case studies reflects a progression in thinking so they are not exactly 
identical. However, they do share data concerning some common themes on history, 
context, and politics and conflict at the organisational, group and individual level. 
These were the themes that came from the systemic conflict theoretical framework of 
chapters 2 and 3 and the interpretative aspects of the theoretical development in 
chapters 5-7. Thus there is a matrix of data that provides the structure for analysing 
and commenting upon the data. This is shown below. 
History Context Politics/conflict 
Organisation History External National and local 
Environment and politics, 
internal organisational 
configuration conflicts and 
coalition/ routines 
Group Origin and birth Relationship with Inner and outer 
the Board and groups, group 
quality of the dynamics and roles 
holding of members and 
environment leader 
Individual Personal and work Role within group Inner conflicts, 
history and its resonance inner dialogue and 
with the past defensive routines 
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The data structure also infonns the discussion on the nature of organisational learning 
and the role of the 'top team' in each case study as set out in chapter 5. 
The research process of using case studies requires the presentation of qualitative data 
to be both accessible and available for the reader so that they can judge for themselves 
whether, given the data and the theoretical framework, they may draw similar 
conclusions. The balance between providing excessive detail that can lose the reader 
and sufficient detail to make ajudgement' is a difficult one and is an area where 
qualitative research can sometimes be weak. Inevitably not all of the data can be 
presented or should be presented and thus it is selective. However, the judgement 
taken on what to include is driven by the themes that address the key research 
questions in each case study. The final style and structure of the cases have been 
influenced predominately by the works of Diamond (1994), Menzies (1960) and 
Levinson (1972) as well as Hirschhorn (1988), Kahn (1993) and Mirvis and Berg 
(1977) on style and structure. They tend to provide rigour, descriptive data and an 
analysis of the presenting and systemic issues. In addition, the development, analysis 
and presentation of inductive reasoning has been strongly influenced by Minto (19 82), 
Neumann (1996) and, to a lesser extent, Miller (1989). 
The research strategy and the data collection methods are set out in part three, 
chapters 9-11. Briefly summarised, the research strategy was based on a 
constructivist philosophy, a qualitative, case study approach using clinical research 
methodology. These included several in-depth interview techniques, non- 
participatory observation, feedback and checking processes, personal profile 
questionnaires and in one case an organisational audit instrument. These methods 
were considered to attain reasonable standards of reliability and face validity. 
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The use of cross verification of data, triangulation methods, statistical verification of 
the personal profiles, independent interpretation of group observations by group 
experts plus checking understanding and meanings with the research participants 
provided some checks and reduced the effects of bias and omission, which no doubt is 
present. 
Thus, in order to strike that balance of clarity and data transparency each of the cases 
present key themes in the data collection and have a common format both for ease of 
reading and for comparability. They start with a short summary paragraph of the key 
issue. Each case also has an account of the entry process as an introduction to the way 
the system handles external imports, along with some 'thick description' of the first 
meeting in order to give the reader a flavour of the organisation. 
A common template has been developed and it is shown in the table at the end of this 
introduction to Part four. The table seeks to show a clear link between the research 
questions, propositions/working hypotheses, the analysis required and the sources of 
information. This link can sometimes be lost in the narrative of a case study 
approach. Thus, the template seeks to provide natural points, at the end of the four 
research questions, where inferences can be drawn from the data as to how far 
questions can be answered. The emphasis is on inference and an inductive, and 
therefore, interpretative process to understanding the organisational dynamics of 'top 
teams' (see Minto, 1982). 
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Each case then has six main sections following the format of the above matrix. It 
includes: 
An introduction to the case - the history, setting and key players 
The organisation - the issues of the environment and context on organisational 
leaming 
The role and dynamics of the group - how it manages its task and boundaries, 
the roles and authority of members of the group and how these relate to 
personal histories and the group 'matrix' 
The nature and scope of strategic organisational leaming - is there any and 
what helps or hinders it 
Personal reflections as the researcher as instrument - what feelings and 
impressions and projection did I experience in the role of researcher and what 
do these add to the analysis 
Conclusions about the case and the inferences that can be drawn 
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In addition, each of the cases also reflects a slightly different predicament in 
relationship to its strategic task and learning opportunities. The first case is of a local 
authority managing whole sea-change in its political agenda and control and the 
difficulties for the 'top team' in coping with uncertainty in such turbulent times. The 
second case is of a NHS trust status hospital that is faced with changes in the external 
terrain as they move from a civil service ethos to a market led-organisation and the 
problems that arises for the 'top team' as they seek to manage the transition and their 
learning. The third case study is of another local authority that seeks to manage 
stability after a period of considerable change and their difficulty of managing through 
'peace-time', the subsequent dynamic and the impact on strategic organisational 
learning. The names of each organisation and the key players have been changed to 
maintain anonymity in all of the cases. Each case is slightly different in the detailed 
content. However, reading one case study in-depth provides an indication of the 
others but together they suggest some recurring patterns of organisational 
dynamics and the impact on strategic organisational learning. 
The intended outcome of these cases is that they will illuminate, refine and enhance 
the initial propositions and help develop the emerging theoretical model presented in 
chapter 8. Such an outcome will help understand the dynamics of strategic 
organisational learning from a systemic and interpretative perspective and its 
implications for further research, management interventions and organisational 
consultation. 
A table of the case study template follows. 
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A table of the case study template - part four 
Key research 
question(s) - 
What is the impact of the 
dynamics of 'top teams' 
on strategic 
organisational learning? 
Proposition one: 
If the environment is 
turbulent then the 
organisational learning 
will be reduced to lower 
levels of attaimnent 
1. Are the dynamics of 
the 'top team' 
influenced by the 
conditions of the 
environment? 
Yes 
- There are changes in the 
environment mainly due 
to central government 
reduction in finding 
increase in central 
govt. control 
. reduction in public 
sector policy input 
. increased competition 
in public services 
- Sector analysis of key 
trends in the public sector 
political trends 
economic and financial 
trends 
. social positioning of 
public sector and its 
competition 
impact of new 
technology 
- Experience of people in 
public sector 
organisations 
- Secondary data 
including articles on the 
sector 
- data sources on funding 
to public sector e. g. 
national statistics 
- Committee papers 
- Interview material from 
the first interview with 
directors drawing upon 
Q4 and5 
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1.1 Is the Yes 
environment 
turbulent? 
- Boards/Members 
provide a facilitative and 
holding environment for 
the 'top team' 
. they provide a policy 
framework 
. they provide 
management experience 
. they are motivated to 
support public endeavour 
- Look at the history of 
the organisation. 
- Examine the values and 
politics of the 
organisation 
- Seek commentary about 
the strategic and policy 
leadership of the 
chairman and the 
'board'/committee of 
Members 
- Secondary data from 
notes of committee/board 
meeting and similar 
references 
- Interview material - first 
interview with directors - 
drawing upon Q6-8, Q 15 
and 16 
1.2 Does the Proposition two 
context of the 
organisation If the top team's 
provide a boundaries are poorly 
'holding managed, then teaming 
environment' for will be reduced 
organisation- 
ional teaming? 
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2. Is the 'top team' able 
to manage its 
boundaries and task? 
No 
- 'Top team's are often 
plagued by difference 
about the nature of the 
task 
- Political differences 
interfere with them 
carrying a common view 
- There is a difference 
between what people say 
and what they do 
- Examine whether the 
'strategic task' is shared 
- Examine how it carries 
through its decisions 
- Secondary data using 
strategy papers that 
explains the key task(s) 
- Interview data that 
infers differences 
individually and 
collectively to answers to 
Q6 and 10 (first 
interview) 
- Secondary data using 
minutes of meetings and 
decision 'hit rate' 
- Examine interview (first 
one) data on team 
effectiveness Q 10 
2.1 Does the No 
team hold a 
common view of - The 'top team' leader's 
the strategic role is contingent upon 
task? the environment 
the organisational 
context 
the group's dynamics 
personality 
which suggest that the 
leadership role is difficult 
to maintain and would 
therefore rely upon an 
ability to hold ones 'role' 
- Explore how does 
leader supports task 
attainment 
- Interview data trom 
directors about their 
leader -QII 
- Interview data from the 
leader about their own 
style (both in the first 
interview and second 'in- 
depth' interview) 
- Observed behaviours in 
the group from non- 
participatory observation 
- see group analysis 
grid/content analysis 
I 
11 The data was restricted to relevant points due to its extensive volume and managing 
ethical issues about confidentiality. This was also true for the group material 
206 
2.2 Is the 
leader's role 
facilitative to 
task attainment 
(and therefore 
leaming)? 
No 
The ability to manage the 
boundaries of the sub- 
system are a function of 
internal and external 
relationships. These 
suggest that such 
boundary management is 
difficult 
- Explore how it manages 
its external relationships 
with other groups esp. the 
board/committee 
- Explore how it manages 
its own internal dynamics 
of 
roles 
conflict and 
differences 
. politics 
- Interview data from first 
interview Q8, Q12-14 
- Observed behaviours in 
the group from non- 
participatory observation 
- see group analysis 
grid/content analysis 
2.3 Are the 
boundaries of 
this 'top team' 
subsystem 
optimally 
managed? 
Proposition 
three 
If there is a 
predominance of 
basic 
assumption 
motifs then 
learning is 
constrained 
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3. Do the dynamics of 
the team impact on 
organisational learning? 
Propositionfour 
If role holders 
are unable to 
contain their 
anxieties, then 
they will 
undermine their 
own role 
$authority' 
Yes 
- Basic assumption 
behaviours are likely due 
to 
. difficult organisational 
context and environment 
. difficult leadership and 
group dynamics 
- Examine the behaviours 
and themes in the group 
in relationship to basic 
assumption, group 
fantasies and social 
defences 
- Group Analysis Grid 
and content analysis from 
non-participatory 
observations of the group 
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Yes 
- Personal valancies 
impact on role 
effectiveness 
- The dynamics of the 
'group matrix' will be 
present 
3.1 Does the 
team display 
examples of 
'basic 
assumption' 
motifs over 
'work? 
Propositionfive 
Double-loop, strategic 
organisational learning is 
impaired by 
organisational defensive 
routines 
- Explore the inner 
dialogue and assumptions 
of each director and its 
impact on their role in the 
group 
- Draw upon their words 
and behaviours in the 
group using Group 
Analysis Grid and 
content analysis from 
non-participatory 
observations of the group 
- Use FIRO-B/ personal 
inventory for initial 
scores for opening 
discussions 
- Use of key elements of 
secondary in-depth 
interviews with each of 
the directors 
3.2 Do 
individual 
tvalancics' 
reinforce 
difficult group 
dynamics? 
No 
- All systems learn 
- Learning may be 
facilitative or habitual 
(level three or level zero) 
- The drive for (public 
sector) efficiency focuses 
on opcrational/single 
loop learning 
- Explore the nature of 
the learning that takes 
place within the strategic 
system - i. e. the 'top 
team' across the 
boundary with the 
board/committee 
- Interview data from the 
first interview with 
directors Q17-19 
- Further data from 
feedback and dialogues 
sessions with each 'top 
team' as a group in the 
latter stages of the 
rescarch 
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4. Is the organisation 
able to attain strategic 
organisational learning 
at a high level? 
No 
- The learning is not 
shared institutionally 
- Context promotes 
single-loop learning 
- Defensive routines 
inhibit such learning 
- Hard to gain insight 
from crisis, without 
reflection 
- Examine how far the 
learning is double-loop 
learning 
4.1 Is there 
strategic 
learning? - Where leadership is 
optimally bounded 
-Explore boundary 
relations between the 'top 
team' and its 
board/committce as 
contingent upon the key 
questions above 
- Interview data from the 
first interview with 
directors Q20-21 
- Further data from 
feedback and dialogues 
sessions with each 'top 
team' as a group in the 
latter stages of the 
research 
- Feedback and dialogue 
with each 'top team' 
4.2 Is such 
leaming double- 
loop? 
4.3 Does the 
strategic 
leadership 
provide 
facilitative 
structures? 
(Builds on 1.2 
and 2.1 above) 
210 
Cases in organisational dynamics 
Chapter 12 - The'top tearn'that fragmented - coping 
with uncertainty 
1. Introduction 
This case study is about a 'top team' in a local authority that experiences considerable 
change in its local environment and context and the difficulties it faces to adjust in 
such uncertainty and difficult times. 
Information about the setting of the case, the initial contact and entry and the key 
players is provided in this section. The organisational and group dynamics form the 
bulk of the rest of this chapter with analysis of the presenting data. 
1.1 Background information 
Ellismoore District Council operates within the leafy suburbs of a large metropolitan 
city. It has it roots in a political and legal framework of local government policy and 
thus it seeks to provide statutory and public services to its local beneficiaries. In 
1974, it was re-organised as part of the broader local government review of the time 
and in 1979 its boundaries were redrawn which turned out a conservative political 
majority both nationally and locally. The conservatives have been more or less in 
power for most of that time with the exception of the last local government elections 
in May 1994, when a Labour local government was returned. 
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The district is generally affluent with a small part of it in the south being 
economically more dependent with 'social housing' and 'high rises' being the social 
landscape. This divide between the southern part of the district and the majority is 
marked by a busy dual-carriage way, which is a notable social as well as physical 
boundary. 
The formal organisational structure was based on traditional local authority lines with 
the elected officials (Elected Members) running the council through sub-committees. 
These in turn reported to a main lead committee. The latter was run by the Chair or 
'Leader' of the council and supported by the CEO and his 'senior officers' meaning 
the members of the directors group. The other sub-committees were run by their 
respective departmental chairs and supported by the directors for each service. There 
were six main committees: Finance, Welfare Services, Planning, Environment, 
Leisure and Education Services. Other ad hoc and special projects committees were 
set up on the basis of need. 
The authority had approximately 8,400, staff at the time of study, with about 150 -200 
senior managers depending upon what criteria were used and the role, experience and 
opinion of the interviewee. 
Internal staff Survey, Jan 1994 
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.0 
Flaure 12.1 - An overview of the structure 
Elected party 
Leader of the Council 
Committee Chairs 
CEO 
Departmental Directors' 
Service-led Departments 
Units and teams supporting/providing public service(s) 
1.2 Initial contact 
The initial contact for his organisation came from two sources. Firstly, it was one of 
the local authorities that was considered by the panel of public sector experts as an 
organisation going through change and would be worthy of study and leaming. 
Secondly, one of the directors was informed about the research and suggested that he 
and the 'top team' would be interested in exploring it further having spoken to the 
CEO. 
' Departmental directors were accountable to the CEO through the line and executive 
management structures as well as to their committee chair through the political 
management of the authority. 
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A meeting was arranged with the 'top team' as part of their regular meetings and a 
presentation was given of the research inquiry and the resources and input that would 
be required from each of the members of the group and the group as whole. 
Two members expressed some doubts about the use of 'academic' research but after 
considerable debate it was collectively agreed that the research would go ahead and 
members would see all of the stages through. 
The group met in one of the elected Members' committee rooms and it had a 
combination of either a business operational meeting or a policy-type meeting once a 
fortnight. Ellismoore District Council (EDC) was a Conservative authority at the start 
of the research period. On entering the main town hall I was met with a clean and 
efficient looking reception area and a low profiled security presence. The large 
reception area was very busy and with housing bcncf its and rent related queries being 
on the ground floor that may well have swelled the apparent numbers. Members of 
the public were seen in other areas of the town hall: in the education department, in 
the environmental control section, in planning and with the exception of their colour- 
coded security badges they seem to have a free range of the building. 
The study started in February 1994 and throughout the duration of the study, over a 
year, this busyness in the main reception area and the building more generally was 
always present. 
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The town hall, or civic centre, was a very modem, multi-storey building with glass 
and brick 1960s architecture. It was surrounded by an artificial lake out side of the 
main doors that was traversed with a walkway which was like a bridge across a moat. 
The Town Hall was often referred to as the 'Silver Tower' 
1.3 The key players 
The research was undertaken with the 'top team' of the local authority: the directors 
or as the called themselves the Chief Officers' Group (COG). The nine key players 
were: 
Colin Maccini, the CEO 
Anne Marks, Director of Administration 
Francis Craig, Director of Finance 
Harold Matthews, Director of Housing and Social Services (DHSS) 
Leon Davids, Director of Leisure 
Toni Johns, Technical Services 
Geoff Browns, Director of Environment 
Judi Patch, Policy Analysis unit 
Trudy Lukes, Director of Education. 
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2. The organisation and its environment 
This section addresses the research question: 
Question one: Are the dynamics of the 'top team'influenced by the 
conditions of the environment? 
Theory suggests that the answer should be yes, but we are concerned with two 
specific sub-questions: 
2.1 Is the environment turbulent? Le with large scale and unpredictable change 
2.2 Does the context of the organisation provide a 'holding enviromnent' for 
organisational leaming? 
Z1 Is the environment turbulent? 
An analysis of secondary data including articles, background papers and minutes 
suggested that there was a general context of change and uncertainty. This was 
characterised by a number of trends. 
There was the political drive for increasing the competitiveness of local 
authorities through Compulsive Competitive Tending (introduced by the Local 
Goverment Act (19 8 8)). 
0 There was a move to take public services out of the realms of public provision 
and change the role of local authorities. Authorities were no longer there to 
provide but were to be 'Enablers', according to Nicholas Ridley, MP (Gyford 
(1991), Clarke and Stewart (1998)). This meant a change in roles, structures and 
relationships with 'customers' and 'partner' agencies. It also provided a different 
paradigm for working where 'commissioning bodies' took over the role of service 
managers and different parts of the department could be both client and provider. 
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a The Conservative government was committed to reducing public expenditure 
with its efficiency drives starting in 1981, rate capping and local government 
restraints through the mid 1980s through to actual cuts in expenditure during the 
years that followed. The main cuts were between financial years 1981-82 and 
1989-90 and they were in the order of 6-7% in real terms, with some growth for a 
year of two per cent for 1990-1991. This was followed by a further 1.5 per cent 
cut in real terms between financial year 1991-1992 and 1993-4 and an estimated 
relaxation of cuts for 1994-1995. Since then the government has found it difficult 
to keep its expenditure commitments without its active privatisation programme 
(Flynn (1993) HM Treasury - Public Expenditure Analysis to 1994-95, Cmnd 
1920) 
Several legislative acts have impacted on the provision of services in a 
parliamentary act in housing, the Children Act 1986 and in the case of this 
authority new funding arrangements for socio-economic projects in the south of 
the district funded from European monies. This had required new internal 
structures, processes and procedures to meet the criteria of central government (or 
its agent) and the expectations of local people. 
The authority was also in the midst of preparing for 'white collar' CCT where a 
proportion of services such a legal, training or other professional services were 
expected to be put out to tender. 
The impending local election in May was only three months away when the study 
started and it was a source of great anxiety and excitement as it was predicted that 
there would be a change of local government from Conservative to Labour. 
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The national government was not seen as hostile or overly engaged with the 
authority compared to the extreme examples of the time - Lambeth ('looney-left) or 
Wandsworth ffory stars'). Thus, the authority did not receive considerable 
external attention, it had good political and resource relationships with central 
government and many of the 'top team' saw the local authority as rather inward 
looking (see comments on culture later). Thus, while there were changes in 
national political and economic conditions these were not considered by the Chief 
Officers (the directors management group) to be overwhelming. It was said by 
Chief Officers that the operational side of CCT and the employment implications 
ofjobs going outside the council was the most worrying. But the key issues on 
every one's agenda was the difficulty of the forthcoming election. This seemed to 
be the key issue for the Chief Officers group (COG). 
These main features of the national and local environment suggested that most of this 
authority was not in 'turbulence', when compared with the mid 1980s between 1983 
and 1 990. It was during this phase that most of the legislation was introduced, most 
of the cuts were experienced and the political polarities were most apparent between 
central and local government and especially between the conservatives and Labour 
local authorities (Widdicombe Report, 1986). As Toni Johns put it: "I do not see 
central government as the problem. " 
In addition to these external trends the directors identified three other key issues that 
concemed them. 
* The implications of less resources 
e The implications of CCT 
* The forthcoming elections 
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2.1.1 The implications of less resources 
Quotes on these based on the first interviews 
"The most important issue facing the council is economic development. " Toni Johns 
(Technical Services). 
"We need to develop our economic development strategy for the south of the district 
and the rest of the area. " Toni Johns (Technical Services) 
"Economic development is the most important. We should have started to develop 
plans, take steps forward and give an increased coherence to the council's work. " 
Anne Marks (Education) 
"We also need to be more innovative in the way we do things. " Anne Marks 
(Education) 
"The council's macro problem is not having the (legal) capacity to raise the money it 
wants. " Anne Marks (Admin. ) 
"High unemployment and poverty in some areas of the district are a real concern for 
me. " Anne Marks (Admin. ) 
"Resources. They are low compared to other similar districts but we are high 
spenders compared to other Tory councils and we have higher service for rates level. " 
Francis Craig (Finance) 
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2.1.2 The implications of CCT 
* Quotes on these based on the first interviews 
"On competitive tendering there is lots of independent action taking place. So we are 
not consistent nor well co-ordinated. Lots of people in the organisation are feeling 
threatened. " Judi Patch (Policy Unit) 
"The extemalisation of CCT is my main concern. We have started our first phase of 
50%, some of the libraries are out, we've got partnerships with the private sector and 
developed new ways of working on new central government funding and on economic 
development. It has broken down departments across the council but needs quality 
and marketing to be monitored across all directorates. " Leon Davids (Leisure) 
"On CCT we have moderate policies but the way they get implemented will depend 
on the Members.. How will it be developed? What will be the strategy? " Francis 
Craig (Finance) 
66 people are feeling threatened by competition and externalisation, " said Judi Patch 
(Policy unit). The same view was shared by Geoff Brown (Envirorunent), Leon 
Davids (Leisure), Anne Marks (Admin) and Francis Craig (Finance). 
Craig added: "Unsure of Labour (on CCI)and what they would want to structurally 
change to meet CCT interests as there is a question of efficiency on the interfaces 
between client-contractor split. "4 
4 Craig is referring to the predicted Labour victory in the forthcoming local elections. 
Labour Group policy is to provide as much as possible through their own units. 
However, this can cause a conflict or management difficulty as the 'client' and the 
'provider' could be in different parts of the council or in some instances report to the 
same director. How those issues should be resolved in an efficient manner is the point 
of his comments. 
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2.1.3 The forthcoming Iocal dections 
* Quotes on these based on the first interviews in March 1994 before the elections 
"There is great mistrust of the COG (by the Members) at the moment but its going to 
be more if its going to be Labour. " Toni Johns, Technical Services 
"The Labour Group is lacking in political nous... and that worries me. " Toni Johns, 
Technical Services 
"The election. It brings such uncertainty. It's uppermost in the directors' minds and 
depending on the (political) outcome some people feel threatened especially Colin 
(CEO), Leon (Leisure), Geoff (Environment) and Harold (DHSS). " Judi Patch, 
Policy Unit 
"My concern is whether or not there will be political power in the district. Otherwise, 
there will be uncertainty and the sense of instability. " Colin Maccini, CEO 
"There is greater tension than usual, especially between Francis and Anne. It is due to 
the elections and the pressure as this had not happened before. " Leon Davids 
(Leisure). 
"The elections will mean a great change on the political persuasion of the council. " 
Anne Marks, (Administration). 
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"The elections is a key issue but particularly what happens after. There will be a 
change in party and leadership style... it is going to be interesting. " Francis Craig 
(Finance). Craig continued his comments: "People are fearful and scared. They do 
not like the uncertainty. " 
"Some feel threatened about jobs, especially if Labour come (as a result of the 
elections). " Harold Matthews (DH and S S). 
"It all leads to power plays and gossip. People take sides. The whole building is 
buzzing ... you can see and hear it in the lifts and in the canteen. " Colin Maccini, 
CEO 
Thus, while the external environment may have the difficulties of change during the 
mid- 19 80's, at the time of study the external environment was not turbulent, changes 
were not large scale and unpredictable. The pressures of funding, resources and the 
process and implications of CCT did not abate but the council's responses to these 
relied on the direction given by the elected Members. However, the uncertainty 
attached to the outcome of the local elections generated a high level of speculation, 
uncertainty and anxiety in the minds of the Chief Officers and this seemed to create 
internal turbulence in the COG, as a strategic sub-system, and as the case will describe 
it had an impact on strategic organisational learning. The external environment was 
not turbulent during the period of study but it appears that was not the case for the 
internal context. This is discussed further in the next section. 
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2.2. Does the context of the organisation provide a 'holding 
environment'for organisational learning? 
The context of the organisation or its 'holding environment' as described in chapter 8, 
includes the values, culture, leaderships and facilitative structures. 
This section will briefly examine: 
9 The history of the organisation 
41 The values and culture of the organisation 
* The strategic leadership role and task 
2.2.1 The history of the organisation 
The organisation's history is understood from the changes that took place through the 
most key appointments: the Chief Executive Officer. The events leading to a new 
appointment were often a reflection of the elected Members' collective 
unconsciousness as well as rational political decisions. 
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Since 1979, the authority has had four clear epochs. The first epoch was marked by 
the authority having a traditional Town Clerk. His role was a legal and administrative 
executive to the elected Members and to carry out their policy remits through the rest 
of the organisation. As a custodian to public funds and a keeper of probity the role 
was to carry out the political mandate but within the strict guidelines of local authority 
standing orders and government guidelines and legislation. 
However, the authority realised that it needed a different internal configuration of 
organisation in response to the increasingly challenging and changing environment. 
In 1986/87, the Town Clerk 'fell out'(mentioned by Judi Patch, Toni Johns, Anne 
Marks) with the Members as they wanted to move from a legalistic focus to a broader 
customer orientation one. This was in tune with the mood of local government more 
generally at the time. The Local Government Training Board, published several 
working titles in the domain of public service orientation (LGTB, 1988 and 1989), 
reflecting the general tenor of local government reorientation. 
The second epoch began during the year 1986/87, when the new incumbent, James 
Grubeck, was given the new title of Chief Executive. 
"James was good at establishing a team and being open. " (Anne Marks, Admin). He 
also provided the customer focus that was wanted by the elected Members and set 
down clear vision and value statements Marks added. The authority based, their new 
culture on the McKinsey 7-S model as described in Peters and Waterman, (1982). 
The move from legalistic to customer focus was also reflected in the authority's 
attempts to move from being a direct provider to being an enabler of a mixed 
economy of providers with the private sector, the voluntary sector and joint ventures 
being part of a new public service economy. 
224 
It was Nicholas Ridley, MP, who described the times by exhorting that local 
authorities should become 'Enablers' of public services rather direct providers 
(Gyford (199 1), Clarke and Stewart (19 8 8)). 
The Members undertook the message with some seriousness and put forward a major 
reorganisation. They wanted to see the organisation change from functional and 
departmental silos into responsive and competitive business units in response to 
central government calls for greater competition in public services. 
The then Chief Executive was described as a 'mover and shaker(agreed by Judi Patch 
(Policy unit), Toni Johns (Technical Services), Anne Marks (Admin), Colin Maccini 
(CEO at the time of study). 
In 1989 'they got rid of people'. "The changes were managed through budgetary 
control, cultural and structural change , so we had a 
flatter organisation ... a loosening 
up. " (Francis Craig, Finance) 
"We also had losses at the 'top team' which fell from seventeen to the now. "(Harold 
Matthews, DH and SS). There were nine members now on the 'top team'.. 
"Initially, most staff reacted well, with most dissatisfaction in Finance more than in 
others. The cultural maladjustment was at the 'top team' level and its relationships 
with Members. " (Francis Craig, Finance) 
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The process of change led to financial cuts, restructuring and a loss of staff (10% plus 
the loss of about 4000 teachers to locally managed schools). "Devolution is seen as 
fashionable. " (Francis Craig, Finance) With the changes that followed James became 
increasingly unpopular both with the staff and the elected Members. "The 
management of change he did appallingly. There was no consultation and just 
academic tracts. James was a great shaker of trees but didn't know what to do with 
it. " (Colin Maccini, CEO) 
"I could not believe what he was doing to us. " (Senior staff). James became more 
unpopular with his own 'top team', the staff and the Members and in 1992 left 
'having fell out with the Members. ' 
May 1992 marked the third epoch. The Members were left with the problem of no 
head at the organisation. After much internal politicking they decided to appoint an 
internal candidate, an existing Director, who got the post over two other internal 
Directors who also applied for the post in the 'top team'. Colin Maccini, the newly 
appointed CEO, decided to carry on and build on the work of his predecessor. He 
claimed that his appointment was due to his vision of. fast, flexible, customer- 
orientated service delivery; empowerment of staff; corporate rather than departmental 
working; and a significant move towards the concept of an "enabling" authority, 
collaborating with other service providers. All staff were invited to a series of repeats 
of the presentation to elected Members which won him the post of CEO. 
The views about the new CEO varied from supportive to outright hostility and envy 
and these are considered further in the case material on the group. The new changes 
were seen as: "Too reactive - it should be more proactive. " (Harold Matthews, DH 
and SS). 
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"The pace of change is very fast, people get left out. There's been no time set aside 
by Colin Maccini for preparation. " (Trudy Lukes, Education) 
"It's chaos, but its constructive chaos. "(Geoff Brown, Enviromnent). Brown 
continued: "Colin Maccini is a good communicator and has a structured and 
participative approach. But he needs to communicate even more. " 
"Colin picked it up and moved it on. Last year (1993) was very painful. " (Leon 
Davids, Leisure) 
"He's not really consulted but managed it well. " (Francis Craig, Finance) 
"Colin has accelerated the process out of anxiety. " (Anne Marks, Admin. ) 
The changes continued until the summer of 1994, which marked the transition into 
epoch four. Shortly after the May elections, the new Labour majority sacked a 
number of the Directors. These included two of the CEO's 'favourite directors' and 
the 'trouble-maker' (see the account of the group). Colin Maccini also resigned on a 
point of principle. Thus the final epoch was marked with the appointment of a new 
CEO from a neighbouring Labour authority. 
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Table 12.1 - The key eras in Elfismoore's history 
Driving force 
Leadership 
Period I 
Since 1979 
Public interest/ 
Good governance 
Politicians with 
Town Clerk admin 
Period 2 
1986/87-1991 
Central govt. drive 
on efficiency 
Chief Exec James 
Grubeck 
Rapidly changing/ 
turbulent 
Excellence culture 
projected 
Public sector 
orientation 
Period 3 
1991-1994 
Central govt. and 
internal politics 
Politicians and 
Colin Maccini, 
CEO 
Changing but 
known 
Excellencein 
service delivery 
Meet social and 
economic goals 
Professional6 
Flat with business 
units 
Slim-lined 
Period 4 
1994 Post electionss 
New Labour Group 
and economics 
Leader of council 
Environment Stable 
Values 
Strategy 
Skills 
Structure 
Staff at the 
top 
Style 
Systems 
Custodian of public 
funds 
Maintain probity 
Legal and admin. 
Traditional 
hierarchy 
Large management 
team 
Legalistic 
Functionally 
bureaucratic 
Managerial 
fonnally Corporate 
Initial reductions 
made 
'Can do - tough 
love' 
Looser due to 
change and CE 
personality 
As before plus 
confrontative 
Business process 
tied to strategy 
and new CEO 
(designate) 
Unknown reactions 
by central govt. 
New Labour - 
popularist 
Address low income 
and unemployment 
N/A. 
No evident changes 
Reduced further 
More politically 
controlling 
N/A. 
5 The data for this period was accurate until the autumn, in the year of the elections. 
Where insufficient data was available, then the cells have been left as NIA. 
'A high degree of value was given to maintaining professional affiliations. For 
example three of the COG were chairs of their national local authority professional 
group and each spoke proudly of it in their interviews. Two of the others kept close 
professional links with their private sector counterparts. 
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The internal changes over the last decade match those externally. From the 1979 to 
the mid 1980s, the changes were incremental, planned and intentional. The further 
responses to a turbulent environment were matched with changes in structures, staff 
numbers, political reality and the change in CEO in circumstances that continued to 
be due to conflict between each CEO and the elected Members. 
2.2.2 The organisational culture 
The data about the organisational culture came from the interviews with the directors 
and the material addresses question 2.2- specifically: Does the culture support 
organisational leaming? 
There were a number of typical quotes from the interviews and some secondary data 
from the staff survey and non-participant observation in public areas of the council. 
Typical quotes about the organisational culture 
"It's cosy, comfortable and compliant. The place lacks passion. " (Toni Johns, 
Technical Services) 
"Yes, its over-cautious, has a middle-class white culture and is perceived as staid and 
holding up the status quo. There is a feeling of being comfortable. Yet we do some 
cutting edge stuff compared to other authorities. " (Harold Matthews, DH and SS). 
"There is something about the culture here where the message is repeated in several 
places but the staff hear different things, " said Anne Marks (Admin). A similar view 
was also held by Trudy Lukes (Education) and Geoff Brown (Environment). 
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"I think its a canteen culture - not a healthy organisation. " (Francis Craig, Finance). 
Craig continued: "This authority is a political hot house - but not everybody's 
allowed to play and it taken me some time to realise it. In other authorities I've 
worked in, the front-line staff are far more involved with the political process. They 
are aware of the political processes and nuances, know the pet loves and hates of 
(elected) Members, the personalities. But not here. They are simply not involved'. 
In addition, the directorates found it difficult to work together. 
"The notion of corporateness threatens the identity of the directorates and there are 
feelings of anxiety as the CEO undermines my own authority as a director. " (Trudy 
Lukes, Education). She added: "Corporate working is flourishing, but it depends on 
issues to make it work. Co-operation between directorates is not so vibrant. " 
"I think inter-directorate issues are explained by change generally rather than anything 
to do with difficulty in the organisation... I would sum it up as saying relations are 
good and bad. " (Harold Matthews, DH and SS) 
"There is not enough sharing. " (Francis Craig, Finance) 
"They are good on bilateral working but not on multi-lateral working. " (Anne Marks, 
Admin) 
"It varies considerably, by and large its OK among the senior officers but not so good 
further down. " (Geoff Brown, Enviromnent) 
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"It seems to works well at second tier level (i. e. assistant directors) but levels three, 
four and five, uncertain. At best I'd restrict it to the top 150 -200 (out of a staff of 
8,400). " (Anne Marks, Admin. ) 
"It works well for the first three or four tiers (of senior officers) but after that it 
doesn't. " (Colin Maccini, CEO) 
"There are tensions between those who want the freedom of being business units and 
those holding onto the corporate role. " (Judi Patch, Policy). Anne Marks held a 
similar view. 
"Some of us are trying to work better together. Thus, some individuals in individual 
directorates worked well with other individuals but the inter-group relations were at 
best poor. " 
The staff survey reported that: "Of the 1,108 respondents, over 50% felt that inter- 
directorate relations were poor. " 
The report also stated that it was difficult to get information to carry out tasks from 
other departments. 
Finally, on the working culture of the 'top team' there were a number of perceptions. 
"The staff see that within the 'top team' there are a chosen few - whether true or not. 
The perception is there... a "Queen Bee" philosophy. " (Anne Marks, Admin) 
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During the study, observations of staff in the staff canteen and in other group events 
e. g. training events - showed that staff would openly discuss their distaste and anger at 
Colin, and his favourites. Some of these staff, which were mainly outside of the 
senior management cadre, did not like his style. They characterised it as: insufficient 
consultation, too fast, head in the clouds, and selecting people who did things his way. 
The internal staff survey reported that: a majority of respondents did not feel that the 
'top team' was giving clear direction and leadership (report Q3b) and only 4 out of 10 
had read and understood the Council's strategic plan for the future. 
The culture of the organisation was characterised by an organisation in flux and it 
appears that it hindered the organisation from performing. Table 12.2 from a strategy 
workshop of the COG summarises the key aspects of the culture that hinder 
performance and possibly leaming. 
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Table 12.2 -A list of items that describe the negative aspects of the 
organisation from the COG's strategy day in February 1994 
Departmentalism. We're OK you are not 
Lack understanding of managing corporately, projects or inter-relationships 
Hard to communicate the relevance of creativity 
Pace of change is too fast 
Hard to achieve participation at all levels 
Hostility and criticism when risk taking goes wrong 
Not good at celebrating successes - or tend to be qualified 
When thrown off course it tends to lead to depression 
Lack confidence in clear overall plan 
Working to antiquated rules 
Transparency of reorganisation is low 
Public service is compromised by fear ofjob security, competition and commercial 
relations. 
Poor on complaints and customer service 
Consultation and participation is poor 
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2.2.3 The strategic leadership 
The data about the strategic leadership comes from the interviews with the Executive 
directors, non-participant observation in meetings and in public areas of the council, 
regular briefings from Judi Patch (Policy unit) and informal one to ones with the 
Colin Maccini (CEO), Anne Marks (Admin) and less frequently with Harold 
Matthews. 
In the first and pilot case study there was not an explicit question about the task. 
Thus, inferences about the task may be drawn from how the leaders take up their role 
collectively and individually. 
By 'strategic leadership' we are looking predominately at the role of the elected 
Members and to a lesser extent their relationship with the Executive directors, the 
Chief Officers Group (COG). Do they provide the conditions for learning? 
The central question is how do they manage their boundaries: 
* Externally with other agencies but particularly central government and other 
agencies 
Internally among themselves and with the COG 
External relations 
The political flavour of the council was a 'centralist' one with few differences in 
values between the elected leadership and the Opposition. Good house-keeping, 
liaison with the local business community and nothing too outrageous was the 
approach compared with some of its more radical neighbouring authorities. The 
political leadership had enjoyed considerable stability for over a decade and a half 
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The council, under the conservatives, were aligned to the national political agenda but 
tended to represent the 'paternal' side of the right's political spectrum. "It is a 
moderate conservative council, " said Francis Craig (Finance). 
Matthews said: "As the Tories are pragmatic and Labour are pragmatic there tends to 
be not that much difference between them. One of the problems for Labour, if they 
get in, is to show they are different. " 
From the management meetings of the COG, they reported good relationships with 
the European Community evidenced by new sources of funding and that they worked 
well with neighbouring authorities. This was corroborated by work the researcher 
was doing work in some of those authorities and the Department of Environment, 
which saw them as partners. Large scale contractors generally worked collaboratively 
with them and the expert panel also saw the authority as collaborative. Relationships 
with the local voluntary sector was more strained as were some relationships with 
political wards where repairs and council standards were not meeting published goals. 
There was little discussion about the external world and compared to the other studies 
this may also reflect the inward-looking nature of the council that is inferred in the 
accounts about the culture in 2.2.2 above. 
Internal relations 
The leader of the council under the Conservatives was reported to take the middle 
ground. But there was a sense from senior officers that this leadership lacked 
strategic clarity, commitment from the leadership group or 'leadership' to elected 
Members of the authority more generally. 
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Quotes included: 
"There is no political ideology or leadership. " Harold Matthews (DH and SS) 
"The leadership is muddling through... it lacks decisiveness and is short on follow 
through. " Toni Johns (Technical Services) 
"The leadership is non-existent, " said Colin Maccini (CEO). The same view was 
expressed by Judi Patch (Policy unit), Harold Matthews (DH and SS), Leon Davids 
(Leisure) and Trudy Lukes (Education). 
Other statements included: "It is confused. " (Geoff Brown, Environment); "They 
vacillate. " (Francis Craig, Finance); "The leadership is fragmented. " (Anne Marks, 
Admin). 
"There is no control over the committee chairs so decisions are unpredictable at 
committee. " Judi Patch (Policy unit) 
Colin Maccini adds: "There is a leadership battle every week. " 
"Policy is ambiguous so it makes it difficult to take a practical approach to strategic 
intent. And where there is clarity it is very temporary. " Anne Marks (Admin) 
"He has a weak style (referring to the leader of the council).... The formal political 
leadership, he's leading a coalition rather than a party. He has a style of management 
of balancing people's interests and really he could be more directive without a 
problem from officers. " Anne Marks(Admin. ) 
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The policy leadership group was not coherent. It seemed they lacked the ability to 
articulate their policy or strategic intent and found it as difficult to act on any 
commitments that were made. An inference from the above accounts is that the group 
did not have a clear sense of its strategic task and was not able to manage its task 
boundaries. 
2.2.4 How did the leadership group manage its boundaries with the 
COG? 
'The Joint Consultative Group mechanism of chief offices and the executive Members 
(chairs of committees) works well' said Anne Marks (Admin). This view was also 
held by Geoff Browns (Environment) and Leon Davids (Leisure). They also felt that 
the inner group of the leader of the council, the deputy leader, the CEO and the 
director of Finance (plus ad hoc Members) inter-group meeting also 'works well'. 
Harold Matthews had a contrary view on the latter. He said: "It doesn't work! " The 
political agenda changes by the time the issue gets into the public domain (a 
committee meeting) and it leads Chief Officers into a false sense of security mainly 
because the chairs are not managed. 
"The line between Members and officers are managed and are fairly well understood, " 
suggested Anne Marks (Admin). 
In addition, to the formal structures, described in the introduction above, there were 
three main co-ordinating bodies between elected Members and Chief Officers: first 
there was a partnership mechanism of chairs of the main committees and directors that 
meet. This was a quarterly meeting and was generally reported to work well. The 
second main mechanism was a very much smaller group of the top elected Members 
of the council and the key management group officers. The purpose of this group was 
to set the agenda for the partnership meetings and provide a chance to trouble-shoot. 
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These met more regularly every four to six weeks. Those that attended included the 
leader of the council, the deputy leader, the chief whip, the Chair of Finance and other 
invitees according to the issues. For example the Chair of Housing may be invited if 
there is an issue on rents arrears. Officers included the CEO, and the Directors of 
Administration, Finance and another management Board director. Generally, these 
were said to work well in that they provided a full flow of information and contact 
between officers and elected Members (Anne Marks, Leon Davids). But were not felt 
to be working well at the time as there were not being held as frequently, contact had 
been waning recently and Members' own agendas seem to undermine the partnership 
(Harold Matthews). Finally, there were the one-to-one chats that took place between 
the director and the chair of the committee - some of this was formal and above the 
line discussion and some of it was politicking and below the line. Toni Johns had the 
reputation among the management group of often operating below the line with the 
Chair of Technical Services. 
Nonetheless, it was agreed by the majority of the COG that the formal links between 
officers and Members appeared to be clearly understood. However, was it the same or 
different on the relationship side? 
"Relationships have declined due to the incident of the 'get them off your back' 
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memo. Judi Patch (Policy unit) 
"Many colleagues are tarred with having their own agenda. " Toni Johns (Technical 
Services) 
7 This refers to a remark made by a Chief Officer to a request from an elected 
member. The Chief Officer had hand-written instructions to a Member's request in 
reply to a memo from a middle manager. The Chief Officer ended his response with.. 
'this should get them off your back' - referring to the Members. Unfortunately, the 
returned memo found its way into the Members papers. 
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"Officers are more to be coped with than the opposition. " Anne Marks (Admin) 
"There is a fear of the COG being too strong. " Harold Matthews (DH and SS). A 
similar view was expressed by Toni Johns: "The Members are fearful of a united 
Chief Officers' group. " 
"Labour want to take back power from the officers and give it to the community. " 
Harold Matthews (DH and SS) 
"The political agenda is to get rid of Chief Officers. " Geoff Browns (Leisure) 
"I think that the power struggle at member level is getting mixed up with power 
struggles among officers. " Francis Craig (Finance) 
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"I am reluctant to take anything to the Environment committee... " Harold Matthews 
(DH and SS). The story is continued by Judi Patch (Policy unit): "Geoff Browns and 
his group got a severe beating at the (Environment) committee for tabling papers and 
giving a poor presentation. The argument was sound but they got a hammering on 
presentation. " 
Thus, the quality of the relationship between Members and their Chief Officers is 
described as low and thus so is trust. 
The key messages suggest that: 
0 The external environment is not a source of organisational anxiety: relationships 
with key external agencies is collaborative, new sources of funding are potentially 
available, there is some need for area based economic initiatives and priorities do 
need to be set on resources. Thus, the environment, per se, did not appear to 
impact negatively on the organisation during the period of the study. 
The internal context was supported by clear structures and processes between 
Members and Chief Officers 
But these structures were undermined by three processes: 
- The lack of clear political leadership and authority. Thus, Members worked on 
their issue or personal agendas over a broader and shared political agenda. 
Outcomes on agreed decisions are uncertain and it makes it hard to carry 
through tasks or policies 
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- The poor quality of the relationship between Members and officers along with 
low levels of trust. 
- That there was not a shared responsibility of the strategic task and Members 
appeared to take a combative, style towards officers in a 'us and them' approach 
rather than taking the overall interests of the council. 
The forthcoming election was seen and experienced as a difficult time for the 
management group. It was experienced as a time of high uncertainty, a possible 
threat to their own employment prospects, a fear of being hounded out and sense 
of increased tensions was felt by all members of the team. The onset of the 
election raised considerable anxiety and not knowing whether the conservatives 
would get back in or whether the Labour party would get in made it difficult for 
the team to operate with any certainty. This was a topic that took up about half a 
day in the strategy workshop in February 1994. They had to ensure that they kept 
in touch with both parties without appearing to give favour or at the same time 
undermine their current responsibilities to local political administration. This 
was a very difficult line to tread and the interface between the COG and the 
elected Members will be discussed in the next section (Group - context). 
*** 
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In May 1994, the elections were held and the Labour group were elected. This 
provided an initial impetus for organisational change. The change agenda was clear 
and a change in culture was also incorporated with a change in the colours of the 
reception area - from blue to red. The authority was going to provide as many 
services in-house as possible and new Partnerships were going to be forged with the 
local business community - looking for better planning gains. It was a period of 
excitement and energy. There was new hope. However, the economic reality, as 
opposed to the strategic intent of the political manifesto, began to hit home. The 
honey-moon period was short and by the end of the summer the politicking between 
Members and officers intensified. The Members then proceeded to get rid of three of 
its Chief Officers, and two others left including the CE, who was replaced with new 
CE from a nearby authority. There also seemed to be a fall back on the traditionalists 
in the existing team - the two internal candidates. 
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Z3. Analysis of the organisational environment and context 
This first part of the case study addressed the question: 
Are the dynamics of the 'top team'influenced by the conditions of the 
environment? 
In looking at both the nature of the environment and the organisational context the 
narratives seems to suggest that these factors did impact on the 'top team' operating as 
a subsystem for strategic organisational learning. In this case study, the impact of the 
environment and organisational context on strategic learning appeared to limit 
leaming to meeting operational imperatives over strategic ones. 
Firstly, the environment was seen as a significant factor that impacted on the process 
of change and the capacity to learn. There were clear stages during the process of 
transition from an authority with political and environmental stability to one that 
made a paradigm shift during 1989- 92. 
The starting point, pre 1979, seemed to represent an initial attachment both politically 
and historically to a well established understanding among Members (of both political 
parties) about the organisational norms and protocols and these were rooted in history 
and traditions. 
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Initially, the Members appeared to make incremental changes in response to the 
demands of the external environment. But this appeared to break down as the 
demands from the external environment became increasingly frequent and the size of 
expected changes also increased. There was unprecedented change. For example, 
during 1987/88, the authority had to introduce a competitive tendering process, cut 
budgets by 5%, and re-organise the whole of the social services department and the 
education departments (two of the biggest departments in terms of spend, employees 
and contact with the public). 
These demands continued through until 1989, when the organisation's staff 
experienced the first major trauma. Redundancies were made. The organisation 
became flatter and there was a break with tradition and traditional values. There was 
considerable anxiety and unhappiness. This delayed and rapid change led to the 
breakdown in the boundary management between the environment and the 
organisation as held by the leading political subsystem of the elected Members. This 
was evidenced by poor task leadership by the politicians, in fighting among the 
Members and high levels of uncertainty and anxiety that was present through out the 
case. This made it difficult for officers or Members to take time to reflect or use the 
opportunity for learning. It is suggested that during the rapid changes that took place 
staff and Members suffered the trauma of object-loss as tradition and stability were 
replaced with chaos. 
The major change took place during the second and third epochs as described above 
and summarised in table 12.1. Yet we also see in the accounts evidence of managing 
external boundaries through strategic projects and partnerships with central 
government, Europe, large national contractors and neighbouring district councils. 
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These two differing realities of the external boundary management suggest that there 
maybe a process of splitting taking place between internal and external. The source of 
that may be the initial and unacknowledged loss and therefore it may suggest that the 
learning and responsiveness to the external world is 'adaptive'. Meanwhile the 
unresolved conflict and differences continue internally. 
There seemed to be a lag of a year or two between the key changes in local 
government (circa late 1886-1988) and the impact of these changes on the authority 
(1989/90). 
During the period of study, while the environment itself was not turbulent, the 
aftermath of the change appeared to continue in the form of a delayed response to 
loss: deferred to internal differences and flight from the strategic task. This may lead 
to a reduced capacity to learn strategically as the social and defensive routines of 
denial, blame, scape-goating, hostility and political in-flghting take precedence over 
reflection and insight. 
Secondly, the internal organisational context reinforced this dynamic by factors 
identified earlier in the Chief Officers accounts. The uncertainty of change, the 
inward looking nature of the organisational culture, the in-fighting by elected 
Members. However, a significant element seemed to be the difficult and poor quality 
relationship that existed between the COG and the elected Members. Thus, the 
internal context for strategic organisational learning appeared to be impaired by 'basic 
assumption' activities, phantasy and fears with the 'good object' of the past being 
replaced with the feared external and persecutory 'bad object' of the future: the 
impending Labour Group. 
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Finally, the elected Members seemed to have a history of scape-goating their 
executive directors: Harry Jukes (the first Town Clerk), James Grubeck (the first 
CEO) and Colin Maccini (the exiting CEO). All were exported from the system as 
the authority reached a transition phase in its history. Thus a recursive pattern was 
emerging, a defensive routine, which suggested that in periods of high stress and 
uncertainty, there was a ritualisation of getting rid of the CEO: the internal bad object. 
This can be seen as projecting the anxiety and difficulty of change onto the CEO and 
exporting him and those bad feelings of anxiety out of the system (Jaques, 1953). 
Moreover, regarding Maccini's departure, his post was replaced by a CEO who 
worked in a traditional Labour authority and the newly elected Members relied on the 
advice of the two internal candidates who represented resources and probity. At one 
level the new Labour authority may have beenjust getting its house in order. From a 
psychodynamic perspective, it may have reflected the political leadership's 
(Members) wish for comfort, familiarity, things known, and possibly control, over 
things uncertain, uncontrollable and uncomfortable. 
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3. The group and task 
Question two: Is the 'top team'able to manage its boundaries and task? 
This section addresses the above question. Here the focus moves from the boundary 
between the team and its context and environment to the 'top team' of executive 
directors themselves, the Chief Officers Group (COG). After looking at the main 
features of the group this section will look more deeply at three related sub-questions 
3.1 Does the team hold a common view of its task effectiveness? Is it effective? 
3.2 Is the leader's role facilitative to task attainment (and therefore leaming)? 
3.3 Are the boundaries of this 'top team' optimally bounded? 
The key features of the group 
The group was the result of cuts. In 1990, it had a reduction from seventeen Heads of 
departments to eight Directors and the Policy analyst, who was Pot a director. In 1992, 
the group lost its CEO, James Grubeck, and was replaced by one of its own members, 
Colin Maccini. Two other internal directors applied for the CEO post: Francis Craig 
(Finance) and Anne Marks (Admin. ). The two internal candidates each individually 
declared they could do the job better than Colin Maccini in their one to one 
interviews. Toni Johns, an ally of the two also had no respect for Colin. Toni Johns 
stated: "Colin is management by hype. I don't go with him at all. He's just muddling 
through, amateurish, has no power base with Members and does not use my 
experience and credibility. He needs to bring Francis (the Director of Finance) and I 
on board. But he just won't listen. " Toni Johns 
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Each director, excluding the CEO, had very large directorates to manage. The age 
band of the group was from 40 to 57 with the modal age being about 56 based on the 
information from most of the COG. 
The group members 
Each member of the group contributed experience and skills in their roles. 
Colin Maccini was the CEO. He had been appointed from among the ranks of the 
directors and was previously charged with managing Social Services. He had held a 
number of senior posts in other authorities and his rise to the CEO's position was met 
with mixed reaction from colleagues and staff. 
Anne Marks was the Director of Administration. She had a long track record in local 
government, of which 12 years were spent in this authority. She was a fairly 
traditional local government officer protecting her directorate, the role of central 
services generally and the public purse as required by local government legislation 
and committee standing orders. 
Francis Craig, Director of Finance, had worked his way up from a junior post to his 
Directorship. He'd been in post for nine years. He was known for his thoroughness 
but also for his conservative nature and wish to keep 'Finance' centralised. 
Harold Matthews, Director in Housing and Social Services, had been in post fluee 
years. He was bright and intellectually very sharp. Brought into the management 
group from another authority because of his strategic thinking and shrewdness. 
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Leon Davids was the Director of Leisure. He had been in post four years and had 
successfully taken the leisure service into the world of CCT. He waswell qualified 
both in his area and in general management being one of the few managers with 
management qualifications. His rather unusual and grandiose schemes and 
personality had won him successes but also attracted unpopular acclaim from, 
colleagues and elected Members. 
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Toni Johns, Director of Technical Services, was brought in ftom outside to a new 
technical directorate where changes were made swiftly and the rest of the time Toni 
operated more as a politician than a Chief Officer. 
Geoff Browns was Director of Environment. His experience in the private sector and 
creativity was initially highly valued and certainly respected by outside contractors. 
But his seemingly flamboyant style and consistent, 'just-in-time' or late delivery of 
policy papers and ideas later became an irritation to staff, colleagues and elected 
Members. 
Judi Patch was the Policy Analyst. Her role was to provide continuity to the group, 
ensure that items on the strategic agenda were progressed and support the directors. 
She had been with the authority for ten years and was seen as very knowledgeable 
about the working of the organisation, trust-worthy and was seen as the 'honest 
broker' between colleagues, between directors and elected Members and among staff 
Trudy Lukes was the Director of Education, a Head of school turned local authority 
director. She knew the education field well and the local council and has been in post 
for best part of eight years and 'has seen it all'. Trudy Lukes was very disillusioned 
with the changes in education through Local Managed Schools (LMS) and there was 
anxiety and fears among staff in her directorate with the proposed changes in local 
education organisation. 
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3.1 Does the team hold a common view about its task effectiveness? Is 
It effect? 
The group task 
The group's normative task was to provide a corporate and strategic focus to the 
council's political agenda and to help the council provide the appropriate services and 
support to the local community. 
Views about the group's capacity to fulfil the task varied. 
"We need more planning processes. We are not seen as corporate and the group needs 
more strategic support and information on what is going on in order to do a good job. " 
Harold Matthews (DH and SS) 
"The group is much better than it was. Very effective decision making with 95% of 
them carried through. When ever there is a crisis we get on well. Nice group to work 
with. Very creative. " Colin Maccini (CEO) 
"The team has deteriorated over the last three to four months. Probably if Toni left 
there would be more team work and trust. The team works very well due to Colin and 
the range of angles people bring. Its just not effective at the moment; team working is 
notworking. It's temporary. " Geoff Browns (Environment) 
"The group is crying out for team building. " Trudy Lukes (Education) 
"The group needs more planning processes... it is not seen as strategic. " Harold 
Matthews (DH and SS) 
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"We need more reflective time. " Trudy Lukes (Education) 
In addition, there was the continued task uncertainty that arose from the forthcoming 
elections (Trudy Lukes, Geoff Brown). In the meetings there was also a general 
feeling of deficit and that the group needed something more to fulfil its task. 
The group appears to be less effective than it would like to be and explains it by the 
lack of strategic clarity, the need to have better internal processes and time out for 
strategising. 
3.2 Is the leader's role facilitative to task attainment (and therefore 
tearning)? 
The role of the leader features as high in the theoretical approach to understanding 
groups in this thesis, especially how they provide the conditions for task attainment 
and learning. Information was obtained from each of the directors about Colin 
Maccini. There has already been a flavour of some of the views held by the two 
internal candidates for the CEO post when Colin was appointed and those of Toni 
Johns. The following captures other comments made about the CEO. 
The role of the CEO 
The role of the CEO, Colin Maccini, was seen as both positive and negative 
depending who was speaking. 
There were those who said positive things about him: 
"He's made us crisper less emolument - energised us. " Anne Marks (Admin) 
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"He's really shaken people. " Geoff Brown(Environment) 
"His style has created a buzz and he's able to keep the broad picture. " Harold 
Matthews (DH and SS) 
"He has the distinctive ability to focus on the outside and has developed working 
partnerships with other regional CEOs. " Anne Marks (Admin) 
Colleagues also agreed that the CEO was very strong and could be hard to shift once 
his mind had been made up. However, "if you make a cock up of something you will 
get a roasting but the next day you start with a clean slate. " Judi Patch (Policy unit), 
Toni Johns agreed. 
"He's scrupulously fair in handling multiple roles. " Judi Patch Policy unit) Three 
people had described him as very supportive at a personal level (Geoff Brown, Leon 
Davids and Judi Patch). He was described as chairing meetings well and one officer 
felt that they shared the same management style (Leon Davids), but, "He needs more 
of a strategic plan to give people clear leadership. " 
"He does not always carry erudite arguments for his actions... but I have never seen 
him run away from an issue either. " Judi Patch (Policy unit) 
There were also those that said less positive things about the CEO: 
"I think he is into damage limitation... He lacks the corporateness he speaks of and 
the clarity and timing. Everything is all at a gallop. " Toni Johns (Technical Services) 
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Johns continued: "He does the opposite to empowering - at specific, usually lower, 
levels he empowers (them) but at a corporate level his style leads to fragmentation. 
He has strong views about the way forward. " The stong-mindedness of the CEO was 
also noted by Anne Marks (Admin). Both Francis Craig (Finance) and Anne Marks 
(Admin) described the CEO as working with 'Maoist theories'. It was said that Colin 
Maccini, CEO, had an autocratic style and likes to have 'yes' people around him 
(Francis Craig). 
"He has a Queen Bee philosophy and selects people who do it his way. " Anne Marks 
(Admin) 
"My worry is that too much of the work falls on a imall group of people. This leads 
to cracks and a potential crisis. " Leon Davids (Leisure) 
"He does not take a rational assessment of the reality and just about gets through the 
business. He' s lousy finisher. " (Francis Craig (Finance). Colin Maccini was also 
reported to have stereotypes about each of the other directors and works by bringing 
pressure from below by stimulating lower level officers. This point was raised by 
both Toni Johns (Technical Services) and Anne Marks (Admin) 
"Thus, he will work directly with individuals rather than through the (management) 
line. " Anne Marks 
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Colin's role was firstly established in his formal authority as CEO, given to him by 
elected Members in 1992. He was not highly regarded by all his colleagues, and even 
those that followed him were not without criticism. He was seen as strong-willed and 
driven by conviction rather than by a focused strategy or hard data. He appeared to 
work with people who understood and worked with that style of energy and seemed to 
work with a selected group of individuals. He did not always observe the formal 
reporting lines or mechanism. He was an object of admiration, competition, envy and 
anger by various directors (and senior managers) and was split into 'good' Colin 
Maccini and 'bad' Colin Maccini for some of the same members of the COG and 
these views may have also reflected more structural differences within the group 
where there were those for him, those against him and those in the middle trying to 
stcer a middlc ground. 
Colin Maccini appears to provide visionary leadership as he thinks 'big picture', goes 
for the strategic platform and works from conviction. This works for some people in 
the organisation and some of the COG. It also generates anxiety and resentment in 
others - e. g. Francis Craig, Anne Marks and Toni Johns as well as second and third 
tier officers. The lack of strategic focus, by-passing agreed structures, not providing 
sufficient containment and holding for the COG as a whole suggests that the CEO was 
unable to provide a facilitative holding environment for the COG. The process of 
splitting and some openly expressed contempt also suggests that projective dynamics 
were enacted and under such conditions it may have been harder for the CEO to play 
out any other role (see individual reports below). 
Thus, it suggests that the CEO as group leader was unable to provide the conditions 
for strategic organisational leaming. 
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3.3 Are the boundaries of the 'top team'sub-system optimally 
managed? 
The management of the group's boundaries is important in that it provides 
containment and supports task attainment and learning. This is looked in this case as 
the relationship with the elected Members. Data from the interviews with the 
directors suggest that the group were clear about the formal structures and boundaries 
but felt that the relationship side was poor. (See section 2.2 above). They thought 
that the leadership was weak, unclear about strategic intent and troubled by infighting. 
However, the dynamics of the group's boundaries with the elected Members was 
simply dominatedby the impending elections. Further comment on the dynamics 
during that time provides further data. 
Strategies for coping in the context of uncertainty 
The management group developed a greater awareness and attention to the political 
subtleties of both the Conservative and Labour groups. They talked about their 
context regularly between agendas item in their business meetings and with each other 
in their various sub-groups and alliances. Collectively they set a number of strategic 
away days and used these as a process for managing the volume of infonnation, the 
enrolment of the next tier of managers and a forum for strategic debate and planning. 
The data was collected ftom non-participatory observations of two of the strategy 
sessions (February and April 1994), a COG management meeting (March 1994) plus 
informal conversations and formal interviews with members of the COG. The three 
main sources are presented in chronological order to provide a sense of the developing 
themes and issues: the strategy session in February, the COG management meeting in 
March and the second strategy session in April. 
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The first of these strategy events took place in February 1994. It was a two day event 
with second and third tier officers also attending - about 45 people in total. The group 
was presented with a number of trend and scenario analyses as well as the results of 
the then recently completed staff survey and some attempts of bench-marking the 
council with other authorities. Maccini did not join the meeting on the first day due 
to other business, but joined the smaller group meeting of the COG on the second day 
and received feedback about the day. 
Themes that arose out of the first day included the question of organisational culture 
and structure as it related to the change. Competition within the organisation and a 
better understanding of corporate working were among the issues that the group were 
expected to adopt. The organisational focus of the discussion was: How should we 
structure ourselves to meet the new challenges? The group was given a considerable 
amount of data to digest with a total of ten main reports to consider and comment 
upon within the space of five hours. Each topic areas had a presentation, followed by 
a quick burst of questions of substance and then some rather shallow debate - due to 
time - before moving onto the next topic. The first three or four presentations were 
taken very seriously. By the early afternoon the level of humour, boyish exchange 
and puns had increased and it was more like the House of Commons on a Thursday 
afternoon than a strategic analysis group. Several references were made to Colin's 
absence and the thought that a tape-recorder was in the room developed currency 
through the afternoon to the point where one presenter said: ' and if you are listening 
Colin.. ' and subsequent comments followed the same way. The meeting ended at 
about 4.30pm with the last items being rushed and the group ending on a rowdy and 
noisy note. 
The second day was more serious with Maccini in the Chainnan's role and Judi Patch 
facilitating the day. There was some discussion about the value of yesterday's 
meeting. 
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Leon Davids (Leisure): "I saw yesterday as helpful as it was a means of gathering 
information. " 
Francis Craig (Finance): "Yesterday's work was interesting but it suggests that 
structure is used as a general word for other things e. g. culture. I also saw 
centralisation (of structure) as a mark of frustration or cop out with what is happening 
and I would welcome some clarity about where we want to go. I have some 
uncertainty with the leader (of the council) or even the party. " 
Toni Johns (Technical Services): "I found yesterday astonishingly negative and 
pessimistic. The 7-S framework is useful but we need to get a strategy that works. " 
Anne Marks (Admin): "There is a lack of strategic, superordinate goals from 
Members and this affects the COG and the staff. " 
They started to use the 7-S framework to consider the importance of structure to meet 
the needs of the customers. 
Over the months, the group made continued attempts to structure their thinking, 
process data and manage their concerns and anxieties. An excerpt from a COG 
meeting in March highlights some of the issues. 
Anne Marks: "How trusted are we by the public? Are we trusted? Do we have the 
credibility to show it? " 
Geoff Browns (Environment): "We need to build on these. " 
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Francis Craig (Finance): "Members feel they represent democracy and they perceive 
pressure groups as unrepresentative, white middle class lobbies and forums. When 
Members see them being acknowledged by officers they take this as undermining 
their roles. " 
Judi Patch (Policy unit): "We know that Members do not like us to do it as we have 
had explicit feedback. " 
Toni Johns (Technical Services): "But Members will not stand up and take the flack. 
Officers take it. " 
Geoff Browns: "Yes, the last committee meeting was a classic example of a member 
putting the CEO in a poor position. ... So what is this democracy we are 
here to 
support? " 
Toni Johns: "If s to make them feel in charge. " 
Harry Mann (Education -substituting for Trudi Lukes): "Some feel in charge 
individually (the chairs of committee) but not collectively. " 
Colin Maccini, CEO: "We need to help them to realise when we help them deliver 
what they want. " 
Francis Craig (Finance): "When labour get in things will change. Current Members, 
don't trust us, but will givc us a clcar run. " 
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Anne Marks (Admin) "At a macro level they're OK with us in control... but at a local 
level they want more involvement. " 
Francis Craig (Finance): "Often meetings get high-jacked. They put in an agenda 
item high, say its urgent. No facts or nothing. And when yoleve done the research 
and brought things out to the light, they say they are not interested. " 
Leon Davids (Leisure): "It reinforces the points and suggest the we need to provide 
Members with information. " 
The discussion continued for another 10 minutes, with the group trying to work out 
what the new administration might want and need post May, after the elections. 
Finally, the second strategic away day was in April 1994. It was a confidential 
briefing for the management Board and it provided an analysis of each Party's main 
policy agenda, likely voting outcomes by ward, the likely actions that might follow 
and the implications for the management group. The content of the briefing was 
confidential. However, the meeting itself and the impact on the group provides 
further data of their strategies for coping with the difficulty of uncertainty and the 
impending May elections. Some of the reactions from the group included the desire 
to deliver in short time scales despite whoever won the elections to show that they 
were committed to new political administration. It was reported at the meeting that 
two or three prominent elected Members would 'put the boot in... saying that the 
management group don't do what you want them to do and they cannot be trusted'. 
Latcr a discussion about Members desire to see financial prudence was seen as a mask 
for getting rid of management. 
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Francis Craig: "Here is another concern. The processes for change is seeking 
improvements (his stress) and should not undermine our excellent record on financial 
control. In them trying to review critically and see who is doing what, I still have 
some concerns that they will start making comparisons of level of delegation and my 
own structural role. Colin, I hope you are taking this on board. " 
Colin Maccini: "Yes, I do not want us to get sucked into or messed up on financial 
controls... "(interrupted by Francis) 
Francis Craig: "We need to properly evaluate whatever model of performance that the 
Members put forward. " 
Colin Maccini: "The argument is not about that. There is no difference of opinion 
among us (the management group). It's just a silly game. People are trying to split us 
up. " (All around the table agree) 
Anne Marks (Admin): "Can we continue this discussion elsewhere? " 
Francis Craig: "No! " 
Anne Marks: "Well, there are some concerns and anxieties among staff - there's 
turbulence in the staff. They are worried as their views differ with Members on CCT. 
Staff do not see focus on customers but are more concerned about the product and the 
internal affairs of the council. Need to take that on board. " 
Colin Maccini (CEO): "Yes. Judi, have we got the papers for the next item... " 
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The meeting was swiftly moved on and during the morning coffee break there was a 
heated disagreement between Geoff Browns and Toni Johns over who should take the 
lead and which side was right on a planning development that was in the process of 
negotiation. Toni Johns took the side of the private developers a large contracting 
outfit. Geoff Browns felt that the social aspects were more important. Each 
represented a different view, which also reflected the differences among the elected 
Members. 
Maccini attempted to arbitrate but the issue remained unresolved and the formal 
meeting resumed. The meeting continued with further data so much so that one 
officer said: "There's lots more data. How best can we use it especially in such a 
rapidly changing environment? " Later the same officer says: "It's what conclusions 
that get drawn for the document that's important. " The first part of the meeting ends 
at lunch time. Colin concludes the meeting: "Fascinating documents. Well done! " 
3.4 Analysis 
The Chief Officers Group's immediate context of the impending elections seemed a 
major pre-occupation of the group's strategic discussion and a distraction. The 
scenario planning, the speculation, the absorption of large quantities of data also 
prevented the group from focusing on the strategic organisational task. The hive of 
activity can be understood as the COG's attempted to manage it boundaries, 
contingency plan and create a common platform and agenda that they could 
collectively agree upon. Yet their behaviour could also be seen as far from task 
related, and more like a case of 'basic assumption 'flight' from the pain that most of 
them dreaded and some predicted; they would lose their livelihoods 
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The COG did not share a similar experience or support of the CEO. The individual 
interviews showed that they had varying political alliances with elected Members and 
they seemed to think that other COG members were going to 'get the chop' but not 
them individually. Thus, the group seemed to have differences that were not 
acknowledged in these meetings, and therefore generated a false unity or a pseudo- 
group: acting 'as if they were a task related group. 
Can the team manage its boundaries? 
The inference from this case study is that the COG sought to manage its boundaries 
but was unable to do effectively due to: 
The continual internal flux of their context and relationships with elected 
Members 
The difficulty of effectively processing the continual stream and volume of data 
despite all attempts 
It seemly acting as a 'pseudo-group', where it did not acknowledge differences 
within the group 
Thus, the proposition that insufficient management of the 'top team's task and 
boundaries, which leads to impaired leaming for organisations at a strategic level, 
does seem to have some face validity in this case. Further analysis of the group may 
provide addition validation or data that counters this view. 
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4. The Group and its internal dynamics 
Question three: Do the internal dynamics of the 'top team'impact on 
organisational leaming? 
This section addresses the above question by exploring the key internal dynamics of 
the team in order to answer two further sub-questions. These are: 
4.1 Does the team display examples of 'basic assumption' motifs over 'work'? 
4.2 Do individual valancies reinforce difficult group dynamics? 
4.1 Does the team display examples of 'basic assumption'motifs over 
'work'? 
There are three areas that help us understand the dynamics of the group in considering 
'basic assumptions'. 
These are: 
* The roles and relationship of each director as seen by other members of the group - 
the source of this data is from the first interviews using the interview schedule 
9 The dynamics within the group as understood by members within the group - the 
data also comes from those same first interviews 
The dynamics of the group based on scoring statements against basic assumption 
theory (see Appendix 1) using the Group Analysis Grid and content analysis of text 
of latent themes 
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4.1.1 Roles and relationships 
In understanding the dynwnics of the group a first level analysis suggests that group 
roles are formed and that these may be significant in understanding the impact on 
organisational leaming. 
The following provides an account of how each member is seen by their colleagues. 
The CEO's role was discussed in 3.2 above and thus he is not included here. The 
group members each had perceived roles. Themes that were said to have resonance 
from the interviews with their colleagues were as follows. 
The group members each had roles that were both given to them and taken. Here are 
some of the common themes that were mentioned about each group member. 
Toni Johns - Director of Technical Services 
"Often he doesn't talk and when he does he makes obvious statements. " Judi Patch 
Colin Maccini saw him as: "A genius or a mad man. " 
"I see him as untrustworthy. Yes he is a scapegoat but it brings it on himself He's 
also more comfortable with the elected Members than being one of us (COG). " 
Harold Brown 
Anne Marks summarised him as: "A difficult person! " 
Toni said of himself. "I have a severely individualist management style. " 
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Toni had a very individualist management style - for example he didn't have a desk in 
his office but had it laid out with settees, and his secretary handled all of his 
correspondence and schedules. He was often the scapegoat in the group but seems to 
enjoy it. He tended to take his lead from Members, especially his chair of committee, 
and was not widely trusted. 
Anne Marks - Director of Administration 
"She is not trusted by colleagues and is seen as devious, clever and astute. " Judi 
Patch 
"She has a subtlety of thinking so is a sage. She's a good lateral thinker too. " Geoff 
Brown 
"A strategist and conceptual thinker. " Leon Davids 
Anne said of herself. "I feel very uncomfortable regarding my own confrontational 
style vis a vis Toni Johns. " 
Anne is cast as a strategist and very conceptual. She is seen as a sage like thinker and 
maybe a little aloof While her capacity to think is valued, she is not trusted by her 
colleagues as seen as devious perhaps are they are unsure which way she will be 
thinking. 
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Judi Patch - Head of Policy unit 
"She just says what we are thinking; very capable and able to carry out work 
programmes. " Geoff Browns 
"Very, very helpful. Well regarded and good at communication. " Leon Brown 
Harold Matthews had another view: "I question her role on the COG. Is she support 
for the executive function or policy analyst. I think we need the latter. She is the 
former? " 
Judi described herself as: "The honest broker ... spending a lot of the time walking on 
the fence trying to retain an independent position. I am very uncomfortable with 
some of the conflicts between Colin and Toni, and Colin and Francis. " 
Her role on the management group is sometimes questionable: unsure if its to support 
the group or really a policy analyst. Seen by all as very capable, helpful and well 
regarded through-out the council at all levels. 
Harold Matthews - Director of Housing and Social Services 
"He's a process man. He doesn't say much but he is very resourceful. " Leon Davids. 
He continued: "He's sensible, quiet, rational, thinks through issues... I really like 
him. " 
"Quiet but listens, especially on capital expenditure items. No. You can't get 
anything past him. " Anne Marks 
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Harold Matthews was seen as the process man; doesn't say much but was very 
sensible and rational. The strong silent type. 
Francis Craig - Director of Finance 
"Speaks more than he needs to. " Leon Davids 
"He holds the purse strings and so is very powerful. But he's not adapting to the 
cultural change. " Judi Patch 
"Peter and I have a good relationship except at budget time. He's very powerful at 
budget time. It difficult, frustrating as he's not managing the change and so I get 
annoyed when he plays policeman (of the finances). " Colin Maccini. Leon Davids 
shared the same view. 
"He's a child compared to Anne Marks. He's straight. Hates his authority being 
challenged and is a power base. " Geoff Brown 
"He's very emotive. " Leon Davids 
Francis Craig holds the purse-strings and is thus very powerful. He can act out 
organisational financial policeman and dislikes his power base being challenged. 
Otherwise he is not devious: what you see is what you get 
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Trudy Lukes - Director of Education 
"The older stateswoman" was the opening comment made by Judi Patch and it was a 
view commonly held by others. 
I "Detached sage. Deep even. " Geoff Brown 
"Not really get on with others; tends to keep herself to herself. " Colin Maccini 
"A sober individual who is well regarded. " Leon Davids 
Trudy was seen as the sage-like, but may be distant, elder stateswoman. It was also 
noted that she often sent substitutes to COG management meetings. 
Geoff Brown - Director of Enviromnent 
"He's really successful. A shooting star. Very much like myself. We have the same 
star sign, same clothes and hang out in the same places. " Colin Maccini 
"I wish he would come down out of the clouds. " Harold Matthews 
"He flits in and out, a bit of a scatter brain. Bubbly type but he could slow down a 
bit. " Leon Davids 
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Geoff was an ideas man and often came up with innovative solutions to problems with 
varying degrees of appreciation from others. The CEO saw him as high-flyer and 
there seemed to be a degree of identification between the two. The role of the ideas 
person appears to hold for Geoff. 
Leon Davids - Director of Leisure 
There was a noticeable absence of comments about Leon Davids from his colleagues; 
only two directors mentioned him. They said: 
"Unsure of his calibre. He tends to ride on the back of others. Good speaker though. " 
Geoff Brown 
"He rarely exerts his influence on the COG management meetings. " Anne Marks 
There is a silent or invisible role that he appears to play. 
Each of the members seem to have a role in relationship to this group. The scapegoat, 
the strategist, the sage, the process man, the ideas one or the invisible. There 
appeared to be some general agreement among colleagues about each others roles. 
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4.1.2 The dynamics of the group as understood by its members 
How did the group understand its own dynamics. Data from 2.2 and 3.1 suggests that 
the group does not see itself as an effective team and a number of reasons were given. 
An exploration of the teams view of its own dynamics provides additional data for 
this analysis. 
Data for this section was from the initial interviews, a feedback and dialogue event in 
September 1994 and continuing conversations with people in the organisation. 
There were two other dynamics that the group noted about itself over and beyond 
those of role covered in 4.1.1. These were: 
e Identifying subgroups within itself 
* Identifying internal conflicts. 
Groups within the group 
There were three clear groupings that were identified and agreed by all the members 
of the group both in the individual sessions and the feedback session in September. 
The first group was Colin Maccini (CEO), Geoff Browns (Environment), Leon 
Davids (Leisure) and Harold Matthews (DH and SS). These were the people who 
worked well together and shared some of the 'can do' culture and values that were 
articulated by Maccini. They worked on the basis of meritocmcy and enterprise. 
The second group was almost in direct and open opposition to the first. They 
included Francis Craig (Finance) and Tony Johns (Technical Services), with Judi 
Patch having a close and personal relationship with Francis Craig, but was very 
distant from him in meetings. 
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The third group were 'the others'. They were not a group together but were more 
independent. These included Judi Patch (Policy unit) in her role as peace maker, 
Anne Marks (Admin), who was not really trusted and Trudy Lukes (Education) who 
was the 'Elder Sage'. 
The roles that the women were given also appeared to be genderised in that they were 
often 'go-betweens', and again the women all talked of the sexist attitudes and climate 
of the organisation in their individual interviews. 
Conflict and dynamics 
The group dynamics were described by directors as: 
"... Having some tensions. " Judi Patch 
"Issues of trust, isolation and hurt continue to be around. " Francis Craig 
"There are differences in values, " stated Toni Johns. That view was held by others 
including Harold Matthews. 
"The relationships are unsatisfactory. " Trudy Lukes 
There were also tensions between individuals: 
"The battle between Toni Johns and Geoff about who owns economic development is 
constant and warring. " Judi Patch 
"The tensions between Francis and Colin, I feel uncomfortable about the exchange. " 
Leon Davids 
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"I feel Colin protects Geoff Browns, Harold Matthews and Leon Davids and leaves 
Toni Johns and Francis unprotected in meetings. " Judi Patch 
"There are also tensions between Anne and Francis. " Leon Davids 
"Trust is an issue for the group, especially the relationship between the management 
group and Toni Johns. If we could improve that everything would work much better. " 
Francis Craig. It was also a view expressed by Trudy Lukes and Harold Matthews. 
Finally, Patch concludes: "There is good social respect between officers with the 
exception of Toni. " 
There were several directors who reported that Toni Johns was spreading 'dirt' about 
fellow officers. 
4.1.3 The dynamics of the group based on the Group psychodynamics 
The dynamics of the group were predominantly 'work' type of behaviours but the 
level of 'work' on a 1-4 scale tended to be low (scores I and 2) (see chapter 7 and 
Appendix 1). The other main dynamic in the group was 'fight' activity and there were 
a number of examples of those as described in the accounts in section 4.1.2 above. 
(See tables 12.3 below) 
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Table 12.3 
The Dynamics of the group based on the Group Analysis Grid 
wl. w2 w3 w4 FL Fi DP CP CD Und 
791 47 302 76 8 62 161 65 46 00 24 
100% 6% 38% 10% l% 8% 20% 8% 6% 0% 0% 3% 
A breakdown of relevant sessions by team member is provided in Appendix 8.2. 
The group spent 55% of its time in 'work' mode with 'fight/flight' motifs accounting 
for 28% along with 'dependency' 8% and pairing 6%. Most of the 'work' activity is 
level 2 (represently nearly 70% of all work) with level 3 activity representing 17% of 
all work. 
The pattern of the group's dynamics suggests work took place but at low levels. This 
dynamic was profiled with a range of basic assumption motifs including 'fight, 
'flight', 'dependency' and some 'pairing'. 
The following notes were taken on I March 1994. They highlight some of the 
tensions in the group's regular meetings. 
The Management group is having a discussion following a presentation by Francis 
Craig (Finance), regarding a small capital investment project. 
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Colin Maccini (CEO): "Fine in principle but are the numbers where they should be? " 
Francis Craig: "The numbers? " 
Colin Maccini: "Looking at the legislation, Anne and I looked at it (the proposal) and 
we are... " 
Francis Craig (interrupts) : "The letter dated the I February responds to that... " 
Colin Maccini (abruptly): "We'll look at it" 
Francis Craig: "What is my role in relation to this institute? MY independent financial 
advice can't be given if I'm blind, deaf and dumb. We need more discussion on this 
point.... Does not the Executive Director on Finances not have a primary role in the 
allocation of resources, rather than just feeding in the input? " 
Colin Maccini: "Can I remind you that those decisions are brought to the Chief 
Officers management group and that directors can discuss them here. You have had 
ample time for... " 
Francis Craig (interrupts): "I am concerned that we are moving away from what was 
said at the last Chief Officers strategy retreat about the role of the team. I arn 
concerned we are going against agreed principles. " 
The discussion continued in the same vein for several minutes with Francis Craig and 
Colin Maccini exchanging views. No one else contributed. 
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Colin reminds Francis that the decision was, "Made at the management meeting. " 
Francis Craig: "No it was not. You could not have raised that here. I would have 
remembered. You only mentioned it [the decision] yesterday and you didn't even give 
me five minutes. " 
Colin Maccini: "Do you recall the order of things regarding your report?! At that time 
we only had half of your report without the other side [from the customers' view] and 
at that point we made a decision in principle. " 
Francis Craig: I differ. The general view by my staff is they have been targeted in 
this. They are worried about the investment and thus the delay. There is a feeling of.. 
[pauses] of being de-stabilised. Some officers are saying to my staff. 'You're out of a 
job; you'll be working for me. ' 
"The process is dismissive of us and... you should be aware that I am consulting 
(elected) Members on this. " 
Colin Maccini (interrupts): "Thank you. " 
Others chip in and the conversation gets heated. Toni Johns (Technical Services) 
sides with Francis Craig and Anne Marks (Admin) sides with Colin Maccini. The rest 
say nothing notably trying to keep a low profile (the others actually slouched in their 
chairs). The meeting built up to a direct confrontation from Craig. 
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Francis Craig: "Why was I not involved? You are side-lining me and the management 
team. No one has contacted me since then (when the 'decision' was made). I simply 
do not understand you. You are deliberately... " 
Colin Maccini (interrupts): "My experience of you at times and at the moment is that 
its impossible to... " 
Craig (now shouting): "I was in your office only on Friday, why not mention it 
then?! " 
Colin: "Let's talk after the meeting. " 
Francis: "No. I want it to be discussed here. It should be discussed. I want my 
colleagues to know how I've been treated. " 
Colin: "It will be discussed outside of here. " 
Anne Marks steps in as do others and the matter is closed. "Lets move on, " said 
Colin. 
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This extract serves to demonstrate a number of points regarding some of the deeper 
issues relating to the tensions. These seem to include: 
4p The question of director's authority within the team and the council: both of the 
director of finance and the CEO as leader. Who has it and how should it be 
exercised? 
* The collective role and authority of the group. Is there a clarity about task as 
directors remain silent or take sides rather than tackle the issue? 
9 What are the agreed protocol and procedures - structures of contairanent - that can 
be relied upon to manage through the internal chaos? They looked unreliable and 
arbitrary which makes it hard to channel organisational learning of any type. 
The dynarnics of the team are explored further in the next sub-section, which looks at 
'basic assumptions'. 
278 
4.. 1.4 Does the team display examples of 'basic assumption' motifs over Iwork'9. 
The data suggests that the group does engages in basic assumption motifs in the form 
of splitting, 'fight', flight and acting 'as if they were a coherent group as opposed to a 
'pseudo-group'. The group appears to put a lot of energy into understanding and 
managing the relationship with the elected Members and there is a thin line between 
doing that well and being obsessional. Thus, basic assumptions seem to be dominant 
over 'work', given the routine nature of the 'work' that takes place (See appendix I 
for definitions and descriptions) 
A systemic analysis of the Group 
The organisational context for the relationships with Members was an over-riding 
dynamic which seems to explain much of the dysfunctional aspects of the group's 
thinking and actions. The way elected Members behave seemed to have spilt over 
into the officers group, where these dynamics were also replicated. 
It seems that the boundary of the inter-group dynamic is 'under-bounded'. The task 
of both groups was not clear, they both had examples of basic assumption activity, 
time scales for decision making were short, communication patterns were difficult and 
there was competition for authority. Thus, the group appeared to be 'underboundcd' 
(Alderfer, 1980) where boundaries and task are underdeveloped. The implication is 
that organisational learning will be impeded by unfocussed and recursive routines. 
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4.2 Do individual 'valencies'reinforce difficult group dynamics? 
This section explores how the managers' context, history and inner conflicts and 
drives help throw light upon how they took up their roles in the strategic forum of the 
management team. Five people left during the entire period of the study. However, at 
the time of gathering this data from the second, one to one, in-depth interviews there 
were still six Chief Officers in the management team. The three that had already left 
were: Toni Johns (Technical Services), Trudi Lukes (Education) and Geoff Browns 
(Environment). 
ToniJohns 
A second interview with Toni Johns was not possible as he had already left and his 
appointment was cancelled. 
Trudy Lukes 
In all the changes, it became too much for Trudy Lukes. She could not come to terms 
with loss of the role of the local education authority with the introduction of Local 
Managed Schools (LMS) and she suddenly took early retirement. By all accounts in 
the building and reliable sources this move was welcomed by all concerned. Thus, a 
second interview was not possible. 
Geoff Browns 
A second interview was arranged with Geoff Browns but it was postponed due to a 
large project needing his final touches before completion. We arranged to meet after 
his late vacation later on in the autumn. Events took their course and he did not return 
to the council and a second meeting did not take place. 
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Thus, this part reports on six of the remaining directors. These include: Colin 
Maccini (CEO), Anne Marks (Administration), Judy Patch (Policy unit), Francis 
Craig (Finance), Harold Matthews (DH and SS) and Leon Davids. 
Each of the directors filled a variety of personal profile inventories, and these were 
used as tools for personal and existential exploration through in-depth interviews. 
These were held during October to December 1994. The details of this process are in 
chapters 10 and II of the research methodology. A summary of the instruments used 
for each person is presented in Appendix 8.3 
The following accounts are taken from the process outlined above, the comments 
from their colleagues (used as feedback and dialogue) and working notes from each of 
the sessions. All of the directors completed their Myers Briggs Indicators forms and 
one other profile (except Leon Davids who only did MBTI). 
The outcome helped look at the individual accounts to the question: What impact do 
individual, 'unresolved', memories or conflicts have on the group's dynamics 
a As this was the pilot a range of profiling instruments were used. These included: 
Firo-B, Myers Briggs Type Indicator and Cattels 16PF. A summary of these are 
recorded in Appendix 8.3 
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The individuals - history, role context and inner drives - the internal 
dialogue 
Colin Maccini 
Colin was in his mid-Forties and had been in the authority for some five years. He 
was dedicated to work and each day was one of the earliest to arrive to work and one 
of the last to leave in the evening. 
His natural style was an extroverted one based on the personal inventories and he 
tended to be good at making and maintaining good social relationships. He described 
himself as independent and daring and didn't care too much for stuffy 
conventionalism. 'I like to cut through the crap. ' 
His personal profiles gave a clear view that he was strong on abstract thinking (NT in 
MBTI and a sten score of 8 out of a ten point scale on 16PF). Thus, he was fascinated 
with good ideas, innovative approaches and processes and enjoyed solving complex 
problems. 
When asked about his strengths he said: 'positive energy, enthusiasm, a winner, 
speedy, happy, quite receptive, lucky and good with large groups. ' He had won the 
support of the elected Members with a presentation of his vision for the council and 
now presented this quite regularly to staff groups. From these a number of officer 
'working groups' were set up where Colin Maccini could work more directly with 
staff. 
"I lead from the top and quash from the bottom. I've a fairly participative style but 
retaining eight-tcnths or ninc-tenths of the decision-making -a consensus with leeway 
to make the decision as the Executive Director (CEO). 
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"I don't get around as much and do get complaints from staff that I'm not with them 
enough. " 
At the end of the day, Colin would take time to relax and reflect on his decisions 
(Colin Maccini). "At about 5prn is the best time to catch him if you want to put 
forward another view or argument he seemed so attached to earlier ideas in the day. 
Here's where he is at his most thoughtful. " (Leon Davids) 
"I can cope with pressure, but tend to just work harder. My personal circumstances 
allow me to do that ... I know I expect a lot from my colleagues and sometimes drive 
them too hard. I'm a hard task master, " said Colin Maccini. 
"Much of my style comes from the enterprise nature of my family. I am the only one 
in the family that does not work for themselves. The rest are all small business 
people. I guess that's why I'm like this. " 
In the final interview with Colin Maccini, he spoke of his decision to leave and the 
principles and reasons behind the decision, including that the elected Members had 
undermined the authority of the CEO and it was time to leave. He was both fair 
minded and philosophical about it without malice. An appropriate deal had been 
negotiated and he was going off to work as an independent consultant. The only other 
post that was challenging enough in another part of the public sector had recently been 
taken so that was it. Independence was the chosen route for the time being. 
Subsequent contact with Colin Maccini suggests it was the best decision he had ever 
taken and he was still kept informed of the internal politics of the council. 
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Analysis 
Colin was seen and presented himself as entrepreneurial in his approach. Clear about 
the vision for himself, good at presenting and convincing others but it appeared that 
he was less grounded than his peers (and staff) would have liked him to be. This was 
coupled with a fairly firm, some suggested autocratic, style of management. 
Together, the overall approach was experienced as undermining of the directorate and 
corporate working but liberating for staff who could shine under Colin Maccini's 
version of meritocracy. It appeared that he had to have the last say in decision- 
making. He liked to influence processes and was driven by values rather than rules. 
He rarely changed his mind. 
He worked hard and appeared to enjoy it. He said that the 'can do', 'work hard', 
'sociable' and 'entrepreneur style' was traced back to the small enterprise culture of 
his family where all these virtues are well known as a successful recipe for small 
enterprises. How far these values were appropriate to the council seemed 
questionable and they, in fact, clashed with the organisation's dominant culture and 
sense of identity of bureaucratic incrementalism. It is possible that Colin's 
unconscious dialogue was to 'run the business' of the council 'as if' it was a small, 
family business. The COG did have the features of a dysfunctional family dynamic, 
which may have been collectively enacted between Colin and the other directors to 
meet some other unconscious agenda. However, it can be said that his style was 
generally counter-cultural both to the organisation and more immediately the COG. 
Thus, the anger, envy, competition and admiration that was expressed by his 
colleagues was not surprising. Colin Maccini did have a very charismatic impact. It 
was easy to see why he was the object of both love and hate as positive transference 
feeling towards him were very strong. (See my personal reflections on this point 
below). 
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It seemed that the style that Maccini took as CEO was the only one he knew and given 
its absence in a large public sector organisation, it may be suggested that the familial 
explanation of the eldest sibling taking over 'father's' role, may have some face 
validity. Thus, the clash in mutual expectations - unspoken and unconscious - 
contributed to a 'cycle of mistrust' between Maccini and his colleagues. The enacted 
dynamics between Colin Maccini and the group, and the friction with him and Francis 
Craig and Toni Johns has some of the marks of 'sibling rivalry. What can be said, 
however, was that people were working from completely different unconscious 
models and internal dialogues (see accounts below). 
Colin Maccini played the role of both rescuer and persecutor ( good and bad object) 
on behalf of the strategic apex to be a focus for the organisational social 
fragmentation, change and flux. This systemic organisational dynamic was reflected 
through 'splitting' in the social systems of the COG, the staff and the elected 
Members. He also become the victim of these schisms and was the third CEO to 
'leave' in unpleasant circumstances. 
Anne Marks 
Anne Marks declared a strong commitment to working in the public sector and felt 
she was able to take a detached and analytical look at things. She saw herself as good 
at strategic analysis, a bit of an ideas person and definitely a shaper of events. This 
was in line with her MBTI profile which she agreed was INTP. She described herself 
as fairly positive but acknowledged that the lack of self reflection meant that 
sometimes she could loose the leaming. She expressed a deep dislike for politicking 
and said that she was not very good at it. 
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When asked about the dislike of politicking she described the dislike of noisy 
confrontation and how uncomfortable it was to experience: people shouting at each 
other. Further discussion traced this back to her own family dynamics where she was 
always the one in the middle of terrible rows and relationships. So when Colin and 
Francis Craig fought, she often found herself taking up 'the role of interpreter and 
conduit'. 
The issues she had with Francis Craig were not being avoided because she was scared, 
according to Anne. But were to do with good conduct and how 'we should behave as 
officers'. 
Anne Marks said that she did not have significant periods of doubt but also said that 
while she enjoyed the leadership role there had been a mixture of contradictions in her 
achievements. She had reached seniority quite quickly in her career and had chances 
to go further. But either did not go for them or did not succeed. This created a degree 
of ambivalence about her success and left some unresolved doubt in herself - 
expressed as: 'given who I am, am I sufficiently ruthless and daring to succeed? The 
general model of a CEO had a more hard edged approach. ' 
Anne Marks also set high standards for herself, and staff, and usually delivered to 
deadlines but could also be seen as too slow to come to a decision, when others - staff 
and Colin - wanted it quickly -I can be seen as over fussy". I sometimes say about 
myself. good product but slow. " 
"It doesn't worry me if I turn up slightly late, I work best in teams where I can be in 
and out. " 
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About half way through the interview, Anne Marks asks: "Not sure if this is the sort 
of thing you want. " She goes on to report a balanced and stable family life and that 
there should be more support within the organisation so that people could take risks, 
fail but leam from the consequences before it was beyond the pale and they were into 
exit counselling before anyone could do anything about it. Anne Marks stated that the 
culture of the COG was really set by Colin Maccini; that he sees her as a threat and 
thus tends not to use her as much, even when the task is part of herjob. The CEO's 
talk about teamwork was described as 'rhetoric'. 
From an earlier interview Anne Marks had raised the issue about what might she do 
next and asked for it to be raised again in the second interview. The options as she 
saw them varied from early retirement to going back to the private sector. She 
expressed an increasing and growing doubt about how one could make an impact on 
people's lives in her role, or even that of CEO, in a large local authority. She 
concluded the exploration with the thought: "I could well be happy here for 
sometime... bar some of the tensions in the building, and we can put that down to 
Colin's style. While I admire his initiatives he lacks strategic sense... If things don't 
improve by a significant factor I feel performance will fall compared to other 
authorities. " 
Her final point was that she decided not to apply for a recent CEO post in the south of 
the county because: "I do not want to move the family until the teenagers have 
finished college; I did not want to travel across the county; and I need to come off the 
fence and make a decision quickly. One way or the other. " 
"if early retirement was to be discontinued it is going to be a tough choice. " She 
acknowledged, "Some conflict and tensions between wishes and greed. " 
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Analysis 
Anne Marks is experienced as somewhat cautious and guarded. Her sharp intellect, 
legal training and principles tended to reflect her day to day style of working to 
accepted rules - be that the behaviour of officers, criteria and authority for decision- 
making, or requests from authority figures. Her formal legal role also reflected her 
personal preference for rules. 
Her difficulty with tackling confrontation between colleagues was directly linked to a 
past memory of her own family. The more familiar role of the minor sage, seemed to 
resonate with her ambivalence around authority reflected in her own conflicts around 
personal success and career progression. This issue of authority was seen again right 
at the very end of the interview when three reasons were given for withdrawing from 
applying for a CEO post, even though it was something he expressly wanted. We also 
see some discrediting of the CEO, and the internal mental model of a CEO was one 
that is hard edged and much more aggressive. Earlier in the interview she suggested 
that there was little self doubt. Yet, the doubts were implicitly and explicitly 
expressed through-out the interview. There were also several requests to the 
researcher to gain reassurance: 'Is this OKT; 'Is this what you want? '; 'Are we on 
track? '. 
The discussion about various forms of support - the family life, support to take risk 
and invitation to the researcher for support - may be an expression of generosity from 
a position of positive self regard, a call for support or both: expressing personal 
ambivalence about intimacy. He had very low scores of expressed and wanted 
inclusion for his Firo-B 
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Finally, the fear of managing other's hostility, playing by the rules and ambivalence 
about success and authority impacted on Anne's ability to take up her full role in the 
group: accentuating a pacifying role, the minor sage and a one who keeps their 
distance. The role of distant thinker generated feelings of mistrust among group 
members and the role provided an unconscious 'pay-off for both the group and for 
Anne. For Anne, it stopped her having to confront the two underlying themes in the 
discussion of managing her own hostility and getting close to others. For the group, 
they could keep her on the outside, and therefore reduce her personal authority and 
power because of a fear that was based on her being 'unknown' - seen as 'devious' 
and a bit of a dark horse. 
Judi Patch 
Judi Patch was in her mid 50's and was seen as trust-worthy and 'safe'. She described 
her current family life as great and very stable. Her 'real life' was outside the council 
and she did not find it difficult to switch off. Judi Patch did not let work-life 
dominate. "Life, kids, job, finances, house, friends are all good and I have lots to 
celebrate. " 
"If I get kicked out, I'd be worried but I'd get on with it. I'm past my prime but have 
confidence in my own ability. " Three more references are made to the stability of the 
family and how important it was to her. "I talk to my mother every day. " 
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Discussion based on her personal inventory focused on her relaxed and stable 
approach, plus her ability to act as a resource investigator and chairperson9. Her 
personal inventory also suggested that she was far more outward going than she had 
expected or for that matter been observed in the group. There was a clear extroverted 
preference in her MBTI scores and a sten score of 8.69 out of ten on the extroversion 
scale for 16PF. When asked why this might be so she suggested: "I'm less confident 
in the Chief Officer group management group as I do not have a directorship. " On 
further inquiry Judi Patch said she didn't know why she was less than outward going 
in the group but added that she did not like the friction between Colin and Francis. 
"I'm intimidated by the Francis and Colin thing. I feel uncertain about the 
appropriateness of their interventions in the meetings. I often want to say something 
but feel its not politic to do so. I'll bide my time. Sometimes confrontation is OK but 
its a short route to achievement and often it goes wrong. I go for the bridge building 
approach. My personal philosophy is that it will pass. " 
On organisational politics, Judi Patch said she could play that game better than most if 
she wanted to, but doesn't. "I prefer to give of self, rather than role. " 
Judi held a number of secrets for the group of which some of them were shared in the 
interview. Over 50% of the interview was spent on these rather than herself and when 
the conversation did really focus on her she got and made a cup of tea. 
!, Here the respondent is describing group 'roles' of their colleagues in 'Belbin terms'. 
For example, 'resource investigator' for one who brings in new ideas and resources 
into the group, 'chairman' for those chair the group, 'shaper' for one that takes control 
and shapes events, 'plant' for ideas person and 'monitor evaluator' for the person that 
constantly checks reality. A fuller discussion of Belbin can be found in Belbin et al, 
1976. 
The other point is that their concept of 'roles' is not the same as used by this thesis 
which refers to group dynamic roles such as 'scape-goat', 'rescuer' and those that are 
based on a psycho-dynamic approach 
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Analysis 
It appears that much of Judi's stability in role comes from the stability of her family 
life and relationships outside of the work environment. She presented herself as fairly 
self assured, philosophical and happy to deal with what life brings in the work arena. 
She was the keeper of many secrets and was thus in a position to use these to best 
advantage. Thus, the comment that she could be political if she wanted is grounded, 
among other things, in the quality of confidential information that she often receives. 
Yet, taking the role of 'honest broker' and 'confidant' was chosen as a personal 
strategy over confrontation and politicking. 
Moreover, not being a full a member of the COG, made her feel that she had a weak 
power base or legitimacy in challenging and questioning the CEO, the Finance 
Director or the COG. The stated low level of personal investment and attachment to 
the job was less than that to her family. These may help explain some of the 
dynamics that affected how Judi took up her role i. e. sitting on the fence. However, 
further inquiry would be required as she spent a good deal of the interview avoiding 
the stated purpose of the interview. On reflection the 'secrets, which took up nearly 
half of the interview, may have been used consciously or unconsciously as a 
distraction from the topic, Judi. 
Francis Craig 
Francis Craig was in his late 50s. He was very professionally driven in his role and 
described himself as "Standards orientated... [but] happy with short cuts as long as 
they do not go beyond certain standards set for the task. " He was out-going, 
independent and tough-minded according to his personal profiles. 
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He felt that he was good at handling people and was quite humorous as an accountant. 
"I've got a good sense of humour, don't panic, don't frighten easy and don't run away 
fromproblems. I'm good at my job and feel competent in the job. 'IthinkthatIama 
reasonably intelligent person... and I know how to get things done. Tell me where 
you want to be and I know how to get there. I'm hard working, loyal, imaginative and 
a practitioner, a doer. I know the rules better than anybody else and can use them 
without breaking them. Others just blunder around. 
"Thus, I am well respected by the [elected] Members. Can be difficult and am happy 
to stand out. 
"There is a problem with Colin and me. He's good at projecting himself and 
"assertion managemenf '. I am more structured and keen on having implementation 
stages explicit. Colin, people find him more difficult. What he wants, they don't 
know. How they are doing, they don't know. He doesn't tell them and there are no 
agreed targets. So the only way to get them on board is they take on his approach 
body and soul. 
"My fairness can get me into hot water. I can get into difficulties with Members 
unknowingly. " He gave an example of his 'fairness' that upset Members. He also 
stated that Toni Johns' treatment was unfair and when he spoke up for Toni Johns it 
left 'a bad odour' in the COG. 
"I can also be mischievous, with an intrusive humour, that relieves tension and grates 
so that things are not taken too seriously. My wife agrees with me on that. 
"As the second child in the family it tends to make me like that. As I could not beat 
him up [his brother] as he was nine years older, I use to take the piss. 
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"The problem is that I don't know when to stop, especially when I know I've got it 
right. It a core issue. In work with my own professional standards of behaviour, the 
financial management and regulatory role, I won't let it go. It has very clear and set 
parameters. So sometimes I'll be happy about that and sometimes unhappy. 
"Some people say that I can be assertive and overbearing. My wife and staff don't say 
that as they know how to handle me. I have a good relationships with staff. I know I 
can be intellectually arrogant but I'm not with my own staff. 
"I think Colin is overbearing in the COG meetings - he uses excuses not to talk to me 
and I get pissed off when he doesn't ask me (to undertake a task) and I tend to do 
something stupid. But if asked, I always help. 
"It happens like this. Colin makes an assertion, and acts on it. I react and say its 
bloody unfair so I tend to be bloody unfair back. He pushes me into doing things I 
don't wish to. 
"This used to get me into a lot of trouble as a kid, with my parents, especially my 
mother, and get me into fights. I was small, thin with big hands - but cocky. An East 
End boy. I would match like with like. I was a street-fighter: dangerous physically 
but channelled it into rugby. And now I put it into intellectual dangerousness. " 
He saw some of his childhood traits in his own children and commented what a 
difference it had made to his own life. "I can still do it... I worked up from the shop 
floor... to a director's position. " 
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Some of the traits were also seen in his own parents and he spoke of them with 
affection and respect, without a sense of idealisation. "It's nice to have parental role 
figures and extended family. 
"I've got lots to give [long pause] but where is local government going and how can 
one influence it. Generally, I don't take work home but in general work hard. The 
work-home balance is very divided. I personally prefer to keep home isolated from 
work. " Francis Craig then spoke of a number of personal, family difficulties. 
"It recently dawned on me that staff say 'you always reassure us' and that's nice - 
feels appreciated. 
"I think I am good at delegating both at home and at work, especially where there is a 
lot of trust. " 
Analysis 
Francis presented himself as competent and well attuned to the organisation - in the 
staff, the managerial and political domains. He liked to deliver and used 'professional 
standards' to set appropriate boundaries for himself. His drive to work outside the 
boundaries, 'act out' if he doesn't get his way and engage in a dyadic, collusive and 
dysfunctional relationship with Colin, can be in part traced back to his childhood 
experiences and how he dealt with his older brother. His coping mechanism for 
dealing with siblings, authority (parents) or other forms of threat, frustration or 
competition was to hit back out of a sense of fairness. As a child this may be seen as 
justified rage. As an adult, it appears to feed some other unconscious need in 
relationship to Colin. 
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Given other data reported in this case, some of it may be competition for the post of 
CEO, envy and sibling rivalry. While Colin Maccini is not nine years his senior, 
Colin's seniority comes from his role as CEO, drawn from a body of equals. Thus, 
there is likely to be a degree of transference, counter-transference and projection 
operating for Francis and maybe Colin too. The other part is the authoritarian way in 
which Francis Craig experiences Colin Maccini's management style and his negative 
reaction to such authority since he was a child. 
Francis Craig also valued his family life, despite some of the difficulties which the 
family managed. He separated work from home very clearly and this splitting 
provided a boundary from the excesses at work. His coping mechanism for those 
excesses are to 'act out' and get into trouble, as did as a child; or sublimate his 
frustrations by working extra hard or launching an intellectual attack, like the game of 
rugby. Thus, he can get into playing games. 
His notions of family and support are in some ways unconsciously carried from his 
appreciation, that the new Members may just need support as they take on the 
challenge of running the authority. Francis's comment about staff finding him 
reassuring may also symbolise the 'solid man' he saw in his father and as he may 
wish to be himself. The lack of a university education was raised as something that 
stopped him from feeling completely 'whole' was discussed in the first interview. 
Yet his 16PF indicates a high score on intelligence. 
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Harold Matthews 
Harold Matthews was the youngest member of the group at aged 40. He said of 
himself that he had a serious approach and was not light-hearted enough at times. 
Harold Matthews said that he was interested in process and its balance with task. He 
saw himself, as did others, as fairly introverted. He was normally happy to speak off- 
the-cuff but in the group he did not feel confident to do so and liked to think things 
through first. He said: 'I do this because I do not always feel confident about myself 
or trust the group. ' But if the issue was important enough he was prepared to 
challenge. 
am not an extrovert, talkative or expressive and not infectiously enthusiastic. " 
His MBTI profile, and he agreed, was INTP tended to support this view of himself 
Although he was warm hearted the conversation regarding his Firo-B suggested that 
he did not need to be included and was happy to stand outside of events. 
He suggested that his approach was rooted in his experience of being at school where 
he was not a good performer. "I was in the lower class of a grammar school at the age 
of thirteen and was not a real achiever. 
"It was not until after I left school and attended a management course that I realised 
that I had something to offer. 
"Another reason why I am so quiet in the group is that the group does not always 
work on strategic items, deferring to the easier operation things. " (See comments on 
defensive routines in section 5.2). Furthermore, he stated that: "When people start 
playing games, and I'm not in the chair or in control, I just shut off. " 
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He also felt that Toni Johns was feeding Members with information to oust him out. 
"I have little respect for authority but am able to manage it most of the time. " 
Analysis 
Harold Matthews appeared to take the role of the introverted, process strategist or 
"intellectual" in the group. This was partly his natural style but it may be also used as 
a defence against getting it wrong and the possible attendant feelings of being 
perceived at the low end of the class. As the youngest member of the group, and a 
source of at least one colleague's attack, such feelings may have some validity. 
He was unapologetic about his style and re-emphasised at the end of the interview that 
he was: "Not an extrovert, not talkative or expressive and not infectiously 
enthusiastic. " The interview ended abruptly at that point. 
His dislike for authority, and possibly the role of the researcher, may be reflected in 
the abrupt end in the interview and it being punctuated with the nots.. The authority 
issue may be related to the experience of school Harold spoke of that had failed to 
validate him for whatever reason. 
Leon Davids 
Leon Davids presented himself as a fairly jovial and positive individual. He was in 
his late 40's and had a good track record in local government. He came to the council 
from a neighbouring authority, where he'd felt that he had gone as far as possible in 
that j ob. 
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Leon Davids said: "I'm creative, imaginative, gregarious, easy going with 
entrepreneurial skills and prepared to take risks. " His profiles reflected his own views 
with an agreed MBTI of ENTJ and the Firo-B highlighting his expressed and wanted 
desire for social contact. 
He felt that he had good leadership skills and was a good analytical thinker. 
"I'm able to organise himself, get money from the council and am fairly upfront and 
team orientated with my own directorate teams. " 
He acknowledged that: "I'm sometimes seen as always having hare-brained schemes 
by the COG but the project management bores me to tears. " In fact, it was one of his 
'hare-brained schemes' that led to his departure. 
He also acknowledged that in his current role he had a problem with saying no, 
challenging Colin on very difficult deadlines and taking on too much. When asked 
why was it hard to say no, Leon Davids admitted that it was due to, "Not wanting to 
offend. It's a personal thing. It's wanting to be a good boy sort of thing. " 
Leon also found it difficult to have a voice in the COG management meetings, being 
one of the quiet ones, compared to being in his own directorate team meetings. "I'm 
more confident in my own team. In the Board we are set up as a group of equals but it 
does not feel like that. Everything is polished and it feels that papers are signed, 
sealed and delivered. There are less ideas and the focus is unreal. 
"I feel better as a COG member outside the room than in it. For example the Quality 
Team is an excellent one and I run that. 
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"The room also feels weird. I feel more secure in my own room. The room for the 
COG management meetings carries a lot of baggage of those where we have horrid 
meetings with committee. When we use other venues we achieve more on the away 
days, but elected Members are unhappy about it. " 
Leon sought and gained a great deal of personal satisfaction from passing examines. 
He had done a DMS earlier in his career as well as his professional exams and had 
just completed another diploma programme by Open University and was to take on 
another. He'd received top marks for his year. 
"I'm extremely proud of my academic achievements. " 
He also gained satisfaction from his staff being praised, as it reflected his glory. He 
also liked to have an entrepreneurial and high profile approach. 
"Working in teams is the best approach, " reports Leon Davids. On asked why, his 
response was that his belief in working in team arose from his public school days, his 
squadron days in the RAF and some of his university experience as a student. He also 
learned from his early career in local government, around the mid 70's, that the 
autocratic style of his boss was experienced by all as, "awful and if I'm in charge I'll 
never operate like that. I operate an open door policy yet for some senior managers, 
not heads of services, they find it hard to come through the door of the Director. " A 
further exploration of the strong attachment to teams is closed down as Leon is unable 
to remember anything from earlier on in his childhood, before the age of nine. 
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Analysis 
Leon Davids is experienced as friendly and ambitious. His strive to do well, be the 
best student, be a good boy, and be liked by his team may suggest a desire for 
approval from others - peers, subordinates and those in authority. It may also reflect 
an internal critic that he needs to do really well to be approved. He is good at his 
work and his personal profile suggests a preference for visionary leadership, which 
supports his strategic and idea's driven approach. 
Leon Davids' role was the quiet one. Given his need for external recognition, his 
positive regard for teams in general and authority in his own team in particular, there 
is reason to believe that the COG's group dynamic reinforced the silent role for Leon 
and that it had some resonance for him. One thing that is evident from others' views 
of Leon and his own analysis of himself is that he found it difficult to take up his full 
authority in the group. The organisational and group context explains some of this 
role hesitancy. But the negative attachment to the room, which may have symbolised 
a critical parent in the mode of the elected Members, plus his ability to run his own 
show outside the group suggests that the group and Leon were enjoined in an 
unconscious dynamic to hold him in a particular role for the group: the quiet, hare- 
brained one or the 'idiot' of the group (Bion, 1961). It is also possible that there was 
some ambivalence on Leon Davids' Part between being a team player and the deeper 
desire to be an individual as expressed in his other roles outside the group. It may be 
the fear of rejection by his peers or even Colin Maccini in his role as authority, that 
keeps Leon Davids from fully functioning in the group. When Leon Davids did take 
his ideas to the limit, took up his role his internal prophesy was fulfilled and the 
elected Members rejected him. He was sacked. 
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4.3 Do individual 'valancies'reinforce difficult group dynamics? An 
analysis of the individuals 
Each individual's personal dynamic were presented from the in-depth interviews that 
explored their personal history, inner dialogue and context and meaning for each 
directors. While each member had their own unique history, inner tensions and 
conflicts, they all fitted a role within the group that served some of the needs of the 
group as well. 
Each of the individual issues and concerns that affected how members of the COG 
took up their role had its own origin. Yet there were a number of common themes 
that emerged, which provide a wider systemic understanding of the dynamics in the 
group. 
The social and unconscious roles that people took up and were given were a function 
of three key elements: 
e People's personal style 
* Their family and childhood relationships 
9 Their formal job roles 
Theory suggests (discussed in chapter 7 on roles) that there are links between 
personality preferences and job roles. Thus, these links are as expected. However, 
the factor that appeared to significantly reinforce these roles was the unconscious and 
collusive dynamic of the group. Each of the individuals had a variety of skills, 
strengths and preferences and as team members acknowledged, if these skills could be 
harnessed then the group could achieve a lot during period of transition (Anne Marks, 
Judi Patch and Geoff Brown). However, instead of the differences being a source of 
innovation and change, they were used as way of fuelling the defensive routine of the 
'cycle of mistrust'. 
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The 'cycle of mistrust' was driven by the daily pressure of the organisation but could 
be seen as: tensions lead to miscommunication and misunderstanding, which means 
mutual expectations are not clear or met and results in poor outcomes. As a result 
trust is low and politicking and with-holding takes place leading to greater tensions 
and miscommunication and misunderstanding. The compound effect of differences 
being used as an ego defense for individual role rigidity and a group defense within 
the team, partly helped explain how this dynamic continued. 
The dynamic however can also be seen at a personal level. For each individual 
another source of the dynamic was the splitting and inner conflicts within themselves. 
Each in some way talked about the internal critic - Past messages of 'not being good 
enough' were expressed by all bar Colin. This was juxtaposed with the other 
phantasy of some ego ideal - the 'hard-edged' CEO, the entrepreneurial CEO, the 
intellectual, the solid man, the great thinker. All represented notions of the ego ideal 
and maybe how people would like to see themselves. These two contradictory aspects 
of self suggests an inner conflict. It is suggested that these inner conflicts were played 
out in at least two ways. 
Firstly, it led to roles being limited and encouraged individual defensive routines, 
which reinforced how directors took up their roles. Secondly, the inner conflicts were 
projected into the group and it is suggested that they were enacted on the group's 
behalf by the duelling pair of Colin Maccini and Francis Craig, with Toni Johns as 
Francis's additional shadow who would tend to egg Francis on. It could be said that 
Francis and Colin represented the split in the COG. 
The underboundedness in the system and at the inter-group level may have resulted in 
the conflicts among the elected Members spilling into the COG. Thus, the dyadic 
split between the CEO and Francis Craig could also symbolise a greater difficulty in 
the council, among the elected Members, the staff and the subgroups in the 
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management Board between traditional democratic local government and the new, 
meritocracy of managerialism. Thus, it can be argued that the two men also enacted 
in actuality and existentially the competition and rivalry that was in the group and the 
system more broadly. 
These two thus provided a focus for the dominant unconscious dynamic of role 
rigidity, authority and conflict. It became a stand off. Thus, it is suggested that the 
COG as a subsystem was trapped in its own turmoil, in a context and organisation that 
was itself in turmoil. Thus, systemically, it was difficult for these dynamics to change 
- for the group or for the individual. 
Within the group, two or three had a stable family and social life outside of the group. 
But because their investment and attachment in the group was not as great, or because 
they were ambivalent about their role, they did not take up a stabilising role in the 
group. Instead, they either stood on the touch-line and watched (Judi Patch and Anne 
Marks) or even fuelled it (Francis). 
The inference from this case analysis is that individual valencies can reinforce 
difficult group dynamics through projective identification and the dynamics of the 
'group matrix'. These processes can lead to role rigidity and a reduction in personal 
authority and group task effectiveness and learning. In this case, the situation was 
aggravated because the possibility of containment of the group was undermined by the 
wider systemic dynamics of the elected Members and their collectively impact and 
underbounded relationship with the COG. 
These themes along with the analysis of the group and contextual level provide some 
other insights and understanding of the collusive and deep dynamics of management 
groups. 
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Postscript: After the elections and implications for the group and 
individuals 
The Labour party was elected with a majority. The group's context after the elections 
was initially seen as positive but this rapidly changed. The first member of the group 
to be sacked was- Toni Johns. This happened in the late Autumn of 1994. In his 
politicking before the elections, he is said to have 'crossed one of the Members' and 
his angry retort gave them enough to get rid of him. 
Then there was Leon David. 
Judi Patch (Policy unit) was the informant about the changes that had occurred since 
the first interview (second interview October 1994): "The Members had expressed 
great displeasure over two leisure events put forward and carried out by Leon and his 
staff and had asked for an investigative panel to look at it. " 
The panel included the CEO and two other directors. Patch continued: "It's the tip of 
theiceberg... there's going to be a major clear out. " 
"There is a lot of nervousness at the top at the moment. Most of the directors are 
doing twice as much -working sixty hours a week... The uncertainty is so difficult to 
manage. It means we're always tired. On one hand the Chair of Leisure is praising 
the work then, later wants Leon's head on a platter. 
"Only the new leader is trying to keep things cool but there are no clear messages. 
We are all being carried away on the crest of the waves and it feels like a runaway 
train. 
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"I'm nervous that I am guilty by association and feel this is being used as a 
convenient way to get rid of the Board. It's a very tense situation. I'm sure Colin will 
have his own version. But the uncertainty. Members do not want to hear the bad 
news and they are looking to Francis to be a White Charger to deliver them from the 
problems. " Judy Patch 
Initially Leon was suspended from duties. But it did not stop at Leon Davids. Geoff 
Browns was also investigated by a panel for "inappropriate actions"". The panel 
included the Colin Maccini (CEO) and Anne Marks (Admin). The new leadership did 
not accept the panel's conclusions and set up another committee with leading party 
Members involved in the new panel. In the event, Geoff Browns and Leon Davids 
parted company with the council and Colin Maccini also left on the grounds of 
principle. 
Francis Craig (Finance) had an additional view on the matter. He suggested that the 
Members may be just as uncertain and concerned as they were. "People need comfort 
about what's going on. There are three zones: comfort, discomfort and pain. The 
Members comfort and discomfort zones are very small so they get into pain quite 
easily and with that is panic. " (Second interview, October 1994) 
11 These "actions" were never discussed in the public domain so remained unknown 
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S. Organisational learning 
Question four: Is the organisation able to attain strategic organisational 
learning at a high level? 
The purpose of this section is to address three sub-questions about the nature and level 
of strategic organisational learning in the system and the impact of systemic defensive 
routines. The sources of data for the inquiry are varied: the responses to the first 
interview, the dialogue and feedback sessions held at the interim stage of the research, 
and a review meeting with the CEO in December 1994. 
The three areas of inquiry are: 
5.1 Is there strategic organisational leaming? 
5.2 Is such learning double loop? 
5.3 Does the strategic leadership provide facilitative structures for leaming? 
5.1 Is there strategic organisational teaming? Its nature and scope 
Organisational leaming here refers to manner in which the strategic apex of the 
system understands how it interprets its environments, acts on its decision and 
systematically reviews and institutionalises its findings. It is based on the elements 
argued in chapter 5: scanning, detection and interpretation, taking action, reviewing 
and learning and countering organisational defenses. 
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5.1.1 Scanning and detection: 
The COG group was the body responsible for this. We have seen from earlier 
accounts, especially of the strategy days, that a considerable amount of scanning took 
place in this organisation. Infonnation about funding trends in Europe, a research 
review on other neighbouring authorities performance, regular informal bench- 
marking and constant scanning of the local economy. Thus, the organisation had 
formal and informal systems of scanning. 
The group was also able to detect when things may go off path. However, this 
sensitivity was mainly focused on one agenda during the period of the study: the local 
elections. Thus, the COG as the strategic executive group lost the long-tenn, overall 
strategic picture and were absorbed by the local, short-term and political agenda. The 
consequences were: 
An obsessive drive for data to the point that it could not be efficiently processed 
and thus the action was counter-productive. 
Some strategic data was ignored -e. g. CCT was only on the agenda once during 
the 6 month period September 1993 to March 1994. 
* Interpretation of detections was distorted by the need to 'fit' the outcome to needs 
of the new elected Members in May (particularly evident in the April strategy 
session). 
Tbus, the system was able to scan but its focus for detection appeared to miss or mis- 
read the interpretative clement on the broader strategic agenda for an operational one 
that was short term. 
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5.1.2 Taking action 
The COG readily took action under the leadership of Colin Maccini (CEO). The 
COG developed new processes and approaches to old problems - for example on 
economic development, housing, inward investment. They developed a number of 
new initiatives as well. These included attracting huge sums of government funds, 
developing new partnerships with other authorities in the regional and new 
relationships and building programmes with additional planning gains with the private 
sector. A number of the COG members were being used as 'consultants' and they did 
local authority seminars as part of their professional profile. They would tell other 
authorities what they did and all of this was taking place quietly. As one officer 
noticed: "We don't spend enough time celebrating the successes" and with little time 
for formal strategic reflection and planning some of these community benefits and 
successes were not a source for further leaming, systematic processes, sharing within 
the organisation or even replicating. 
5.1.3 Reviewing and sharing of learning 
The COG was made up a number of leading professionals in their field. They 
professed to seek learning in their field and many were happy to share their wisdom 
with colleagues in other authorities. They valued professional or peer recognition at 
external seminars or with other agencies. However, sharing inside the organisation 
appeared more difficult. 
Sharing across departments was described in the following ways: 
"It easy to work in my own directorate. Eighty per cent of satisfaction comes from 
that. " Toni Johns (Technical Services) 
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"It varies considerably. " Geoff Browns (Envirorunent) 
"The departments blame the COG for what happens to them. " Harold Matthews (DH 
and SS) 
"Need more information to go up and down. There's a barrier between the 
departments. " Geoff Browns 
Both Colin Maccini (CEO) and Leon Davids (Leisure) said it worked well in the 
senior management cadre of the top 150 managers but after that it fell apart. 
These accounts suggest that it is not easy to share learning across department 
boundaries. 
Looking at the strategic review process, it was also noted that instead of strategic 
reviews there were more progress chasing meetings, people were often working by the 
seat of their pants, e. g. Geoff Browns' committee report and the sense of rushing 
about mitigated against learning. 
There were also examples of the group avoiding its task. 
Harold Matthews said that one of the reasons he was quiet in the group was: "I'm 
reluctant to take part in things that should not be at COG management meeting, which 
are really not strategy. There is a tendency to deal with easy things rather than the 
real ones. " (Harold Matthews, second interview, October 1994). 
309 
Colin Maccini claimed that 95% of decisions were carried through. This claim was 
tested by examining the strategic content of the decisions from September 1993 to 
March 1994. Of the 39 items on the agenda 35 were carried through and completed 
(90%). The majority (37%) were of a strategic nature - looking at resources and 
strategy. (See table 12.4 below). A further 17% were 'corporate' initiatives across 
the organisation. They included: health and safety standards, the organisations 
proposals for its training policy, the internal quality initiative, telephone responses and 
the provision of computer services as examples. These topics would facilitate or 
hinder strategy but were not themselves strategic issues. However, if they were 
included then 54% of the agenda would be 'strategic' in nature. The other items 
included issues affecting individual directors which had greater or lesser impact on the 
strategic direction of the authority. For example items affecting the devolved local 
education through Local Managed Schools came under this heading. It still lcft a 
third of the items addressing internal administrative issues. 
Table 12.411 
The key decisions made by the COG over a six month period 
Strategic Corporate and Lead Individual Internal Other 
Type of Decision Resources organisational directorate directorate Administrat- 
e. g. Health & with strategic ion 
Safety implications 
Number of completed 13 622 
decisions 
% of completed 37% 17% 6% 6% 31% 3% 
decisions 
Source: Internal tracking document held by CEO. 
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A further break down of the nature of decisions show that the majority were accepting 
reports and an exchange of information. Problem solving and strategic 
implementation decisions numbered six. Four items remained outstanding or were 'in 
hand'. 
The level of strategic content and impact within the group was low and thus 
possibility of strategic organisational learning was also likely to be low. 
5.2 Is there double loop learning? The role of defensive routines 
Double loop learning was not apparent in this case study. Quite the opposite. The 
organisation seemed to have developed a number of internal routines to impair its own 
learning. The data suggests the system had learned to locate its internal stresses and 
anxiety into an internal bad object: namely the CEO. It had learned to manage the 
transitions of change by scape-goating CEOs and exporting them. The case for 
suggesting that the CEOs were scape-goats and not just poor performers is as follows. 
If all three of them were poor performers it would reflect the quality and judgement of 
those that appointed them. Secondly, the sudden, attacking and unresolved manner 
that led to the parting suggests that the process reflected some other underlying 
problem within the social system of the political leadership. There was considerable 
evidence for that. Finally, this dynamic process had happened three times. It suggests 
that there is something wrong with the system, where the scapegoat argument puts 
forward the view that the scapegoat is a manifestation of the problem not the root 
cause. 
Finally, the organisation engaged in a number of defensive routines. These operated 
at an individual level, at a group level and systemically. The role of these routines, it 
is argued was to protect the organisational agents from confronting the anxiety, 
conflicts and pain that they experienced, acknowledged or were not publicly shared. 
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The purpose was to avoid further pain. Yet the implication of the model suggested in 
chapter 8 is that only by public sharing of these dynamics can one systemically break 
these cycles and regain learning. 
Thus, it is inferred that the dual effect of 'fragmented single-loop leaming' and 
dysfunctional learning suggests that the capacity for strategic organisational learning 
in this system was low. 
5.3 Does the strategic leadership provide facilitative structures? 
Implications 
There are four sources for considering the strategic leadership in this case study: the 
elected Members, the COG, the CEO and other ad hoc groups. 
The information about the role and dynamics of the elected leadership group both 
in the political majority and the wider elected Membership suggested that there 
was considerable in-fighting, a lack of leadership and low levels of trust. 
The CEO provided a vision of how he wanted the organisation but this was not 
widely shared and in some instance provoked an opposite and equal reaction 
among the COG management group, staff and also, it was reported, among 
elected Members. 
The COG management group was not aligned around its task and its boundaries, 
due to splitting within the group, political differences and their own valancies 
which played out in the group in a way that restricted both the individual taking 
up their own authority and the group being task and learning focused. 
The critical boundary for the organisation was in the strategic apex of the elected 
Members and COG. The inter-group dynamics was poor and appeared to be 
'under-bounded' and thus unable to act as a container or a 'holding environment' 
for leaming. 
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Thus, it is concluded that the strategic leadership was unable to provide the conditions 
to facilitate leaming. 
******* 
The implications of this final commentary on defensive routines is that the system was 
under-bounded and operated from a 'schizoid paranoid' position. The system did not 
then have the capacity to manage and learn during change and as the flight from the 
difficulties increased, the system was even less equipped to learn from change. A 
macro-systemic defence was evoked, which reinforced the other defence patterns. 
This suggests a system in 'manic denial' (Jaques, 1953). In such a case leaming 
would be severely curtailed. 
6. Personal insights 
In the spirit of self reflective inquiry and a 'clinical' approach, this section records 
some of the key experiences and dynamics, I experienced in the role of researcher. It 
describes some of the feelings and thoughts about various aspects of both the 
organisation and the process and concludes with additional personal insights. 
Experiences and reflections will cover: 
The environment and context 
The leadership within the system 
The team of directors 
Individuals in the system 
The research process 
Personal insights and learning 
313 
6.1 The environment and context 
My initial experience of the environment and context was described in the entry 
process in section 1.2 above. It was a formal meeting in the Boardroom but the 
majority of people were open. 
The external environment only seemed to live to me in the conversations about the 
budget, CCT and the regeneration project in the south of the borough. There was little 
attention given to central government or other external pressures. 
The internal context was more apparent. To begin, the building itself was a filled with 
activity and it had a efficient yet open buzz about it. There was a strange 
juxtaposition of openness and boundedness. While the reception was an open-spaced 
lobby, there were several security guards almost lounging in the main entrance and 
exit points. I had to get a special pass to get around the facilities and although I 
became well-known by guards and reception alike, I still had to sign the book. 
Many floors had 'Staff only' on the doors as you carne out of the lifts yet it was easy 
to stroll into any of the open plan offices. 
Another example was that the minutes of the COG management meetings were 
printed in the canteen, yet people still used the rumours to get their information, or 
even asked me, about the COG. Moreover, even though I asked for copies of the 
minutes, these were never given. 
Thus, there was a mixed message around openness and boundaries which may also be 
a reflection of the organisation as a system and the ambivalence and difficulty it had 
in managing boundaries. 
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In the lifts, canteen and in various staff meetings, staff openly discussed their 
contempt for the COG, their concerns about job security and constantly speculated 
about the sanity of the CEO. Yet they were all loyal workers and would do most 
things to make it work. Thus, the commitment to public service was also a feature 
that struck me about this local authority and its energy and desire to deliver, compared 
to my experience in the other local authority case in chapter 14. 
While I only met elected Members in passing, their political agendas did not seem to 
be a concern to staff. The latter were more interested in the CEO and the COG. The 
tensions around the elected Members seemed to be mainly experienced in the COG: 
individually and collectively. Thus, as I experienced staff, through many informal 
conversation and observations, they would say that it was the COG that was making 
the context 'unstable. Whereas, for the COG they would say it was the elected 
Members. 
Thus, I would summarise my experience of the environment and context as: 
" The conditions of the external context had less impact than expected. 
" There were clear differences of experience between the COG and the staff 
generally and where they saw the source of the problem regarding the 'stability' of 
the authority. 
The COG were absorbed by the tensions of the forthcoming elections and I would 
suggest that as a group they held these tensions on behalf of the system more 
broadly where examples of splitting have been illustrated in several of the 
accounts above. 
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6.2 The leadership within the system 
While the CEO was not the original contact, I grew to like him and respect him. He 
was energetic, full of ideas and determined to work counter-culturally to the norms of 
the organisation. This I admired, and felt a great deal of empathy for his ideas, vision 
and energy. These feeling I noted during the course of the study. It helped me to 
understand why people would find his style both attractive and maybe arrogant. His 
self belief was what seemed to draw the links through projective identification and as 
I felt it, I understood those who were his 'favourites' or on his side. 
If you were more data rational and traditional, I could also see how he could upset you 
or, tum you off. The interaction between Colin Maccini and Francis Craig, where the 
two nearly came to blows in the account of the management meeting above, I feel 
really makes the point about these differences. 
The various feelings that members of the COG spoke of regarding Colin Maccini, 
were also part of my experience and understanding of him. Thus, I could see how his 
role may be more defined by the 'group matrix' over his ability to take up his 
authority and act a container for learning. 
6.3 The team of directors 
My first meeting with the team was recounted in section 1.2. As a group I 
experienced them as relatively open to my presence with some exceptions from Toni 
Johns, while I was in the meetings. For example in the first meeting of group 
observations people actually shook my hand, others acknowledge me with a smile and 
direct 'hello' and I was formally introduced. Only Toni Johns ignored me. 
Meetings usually started with a lot of informal conversation, which was jovial and 
light-hearted. It would usually inform me of the latest events with the elected 
Members from the committee meetings the evening before. 
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They rarely started on time and people would turn up two three minutes late. This did 
not seem to be any one individual: it would vary. Trudy Lukes often would send 
substitutes as would Geoff Browns and Toni Johns but both to a much lesser extent. 
My feelings about the group was there was a core in my mind of Colin Maccini 
(CEO), Anne Marks (Admin), Francis Craig (Finance), Harold Matthews (DH and 
SS) and Judi Patch (Policy unit). The others either sent substitutes so did not have the 
same impact or were there but not make their mark. 
Overall, my feelings were positive to the group and especially once the first, one to 
one interviews took place. I found all the members of the group interesting people 
who just wanted to get on with life in their own way. 
While I did not feel that there was a great deal of goodwill in the team neither did it 
feel that the group was a based on malicious intent to each other. 
6.4 Individuals in the system 
My experience of some of the individual team members among the directors 
concurred with that of their colleagues and their areas of interests in the second one to 
one, in-depth interviews (see sections 4.1.1 and 4.2 respectively). The CEO, Colin 
Maccini, I have already made some comments about him as a key player. However, 
four other people stood out for me. These were mainly members of the 'core group': 
Anne Marks (Admin), Francis Craig (Finance), Toni Johns (Technical Services - not a 
ccore group' member) and Judi Patch (Policy unit). 
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Anne Marks was the person who had been my link into the authority. Thus, I had 
some feelings of obligation towards her and a sense that I had to make sure it went 
well. Throughout the study I felt she reciprocated this mutual obligation and was 
supportive and thoughtful. While others described her as cool and remote this was not 
my experience. I found her fair, trust-worthy and co-operative. However, I also need 
to note our sense of interdependence on this study. 
Francis Craig was one of the early skeptics of the research. Yet he turned out to be 
one of the most active participants. For example, he had three bites of the (first) one 
to one interviews and just simply talked and talked. He was honest about his views 
and intentions and shared many personal aspects of his life much to my surprise. He 
didn't seem to hold back from voicing his concerns while I was in the meetings and 
that made the study all the more interesting. Thus, I admired his street-boy, fighting 
spirit which reflected some of my own patterns around authority objects and thus 
could identify with him. This was a surprising insight and may explain the level of 
empathy I may have signalled that made him feel so at ease in talking. 
Toni Johns made an impression with me because he said what he wanted, he was 
unorthodox, and challenged authority. In the one to one meeting I had with him he 
was charming, eloquent and even gave me a book to read on 'The Art of 
Judgement"'. His abrasive nature was refreshing. He certainly stood out and would 
not be easily forgotten. He could be rude and very direct; both were witnessed in 
COG's management meetings. He appealed to the rebel within me and this may lead 
me to have a more generous view of him than others. To balance this view, he also 
displayed a wish to attract negative reactions from his colleagues, so seemed to play a 
game within a collusive dynamic of him being the group's scapegoat. 
12 By Sir Geoffrey Vickers (1965) University Paperback. I still have this book but 
have never read it. 
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Judi Patch became my organisational 'minder'. She would constantly brief me over 
the telephone, in the corridor, just before meetings and make sure that the detail of the 
project went smoothly. She was a constant source of data well into mid 1996 and 
almost seemed to enjoy being useful and being the 'insider' or 'deep throat' of this 
sub-urban district council. It seemed to me that what she lacked in formal authority 
she made up for in her informal authority and the range of secrets she held for people 
in the system. It was 'as if she was the organisational confidant and that, I suspect, 
was a role she enjoyed. 
6.5 The research process 
The research process is described in detail in chapters 10 and 11. The area that is 
touched upon here reflects what was different about this study and what were some of 
the outcomes. 
This case study was the first case study thus it was where the research approach was 
operationalised. (See Appendix 8.4 on the lessons learned). Thus, I had more 
information and did more non-participatory and organisational observations than later 
studies. I also spent more time in 'public areas' listening and watching how the 
organisation. worked and talking informally to staff and people along my travels in the 
council. This provided the scope for learning and applying the methodology but the 
process was more driven by the experience of the system, until it became more 
codified as the research progressed. My main reaction is a sense of loss: there was 
something about the first case that was more vibrant and open to exploration than was 
experienced in the others. This may be because it was the first case, the energy and 
people in the other organisations were different or that by adding more structure to the 
research process some of the complexity may have been lost. It is likely that all are 
true but it is not easy to give any of these more weight over the others with any 
confidence. 
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Finally, the group used the feedback from the dialogue session in September 1994 to 
support another strategy away day where they used an external consultant. 
Unfortunately, I could not be present due to other commitments. However, I did have 
a sense of pride that the feedback was valued and used to support their strategic 
thinking. It was important to me that the research met its academic purposes but also 
that the participants in the research found it useful so that the work was not totally 
irrelevant to its application to the 'real world'. It also gave me the spark and 
confidence to revise and take the methodology to other cases. 
6.6 Personal insights and learning 
The process of engagement with Ellismoore District Council has been rich with 
learning and insights. Thus, I am choosing to be selective on the top key themes that 
emerge from my reflections. 
0 My identification with the notion of strong, dynamic and process thinking leader 
was high. This seemed to fit part of my ego-ideal, the way I would like to see 
myself, in a leadership role. 
At the same time I was also surprised by my identification with the rebel and 
outspoken nature of Francis Craig and Toni Johns, both whom I admired for 
different reasons and in some ways they provided a balance within the 'top team' 
to the CEO. They also may highlight my own ambivalence about authority and 
how one manages that in the researcher's role where it is important not to idealise 
or denigrate characters in the 'drama'. I felt able to do that by understanding 
those parts of myself in others. 
I was also struck by the need for the work to be seen as useful and valuable to the 
participants and not just 'academic'. 
I was also struck by the level of connectivity I had made with the team members 
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collectively and individually and kept a track of their progress after the research 
was formally complete in February 1995 - until July 1996. 
Finally, the importance of recognising these dynamics between the researcher's 
role and the system and using these feelings and thoughts as data to gain further 
understanding about the organisation continued to be a source of learning. 
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7. Conclusion 
The case material suggests that there were a number of dynamics that impacted on 
organisational learning. In particular this thesis suggests that history, inner processes 
and context at the various levels of a social system are all important and has put 
forward five propositions. 
The first question concerned the impact of the environment on the 'top team' and it 
explored the relationship between the turbulence of the environment and the 
organisatioif s ability to learn (at the strategic level) 
7.1 Was the environment turbulent? 
In the case of Ellismore, we found that the organisation was in fact operating in 
changing environment but at the time of the study it was not 'turbulent'. 
Theory suggested that the environment would have a significant impact on the 
organisation's strategic system and its capacity to learn. In this case we saw that the 
early high rate of change in the external environment led to the organisation's initial 
incremental change strategy to be tested and eventually it collapsed in the face of 
more change. This led to changes in structure and style - see summary table 12.1 
above. 
However, the impact of the changes were not only a feature of the external 
environment, but also a feature of the way in which the strategic system - elected 
Members and the COG - responded to the changes. 
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It was posited that the (internal) context of the organisation would also impact on 
learning and it was observed that the historic attachment to the past political 
consensus, the political infighting and the resultant lack of leadership, strategy and 
direction, aggravated the impact of the environment and reinforced the strategic 
system's incapacity to learn. These twofold dynamics of the external and internal 
environment provided some initial support for the argument that the environment 
alone is not responsible for the capacity of systems to learn from change, but it is also 
the history and internal conflicts and political dynamics of the system that can hinder 
or facilitate strategic organisational learning. It is thus reasonable to conclude that a 
failure in the internal system to manage the boundaries with the environment will lead 
to negative impact on strategic organisational learning and reduce the impact of such 
processes. 
7.2 Was the 'top team'able to manage its task and boundaries? 
How well does the 'top team' manage itselP The inferences from the discussion is 
that the 'top team' does not manage its task and boundaries well. The group was well 
aware of its deficiencies in having a common task, understanding how to work well 
together and managing the boundaries with the elected Members more authoritatively. 
The 'top team' did not manage these key aspects of their process and this led to low 
task attainment and lost the opportunity for containing the leaming. 
The CEO attempted to guide the organisation more proactively but was perceived by 
some as arrogant and many of his strategies ended up being counter- productive: 
alienating staff and elected Members. The net impact of the COG was its inability to 
contain the conditions for strategic organisational learning. 
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7.3 Do the dynamics of the group impact on organisational learning? 
Data from the accounts and the group observations on the dynamics of the group, 
suggests that its capacity to 'work' and learn was impaired. 
In exploring the nature and dynamics of the group, theoretical propositions suggest 
that we can understand these in terms of 'basic assumption' behaviour. These can be 
understood as a function of three dynamics: 
0 The dynamics of the group 
0 The personal valencies of COG members 
o The organisational systemic dynamics 
The group's dynamic was described as conflictual: both by the group and through 
the researcher's observations. There were fights between pairs, splits in the group, 
groups within the group, projections onto the leader and flight behaviours. There was 
also scape-goating and the formation of the group matrix seemed to reinforce self- 
limiting authority roles for individuals as well as perpetuate the difficult dynamics in 
the group. The prevalence of basic assumption activity and low levels of 'work' 
suggested that the group dynamics did impact negatively on leaming as the group 
took flight from reality, adopted defensive routines and operated in various stages of 
denial. Bion (1961) suggests that the underpinning nature of these features of the 
group is existential anxiety: a fear of annihilation. These group phantasies become 'as 
if' real and impede, even resist, task attainment, robust exchange, reality testing and 
learning. Two elements of this thesis help to throw light on the group phantasy. 
These are the personal valencies that people brought to the group and the systemic 
dynamics of the organisation. 
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The impact of personal valencies appeared to be significant. In this case study, 
COG members took on unconscious and rigid roles that fed their preconscious 
phantasics and early messages from childhood that formed part of their current inner 
dialogue. These thoughts provided individual's with a sense of themselves and in this 
case showed how they took up their role authority in the group. It was observed that 
firstly directors seemed take up less than their full authority in role and in the group. 
Secondly that directors appeared to 'act out' on the basis of this 'inner dialogue' thus 
reinforcing their limited selves and feeding the difficult dynamics in the group 
through the group matrix. These personal valencies provide a focus for the group 
through projective identification and it is the combination of the group and the 
personal through projective identification that makes the collusive nature of the 
dynamic difficult to break. Thus the group can become a self sealing or closed system 
and cease to learn at a high level (i. e. level 3 or 4). 
The systemic dynamics in this case study were also influential. The group was in a 
poorly maintained 'holding environment' where their elected Members were fighting 
both among themselves and with the COG. Thus, the COG did not have an 
environment for leaming, some of the dynamics of the elected Members were 
imported into the COG and the additional anxiety of the impending local elections 
proved absorbing and difficult for the COG to manage. The result was poor boundary 
management (both by the COG and the elected Members) and a poor holding 
environment. Therefore the COG was unable to totally attend to its strategic task nor 
did it have the conditions or capacity necessary - scanning, sharing, reflecting etc. - to 
engage in strategic, double-loop learning. 
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7.4 Is there strategic organisational leaming at a high level? 
In the case of Ellismore District Council, it is concluded that the conditions for 
strategic learning at a high level were not present and that learning was constrained. 
7.5 Additional insights 
In the final analysis here was a group that was operating in a conflictual system, with 
its own internal conflicts and personal valencies. The poor boundary management 
and external demands caused its initial defense to break down and the system to 
become eventually fragmented. 
Five of the original COG members left during the research. A new political party was 
voted in and the environment continued to change albeit at a more manageable level. 
The team fragmented. The three 'independent' group members 'survived', all in 
many ways representing the traditional side of the council and from accounts by Judi 
Patch as does the new CEO. The youngest member of the group - Harold Matthews 
was retained and some of the new COG members were described as ineffectual. (Judi 
Patch and Colin Maccini) 
The coalition around traditional local government may provide a stable point or secure 
base for the strategic system as the changes continue. The newly elected Members 
continued to manage their anxiety and were said to have hope in the new CEO. (Judy 
Patch, Harold Matthews and Colin Maccini). However, following the analysis of this 
case, it is suggested here that unless a secure base is found and the boundaries are 
managed better the process will start again and the CEO will be exported in due 
course. 
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In reviewing the initial propositions, a number of them seem to hold in this case 
study. These include: that the internal dynamics of the 'top team', its relationship 
with the elected Members and its organisational context are important to 
understanding strategic organisational leaming. However, it also challenges the idea 
that the environment is all explanatory and that the management of the external 
boundary may be more significant rather than the environment per se. In addition, 
there are some further insights that are noted. These are: 
9 The prevalence of organisational and systemic defensive routines carry 
considerable weight: more than expected and these may help to explain why the 
system was unable to attain strategic organisational learning through its 'top 
team'. 
The systemic dynamics of the wider systems appear to more powerful in 
understanding the impaired learning of this system than the internal dynamics of 
just the 'top team'. 
If the quality of the 'holding environment' of the group - its context - is poor, is 
unable to act as a container or has its own conflicts and strife, then this will have a 
significant and negative impact on the group's ability to learn. 
Operating from a secure base outside of the work and role setting may provide a 
counter-balance to organisational transition and change. Three of the four 
remaining COG members - Anne Marks (Admin), Francis Craig (Finance) and 
Judi Patch (Policy unit) all said how important the family was to them and they 
were content to stay with the authority. This seems to carry a theme not only 
about their own continuity but also how they might represent it for the authority 
more broadly as noted in the postscript about the group's life after the elections. It 
opens the question as to whether there is a link between stable islands of 
emotional life and personal capacity to cope with personal change. However, 
there is no assumption here that such a link would also apply to learning. 
These emerging themes provide additional insights for this study. 
327 
Cranfield University 
Michael G. Jarrett 
u /V/PN 
LIBRARY 
The Psychodynamics of Top Teams and the Impact on Strategic 
Organisational Learning: Three Case Studies in the Public Sector 
School of Management 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Volume two 
P NVI, s 
LIBRARY 
Cranfield University 
School of Management, Organisational Behaviour 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Academic year of submission: 199711998 
Michael G. Jarrett 
The Psychodynamics of Top Teams and the Impact on Strategic 
Organisational Learning: Three Case Studies in the Public Sector 
Supervisor- Dr. Kim James 
Date of presentation: 21 April, 1998 
This thesis is submitted in partialfuYllment of the requirementsfor tile Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
ii 
Abstract 
The growing literature on organisational change, organisational learning and the role of 
the top team prompted the question: what is the relationship between top teams and 
organisational. learning? It seemed that role of the top team was important to attain 
successful change and ultimately learning. Yet how this was achieved seemed to be 
poorly understood in the literature. 
Thus, the thesis focused attention on the dynamics of the top team, its organisational 
context and the state of the external environment to gain a clearer understanding of these 
relationships. In order to deepen that understanding, the thesis took a systemic and 
psychoanalytical approach and a clinical research methodology, which provided a 
different perspective and seemed to be more suited to this type of inquiry on 
organisational dynamics. 
The 'findings' from the three, in-depth, public sector case studies suggested that while the 
dynamics of the top team could impact negatively on the group task, its impact on 
strategic organisational learning was less significant. 
The main conclusion drawn from the study was that strategic organisational learning was 
impaired not so much by the top team's dynamics, but by organisational and systemic 
defensive routines. 
The source of these recursive pattems was threefold: 
psychodynamic ego and social defenses among top team members, within the top 
team's group and within the dynamics of the Board 
A poor 'holding environment' so that these organisational dynamics were not 
sufficiently contained and thus each strategic subsystem was less 'task' focused 
an underbounded strategic apex that reinforced the dysfunctional dynamics already in 
play 
The implication from these public sector, case studies was that while the external 
environment and the dynamics of the top team were not insignificant, it was the poor 
quality and instability of the internal organisational context that inhibited leaming. The 
role of the Board or elected officials was particularly significant in contributing to this 
outcome. 
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Cases in organisational dynamics 
Chapter 13 - The 'top team' that changed -a case 
study of organisational transition 
1. Introduction 
This case study is about a 'top team' in an NHS hospital that experiences considerable 
change in its enviromnent and context and the difficulties it faces to adjust during its 
phase of transition. 
Information about the setting of the case, the initial contact and entry and the key 
players is provided in this section. The organisational and group dynamics form the 
bulk of the rest of this chapter with analysis of the presenting data. 
1.1 Background information 
Gladding Hospital Trust was established in 1991 as a second and local hospital in the 
area. It is on an expansive, site about four miles south of the city centre. There are 
four other much smaller sites attached to the Trust. The main site is very green with a 
combination of pre-war buildings and some newer buildings, including the new 
Maternity Wing. The hospital has good service roads and parking facilities, which are 
essential to get from one part of the site to the other. 
Gladding Hospital gained Trust status in 199 1. As a Trust it offers a wide range of 
clinical services to the local population of Gladdingshire and much more to a wider 
population in a number of specialities including Plastic Surgery and Bums, Oncology, 
Thoracic Surgery, End Stage Renal Failure, Medical Genetics, Clinical Haematology, 
Cystic Fibrosis and Neonatology. 
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The Trust is also an undergraduate teaching hospital with a number of links with local 
universities in the Regional Health Authority and surrounding area on particular 
issues such as radiology, physiotherapy and nursing and midwifery. 
The hospital had 1500 beds and employed about 5000 staff of whom 30% were part 
time at the time of the data collection. 2150 nurses were employed and 400 doctors 
worked at the hospital. There were a number of Professors in the fields of Surgical 
Science, Medical Genetics, Oncology, Microbial Diseases, Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology and Respiratory Medicine (1994/95)1. 
The Trust has always been seen as'the local' generalist hospital in the area. Being 
seen as second to the other local hospital, The Prince Harry Hospital Trust, whose 
reputation spanned cardiology, research and teaching. 
The formal organisational structure was a traditional hierarchy. The Trust was 
governed by a Board of Non-Executive and named Executive Directors who were 
formally charged with policy, and were responsible and accountable for the Trust's 
performance and financial control. The CEO and the Executive Directors role was to 
formulate the policy imperatives into strategic options and choices and implement 
them. To assist the process of strategic implementation the Executive Directors had a 
layer of managers, who were also budget holders, below them. This group was called 
the Strategic Implementation Committee (SIC), and was made up of the Executive 
Directors, the heads of the major clinical departments and some second tier managers 
from other directorates - but the overwhelming majority were clinicians. SIC was a 
forum for consultation and a place to secure agreement and commitment through 
action to strategic direction. 
The layer of management below SIC included ward level managers, nurses and 
support staff. 
1 Annual report of Gladding Hospital Trust, 1994/95 
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Figure 13.1 - An overview of the structure 
The Board 
CEO 
The Executive Director 
sic 
Clinical Departments 
Speciality Managers 
Ward Level Structures 
1.2 Initial contact 
The process of gaining entry into this organisation followed from the selection criteria 
and methods outlined in chapter 11. An introduction from a third party, professional 
association led to a meeting with the CEO and Deputy CEO. 
The building where the CEO and Deputy were located was a small tower-like building 
in the middle of the hospital site. It had a large clock and weather vane on the tallest 
part of the tower but was only three floors high. All of the Directors were located in 
the main part of this building with the exception of the HR Director who had offices 
close by in an annex, which was linked to one of the main blocks of the hospital. The 
building had the quality of the officers HQ in the middle of the 'operations' on the rest 
of the site. 
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While the building was pre-war the interior was well decorated with pastel and light 
shades in the hallways and a large community mural in the stair-well of the top floor 
offices leading to a number of Directors including the CEO. There were no obvious 
signs of cracked and peeling paint and each of the offices were high-ccilinged, well lit 
and painted in pastel shades. The HR Director was the only exception, whose offices 
were small, cramped, poorly lit and there was an odd wash-basin in the comer. 
The Board room on the lower floor was decorated to a very high standard with 
patterned curtains, wall paper and was more like a four star hotel than a hospital 
meeting room. While capable of holding 30 to 40 people, most of the space was 
dominated by a large, highly polished, oak stained, wood table. There were chairs all 
around the table and pictures of patrons on the wall. There was also a brass-plated, 
plaque of honour of those who had headed the Medical Committee over the last two 
decades. 
The initial meeting with the CEO and Deputy Director was an open discussion over 
lunch in the managers' comer in the restaurant. The two were very open about the 
strengths and weaknesses of the organisation and were both very candid about their 
own style and approach. 
A formal presentation of the research's general aims and process was given to 
the Directors in the Board room and an open discussion took place where after 
some objections and resolution the group agreed that afternoon to go ahead with 
their involvement with the research. 
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1.3 The key players 
The research was undertaken with the 'top team'. The key players were as follows: 
Geoffrey Hands: The Chief Executive 
Dr. James Miller-Winthrope: The Deputy Chief Director and Clinical Director 
Gary Fidder: Finance Director 
David Larson: Director of Human Resources 
Harriet Quinn: Director of Operations 
Ginny DeVoil: Director of Marketing 
Jean Peat: Director of Nursing 
Fred Jury: Director of Quality 
Graham Nett: Head of Information Systems 
Further information will be provided about the personalities and role dynamics of the 
key players as the case study unfolds. 
These main characteristics provide the setting for the case study. The rest of the 
chapter looks at the organisational context, the dynamics of the team and the nature of 
strategic organisational learning. 
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2. The organisation and its environment 
This section addresses the research question: 
Question one: Are the dynamics of the 'top teaminfluenced by the 
conditions of the environment? 
Theory suggests that the answer should be yes, but we are concerned with two 
specific sub-questions: 
o Is the enviromnent turbulent? Le. with large scale and unpredictable change 
e Does the context of the organisation provide a 'holding envirorunent' for 
organisational leaming? 
2.1 Is the environment turbulent? 
An analysis of secondary data including articles, background papers and minutes 
suggested that there was a general context of change and uncertainty. This was 
characterised by a number of trends. 
The political drive for developing trust status hospitals was to increase competition 
in the health service, reduce waste, and provide choice for patients and purchasers 
of health services. 
The aim was to make the health service into a health'market'. Howevcr, the 
'markeV, was not a truly developed one due to unequal power relationships between 
the players, imperfect information, the inability to raise or increase the supply of 
finance capital, and custom and practice which makes the changes difficult to 
sustain. Thus, there has been considerable restructuring in the health service both 
at the national, regional and district level (Flynn, 1993). 
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Many hospitals have been merged or closed down, particularly in London. There 
have been cuts and challenges, especially against staff costs and investment. A 
survey commissioned by the NHS revealed that over a third of the 129 health 
authorities in England, Wales and Scotland were stopping or reducing buying care 
under a number of treatment headings. For example, services have been 
rationalised in a number of areas such as fertility treatments, screening for 
osteoporosis, fertility treatment, varicose vein surgery and ear grommets to name a 
few exampleS. 2 
Within the area of Gladdingshire, the local District Health Authority was re- 
examining all of its contracts and putting services out to bid on a least-cost basis 
(CEO's personal papers). 
The Trust's relationship with the DHA was not very good as the DHA felt that 
Gladding was always trying to 'pull a fast one', said the CEO. From the Trust's 
point of view, they felt that the nearby Prince Harry Trust was often seen as the 
favourites by the DHA. These differences of views made it hard to develop 
collaborative relationships. 
The Regional Health Authority 'Strategy for Health' and the Department of 
HealtlYs 'Health of the Nation' also formed part of the Trust's planning and 
programming. These documents informed the strategic parameters and targets that 
each hospital trust was supposed to contribute to the regions and nation's health 
gain. 
Finally, the fifth wave of GP Fund holders in Gladdingshire had increased the 
percentage of population covered to 22%. This meant that more purchasing power 
was in the hands of the local GPs and that made the 'market' more fragmented. 
These events put greater pressure on the Trust in two ways regarding its strategic 
decisions. Firstly, how could it meet its current revenue requirements and 
increasing losses given its income vulnerability (Board minutes). Secondly, there 
was a strategic dilemma on positioning. How should it position itself more longer 
term as a health provider: generalist or specialist provider attracting contracts from 
a national 'market'? 
The Guardian, November 1996 
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These main features of the national, regional and local environment suggested the 
environment was changing in a way that was both large in scale and unpredictable in 
nature. This seemed to generate short term strategies and responses and this was most 
evident in the Trust continuing financial difficulties. 
2.1.1 The financial situation 
* Quotes on managing money -based on the first interviews. 
"We are tight for money. " Ginny DeVoil (Marketing) 
"Developing a strategic direction through the eyes of largely clinicians does not 
reflect the real world of commercial reality. " Ginny DeVoil (Marketing) 
"Finance is the main problem. " David Larson (HR) 
"Do we have a financial strategy? We don't have a strategic view and not just a paper 
strategy but a clear understanding of what business we want to be in and how we 
therefore want to use resources. " David Larson (HR) 
"Is there a rationing debate or a disinvestment debate? " Geoffrey Hands (CEO) 
"Do we really have the sound financial background that we need? " David Larson 
(HR) 
"The key issue is how do we manage within a financially constrained environment 
where we have a situation of financial overspend. " Gary Fidder (Finance) 
"The key issue is financial management. The relationship between financial 
management and general management at the strategic level; (and) within clinical 
directorates they structure in'overriding' requirements to achieve their financial 
targets. " Dr Miller-Winthrope (Deputy and Clinical Director) 
"When things are not going well it's usually a problem over money; we dont cope 
well. It brings out the stresses and strains, protectionist attitudes, entrenched 
positions, old antipathies and morale falls. " Dr Miller-Winthrope (Deputy and 
Clinical Director) 
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"Funding and performance have radically changed... we require a more structured 
process for measuring money in and performance out. " Ginny DeVoil (Marketing) 
"The problem is finances and getting it in order - everything else is subsidiary. If you 
don! t balance the books... all the rest will be irrelevant. " Fred Jury (Quality) 
"If we are not careful we could easily go L4m in the red. " Fred Jury (Quality) 
"The key issue is the critical funding crisis in the organisation. " Harriet Quinn 
(Operations) 
"The impact is not enough nurses on the ward... " Harriet Quinn (Operations) 
"Cohesiveness (is) not there. There was 'team spirit' in the past but it's weakened by 
the financial position and the difficulties of how we might manage that. " David 
Larson (HR) 
The financial plight 
The financial situation was the most pressing imperative for the organisation and its 
internal context. For the last three years Gary, the Finance Director, has in his own 
words, 'been pulling money out the bag' and saving the Trust. But for the year 
1994/95, the trust looked as though it might be L0.5m. overspent at the time of data 
gathering and the forecast for the year end looked like an overspend of Elm. The 
most pessimistic talked of the trust being L4m overspent. While informal information 
about other Trusts in the Region suggested overspend there as well, they were said not 
to be of the same order as Gladding's. The Board, the Executive Directors and DHA 
were all very concerned. 
The situation had arisen because of a number of reasons. These included: 
Poor information and financial reporting systems so that monthly reports to the 
Board were 'best guestimates' as the information from the budget holders were not 
given or were themselves inaccurate (Board committee papers consistently report 
nature of the problem to the Board with no action followed). 
o Too many budget holders made it difficult to track, control and collate people's 
expenditure. 
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Not all good medics make good accountants. Thus, innovative ideas, clinical 
practice and research were seen as more important than the budget process and 
commitments to medical practice was at the expense of business acumen. 
Historically, money was not a constraint and the recent success of the Finance 
Director sent an unintended signal that'money can always be found somewhere'. 
A number of minor mistakes on accounting procedures led to significant 
consequences through various large pots of money not being claimed. This 
reduced the credibility of and confidence in the Finance Directorate. 
Opportunistic strategy either on behalf of clinicians or the CEO led to large 
investment commitments being made without critically appraising the risk or 
thinking through all the sources of income to match the investment. This occurred 
on a number of occasions. 
Another key area of strategic concern was the Trust's relationship with it key 
stakeholders. However, this was only seen as important by two people: the CEO and 
the Director of Marketing. No other topic shared a common concern for the Directors. 
2.1.2 Managing relationships 
Some of the quotes on managing relationships: 
"We do not recognise the purchaser - we blame them and say that they are at fault. " 
Ginny DeVoil (Marketing) 
"The external relationship is the number one priority. Relationships with the main 
purchaser, local and national; relationships with the fund-holdcrs; relationships within 
the current political environment; the increasing of public expectations on us and the 
role and involvement of consumers and the CHC (Community Health Council). 
There are also the external relationships with the local authority. " CEO 
"We need to manage external boundaries for different stakeholders. " CEO 
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Thus the trust was working in an uncertain and changing environment, with money 
being the key difficulty. The changes and poor relationships with the District Health 
Authority (DHA) and the Regional Health Authority (RHA) made the environment 
unsupportive. Thus, the external environment presented many challenges to the trust. 
It was unstable and 'turbulent' and seen by the CEO as hostile. 
The combination of a difficult environment and a focus on cost efficiency suggest that 
these have a negative impact on strategic organisational learning and such benefits 
will be severely hampered. 
2.2 Does the context of the organisation support organisational 
learning? 
The context of the organisation or its 'holding environment' as described in chapter 8, 
includes the values, culture, leaderships and facilitative structures. 
This section will briefly examine: 
" The history of the organisation 
" The values and culture of the organisation 
" The strategic task 
" The strategic leadership role 
Most of the data for this section came from the first interviews plus other materials 
supplied by the CEO. 
2.2.1 The history of the organisation 
The Trust wanted to change strategically the way they worked: from an administrative 
and machine bureaucracy that was driven by the'product'and the medical Profession, 
to a customer and market-based approach with consistent and cost effective processes 
against an agreed strategic framework. Departmental silos would have to be broken 
down and greater financial accountability would need to be exercised in the new 
environment of quasi-competition. On this matter the CEO proclaimed: 
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"We need to foster the right internal environment and this will vary from time to time. 
You know the bereavement curve (transition curve), I see my role as trying to smooth 
it. " 
Most of the Directors wanted to see more corporate work but through devolved 
business units. To maintain co-ordination and integration they aimed to develop 
business processes into the system whereby each unit would set out it plans and 
strategy, how it was going to raise money (research, teaching, contracts, grants) and 
match that to its programme objectives and resources. This process was still bedding 
down as reflected in the comments on finances and the strategic task below. 
The key changes of the hospital over a ten year period has been summarised from the 
interviews and secondary data in table 13.1 below. It identifies the changes in 
leadership type from clinician to Chief Executive, the change in values, strategic 
goals, skill based, structure, staff at the top and systems. 
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Table 13.1 The Key eras in the Trust's history 
Period I Early Period 2 Period 3 
1980s 1991 1994 
Driving force Meet Health Make the change to Manage the new 
guidelines Trust status era 
Leadership Dr Farrel (all Geoffrey Hands Geoffrey Hands 
Doctors before) CEO CEO 
(Not doctor) (Not doctor) 
Environment Stable Rapidly changing Turbulent 
Values 'The work matters' 'Patients matter' 'Customers matter' 
Strategy Reap scale Trust status - 'Niche' specialist 
economies regional competitor vs generalist? 
Skills Teaching and Application - Increasing 
research general medicine specialism 
Structure Medically-led - formally Corporate Mix of corp and 
departmental dept and business 
units 
Staff at the top Medical Mix of Admin and Managers 
medics 
Style Focus on research Focus on patients Focus on business 
Systems Medical/loose Budget focused Business process 
tied to strategy 
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The internal changes over the last decade match those externally. From the 1980s to 
gaining Trust status in 1991, the changes were incremental, planned and intentional. 
The hospital's envirom-nent and strategic management cadre provided a degree of 
predictability and the organisation demonstrated a capacity to change. However, 
since gaining Trust status both the environment and organisational demands have 
increased and the capacity to change and learn is more dependent upon the role of the 
strategic leadership group, who set the tone for the organisation's culture and its 
strategic task. 
2.2.2 The organisational culture 
The data about the organisational culture came from the interviews with the Directors 
and the material addresses question 1.2- specifically: does the culture support 
organisational learning? 
There were a number of typical quotes from the interviews about the organisational 
culture: 
"Friendly, open place to work" 
"Medically-led and deeply rooted in the culture" 
"Polite, introspective and talented perfectionist" 
"Recruit in own mirror image' at all levels" 
"It will be all right on the night attitude" 
"Tribal directorates" 
"We're second to the Prince's" 
More specific comments included: 
"Mindset arrogant. We're impregnable. We've got all the services here for the 
purchasers. " Harriet Quinn (Operations) 
"The reputation of management were that they were less than mortals. At best 
tolerated at worse something else. " (Compared to doctors) Harriet Quinn 
"We are in transition. We have commitment and doctors in management but not 
medically -led. But still some tensions about management structure for medics... " 
Harriet Quinn 
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"Introspective perfectionists. Recruit in one's own ilk. The two previous CEOs were 
both doctors and here that runs deep. " Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
"Consultants need T. L. C" Geoffrey Hands 
"Committed, comfortable, careful friendly but protective and defensive. Do not like 
to be criticised by outside or like change. " David Larson (HR) 
"History and tradition says 'what we do has worked so far, so we want to maintain it'. 
The real sharp edge is the Prince's. " David Larson 
"Happy, smiling friendly individuals, adaptable staff who just stop and help you all of 
the time. " Gary Fidder (Finance) 
"The medical view point carries enormous sway. " Dr James Miller-Winthrope 
(Deputy & Clinical Director) 
"Sixty hours a week acceptable. " 
"It is an NHS cuddly, friendly, healing people... (the) danger is if local action is not 
taken then events will overtake them. " Graham Nett (Information Systems) 
These quotes seem to suggest four key aspects of the culture at Gladding Hospital 
Trust 
The working climate is one of openness and friendliness. But this belies a deeper 
cultural, underlying assumption about what is valued and taken for granted. 
41 The deeper culture appears to be still medically led. The data from the financial 
difficulties caused by non-financial medics, specialist provision investments made 
without proper risk assessment and the comments above suggest a deeper level 
assumption about the primacy of a covert medically-led culture. The need to be 
perfect was also explicit in the comments. 
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* There is an insular nature to the hospital - evidenced in the sense that they 
recruit in their own image, have a closed mindset, can be arrogant and are 
uncomfortable with change. 
The hospital appears to see the environment as competitive - particularly with the 
other larger, local hospital, Princes. 
These features suggest a drive for medical excellence which is constrained by the 
interests or purchasing power of the customer. The latter may not necessarily be the 
patient. In an excellence driven culture, which is generally inward looking, 
competitive and medically-led at the deeper level, the pursuit of excellence may be at 
the expense of strategic organisational learning. Thus, while the culture per se may 
provide opportunities for learning, this may tend to be in the product or service rather 
than in the organisation's strategic domain. 
Thus, the capacity to draw from experience and learning within the strategic domain 
would tend to rest with the leadership group. The management of the strategic task 
and how they take up their role would be the key factors that may support or 
undermine strategic organisational learning in this context. These are covered in the 
following two sections. 
2.2.3 The strategic task 
TI-le task of the organisation is important for its rationale and strategic approach. In 
chapter 4 of this thesis Miller and Rice, 1967, are quoted as stating that: 'the primary 
task is to survive'. Thus, both what the organisation does and how it does it is 
important as part of providing what Hirschhorn (1988) and Stapley (1996) describe as 
the 'holding environment', or conditions for the strategic apex to work well. 
Directors comments on the task., 
"We are unsure of our mission; or the balance between high risk versus bread and 
butter work. " David Larson, HR 
Gary Fidder, Finance Director, said: "We have been seen as a district general hospital 
but becoming specialist, low activity, high cost specialist. We do have the specialist 
staff but it's the Princes' that's seen as the main one. " 
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"There is a tension - practitioners want to go for territory. Yet GPs want a district 
general hospital. " Ginny, DeVoil, Director of Marketing 
"Our declared objective is to be a generalist hospital to serve the people of 
Gladdingshire but we are increasingly recognised as a tertiary specialist. So our 
strategy is not yet sorted out. " Dr Miller-Winthrope, Deputy and Clinical Director 
"It sounds negative but we are still on a learning curve; still at vision and the softer 
end. " Harriet Quinn, Operations 
"... Creating the right internal to the right external (environment). What fits will vary 
from year to year. " Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
Other generally shared comments on task., 
"To provide good quality health care" 
"In theory developed by the Board" 
"Who owns the strategy? " 
"Business Strategy unclear" 
"Big picture not shared" 
"Hard to get a robust strategy" 
"Unsure of organisational mission or task" 
Thus, there is a clear inference that the boundary of the hospital's strategic task is not 
clearly defined or generally agreed. This is within a context of local demographic 
trends following the national pattern of an increasing elderly population and an 
increase in the needs of Childbirth. These also influenced service delivery and 
planning at this hospital .3 Given the changing context and an unclear strategic task, 
the capacity for strategic organisational learning is low. 
These elements of a developing strategy, a clear culture, a traditional structure in 
transition and financial difficulties, made for a difficult internal context that matched 
the external changing and turbulent external context. 
I Internal Magazine of Gladding Hospital Trust 1994/95 
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Managing the boundaries across these internal and external pressures put considerable 
tension on the Board and the 'top team'. How well are they managing these important 
dynamics? That is the subject of the next section. 
2.2.4 The strategic leadership 
The data about the strategic leadership comes from the interviews with the Executive 
Directors. By 'strategic leadership we are looking at the role of the Non-Executive 
group and its relationship with the Executive Directors. Do they provide the 
conditions for learning? 
The central question is how do they manage their boundaries: 
op Externally with other agencies but particularly with the health authorities and 
central government 
e Intemally with the Executive Directors 
External relations 
The politics and strategic leadership of the organisation was driven first and foremost 
by the external agenda. Central government laid the broad context for the financial 
and political agenda. This was felt by the group to be reinforced by the Regional and 
District Health Authorities who did not appear to be particularly helpful to Gladding 
Trust and were seen to 'take the party line', without room for flexibility or manoeuvre 
for any innovation or change. 
CEO states: "No. The control is very carefully termed central political control. It has 
to be enacted through various routes: either the region (the regional health authority) 
or through the person (official). But it's still central control which has purported to be 
over the 'what'. But from where I sit it is increasingly over the 'how"' 
Thus, based on this inference and the earlier comments about the Trust's image with 
the health authorities, it appears that the management of external relations and 
impressions is poor. If that were the case then it would negatively impact on learning. 
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Internal dynamics 
The second order of political influence and control was the relationship between the 
Board (of Non-Executives) and the Executive Directors. Formally, the Board was 
jointly and severally accountable for the trusVs performance. However, the reality 
was that they were part-time members who meet once a month and who were not part 
of the day to day running of the hospital. The Chair of the Board met more regularly 
with the CEO but the Non-Executives were not really in a position to act upon their 
authority. They were reliant upon the recommendations of the Executive Directors. 
What people said: 
"The Board are too polite. You expect if you go into f4million over-spend to get 
scalped... but it's yet to happen. " Harriet Quinn (Ops) 
"They (the Board) could do more and be more productive... At the moment they are 
challenging us (Executive Directors) but we should be helping them to ask the right 
questions. " David Larson, HR. 
"The Board is not as clear as it should be and that is a bedevilling problem. " Geoffrey 
Hands, CEO 
"The Board works reasonably well. But is sometimes so relaxed it is untrue... 
Deadlines are missed, resources given away and (they) have backed off on some of 
the clinical issues. " Gary Fidder, Finance 
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"The Chair is in a difficult position. While he tries to understand the organisation he 
is reliant on what comes from the ground (the Directors). " Dr Miller-Winthrope. He 
adds: "Not clear about what's decided or decisions seem to get shuffled away 
especially on finance but it applies to other things. For example at last August (1995) 
Trust Board meeting, I expected a big noise, a big bang at the Board especially over 
the finances. But nothing happened. It was a big let down. Things then drifted too 
long. " 
"They feel to me as if they put patients first but don't know. They do not feel like a 
profits Board. " Ginny DeVoil, Marketing 
"I don't have much contact. The Chair's a nice bloke but seems a bit nervous when 
stuff hits the fan. " Graham Nett 
The inference is that there is little confidence or role authority invested in the Chair 
sPecifically and the Board more generally. However, the strategic agenda is managed 
and this seems to be by the CEO. 
"These pre-meetings of the CEO and the Chair are increasingly becoming a 
hindrance; by the time the item comes to the Board it has lost its energy and richness. " 
Harriet Quinn, Operations 
"A lot of power is exercised outside the group (the Board) and the influence of the 
CEO and the Chair with the backing of the medical fraternity. " David Larson (HR) 
"There are ways in which you can see decisions in the meetings coming out of the 
blue. " David Larson (HR) 
"CEO making more decisions than before. " Gary Fidder, Finance 
"CEO can and does lead them [the Board]. " Ginny DeVoil, Marketing 
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"The leadership reinforces everything about the culture of this organisation. It's in the 
background of mix and nice etc. etc. The style mirrors this organisation. But if you 
had to be task driven, there would be a problem of a major dislocation. " Fred Jury, 
Quality 
"The team [of Directors] straddles the tension of the devolution and command 
control. " Fred Jury, Quality 
"The CEO can make agreements on capital expenditure in the corridor with a 
clinician. That! sa problem... for example the cardiac strategy came out of the blue. " 
Graham Nett, IS 
The key messages suggest that: 
* The Board is still finding its feet and is thus unable to provide the environment for 
support and organisational learning at a strategic level. 
e The Board is being managed by the CEO through 'off-line' meetings. 
e The locus of power in the strategic apex is limited to the Chair, the CEO and 
Deputy/Clinical Director. 
Z3 Analysis of the organisational environment and context 
This first part of the case study addressed the question: Are the dynamics of the 'top 
team' influenced by the conditions of the environment? 
In looking at both the nature of the environment and the organisational context the 
narratives seem to suggest that these factors will impact on the 'top team' operating as 
a subsystem for strategic organisational learning. The impact in this case study on 
strategic learning appears to be negative. 
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The factors most apparent were: 
* The organisation was moving through rapid transition 
Gladding hospital Trust was an organisation that was in transition, seeking to move 
from a bureaucratic hierarchy to a devolved, business and market led approach 
meeting the needs of its customers. The move from 1991 through to 1994/5 was 
greater in the scale of change than had been for the previous decade or more. The 
rapid acceleration required for this 'paradigm shift' in culture was greater than the 
organisation's capacity to manage that transition. This meant a focus aimed on 
short term and financial goals over longer term developmental and leaming goals. 
In addition, the culture still seemed to be deeply informed by a 'basic assumption' 
regarding the primacy of a medical paradigm over that of a managerial one. It is 
not to argue that one is better than the other but that they were never negotiated in 
relationship to what the organisation now required. 
The organisation was facing a turbulent environment 
Theory suggests that the pressures of the external environment do impact on the 
organisation. In this case the change from a stable regional environment within a 
district health authority to a quasi-market within a potentially national market 
would expect to have an impact on the trust. In this case it impacted negatively in 
two main ways at the strategic level of this organisation. 
First, the organisation had a significant resource and financial difficulty. This was 
due to external factors such as the financial constraints of the health service, the 
poor relations with the RHA and DHA, the need to be more market led and the 
ambivalence of competing within the market and unsure about its strategic 
positioning. 
The second impact that the external change exerted on the organisational system 
was the strategic pull between being a generalist district hospital, which it had 
historically been, and the other pull to be a tertiary specialist, which was being 
driven both by practitioners on the inside but potential market opportunities on the 
outside. The organisational system's boundaries were being threatened by these 
tensions and there was a danger of the organisation becoming underbounded and 
its leaming fragmented. This was driven further by the conflicting demands made 
by the RHA, the GP market and the DHA and the group's ambivalence and 
uncertainty about the nature of its strategic 'primary' task. 
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Finally, there were also internal factors. While the external impact on the 
organisational system was problematic the internal configuration and practices of 
this Trust did not help. The system was poorly managed financially and was 
unable to strike the balance between devolution and control with its medically led 
units. These were among the issues quoted by the Directors. The medical 
Directors continued to be budget holders and they had a number of strategies to 
both retain their budget and in many instances over-spend. This may reflect the 
history and culture of the health service more generally of being medically driven 
with the consultant posts being the key influencers and holders of power. In the 
case of Gladding hospital trust, the culture was one of being informally medically 
driven, formally through the Strategic Implementation Committee and both 
symbolically and in reality through the Deputy CEO, who was also a doctor and 
the Clinical Director. 
o The strategic task was unclear 
The primary task was unclear and this reduces both task attainment and leaming. 
The role of the leadership body at the strategic apex provides an important part of 
ensuring task congruency and that also appeared to be lacking. 
* The Board was unable to provide the strategic support that is required 
The Board had still not established its role or authority. Thus, it was unable to 
provide the required 'holding environment' and thus the capacity for strategic 
organisational learning was impaired. 
The CEO, the Chair and the Deputy/Clinical Director operated in a way that both 
helped and hindered the development of the strategic apex as a whole sub-system. 
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The danger appeared to be insufficient containment of the changes. While 
boundary and learning fragmentation was still possible, the trio of the CEO, the 
Chair of the Board and the Deputy CEO appeared to have provided the holding 
boundary and space for the organisation to potentially weather the transition of 
change and recover opportunities for learning. There was no evidence of such a 
role being performed else where in the organisational system and even in the case 
of the trio, it was being held mainly by the CEO and the Deputy CEO. This was 
helpful in that in the short term it provided a transitional space as discussed in 
chapter 6. The area to recoup, 'play, rehearse and gain mastery over complexity. 
If the temporary 'holding system' of the trio were to continue then it could reduce 
the authority of the strategic apex of the Board and the Directors as they may 
operate from a 'dependency' mode relying upon the strong leadership of the CEO 
at the longer term expense of strategic organisational learning. 
The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that a turbulent environment reduces the 
capacity of the 'top team' and its ability to facilitate strategic organisational learning. 
This appears to be valid in this case. However, this needs to be qualified in three 
main respects: 
It is not the turbulent environment per se that reduces learning but it is the quality 
of the internal 'holding environment' and how the external environment is 
managed that has a greater impact. This reflects the capacity of the strategic apex 
to manage its external boundaries 
* It is essential that the strategic task is clear, agreed and managed so that 
accountabilities, roles and differences can be faced, challenged and resolved rather 
than 'shuffled away' 
A temporary group or 'transitional space' may provide the role of a short term 
'holding environment' to support the transition of change. Theory suggests that 
such an arrangement is not sustainable in the longer term where strategic 
organisational, double-loop learning is sought because the temporary space 
becomes a social defence rather than a facilitator of learning 
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Thus, it suggests that the internal dynamics of a complex, adaptive social system can 
respond to the demands of a turbulent environment. However, that response can 
support or hinder strategic organisational learning depending upon the long term 
ability of the strategic apex to manage its strategic task and boundaries. 
3. The Group and task 
Question two: Is the 'top team'able to manage its boundaries and task? 
This section addresses the above question. Here the focus moves from the boundary 
between the team and its context and environment to the 'top team' of Executive 
Directors themselves. After looking at the main features of the group it will look 
more deeply at three related sub-questions: 
* Does the team hold a common view of its task effectiveness? Is it effective? 
* Is the leader's role facilitative to task attainment (and therefore learning)? 
e Are the boundaries of this 'top team' optimally bounded? 
The key feature of the group 
There were nine Directors. Seven of these were serving members on the Board. 
These were the Directors of Operations, Human Resources, Finance, Clinical 
Services, Marketing, Nursing Services and the CEO. The Directors of Information 
Technology and of Quality were not Board members. 
The group described itself as a relatively new group, being together for three years 
when the hospital gained Trust status. Three members had been with the hospital for 
over ten years with one of these being for 21 years. The rest of the Directors had been 
with the organisation in their roles for three or four years and were specifically 
recruited as part of the new trust management. Thus, the group was born. out of the 
birth of transition into being a trust status organisation. It was also created out of the 
needs to meet external demands and the internal wish to change, as the choice about 
when to take up trust status had been made internally. 
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Thus, while the task of the group was to provide a strategic hub for the development 
of the trust, the meaning of the strategic task was not commonly shared as evidenced 
by the different perspectives on it (see quotes on strategic task above). 
The group members 
Each member of the group contributed a variety of experiences and skills in their 
roles. 
Geoffrey Hands, ChiefExecutive Previously had some health service experience early 
in his career and later was a senior partner in a health based organisational 
consultancy firm. He has been in post and the organisation four years. An 
entrepreneurial style and liked to work with new ideas and a bottom up approach. 
Dr. James Miller-Winthrope, Deputy ChiefDirector and Clinical Director He had 
been in the organisation for about 12 years and was Chair of the Medical Committee 
during 1991-92. He was seen as the elder statesman of the group and had 
considerable authority in his role, with the hospital and with the clinical fraternity. 
Gary Fidder, Finance Director Brought in to help to control and manage the 
resources. In post for about three years. Previously worked in local government and 
would argue that there should be only a limited number of key budget holders to gain 
financial control. 
David Larson, Director ofHuman Resources Known nationally as a technical expert 
on HR issues. He came when the hospital gained trust status. He tends to question 
every thing and likes to shape events and processes. Often seen as confrontational but 
is often misunderstood. 
Harriet Quinn: Director of Operations She was responsible for all the hospitals 
services and estate management. She has been in the hospital for ten years but in post 
for three. Regarded as full of ideas and often manages difference in the group. 
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Ginny DeVoil, Director ofMarketing She was responsible for income generating 
schemes, contracts and introducing business processes within the hospital. She's been 
a staff member in the hospital for 22 years (mainly in pharmacology) but in post for 
four. Well known and liked throughout the Trust. 
Jean Peat, Director offursing Expert in her field and responsible for nursing issues. 
She does not manage nursing staff, who are managed through the clinical specialists 
and ward sisters. Thus, her role is sometimes compromised. 
Fred Jury, Director of Quality His role was to engender quality systems across all of 
the hospital. He has been in post for about two years. Presently seconded part-time to 
the Regional Health Authority. Very strong on process logic. 
Graham Nett, Head ofInformation Systems Responsible for managing an integrated, 
computerised, information and reporting system for the whole of the hospital site. 
3.1 Does the team hold a common view about its task effectiveness? Is 
it effective? 
The group task 
The group's normative task was to provide a corporate and strategic focus for the 
Trust and particularly make it financially viable. The strategic focus varied among 
members of the Director's group. Some felt a sense of alienation from the process 
and questioned the source and wisdom of the changes. There were also areas of 
disagreement among the group about its strategic task as shown in 1.3 above. 
They shared the common ground that health care was their mission, but the actual 
strategy and means was not agreed. This lack of distinctive task clarity and boundary 
may well explain why the group did not see itself as effective in its role. 
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Quotes on effectiveness 
"How can we be effective when we have no shared vision or understanding of the 
strategic goal. " Harriet Quinn (Ops) 
"We do not understand the financial implications of the strategy. " Harriet Quinn 
(Ops) 
"We have a potential to get into the non-strategic and short term view. "' David 
Larson, HR 
"Wre no good at taking action. " David Larson, HR 
"Never fail to deliver. The Directors are good value. " Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
"Not as effective as we could be or should be. But we have no benchmarks. " Dr 
Miller-Winthrope, Deputy and Clinical Director. A similar sentiment was expressed 
by Ginny DeVoil, Marketing. 
"Not enough finishing - so don't make the decisions on time and fail to deliver. " 
Ginny DeVoil, Marketing. She also adds: "The members of the group on the whole 
are very intelligent, brainy, strong, good at consequence appraisal, looking at options, 
strategic thinking but we still fail to deliver decisions made in the time set. This then 
impacts on others, me personally and down the line. " 
"Great on thought but poor on implementation -a general NHS trait. " Fred Jury, 
Quality 
"Not any good at policy making. OK if its just sharing information but feel alienation 
from the decision making e. g. looked what happened on the cardiac strategy. " 
Graham Nett (IS) 
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"We have demanding and conflicting priorities. " Ginny DeVoil, Marketing 
The group appears to be less effective than it would like to be and explains it by the 
lack of strategic clarity, unresolved conflicts over priorities, a lack of a policy 
framework and a general sense that the group is not consistent in its delivery. Thus, 
one infers that the group does not seem to be effective in its strategic task. 
3.2 Is the leader's role facilitative to task attainment (and therefore 
learning)? 
The role of the leader features as high in the theoretical approach to understanding 
groups in this thesis, especially how they provide the conditions for task attainment 
and learning. Information from the first interviews was obtained from each of the 
Directors about Geoffrey Hands. The following is a statement of what they said. 
The role of the CEO 
The CEO had a range of comments about his steer, clarity and sense of direction. 
"He should give a sense of clarity of purpose and role... but something is lacking. " 
David Larson (HR) 
"It's more a developmental approach, " says the CEO about his own style. 
"There is a clear leadership approach and it is respected as such. " Dr James Miller- 
Winthrope 
Comments about his strategic thinking, ability to confront difficult issues and 
decision-making were mixed. 
"... I have the ability to confront difficult issues even maybe where things are put at 
risk. " CEO 
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"Good on issues. " David Larson (HR) 
"Too much spur of the moment with major strategic developments often starting in 
the corridor. During his walk about he can make promises to fix things without 
recognising the financial implications. " Dr James Miller-Winthrope (Deputy & 
Clinical) 
"Finds it hard to handle difficult issues and be firm in the Chair [person's role of the 
Exec]. " Harriet Quinn (Ops) 
"I may not be tough enough. " Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
"He's a charismatic entrepreneur - leading from the front. " Ginny DeVoil (Marketing) 
"Don't think there is a leadership. " Graham Nett (IS) 
"Issues are often driven by him but he usually has more information - not in a 
manipulative way - and others follow the same way. " Fred Jury (Quality) 
"There is an incongruence between what he says and what he does. This can be 
unsettling and reduces trust. " Dr James Miller-Winthrope (Deputy & Clinical) 
He had generally good relationships with the other Directors with the exception of the 
HR Director. But his management of the group was seen as less effective. 
"A bit of a perfectionist so can make unrealistic demands both on himself and others. " 
Gary Fiddcr, Finance 
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"He's aware of the personalities in the group and all the gossip. That always surprises 
me - first that there is gossip and secondly he knows about it. " Dr James Miller- 
Winthrope (Deputy & Clinical) 
"He has difficulty in handling the group -a difficult and strong group, with functional 
experts: Hmm, it may leave him exposed. " Harriet Quinn (Ops) 
"Devolves to those who he feels he can and pulls the reins for those whose boundaries 
need to be controlled. " Graharn Nett (IS) 
"He's a bit of a workaholic. " Gary Fidder, Finance 
The CEO seemed to have high standards and worked well with those on the same 
wave-length. He appeared to be clear on direction if not on detail as suggested by his 
strategic interests and desire to change things but which lacked an analysis of the 
operational implications. There is a mixed view as to whether he is tough enough and 
his ability to manage the group. It appears that the CEO means different things for 
each member of the group. Some of these differences may be projections. 
Nonetheless how they perceive the CEO does influence both their relationships with 
him and the authority and confidence they may invest in him. 
He is seen as an unpredictable, entrepreneur, driven by the big picture if not on detail. 
While most of his relationships are good, even his closest aide, Dr Miller-Winthrope, 
suggested that his seemingly erratic behaviour can reduce trust. The CEO also 
appears to have those he feels are with him and those he has to rein in. 
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The issue of control seems to be emerging out of the all data so far and the drive to 
fulfil the more immediate demands may be at the expense of the longer term 
objectives and it may be a trade-off that Geoffrey Hands is aware of but which 
currently does not suit all his colleagues. [Further data from the second interview (see 
below) seems to throw further light on this, suggesting some mixture of a dynamic of 
control that currently suits both the organisation and the CEO. ] 
3.3 Are the boundaries of the 'top team'sub-system optimally 
managed? 
The management of the group's boundaries is important in that it provides 
containment and supports task attainment and leaming. This is looked in this case as 
the relationship with the Board. Data from the interviews with the Directors suggest 
that the group had a mixture of feelings about and confidence in the Board. The focus 
here differs from the earlier inquiry about the Board which was concerned with its 
'holding' capacity and external boundary management. The theme in this subsection 
is more about the intergroup dynamics and the role played within that of the 'top 
team': in this case the Executive Directors. 
They thought that the leadership from the Board was weak, that they were simply a 
rubber stamp for the subgroup of the CEO, the Deputy CEO and the Chairman, and 
that the Board did not really make Directors accountable or ask seeking questions. 
Quotes about the Board 
"People are very articulate and so put up a barrier rather than gloves off. " Harriet 
Quinn (Ops) 
"They do not give us as difficult times as they could - what a relief It's because they 
are not involved. " Gary Fidder, Finance 
"In theory the Board is responsible for strategy and the Directors do it. But it's more 
complicated than that; Geoffrey (CEO) leads them as they have poor information. .. 
"Nobody asks hard questions; softly, softly... weak stuff. " Ginny DeVoil (Marketing) 
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"Jerry is a good Chairman in the role. He has a nice way of fooling people and comes 
over as a bumbling man; but it belies shrewdness and a sharp brain. Otherwise you 
are a fool to believe it. " Harriet Quinn (Ops) 
"I don't think the Chair has great chairing abilities. Brings people together, smoothes 
things down, sometimes asks awkward questions but doesn't appear to like to let 
others ask awkward questions especially if it may impact on him. " David Larson 
(HR) 
"I would have said the relationship between the Board and the group is cosy, but no 
it's not cosy. It's not positive and it could be more productive. People doet always 
play an open card and we don't use each other as we should be used. " David Larson 
(HR) 
"The Board is not as clear as it should be. The Chair acts as a counterpart to me, calm 
compared to my style. But some of the Non-Execs are a problem. They are able 
people but (they) are not available. They have a wealth of experience but such a busy 
life we do not see them and at the Board it tends to be adversarial. Some not so good 
but it's a struggle to replace them. Some are in between. " Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
"There are tensions between the line, between the Exec (the Directors) and the Non- 
Executives ( Board members). I can't see the positive evidence for it so I only assume 
that something is happening. " Gary Fidder, Finance 
"He's (the Chair) appreciative of the pressures on Execs (Directors). They recognisc it 
and that we will not hit all deadlines. " Gary Fidder, Finance 
"Frank, constructive, mutually beneficial but the Non-Execs are not the top selection 
of the lot. " David Larson, HR 
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3.4 Analysis 
The Directors group's immediate context of the Board lacked clear leadership. The 
relationship between the group and the Board was by no means poor but the Board 
was unable to provide the support and challenge the group needed because of a lack of 
information, ambivalence about collectively taking up its authority and the 
dependency upon the CEO for his lead and direction. The Board was 'underbounded' 
as it was unable to establish either its identity or authority independently from the 
CEO, the Deputy CEO and the 'top team' as a whole. Thus, in not holding its role 
boundaries it ceased to provide a 'good enough holding environment' from its own 
position of dependency and its own embryonic state. 
While the Board was not hostile or antagonistic - compared with cases one and three 
in chapters 12 and 14 respectively - there was not a sufficient boundary between the 
two groups to enable each to take up their different but interdependent roles providing 
support that was challenging and constructively critical, allowing the group to think as 
opposed to the 'dependency' dynamic that had been established early on in the 
relationship between the Board and the 'top team'. 
Thus, the Directors group was unable to optimally manage its boundaries with the 
Board and this undermined the strategic organisational learning as there was 
insufficient boundedness and containment, with the Director's group using the CEO 
6as if he was both CEO and Board. The Board seemingly colluding with this 
dynamic. 
Can the team manage its boundaries? 
The inference from this case study is that the Director's group or 'top team' is unable 
to manage its boundaries due to: 
9 Poor task alignment and effectiveness 
Poorly managed boundaries 
Insufficient object constancy in the leader who provides some containment but not 
for all the team as a subsystem 
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Thus, it suggests that there is insufficient management of the 'top team's' task and 
boundaries and this will have implications for strategic organisational learning. These 
implications are discussed in sections 4 and 5 of this chapter on organisational 
learning. 
4. The Group and its internal dynamics 
Question three: Do the internal dynamics of the 'top team' impact on 
organisational learning? 
This section addresses the above question by exploring the key internal dynamics of 
the team in order to answer two further sub-questions. These are: 
Does the team display examples of 'basic assumption' motifs over 'work'? 
Do individual valencies reinforce difficult group dynamics? 
4.1 Does the team display examples of 'basic assumption'motifs over 
'work' 
There are three areas that help us understand the dynamics of the group in considering 
'basic assumptions'. 
These are: 
The roles and relationship of each Director as seen by other members of the group - 
the source of this data is from the first interviews using the interview schedule 
* The dynamics within the group as understood by members within the group - the 
data also comes from those same first interviews 
The dynamics of the group based on scoring statements against basic assumption 
theory (see Appendix 1) using the Group Analysis Grid and content analysis of text 
of latent themes 
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4.1.1 RoIcs and relationships" 
In understanding the dynamics of the group a first level analysis suggests that group 
r oles are formed and that these may be significant in understanding the impact on 
organisational learning. 
The following provides an account of how each member is seen by their colleagues. 
The CEO's role was discussed in 2.2 above and thus he is not included here. The 
group members each had perceived roles. Themes that were said to have resonance 
from the interviews with their colleagues were as followed. 
Dr. James Miller-Winthrope: Deputy Chief Director and Clinical Director 
He was seen as the boundary spanner between different interests, the honest broker, 
reality checker and the one who had his finger on the pulse. This comes from his 
colleagues comments of him: 
"He provides mature reflection. " Harriet Quinn (Ops) 
"He's the honest broker. He can be money, task and delivery focused and be a 
representative of the medical side. James has got high medical credibility. " Fred Jury, 
Quality 
"He is calm, rational yet caring. " Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
"He's influential on the medical side and has his finger on the pulse of the hospital. " 
Gary Fidder, Finance 
"Good at action and testing reality. " David Larson (1111) 
4 Members of the group describe some of the 'roles' of their colleagues in 'Belbin 
terms'. For example, 'shaper' for one that takes control and shapes events, 'plant' for 
ideas person and 'monitor evaluator' for the person that constantly checks reality. A 
fuller discussion of Belbin can be found in Belbin et al, 1976. 
The other point is that their concept of 'roles' is not the same as used by this thesis 
which refers to group dynamic roles such as 'scape-goat', 'rescuer' and those that are 
based in a psycho-dynamic understanding of groups. A full discussion of these was in 
chapter 7 
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"As the medical Director on most things I can get my own way but it can attract 
envy, " says Dr Miller-Winthorpe of himself in role 
Gary Fidder: Finance Director. 
Gary was seen as autocratic, a 'centralist' and was one for detail. On Gary, people 
said: 
"He likes counting beans. " Fred Jury, Quality 
"He is one for nagging detail. " David Larson (HR) 
"Gary and David are always together on issues. " Harriet Quinn (Ops). Fred Jury, 
Quality, also had a similar view 
"He's an autocratic centralist. " Harriet Quinn (Ops) 
"He's a bit of a blocker. " Dr James Miller-Winthrope 
"I acknowledge that I am seen as a centralist but feel misunderstood. I just want others 
to make the strategic links (between task and finance). " 
David Larson: Director of Human Resources. 
David appears to take up the opposition role in the group. He questions most things 
and tends to come over as aggressive. He was also seen as a centralist and autocratic. 
"He's another autocratic centralist. " Harriet Quinn (Ops). A similar view was held by 
Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
"He is always in conflict with the me. " Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
"He is a shaper. He has an aggressive style. " Fred Jury, Quality. A similar view was 
held by Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
"I like the testing of ideas and roles and to shape things... I also ask irritating 
questions, " David Larson (HR) says of himself. Ile goes on, "It's the principle that 
matters. " 
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Harriet Quinn: Director of Operations. 
Harriet was seen as the ideas and creative member of the group. She tended to 
support the CEO. 
"She is the ideas person. Turns things upside down and is the'plant'. " David Larson 
(HR) 
"She is often in conflict with me. " David Larson (HR) 
"She takes the group dynamics onto the next stage. " Dr James Miller-Winthrope 
"Creative and innovative; understands self and others. " Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
"She takes the creative role - the ideas person; the one who unfreezes attitudes. " Fred 
Jury, Quality 
"I do tend to agree with James but I could do more to lead ideas and actions, " Harriet 
Quinn (Ops) says of herself 
Ginny DeVoil: Director of Marketing. 
She was seen as a barometer of the temperature of the organisation. This status had 
arisen partly because of her long standing time with the hospital (over 20 years), her 
regular contact with a wide range of staff through the role and her naturally helpful 
disposition. 
"She's the monitor evaluator. " David Larson, HR 
"She facilitates and helps the group's resolution. " Dr James Miller-Winthrope 
"She is able to keep an eye on strategy and detail. " Fred Jury, Quality 
"Carries influence - good business grasp; been here for 20 years; has traditional 
allegiances; and knows everybody. " Dr James Miller-Winthrope 
"Ginny and Gary make a powerful lobby. " Fred Jury, Quality 
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I make the business process work by interpreting both for the Exec and the Board the 
implications of changes in the environment in a simple way. " Ginny DeVoil says of 
her own role 
Jean Peat: Director of Nursing. 
Jean has a professional role in the hospital as Director of nursing, but tends to 
underplay it. She finds it hard to exercise her presence and authority. 
"She allows people to talk over her. " Harriet Quinn (Ops) 
"Pretty ineffective. " Fred Jury, Quality 
"Has a nursing expertise but it carries less weight and credibility in the workplace. " 
Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
"She does not have real day to day managerial responsibility for the nursing staff(as 
they report through the Clinical Directors' management groups). " Harriet Quinn 
(Ops) 
Fred Jury: Director of Quality 
Fred was seen as the 'process man'. He was the one to guide the group through 
difficult issues. However, due to other duties outside of the hospital and the fact that 
he did not have a management line to fulfil, he was rarely at the Directors or Trust 
Board meetings. 
"He's very good: stands back and challenges. He doesn't have a management role so 
he also has more freedom. " David Larson (HR) 
"He's the process logic man. " David Larson (HR) 
"He's not really part of the team. He's probably uncomfortable with it. " Dr James 
Miller-Winthrope 
"A powerful person logically and can argue any point. Great on process. " Geoffrey 
Hands, CEO 
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"I have a facilitator's role; retains balance. " Fred Jury, Quality says of his own group 
role. 
Graham Nett: Head of Information Systems 
Graham was the technical man. Hands-on with installing new technology into the 
hospital and was attending Board meetings to report on the project, which was seen as 
strategically important. He was also at the point of leaving for a better paid job nearer 
his family as he had been commuting since being in post. 
"Sorry he's leaving. He has focused mainly on the project but felt that he has not 
really used his commercial nous while he's been with us. " Harriet Quinn (Ops) 
"Graham does not feel or seen as part of the team. " Dr James Miller-Winthrope 
"Ambiguous role as it is a technical project yet the impact and link will be with 
operations and HR and not felt that has happened to the point we wanted. " Graham 
Nett (IS) 
This account of roles provides some clear and consistent messages about how each 
person is perceived in the Directors' group. They do take different roles in the group: 
some are helpful - 'the honest broker', 'the process man' - while others tend not to 
provide the group with additional challenges - 'the blocker. The implications are that 
the roles do Provide some balance to the group but if they become too rigid they may 
serve a deeper dynamic that reduces the effectiveness and learning of this strategic 
sub-system. This is explored further below in the discussion on the group's dynamics. 
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4.1.2 The dynamics of the group as understood by its members 
How did the group understand its own dynamics. Data from 1.2 and 2.1 suggests that 
the group does not see itself as an effective team and a number of reasons were given. 
However, the internal dynamics are given less attention by the group. Roles are 
clearly seen as described in 4.1.1 above. It was also identified earlier the main 
subgroup among the Executive Directors' group was the pair of the CEO and the 
Clinical Director. Like their role on the Board, this was the pair that often made 
decisions. Power was said to shift according to the issue and the level of expertise 
required to tackle the problem but in most cases it was acknowledged that Dr. Miller- 
Winthrope and Geoffrey Hands, the CEO were the principal power holders. 
"The roles we all take can change over time, but a lot of power is exercised outside 
the group by the Chair (of the Board), the CEO and the medics via the Clinical 
Director. " David Larson (HR). A similar view was held by Geoffrey Hands, CEO. 
"Dr Miller-Winthrope looks after the hospital. If a high risk situation occurred he 
would be the one to ask the difficult questions - especially where there is a financial 
risk. " Gary Fidder, Finance 
"The most powerful member of the group is Geoffrey the CEO. No one else in the 
group has that power with the exception of James Miller-Winthrope who has recently 
played more of a role given Geoffrey's overload. " Gary Fidder (Finance) 
"The power is shared by a logical and powerful link between James Miller-Winthrope 
and Geoffrey (CEO). " Ginny DeVoil (Marketing) 
"With Dr Miller-Winthrope, he (the CEO) is very powerful and takes decisions 
outside of the group. I admire him. " Harriet Quinn (Ops) 
I really rate James and Geoffrey (CEO). " Fred Jury, Quality 
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The only other sub-group that was acknowledged as evidenced in the accounts of the 
roles was a counter-group to the pair of the CEO, and to a lesser extent to the Clinical 
Director, and that was by the 'centralist' and 'autocrats' group: David Larson and Gary 
Fidder, the HR and Finance Directors respectively. 
Thus, the dynamics of the group revolve around the 'pair' of the CEO and the 
Deputy/Clinical Director. 
There were also some acknowledged conflicts in the group 
4.1.3 The dynamics of the group based on the Group psychodynamics 
The dynamics of the group were rarely openly hostile - compared to examples in case 
studies one and three in chapters 12 and 14 respectively - but there were examples of 
differences. We see that there are differences between the HR Director and the CEO 
and to a lesser extent between the Finance Director and the CEO. 
"All the members were very articulate, pulled their weight and enjoyed working for 
the hospital. " They tended to chew through issues thoroughly. As one member 
described them: "There is a more than a degree of sibling rivalry. " Harriet Quinn 
(Ops) 
This comment is supported by the view of a number of the Directors 
"The relationship between the HR Director and the CEO is moderately frosty... He 
always seems to take the contrary view to the CEO. " Dr. Miller-Winthorpe 
"The Operations Director and the Director of Finance, there is no love lost between 
these two. There's not a meeting of minds. " Dr. Miller-Winthorpe 
"The CEO pushes or leads the decentralised business units, and I agree we could do 
more with it. While the Directors of HR and Finance they are more into autocratic 
centralist behaviour. " Harriet Quinn (Ops) 
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"Sometimes there is no lead in the group. We sometimes need a proposal instead of 
every one having an input. Then we could get our teeth into something. I'd prefer this 
but instead we tend to go for a compromise on our decision, which are not linked to 
the strategic direction at all. " David Larson (HR) 
"The Director of HR is a shaper like me and I think this is where we have our 
conflict. " Geoffrey Hands, CEO 
"There is a spectrum of people from centralist to more open styles. " CEO 
"The team struggles the tension of devolution and command and control. Could 
probably trace all events back to this (tension). " 
"There is rivalry and a history between the status of being on the Board and not being 
on the Board. " Graham Nett (IS) 
While these tensions are acknowledge in one to one interviews and among sub-groups 
within the group, the tensions have almost become an open secret with the group as a 
whole unable or unwilling at this stage to work on these issues. This was certainly a 
view held by the CEO. 
Otherwise the group attempted to work together. 
An analysis of the group's interactions based on the Group Analysis Grid suggest that 
the group operated as a'work group' for the majority of the time (see table 13.2). 
However, less than 17% of the group's'work! mode was of the higher levels three and 
four, with less than 2% at level four. The majority of 'work! interventions were at 
level 2 (32.8%) where people were progressing the task in hand, rather than seeking to 
understand the nature of the problem at hand or the processes of the group (see table 
13.2) 
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Table 13.2 
The Dynamics of the group based on the Group Analysis Grid 
Total W1 w2 w3 w4 FIL Fi DP CP CID Und 
982 102 317 148 19 68 112 101 80 10 5 20 
100% 10% 32% 15% 2% 7% 11% 10% 8% 1% 1% 2% 
A breakdown of input by each member of the team by relevant sessions is provided in 
Appendix 9.2 
The pattern of the group's dynamics did not seem to engage in the underlying 
conflicts of power, authority and expertise. Thus, the acknowledged but not publicly 
stated power dynamic of the CEO and the Clinical Director were at some level 
accepted and the roles that people took around that pair were also implicitly accepted. 
The HR Director may be said to stand out from the rest of the group on this one and 
may possibly take the role of 'scape-goat' or with Gary Fidder, Finance, the counter- 
pair or shadow to the CEO and the Deputy/Clinical Director. 
The following except reflects a conversation about the pay awards in April 1995. 
This particular except is chosen as it touches on differences in the group, it is strategic 
- in terms of public relations, finance, the relationships with the Health authorities, the 
Department of Health, staff and the public - and it impacts on staff at operational and 
strategic HR levels. 
It also shows how the group tackles difficult dilemmas - one of the sources of 
organisational. learning. The difficulty was not concluded in this Directors' meeting 
before the Board meeting. However, it was eventually resolved as noted in the 
minutes of the Board meeting. Thus, the resolution seems to have taken place off- 
line. In Appendix (9.3) another example is given of the group not able to conclude its 
meeting with a decision. 
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It was a Directors' meeting on staff pay awards. It was the early period when the 
Trust was given the 'opportunity' to settle awards locally, nurses were threatening 
strike action and central government was saying that the decision was to be taken by 
each Trust. The notes were taken on 21 April 1995. 
Geoffrey: "Item six is on pay awards. I saw in the local paper that one of our 
'departmental' friends (Department of Health) is suggesting that all hospitals should be 
awarding 3% pay settlements. It makes you wonder who is running the hospital. We 
need to get papers to the Board for next week so the outcome of our deliberations this 
afternoon will form the papers, which I'll complete tomorrow, for sending out. " 
Gary: "I just want to clarify a point. If we can get up to 3% from the DHA why have 
the aggro on going for 2.5%? " 
Dr. James: "We doWt really want pay problems in Gladding do we? " 
Harriet: "We certainly do not want to go into battle especially with the local media. 
Ginny: "We need further clarification as there seems to have been a change in view 
from the DHA. " 
Dr. James: "That' s right. Our initial offer of 2.5% was in order to receive an overall 
budget premium from our paymasters. But now with the mood being 3% there seems 
to be a change in. " 
David: "But we still need to think about what's best for staff and consult them. While 
the Doctors seemed to have fallen outside of this process and the Nurses are making 
rash commitments we need to keep the helm and provide stability and fairness for all 
our staff, irrespective of rank. " 
Geoffrey: "Whilst I agree, we need to work within the reality of our current situation. 
We need an ideal position, a target position and a fallback position; but the ultimate 
decision has to come from the Board. The fallback is probably 3% with no strings 
attached and our ideal is 2.5% with strings on contracts and working conditions. " 
David: "I'm still unhappy about the implications about the ideal from staff side and we 
will get, and informally have had, representations from the unions. " 
372 
Gary: "But we do need to keep our mind on the bottom line. That 0.5% would make 
up for our current overspend and in terms on working conditions it would stop some 
of the current time sheet abuses that are going on and which are costing us a bomb. 
So I'm for the ideal! " 
Ginny: "I think it's a hard one. Information regarding contracts is already public 
knowledge as it came around in one of the health authority circulars. So while many 
people haven't picked it up yet, our so-called fallback is already in the public arena. " 
Dr. James: "But if we go for 3% we will lose E0.5m 
There is a long pause. The group then moves on to the next item. 
Seven days later the Board minutes report that: 'various options open to the Board 
were discussed and the following recommendation supported! In general terms these 
included the settlement of a range of 2.5% to 3% to all staff, with the total cost not 
exceeding 3%. In the event, while Directors were given the explicit authority to 
engage in pay awards along the stated lines nothing happened until the Autumn due to 
national negotiating positions 
This extract serves to demonstrate a number of points: 
The text highlights the extent to which the group does 'work' (in the Bion sense) 
but it is more on problem clarification and progressing the task: 'work' level two. 
The group does not come to any conclusion in the meeting or subsequently as 
depicted in the extracts from the Board's minutes. 
The text also shows how the roles that members take discussed in 3.1.1 above. 
Dr. Miller-Winthrope takes a balanced approach to the problem; David Larson 
(HR) takes a 'oppositional stance' based on the principled interests of the staff, 
Ginny seeks to test reality and gain clarifications. 
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The extract also highlights the poor task effectiveness of the group dealing with 
the issue only a week before the Board meeting with still no strategic position. 
Finally, less to do with the dynamics but nonetheless a contingent factor, the text 
shows the continued unresolved financial difficulty. 
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The group changes 
During the summer months of 1995, right through to October and into 1996, the 
financial position continued to be one of the hospital's most pressing strategic agenda 
items. Monthly Finance Reports continually stated an overspend against across the 
hospital as a whole and against budget heads by activity - e. g. surgery, oncology, 
diagnostic services and other operational services (taken from Finance reports and the 
monthly Minutes of the Board meeting during that period). Throughout the period of 
study, every financial report ended within the spirit of the following recommendation: 
'Note the adverse financial position of the trust' and 'note the present adverse cash 
position of the trust. ' Variations included: 'Note the continued adverse position of the 
trust'; 'consider options for action necessary to curtail the gross expenditure. ' 
The financial situation went on unabated and it led to the 'resignation' of Gary Fidder, 
the Director of Finance in December 1995. 
The outcomes of the Information Technology project was less than expected and this 
was a cause of considerable concern among the Directors and the central government 
sponsors as it had not yielded the net efficiency gains they had hoped. 
Graham Nett (IS), left the organisation at the end of October 1995, due to a 
combination of, "Weariness from having taken over a poorly specified project to 
start... a better pay offer and the end of commuting so I can be nearer my family. " 
Graham Nett. 
Fred Jury, the Director of Quality, continued to be on the boundary of the group. He 
did not have an executive role among the Directors and he was not involved in the day 
to day running of the hospital due to external commitments and demands. Thus, he 
took on an advisory role to the group and ceased to be a member of the group as 
originally planned. 
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Thus, for various reasons the group saw the departure of three of its members during 
the period of study. 
During the new year of 1996 through to the Spring, the group was smaller and was 
able to reconstitute its own role and self esteem. The Chair of the Board resigned and 
was replaced and a number of Board members were also changed to give the group 
what it was seeking from a super authority. No new appointments were made to the 
Directors until the summer and the group shared the responsibility of 'running the 
business' with the CEO attending the external boundaries more and the Clinical 
Director and the remaining three Directors attending the internal operations of the 
hospital. The Finance Director's deputy provided the Executive and the Board with 
their needs and an appointment was confirmed in the summer of 1996. 
* 
4.1.4 Does the team display examples of 'basic assumption' motifs over Iwork'9 
The data suggest that the group does not display predominant 'basic assumption' 
motifs over work. There will be some meetings where the balance may be different 
and a look at Appendix 9.2 shows how far that is the case. On the contrary, 'work', in 
general, seems to feature greater than basic assumption motifs. 
However, the 'level' of work, as defined in Appendix 1, is low - over 75% of 'work' 
is at level two or less and only 1% at level 4. Thus, the group dynamics seems to 
reflect an inability to learn which is present in its task and boundary management and 
its 'holding environment'. The deeper 'unconscious' and projective dynamics are 
explored further in the next section. 
Secondly, the notion of 'pairing' between the CEO and Deputy/Clinical Director 
seems to be less evident in the meetings. Pairing reflects a low level of interaction. 
This difference may be explained by the way in which these two key players work 
mainly 'off-line' outside the meetings. The latter point was widely recognised by the 
Directors. 
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Thirdly, the most vocal opposition to the CEO's style and approach was David 
Larson, the Director of HR, who took up the oppositional role. He seemed to 
represent the 'fight' in the group. Some of this may have been on behalf of the other 
members of the group who expressed both admiration and suspicion of the CEO. This 
ambivalence and the lack of an adequate holding environment may have also led to 
greater investment in the CEO than may have usually been expected. The 'split' 
between the CEO and the HR Director may also have reflected other tensions in the 
group between clinicians and managers, as the CEO also had some clinical experience 
in the early phase of his career. It may have reflected envy that the CEO and the 
Clinical Director had such a close working relationship. The tensions may have also 
been a symbolism of the differences between the'neW entrepreneurial ways of the 
hospital (and the NHS more generally) and the older order of relationships. 
Finally, given the difficult environment and the lack of group effectiveness, there is a 
case to suggest that the group is not used as a strategic vehicle for leaming and that 
some of the dynamics of analysis operate outside it. 
A systemic analysis of the group 
The exportation of the Finance Director may have represented the group's act of 
scape-goating. The monthly Finance reports and the monthly notes of the Board 
meetings showed that he did indeed warn Executive and Non-Executive Directors of 
the 'adverse financial position' over a prolonged period of over a year. However, his 
exportation may be explained in part by the fragility of the holding environment (the 
CEO and the Clinical Director) and the inability of it to tolerate both the risk and 
anxiety that the Financial Director represented. These risks and anxieties were both 
existential and real. 
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The Finance Director may have represented the organisational and Director's group 
'bad object'in a number of ways. He was always pointing out the bad news (so shoot 
the messenger), he was a self-declared centralist (oppositionalist), and he was also the 
policeman of the accounts/books and wanted to control a medically led hospital 
culture (counter-cultural). He represented the antithesis of the medical Directors and 
the CEO. He had less external allies and 'expertise' than the other 'centralist', David 
Larson (HR) and maybe therefore was an easier target. 
In addition, as he 'pulled rabbits out of the bag' every year, his message was that the 
hospital was in financial difficulty was not believed as the system expected him to do 
it again. He did not, was unable to, and thus he became a target to be scape-goated. 
These dynamics were further aggravated and conflated with the difficulty of the 
financial systems that were not run properly so monies went unclaimed, figures did 
not represent the whole picture and generally managers did not have confidence in the 
financial Director or his work. It is possible that he interjected the feelings of 
hopelessness and incompetence of the rest of the group and thus completed the 
projective identification to take up the role of scapegoat. 
Finally, at a broader systemic level, there was the continual and external pressure on 
the organisation and the group, which rather than ceased, increased. In that total 
systemic dynamic the finance Director'resigned' and was exported out of the system. 
He was given the role of scapegoat. It is suggested that it was the piece of the system 
that the temporary holding environment was unable to contain and still hold it self 
together. 
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Thus, it is difficult to conclude whether the predominance of basic assumptions per se 
inhibits learning. There is evidence of fight, splitting, a dependency leadership motif 
but these are not constrained solely within the group. These motifs form part of a 
wider systemic dynamic that does appear to be reinforcing of the group's context and 
the co-determination of these interactions appear to limit strategic organisational 
learning. 
4.2 Do individual 'valencies'reinforce difficult group dynamics? 
This section explores how the manager's context, history and inner conflicts and 
drives help throw light upon how they took up their roles in the strategic forum of the 
management team. As noted above, three of the team members left during the time of 
study, so this part reports on six of the remaining Directors. These include: Geoffrey 
Hands (the CEO), Dr. James Miller-Winthrope (Clinical Director), David Larson (HR 
Director), Harriet Quinn (Operations and Estates Director), Ginny DeVoil (Contracts 
Director) and Jean Peat (Nursing Director). Each of the Directors filled in a personal 
profile inventory and this was used as a tool for personal and existential exploration 
through an in-depth interview held in autumn 1996. The details of this process are in 
chapters 10 and 11 of the research methodology. 
The following accounts are taken from the second. In-depth one to one interviews 
with each of the Directors, the outcome from their Firo-B datas, the comments from 
their colleagues (used as feedback and dialogue) and a written note including key 
points from each of the sessions. 
The outcome from looking at the individual accounts to answer the question, what 
impact do individual 'unresolved' memories or conflict have on the group's 
dynamics. 
I Firo-B score for each element ranged from 0-9. In identifying self scores directors 
were asked to score themselves as high, medium or low. These were used as a 
comparative to the scored marks where 0-2 was low, 3-6 was medium, and 7-9 was 
high. High, medium, low is the fonnat that will be used to report the scores, which 
also made sense to the respondents. Explorations followed the participants' interests 
and tended to explore differences in expectations or extremes in high or low (9 or 
zero). Raw data for each of the Firo-B scores are in appendix 9.4 
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The individuals' history, role context and inner drives - the internal dialogue 
Geoflýey Hands 
Geoffrey was in his mid forties and had established hiniselfin the role of(TA) with 
more and more work relating to the hospital's relationship with the Outside world. 
Thus, he was increasingly gaining a reputation as a local spokesperson on health and 
public sector issues more broadly. This newly won recognition of becoming the'cIder 
statesman' he both enjoyed and wished to develop. 
His Firo-B data and much ofthe conversation llocuscd oil his expressed control (rm 
score of 9 see Appendix 9.4) and its origins. 
k1h Ic The Coll I jlý I I-] soll o I' F 11-o-11 scorc ý111 (I sc I I', IIIcII11,01- 1 kill(k 
Firo-B Sell' Firo-B Sell' Firo-B Sell' 
score assess- score assess- score IISIIcss- 
ment ment ment 
Express Medium Low-Med II Igh I ligh I. ONý Med-Low 
-ed 
Wanted Low Medium MediUm Low-Med Medium MedlUill 
Ile was aware of his high needs to shape events and proccsscs and that o flen Ile was 
seen as judgmental or a hard task master. -I think I come over stronger than I nicall 
too, " he admitted. 
He thought that his career aspirations may be frustrated by the need 'to follow tile 
company line' - ref'erring to a senior Health Authority post - over his more natural 
entrepreneurial and outspoken approach oil Issues. I le identified that personal values 
on equality and freedom were strong drivers and this was evident In Ills dlys at 
school, university, in his early work career and even no, ýv Ill 111S Current post. I le 
thought that it may even explain the poor relationships that lie first had with tile 
I lealth Authority. 
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The deep personal conviction of equality was traced back to his father's personal 
convictions, his father's outspokenness and the dynamics of the family more 
generally, where he was expected to live up to his father's expectations. "He is always 
sitting on my shoulders. " 
In the work context Geoffrey Hands related to a wide range of colleagues, but he 
recognised that he could not be 'one of the boys' and in many ways retained a private 
'self that was kept separate from the life of work. 
While successful in the post, his personal and career future offered a number of 
equally important yet contrasting alternatives and these were to be further pursued 
during the course of the year. 
Analysis 
Geoffrey presented himself as a conviction based leader driven by deeply held beliefs 
on equality, management and power. His drive for managerial devolution, 'open 
government' and being outspoken on the hospital's behalf seemed to contradict some 
of his behaviours: where decisions were made outside of the decision-making 
authority; where there was a small inner group of the CEO, the Chair of the Board 
and the Clinical Director; and where his behaviour was sometimes perceived as being 
judgmental. 
As a 'visionary leader' with a passion for process, these strongly held beliefs were 
experienced by others as controlling. 
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He seemed to take up the role as the hospital's 'saviour'. This was fuelled by 
Geoffrey's belief in the value of the work of the hospital and psychoanalytically the 
'introjected', outspoken father figure of his past. This was further suggested by recent 
events in Geoffrey's family life that led to his father's uncharacteristic and open 
approval. The impact on Geoffrey of this acknowledgement was significant - giving 
visible joy as he spoke of it in the conversation. This recognition by his father seemed 
to mirror the newly acquired status of elder-statesman and approval by a community 
that had hither-to not given much time or status to Gladding Hospital Trust - including 
the neighbouring Prince Harry Hospital , the health authorities, the D of H and other 
health managers and practitioners. One explanation of these events is that Geoffrey 
could give up the role of the counter-dependent, 'rebellious youth' and acknowledge 
the interdependent nature of the hospital to external agencies as his father's 
recognition had done for him and their relationship. 
Nonetheless, the main inner driver for Geoffrey appeared to be the strong super-ego 
and ego ideal reportedly based on his father. Thus his drive to do the right thing was a 
strong belief system and thus he took on the role of saviour and the mouth-piece of 
the hospital. 
Dr James Miller Winthrope 
Dr James Miller-Winthrope was seen as the 'elder statesman' within the hospital and 
was a man of gravitas. In his role and as a chief clinician he did make life and death 
decisions and this gave him a 'god-like' persona where people - colleagues, staff and 
patients - did project onto him these qualities. Thus, he was used to being in charge 
and in control. 
His Firo B scores are given below. 
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Table 13.4 
Firo-B Self Firo-B Sell, 1`11-0-13 Sell' 
score assess- score assess- Score ýIssess_ 
ment inent 111clit 
Express- Medium Low Medium High Medium Medium 
ed 
Wanted Low Medium Medium Low Medium Medium 
James focused on the issue of control. I Its reactions to control 'depends oil tile 
situation', he said: "I hate it when it is not clear and so there isjockeying lor position. ' 
It was not so much an issue of control per se but whether the person In control had tile 
'right qualifications' or'earned the respect' to take the lead. This was the critical part 
and in some ways may be also an expression oftrust in his relationships. 
Further exploration of these feelings were traced to certain rights which lie felt were 
established and expected as the first born and the right to be in char., ge. The second 
revealed a cautiousness in relationship to others. On the one hand, James eqIovcd 
being 'a member of the gang, one of the boys, a part ofthe process' but this was 
matched with an ambivalence around investing in others or being introspective and 
withdrawn. 
These feelings and personal dynamics were present as a child and they resoriatcd with 
school reports and the experience ot'going through Lmiversity. 
Ile had acknowledged that lie had developed a confident and 'alool' public selt'l 
whereas the inner sclfwas much more private and withdrawn than presented in the 
public domain. In psychoanalytic terms lie lild behind his * false sel F and raising his 
awareness of this was uncomfortable I'Or both ol'us. 
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The comparison of Firo-B score and self assessment for Dr James Miller-Winthropc 
Analysis 
Dr James Miller-Winthrope presents himself as calm, stable and in charge. He is seen 
as the elder statesman within the hospital and a figure of authority. The authority 
comes from his role, his personal presence and the projected investment in his 'life or 
death' judgements and 'god-like' qualities that are associated with him. Theexistential 
authority that is given to Dr James is also enjoyed by him. In some cases he is aware 
that this process takes place and reminds his junior colleagues that the consultant is 
not infallible. In other instances his is not aware of what is taking place and can be 
can seen by his own admission as being judgmental or arrogant. 
This 'god-like' role is hard to shake as his other internal dynamic - that is to withdraw 
- prevents him acting in other ways that do not reinforce his image of being above or 
removed from the fray. His natural tendency to withdraw means that he is less 
expressive and related to others than he may wish (see his raw scores compared to 
others in Appendix 9.4). 
His ambivalence to close relationships focus on areas of trust, being let down and 
unfulfilled expectations in others. Thus, he manages this internal tension by avoiding 
close emotional ties and retains that slightly removed stance which has worked in the 
past, provides some comfort and based on previous experiences there are no perceived 
'benefits' from being any different. Thus, the doctor, by his own admission, is tied 
into a way of being that fulfils a role for the group and supports his own unresolved, 
internal ambivalence and tension. Thus, remains both aloof and existentially 
unfulfilled. 
384 
David Larson 
As the HR Director, David was the youngest members ofthe Directors grOUp, 40. but 
was probably within the average age group For the sector niore generally at that level 
of seniority. 
I lis Firo-B scores are below. 
Table 13.5 
The comparison of Firo-B score and selfassessnient tlor David Larson 
score assess- score assess- SC()I'C ýISSCSS_ 
ment Illent Illent 
Express- Medium I ligh Medium MedIL1111 I'm\ Mcd-I I Igh 
ed 
Wanted Medium I ligh LmN Medil. 1111 MCLI ILI IIIII igh-Med 
Most of the tune spent in the session I'OCLI. sed upon IIICILISIOII. 
David was in many ways the outsider ofthe group. I le had tO C011tinUally push 
himself forward to be 'in' the group and lie found this bruising at times and tirino 
These comments were based on his own observations, I*ecdback from tile first 
interview with colleagues and observation. Sometimes lie would j List give LIP. II is 
strategy of'fighting from the outside' was percei\1cd by others as a personality conflict 
with the CEO. Yet for David thcse'battles' were ori points ol'principle not 
personality. 
I Ic commented that lie was not nornially part oftlic 'in croxvd', the 'key group' aiid his 
experience in many ways was no diftlerent at the hospital. 
"Even now my formal role makes me part ofthe group... but not the HIC01-111A. " 
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I'll-0-13 I'll cII III I ()-D -)C 11 I'll'O-15 1") 11 
David liked to be given clear goals and performance targets. This provided a basis for 
feedback. His experience of general feedback in the hospital was negative but he felt 
that he was not getting any direct feedback at all. He felt that there were low role and 
performance expectation of him and these were well below his own high standards. 
Further exploration of the role of his boss in this and the need for direct and regular 
feedback revealed a memory of family history where David experienced little or no 
feedback - of any kind. 'It was simply the not knowing' that was the hardest thing to 
tolerate and this was what he grew up with as a child and it continued to resonate in 
his current role. 
On being asked whether David had set up regular review meetings with the CEO, he 
replied he had not and contracted to do as an outcome of the session. 
Analysis 
It appears that David has co-created the role of 'outsider'. It was a role he appeared to 
be used to and it was not unfamiliar. A key factor for David from the interview was 
the total lack of feedback he had received as a child. Thus, from a psychoanalytical 
view, his 'not knowing' may well have impacted on his sense of self and thus his 
actions may been seen as a desire to define himself in one of three ways. Firstly, to 
assert his self and identity from a basis of beliefs and worked out principles. 
Examples from his own text and others suggested that he had a willingness to engage 
in conflict where others do not and he suggested that this was based on principles. 
The second element regarding these 'battles' may reflect a wish to receive attention 
and feedback , rather than nothing. In a perverse way it provides some feedback and 
may fill the void of not knowing. However, a third element may rest with his 
relationship with his boss. Here it is 'as if he is expecting the feedback he never had 
from his parents. He does nothing to take the initiative to simply set up regular 
sessions. In his role as HR Director and a national expert in the field he would be 
telling others to do so all the time yet such a simple task he does not do for himself It 
is suggested that there is some form of transference relationship between the boss and 
David based on a desire to received feedback and a fantasy that his role and ' 
performance outputs are low. The CEO several times in his one to one interview says 
that David . ..... is one of the experts in his field. " 
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One tentatively concludes that the combined isolation plus the lack ot'dircct feedback 
for David, resonates with childhood experiences and that fie seeks to compensate 1`61, 
this at an unconscious level by being combative in his relationships with others - but 
especially the CEO. This may provide the unconscious pay oll'ofbeing noticed and 
acknowledged. However, the way he unconsciously 'chooses' to get Ills needs met 
continually casts him as the outsider and reinforces the role. 
Harriet Quinn 
Harriet presented herself as generally OLIt-going, creative and supportive: safe. She 
says that she is one ofthe members ofthe group that pro-vides a bridge bct\vecli 
differences - be they people, ideas, valucs or level ofv"ork bcowen strategic and 
operations. 
Her Firo-B scores are below. 
Table 13.6 
The comparison of Firo-B score and scIfassessineiit l'or I larrict Quinil 
Firo-B Sell' Firo-B Sel f, 1`11-0-11 , -, cII 
score assess- score ýIsscss_ Score zissess- 
ment ilicilt 111clit 
Express- Medium Medium MedIL1111 Medium Medium Med- II Igo li 
ed 
Wanted Low High Medium Low 1,0ýý I ligh 
Harriet has a 'high level ofsell'awareness' hLit WaS StIll SLII-I)I'ISCLI 11V WI C. \j)l0rat'10I1 
that led to her realisation that being IFIClUded into groups/processes was more t-- I 
important for her than expected. It was this area that She Choose to CNPIOrC III tile 
session along with 'wanted' affection. 
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She acknowledged the need for'affection! and she experienced the memory of holding 
back in a family, where she was the eldest of three younger, sisters. This had two or 
three links. Firstly, the affection and approval she sought from her father was not 
therein the way she wanted. She was bought up to 'hold back' and not get 
emotionally involved. Secondly, this holding back was more general in that Harriet 
would set self imposed limits on for example career aspiration. Further discussion 
revealed that this came from a fear of failure - "Not pleasing mum and dad... 
especially as the first and eldest child. " Thirdly, of the most trusted member in the 
Director's group was the person who was not unlike her father and represented a 
symbolic authority figure. 
Analysis 
Harriet is not unfamiliar with managing complex and competing relationships and 
demands as reflected in her experience as the eldest sister of four: managing the 
bridge between parents and probably between parents and children. She was 
encouraged to hold back and yet she has developed a series of strategies that make 
social engagement with her uncomplicated, which reinforce a sense of security. 
Some of the security is held in the trust she places in senior members of the group, Dr. 
James Miller-Winthrope and Geoffrey Hands, the CEO, who she acknowledge may 
symbolise the parents of the past. Another part of the 'security' was held in the self 
limitation on aspiration as well as the fear of failure. 
Harriet seems to be characterised by a need to have security. Thus, it is suggested that 
her behaviours and actions are driven by this inner dialogue and this provides a safe 
environment for herself and others but may prevent her taking more authority over her 
roles and responsibilities. It is a point she comments upon when discussing her own 
role in the group in section 4.1.1 above. 
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Ginny De Voil 
Ginny is 47 and has been working in the Gladding hospital for over 20 years and thus 
has been there the longest. She is seen as friendly and approachable and works hard 
on making the hospital's incorne targets meet. While she is good at relationships and 
making things happen it is not something that she 11cels cornes naturally: 
Her Firo-B scores are below. 
Table 1 '). 7: The comparlson ot'Firo-13 score and se I I'assess'nient for (it nný I llcVoi I 
Firo-B Sel f F11-0-13 Sell' Firo-11 'lei I" 
score assess- score ýIssess_ score ýIssess_ 
ment nient ment 
Express- Medium Medium Medium Medium NICCIIL1111 MCLI-I ligh 
ed 
Wanted Low Med-I ligh MediLlIll Lmý Medium I ligh 
Wanted affection and inclusion seemed to be key areas for discussion. 
"My natural style is to hold back because there is ail internal critic, " ýýIllch can 
generate the fear ofgetting it wrong. Oil further exploration these associations, were 
traced back to tile days being at a traditional single-sex school. Memories were of tile 
school culture of criticism and Ilear, where expectations vvere for high pcil'orniance 
and where there was no roorn Ior mistakes. I Icr school and university cxperiencc 
were thus less than en. joyable and led to 'my own space being prel'cri-ed' over the 
dernands ofthe organisation's. A paralicl was dra\Nn bctween tile school, a large 
institution of the past and some ofthe negative association therein. and the 
institutional nature ofthe hospital and she could see how tile mo could he 
unconsciously conflatcd. 
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Ginny preferred to be seen as a'good person! and thus did not like engaging in 
conflict. She has for example made people redundant but found it a very difficult 
task. This part of her nature was traced to her family dynamic. 
These factors still seemed to play out in Ginny's role in the hospital. She had high 
standards and expectations from her work. When staff did not 'perform as expected', 
she did not like to give them negative feedback on delegated work so ended up doing 
it herself because: "I do not want confrontation to spoil the relationship... and I feel I 
should do it myself. I'd do it better. " 
This inner dialogue had an additional dimension in that Ginny held ideals about the 
perfect leader - her unconscious ego ideal. "A leader was to lead from the front, be a 
perfectionist, carry the load and be able to do things better than others. " Moreover 
they were not to be a "task master or Victorian mill-owner type. " 
Thus, because Ginny basically ended up doing every thing herself she was constantly 
overworked and meeting deadlines at the last minute - often tabling papers at the 
Director's meeting. 
Finally, she recognised that she often'stood on the fence'regarding difficult issues 
and did not give a view. She would move to aposition of grey'(i. e. not black or 
white) and she could see 'everybody's point of view' and would rarely take a position 
based on her own analysis. 
These added up in Ginny's mind to reducing her realm of authority and to her setting 
self-imposed limits. 
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Analysis 
Ginny presents herself as a popular member of the Director's group and the hospital 
more generally. She worked very hard but this seems to be driven by an inner critic 
that has its history in her school experience where the need to perform was instilled 
from an early age. The fear of failure and ideals about the nature of leaders makes it 
hard for her to give up the repetitious nature of this ego and defensive routine that 
seems to be related to an unobtainable ego-ideal or 'false self. 
There is also her stated fear of conflict and confrontation, which reinforces this 
'primary process' and may hold another fear and that maybe of rejection. The outward 
appearance of sociability and the fragile nature of self-worth at a pre-conscious level 
presented some discomfort for her. 
The degree of adaptation and desire to meet other's demands, the 'helpful' role 
perceived by others in the group, not being able to take a stand up for herself and the 
fear of being harshly judged may suggest an adapted nature and the possibility of a 
complex false self. 
In any event, Ginny does take up her authority in her role and there are clear links to 
her past. This serves the group well but reinforces the internal dynamics and tensions 
that Ginny faces. 
Jean Peat 
Jean had the responsibility for Nursing services but was not directly responsible for 
the staff, who ultimately report to their Clinical Directors. This made herjob difficult 
and thus the results of her efforts have been slow to come to fruition. 
On meeting her, she had just come from a review meeting with the CEO that morning 
who had reported very positive feedback to her. 
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"I am on a high. By four years I've started to achieve the vision - my style takes time 
but it comes together in the end... The recent reports I 1rorn the external aLiditor and 
the Nursing Report] were very positive about the services. inclLidin, the savinos inade 
over the last two and half years! " 
Her Firo-B scores are below. 
'Fable 13.8 
Express- Medium High Medium Med-Iligh MedlUill 
cd 
Wanted I ligh I ligh McdIL1111 Mcd-Low MCCIRIIII I ligh 
Much ofthe focus for the session was on inclusion 
She 1'elt that in understanding her own needs for affiliation, it highligilled the 
exclusion ot'Nursing Services frorn the policy agenda ofthc hospital. Tills %, as 
Frustrating and she wanted to be more central and systematically included in policy 
debates for herself, for herselfin role and I'Or the service. 
I ler natural management style was consultative and this matched the halance she sa\\ 
between the Directors having autonomy and there being a corporate framex\ork to 
provide a common base. 
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She was often picking up 'outstanding items' that were left incomplete both at the 
hospital and also at home. Thus, she was often demand led and there were a variety 
of calls on her time, attention and skills. "I find it hard to say no. " She was always 
having to juggle work not just between competing demands but also it sounds 
between operational and strategic. She felt that her drive for work and activity was 
not to be perfect but to be seen as contributing something valuable. 
The other area that seemed to be important for Jean were her feelings on not being 
'publicly acknowledged' or 'appreciated'. 
"It's difficult to get people to appreciate the work in such a large hospital... I've felt 
frustrated as my previous knowledge and experience was ignored and continues to 
be. 5ý 
"We should use Directors background, knowledge and skills to the full. " 
"The Board expect me to have a nursing view. To advise, comment. " But Jean 
reported that she was unable to do so and on initial exploration she felt that: "I'm not 
always looking for the opportunity as well as I might. What I might want to say I may 
not for political reasons - you know there are some no go areas. The CEO may not be 
interested in what I may say. Feel like I am banging my head against a brick wall and 
I know others feel like that. " 
The theme of not being appreciated continued and it led to it being identified that it 
was hard for Jean to 'speak up' for herself or have a voice. 
She identifies that: "It's all to do with my father. He was very authoritarian. So we did 
not speak up. " Further information revealed that the family dynamic reinforced this 
way of being and Jean was able to see how it translated into her work as an adult. 
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Analysis 
Jean worked very hard but it took considerable time for her efforts to be noticed and 
appreciated. This she felt upset about. It seemed that her hard work was driven by 
her inability to say no, the need to be noticed and approved of, and to desire to retain 
the good will of people around her. This was something she did as a child in her 
family, in her family as an adult and at work picking up other people's unfinished 
business. Her difficulty in saying no, may be due to a fear of hurting others. It may 
also be a fear of self injury and a sense of internal, object-loss if others reject her as a 
consequence. This fear may have been sublimated into work. She may have placed 
this energy into strategic and policy agendas rather than operational matters thus 
increasing her effectiveness. 
Jean was unable to really speak up and we see this both from her own text and some 
of the comments of her colleague: "She lets people talk over her"; "She is 
ineffectual. " While, the roots of this behaviour can be possibly traced to childhood, it 
persists in her current work situation and has impacted on her authority to take up her 
role. The existential, as if, role she seems to have taken is the 'silent worker', who 
works hard but is not totally effective or acclaimed for her efforts.. She has done 
good work as demonstrated by the external references. However, in the minds of the 
group and within her, she is unable to speak up and her perceived role authority is 
low. She may carry the phantasized 'incompetence' of the group that B ion (196 1) 
talks of in his study of groups and the role of projective identification. The group's 
pay off is a protection against criticism and against the fragility of the temporary 
holding environment, which if exposed may fragment and leave everyone 'naked'. 
That would make them all open to criticism from the Board, the CEO and their own 
inner critics. 
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4.3 Do individual 'valencies' reinforce difficult group dynamics? An analysis of 
the individuals 
Each individual's personal dynamic were presented from the in-depth interviews that 
explored their personal history, inner dialogue and context and meaning for each 
Directors. While each member had there own unique history, inner tensions and 
conflicts, they all fitted a role within the group that served some of the needs of the 
group. Be it the entrepreneur and saviour, the attention-seeker who never had 
feedback or the bridge builder, each of these seemed to meet the complex dynamic of 
the group and reinforce a number of the individual's personal valencies. Thus, a 
complex interaction of personal, role and group dynamics provides a 'group matrix', 
which is made of multiple, unconscious projective identifications. 
Psychoanalytic theory suggested (see chapter 6) that the unresolved memories and the 
compulsion to repeat these difficult times in our childhood help explain some of our 
actions. In these individual cases there is evidence that past memories of an 
unresolved nature do continue to be unconsciously acted out and that in an 
organisational setting they do impact on how people take up their roles and manage 
their authority. 
Unconscious roles of conflict avoider, perfect leader, 'fence sittee, 'pleaser' seemed to 
be part of individual valencies within this group. These enactments may arise from a 
number of reasons such as the fear of object loss, the intemalisation of demanding 
ego-ideal (objects), the over adaptation of self or a 'false self' as discussed in the 
analysis of each account. This study was not able to substantiate the cause but it was 
able to suggest tentative conclusions. However, it is fairly well established in the 
literature that there is an associative relationship between personal history and the 
inner world that creates and the way in which people take up their authority in role. 
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Secondly, the contending proposition suggests that while there are still positive and 
valuable activities and work that can, and do, arise from our past childhood memories 
and experiences, where these remain un-addressed then in'dividuals will be 
constrained in their ability to fully take up their authority roles. In the cases described 
above, the roles taken and given (note what each says about the other) seem to sustain 
a collusive dynamic that serves avoidance, the reduction of pain and a denial of reality 
for the group and provide a familiar but perverse need for the individual. The latter 
meaning it reinforces their unconscious compulsion to act out or to operate in such a 
way that they get the opposite of what they want or it comes in a perverse way. For 
example the HR Director really wanting feedback but getting it in a way that was 
attention seeking and seen as confrontational rather than just asking for a regular 
meeting. Similarly, the Director of Nursing Services wanting appreciation and 
recognition yet not being noticed by her colleagues and not speaking up. 
Thus, it appears that the personal accounts support the proposition that where 
Directors are driven by their pre-conscious anxieties, these do impact on how they 
take up their role in two ways. It appears that it reinforces the role that each member 
takes up which both serves the group and the self-limiting aspects of the individual. 
In addition, it reduces the impact of their role authority through them not speaking up 
(Jean Peat), speaking too much (Geoffrey Hands), driven by the need to be included 
(Harriet Quinn), or simply needing feedback (David Larson). This 'role 
differentiation' is a product of projective identification between the individual 
valencies and the needs of the group as a whole. 
At a wider systemic level, the impact of the context also seems to be important in a 
number of ways. 
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Theory suggests that the context provides the mirror to the internal objects that are 
represented in the externalisation of those objects. Thus, the group, the institution (as 
objects) and members of the group represented a number of things. For example, we 
see transference relationships existing between the David Larson, HR Director and 
CEO, between Harriet Quinn (Ops) and the CEO and Deputy and Clinical Director. 
The Clinical Director refers to his own experience of being the first born and its 
relationship to fellow clinicians. The Director of Marketing draws upon the parallels 
between the existential and inner demands of her public school institution (the object 
in the inner world) and the institutional demands and of the hospital in the external 
world and how these were conflated. The CEO saw the authority figure in the 
external objects of the health authorities and it was equated to the rebellious child 
within, to the internal father. Thus, it is noted that during the same period that the 
CEO's father actually approved on him, he was also being approved by the health 
community at large. 
A cynic may say his father was cashing in on the CEO's newly found local fame. A 
psychoanalytic view would argue that once the father had provided the sought after 
approval, the rebellious enactment no longer served a purpose. Thus, the health 
authorities were no longer construed or treated as the authority figure or external bad 
object. The latter would have to be tempered with changes within the minds and 
context of the CEO's team and Board and some changes in health authority personnel. 
But the cynical view carries less weight. 
Finally, the group itself changed. One member was exported and the difficult feelings 
that were associated with him were successfully launched as well. There was no 
evidence eight months after the Finance Director left that the same feelings were still 
around. This contradicts theory about scape-goating which suggests the system 
always needs a scapegoat. Some of this may be explained by three factors: 
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The context of the group changed in several ways 
- The health authority shifted its position and the level of intensity while not 
stopping, it did not increase and the system could operate at that level. 
- The Board changed in the spring of 1996 and this provided more of a holding 
environment to contain and support the Directors group and the individuals 
involved. 
- The temporary holding environment was replaced and thus the fragility of the 
system as a whole was not so vulnerable 
a The group itself changed 
The group initially 're-grouped' and began to work as a team and have more 
recently made appointments. There was an opportunity to change roles and end 
the collusive nature of the dynamics that were identified. The study does not 
cover further follow-up 
Geoffrey Hands, CEO, seemed to have been more conciliatory both to the outside 
world and the inner world of the hospital. This may mirror more significant 
changes in his own personal inner and external worlds. 
Thus, while there have been system changes there was no evidence of scape-goating 
during the last visit in December 1996. 
In summary, the systemic dynamic of groups do appear to be a complex interaction 
between the history and inner world of its members and the dynamics and context of 
the group itself. 
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5. Organisational learning 
Question four: Is the organisation able to attain strategic organisational 
learning at a high level? 
The purpose of this section is to address three sub-questions about the nature and level 
of strategic organisational learning in the system and the impact of systemic defensive 
routines. The sources of data for the inquiry are varied: the responses to the first 
interview (Q 17 onwards), the dialogue and feedback sessions held at the interim stage 
of the research, and an additional review meeting with the CEO and the 
Deputy/Clinical Director in August 1996. 
The three areas of inquiry are: 
" Is there strategic organisational. learning? 
" Is such learning double loop? 
" Does the strategic leadership provide facilitative structures for learning? 
5.1 Is there strategic organisational learning? Its nature and scope 
Organisational learning here refers to the manner in which the strategic apex 
systemically understands how it interprets its environments, acts on its decision and 
systematically reviews and institutionalises its findings. It is based on the elements 
argued in chapter 5: scanning, detection and interpretation, taking action, reviewing 
and learning and countering organisational defences. 
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5.1.1 Scanning and detection: 
The Directors group was the body responsible for this. It used both formal and 
informal methods to scan its environment and make sense of what was going on. 
More often than not the way the 'top team' knew about what was going on was that 
they were: "Tipped off informally by other hospitals"; "By informal query started by 
the CEO and the Deputy CEO"; "No signal at all - we just did not have the 
information... insufficient risk assessment"; "Just sensed it and felt uncomfortable 
about our moves. " 
More formal mechanisms included: "The Board is given a report every month of 
income and expenditure projections - but it is perceived as the Director of finance 
giving us bad news"; "The expenditure plans - monitoring them and seeing no new 
contracts. " Early signs were present - slipped dates, renegotiating projects, delays but 
the signs were ignored. In addition, during the period of study a proposal for 
benchmarking was being considered but not followed through. Finally, data from the 
Kings Fund review and the district auditor was also available but in the case of the 
former seemed to be used selectively at the Board meetings. 
The formal scanning processes seem to be slow to detect micro changes in the system 
as it related to strategic initiatives. Often the information yielded was wrongly 
interpreted, mis-read or ignored. The informal processes seemed to be given more 
weight and these were often the basis of executive action over formal data. 
5.1.2 Taking action 
We have already had information regarding the 'top team's' effectiveness and its 
slowness to follow through or complete actions (see 2.1 above). These behaviours 
also extend to strategic organisational leaming. In terms of taking corrective action 
on difficult strategic dilemmas the group's response was no better. 
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"Initially the situation was not dealt with"; "Corridor conversation is usually the way 
things are dealt with here"; "We all retreaf'; "We work on the basis of the last minute 
behind the scene discussion"; "We decided to pull things out at the last minute and 
manage it through special projects, which did not actually produce the results"; "We 
rang round (at the last minute) to drum up business contracts. It was all by the seat of 
our pants. " 
The group was poor at carrying through its decisions and those with a strategic 
imperative were more usually dealt with through informal processes or at the last 
minute. 
5.1.3 Reviewing and sharing of learning 
The group showed little evidence of effective sharing of their lessons. 
"No debate about the issues"; "Insufficient time to critically evaluate"; "When we got 
the report we rubbished the external auditors"; "Some things are just too politically 
sensitive to share"; "There were no lessons drawn; we should have had a post 
morturn"; "Personally I felt we could have handled the situation better"; "Feedback is 
weak - I'd not seen the project status (on a large piece of investment) for over three to 
four months"; "We tend not to share learning"; "We never even shared it at the Board, 
let alone the rest of the organisation"; "There is a new sharing and task force lead by 
the CEO but that's only just developed"; "Not shared; no action"; "No -just denial. 
As to review it would mean accepting the loss and lessons are resisted for political 
reasons. 19 
The group was poor at reviewing and sharing its lesson. It seemed that the fear of 
exposure, retribution from the health authority or from colleagues stopped the 
strategic group from systematically reviewing and sharing its learning on strategic 
initiatives. The informal process again seemed to provide some information but this 
did not compensate for the lack of reviewing and sharing at the strategic level. 
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Thus, the learning that did take place seemed to be informal. There was little, if any, 
strategic or systematic forum or debate on organisational learning. This was not even 
had on a large IT project which was piloted in the hospital in order to 'learn' from it 
and apply to other trusts in the NHS. The fear of exposure by the project group, the 
hospital and the NHS prevented valuable lessons being discussed openly or shared. 
Thus, there was little evidence of strategic organisational learning. The conclusion 
was also apparent in the dialogue session 
5.2 Is there double loop learning? The role of defensive routines 
There was no evidence of double-loop learning in this case study. It is suggested that 
learning in general and double-loop learning in particular was impaired by what 
Argyris calls 'defensive routines'. 
The organisation engaged in a number of defensive routines. These operated for the 
individual, the Board, the Directors' group and the strategic apex of the organisation 
as a whole. At each level the defensive and collusive routine served some other 
'existential' need and was a flight from the task, boundary, critical thinking or 
opportunity for learning. 
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From the discussion about each of the individuals we see the ego-defensive routines 
that have a historical and systemic nature to them. The historical aspect is rooted in 
their personal history and the degree to which they are able to make sense of that 
experience. The systemic aspect is the conjoining of the individual's valency (object 
relations both in the inner and external world) and the group's matrix (projections and 
tranferences at different levels of meaning) which provides the 'roles' that are enacted 
and which continue to serve the individual's compulsion to repeat unresolved 
experiences (see 3.2 above). It also provides the group with a 'structure' that is 
'familiar' and 'familial' to individuals and meets the group's need to ward off collective 
anxiety in a period of change. The organisational change evoked shifts in the external 
objects invested in the institution as it was then and generated varying degrees of 
anxiety as people readjusted to the new environment and context after 1991. The 
collective group phantasy about the depth and meaning of these shifts were most 
likely to have been unconsciously negotiated. 
For the group as a whole, its development and internal experience was marked by the 
absence of a robust 'holding environment' due to the collapse of the Board's authority 
and boundaries. The collusive routine supported the CEO, the Chair and the Deputy 
CEO to 'act as if it were the Board. This provided the temporary and needed space 
for the Director's group to work and it gave the sense of protection. The CEO's'role' 
as 'saviour' and the basic assumption pairing of the CEO and his deputy provided 
temporary relief against the anxious feelings of failure, uncertainty about the strategic 
task, 'bankruptcy' and punishment from the health authorities. 
This collusive and defensive routine appears to have provided the space for the group 
to 'work!, albeit at a low level. 
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The group also 'exported' the finance Director. The evidence does suggest that he 
provided the strategic apex with the correct signals and this was often seen as his 
problem, not taken seriously or actively defied by the medical Directors. His 
reporting and administrative systems were lacking in some respects and this did 
aggravate an already difficult situation. It is suggested that the systemic defence 
against failure was invested in scape-goating the finance Director and that was the 
reason why he 'resigned'. It was the same staff and system that serviced the group 
after the Director left so it was not as if the administrative difficulties were beyond 
repair. 
Finally, the strategic apex as a whole acted as 'as if nothing was going wrong. It is 
suggested that it was in'manic denial' (see Jaques, 1953). The Board meetings 
continued to be notified of the financial problems and its poor image with the health 
authorities but it did not take any executive actions. Instead, the decisions and 
authority was taken outside its formal boundaries. It colluded with the myth that the 
Board was in charge and this may have served a wider defence for the organisation as 
a whole which seemed to be totally unaware of the difficulties the strategic apex was 
experiencing. Even the medical Directors continued to spend as they had in the past 
and medical decisions continued to lead the expenditure lines over the'strategic plan'. 
It was 'as if the organisation as a whole wished to deny the severity of the problem. 
More fundamentally, it was 'as if the medical fraternity wanted to assert its rights or 
at least challenge the shift in culture to a more business model of working. 
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5.3 Does the strategic leadership provide facilitative structures? 
Implications 
The implications of this final commentary on organisational learning is that the 
system reinforces its defensive routines at multiple levels. Where there is any space 
for learning this was lost, constrained or corrupted. Scanning and detection was weak 
or absent, with interpretations based on informal processes. Corrective action was 
slow or ineffective and sharing and learning was kept in people's head at best. In fact 
the environment did not support systemic and institutionalised leaming. Neither the 
Board nor Executive Directors were able to provide facilitative structures through 
providing clarity of the strategic task and the management of boundaries - both 
external and internal. The unconscious role differentiation within the Director's team 
did not help either. Thus, in the case of Gladding hospital trust, its capacity to learn 
during the period of study seemed to be constrained to level zero - systemic habitual 
routines with occasional personal learning. 
6. Personal insights 
In the spirit of self reflective inquiry and a 'clinical' approach, this section records 
some of the key experiences and dynamics, I experienced in the role of researcher. It 
describes some of the feelings and thoughts about various aspects of both the 
organisation and the process and concludes with additional personal insights. 
Experiences and reflections will cover: 
9 The enviromnent and context 
The leadership vvithin the system 
The team of Directors 
" Individuals in the system 
" The research process 
" Personal insights and learning 
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6.1 The environment and context 
My initial experience of the environment and context is described in the entry process 
in section 1.1 above. It was friendly open and a frank exchange. It concurred with the 
'friendly' side of the culture that was mentioned in section 1.2.2 above and my 
feelings were very positive towards the hospital. It was a place I felt glad to go to and 
there was a sense of security. 
I also had very positive associations to it as two years early it was the place where our 
first child was born and the standard of care in a difficult situation was good. I did 
mention this to some members of the group but it was not a conscious thought as I 
worked with them. But it was no doubt in the background. Thus, I wanted them to 
succeed. 
I did not experience the 'turbulence' of the environment. It was quite the opposite. 
The large expanse of the green hospital grounds had the feel of a campus than say 
some of the inner city, Accident & Emergency wards I visited during the early stages 
of the research. Thus, with the exception of the CEO, I did not feel any urgency to 
manage the strategic crisis. Graham Nett was the only other exception but that was 
more to do with managing a chaotic project than a strategic agenda. 
Finally, on the theme of a 'medically-led' culture, there was little evidence of that in 
the manner in which Board meeting or the Executive meetings were conducted. It 
was also true to say the Dr James Miller-Winthrope was invested with all of that 
authority (I certainly felt it) but it was not so evident in the artefacts or surface level of 
the culture. However, it did seem to be present at a deeper level, in that it felt that 
budgets could not be controlled (run by the medics); I was surprised by Professorial 
appointments being made without due course to the Directors group; and the Strategic 
Implementation Committee, which was medically led, seemed to have a persuasive 
lobby that was referred most often at the beginning of meetings in the chit chat period. 
Additional secondary data in the form of notes and minutes of that group's meeting 
support those feelings. 
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6.2 The leadership within the system 
I felt a positive regard for the CEO and admired the way he tackled what seemed to be 
an enormous problem of change. He was positive, dynamic, process driven and 
thoughtfid. I felt a positive transference relationship with him and could understand 
how his colleagues could love him or be envious of him. Thus, I felt I needed to work 
harder on also acknowledging that he could be 'flighty' i. e. make strategic decisions 
in the corridor, be less clear in his thinking and controlling. Thus, I had to struggle 
with the notion of some ego ideal. 
He certainly filled the leadership vacuum for me compared with the Chair who was 
friendly, good at asking questions but not as ruthless as the situation required. 
The only other member on the Board that stood out for me was a partner in one of the 
larger consulting groups. His attendance at Board meetings was sporadic. But he was 
razor sharp on getting to the issues and then holding onto to it until the issue was 
resolved or actions and time scales agreed. 
Dr Miller-Winthorpe also played a leadership role. It was 'as if' he played the loyal 
Lieutenant. He did have gravitas and was a seasoned clinical manager. I felt very 
positive towards him and could see how he could be held as a 'father' figure or 'very 
safe pair of hands'. He was a counter point to the CEO, whose acceptance to risk 
exposure was balanced by the doctor's more clinical and objective assessment of risk. 
6.3 The team of Directors 
My first meeting with the team is recounted in section 1.1 above. It was enjoyable, 
intellectually challenging and a robust exchange. It felt good too that they decided to 
go ahead and made the decision while I was still in the room. So no anxious waiting. 
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Again, I felt positive towards them as a group and became a surrogate, fly-on-the-wall 
member, as I sat through several summer afternoons listening to their discussions. 
Occasional they would make comments like: "I wonder what he thinks of this... " or, "I 
bet you think we're mad" or, "I'd love to see what you're writing. " Only on two 
occasions was I asked directly: "What do you think? " I never answered their 
questions, never felt drawn to become a member of the team or even imagined that I 
was a member of the team. Thus, I felt comfortable in the research role and was 
determined not to be drawn into the role of consultant (see discussion on research 
process below) 
The split between David Larson and Geoffrey Hands was evident: more in the 
exchanges they had and some of the private conversations that I had with them rather 
than open hostility. 
Generally, I felt that there was a great deal of goodwill in the team, they were 
committed to providing the best health care within their region and they were a good 
group of people. No political undertones at least. 
6.4 Individuals in the system 
My experience of most of the individual team members among the Directors 
concurred with that of their colleagues and their areas of interests in the second one to 
one, in-depth interviews (see sections 3.1.1 and 3.2 respectively). The CEO, the Chair 
and the Deputy I have already made some comments about as key players. However, 
three other people stood out for me. These were: Harriet Quinn (Ops), David Larson 
(HR) and Jean Peat (Nursing Services). 
Harriet Quinn always struck me as realistic yet positive. In the face of adversity she 
could see both the realism of the situation and keep upbeat. This I admired and was 
drawn to. I thought this may be just a facade but in a variety of settings this seemed 
constant through out the year and a half I worked with the hospital. She was also the 
one that included me a lot in the Directors meetings and was always positively 
disposed to the research. There may have been some counter-transference on my part 
which linked with her own needs to include and be included. My own Firo-B score 
for wanted inclusion is extremely low (see Appendix 6) and belies a much higher 
desire to be included or more specifically to be recognised. 
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David Larson. I was struck with sadness when David reported that all he ever wanted 
was feedback and how empty that was for him. While it touched the recognition 
needs I have, it also gave me a completely different side to David, that was never 
observed in the public arena or noted by his colleagues. 
Jean Peat comes to mind because of her absence. She constantly and repeatedly 
cancelled meetings but when the whole process was very advanced wanted to be 
involved. 
The issue of absence did strike a chord for me as it was how others had described her. 
Yet in the one to one, in-depth meeting she was a different and confident person. 
There was a sense of 'but a bit too late' for me and some irritation at this late desire to 
be included. For my part, it may be some disappointment in her not taking up her 
authority and being more dynamic. However, there was also a constructed 'reality' 
that she was seen as less than effective and my experience of her understands why that 
may be so. 
6.5 The research process 
The research process is described in detail in chapters 10 and 11. The area that is 
touched upon here is managing the role. In declaring clear boundaries between the 
research and consultancy role it may be that these could be too rigid for this work. 
In Kahn (1993), he discusses the dangers of blurring these role relations and it is from 
that reference that the research was informed. 
The events started with the first feedback session after the group observations and the 
first interviews. After points of clarification and discussion most of the points were 
found as having validity (a tape of the session is available). 
However, the key question was: what are we going to do with it. I resisted overtures 
to have an organisational development programme, to provide a regular review 
outside of the research programme or do anything outside the role. Re-listening to the 
taped material I could see why I might come over as bloody-minded and unhelpful. 
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The outcome was that the group did not engage with the research process for another 
six or seven months and when they did they kept it to a limited agenda of the personal 
one to ones. 
I believed and it was confirmed that the 'feedback' came without additional support 
and it was taken as a critical case (see my file notes in Appendix 9.1). This had 
broken the working alliance that had been established and at the subsequent meeting 
with the Geoffrey Hands and Dr Miller-Winthrope in August 1996, they both said that 
more support was needed during that difficult time and a 'shower of cold water' was 
unwelcomed. 
The point here is in overly adhering to a rigid interpretation of the role, I damaged the 
research relationship. Schein (1987b and 1991) and Kakabadse (1996) would argue 
that you need to follow the 'client's interests'. Kakadabse (1996) further argues that 
such role distinctions are less valuable. 
6.6 Personal insights and leaming 
The process of engagement with Gladding hospital has been rich with learning and 
insights. Thus, I am choosing to be selective on the top key themes that emerge from 
my reflections. 
The initial contact with a system is important in terms of developing relationship 
both for me as an individual and in the role. The past positive association with 
the hospital and the two most key players being my initial source of contact was 
an important facilitative process for my crossing the boundary. The two also met 
some of my ego-ideal expectations of 'dynamic leaders' and the environment was 
both pleasant and as a system open at the first boundary of contact. The benefits 
of this is that real dialogue starts early. The dangers are that it can be seductive 
and the 'shadow' side of both the key players and the system can be less 
prominent. 
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My identification with the notion of strong, dynamic and process thinking leaders 
is high. This forms part of my ego-ideal, the way I would like to see myself. 
This awareness is good in that it has prevented 'interference' in the research 
process of how I'd like others to be and have been able to hear what people have 
said. Thus, the other side of people has been present and it stresses the 
importance of our own transferental material in taking such a reflective or clinical 
approach and the need to hold our own role boundaries. 
Managing the role boundary with more flexibility but keeping the task in mind is 
valuable. My leaming from this case was I was 'over-bounded' and therefore 
closed to the needs of the group. Thus, my application of the learning was to be 
much closer to the team in case study three and ensure that a sense of support was 
present without compromising the role. I further reflect that my 'over- 
boundedness' may have been an unconscious over-reaction (reaction formation in 
psychoanalytic terms) to an under-bounded system. 
Finally, this process re-confirms the view that a reflecting and enquiring approach 
supports a deeper level of understanding when exploring the constructed reality 
of social systems. 
7. Conclusion 
The case material suggests that there are a number of dynamics that impact on 
organisational learning. In particular this thesis suggests that history, inner processes 
and context at the various levels are all important and has put forward five 
propositions. 
The first question concerned the impact of the environment on the 'top team' and it 
explored the relationship between the turbulence of the environment and the 
organisation! s ability to learn (at the strategic level) 
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7.1 Was the environment turbulent? 
In the case of Gladding hospital trust, we found that the organisation was in fact 
operating in an environment of immense change and the relationships with the 
external environment - GPs, health authorities, other hospitals, the DoH, the public 
and patients - had fundamentally and structurally changed. The uncertainty of 
income, resources, working relationship and expectations had changed and it was 
almost like starting again. Tbus, the environment was turbulent. 
For the strategic apex, managing that change was immensely difficult and the focus on 
managerial survival and the protection of the organisation from the reality of the 
situation left little time for structured scanning, reviewing or learning. Few seemed to 
be up to speed with the demands of the change and the organisation still had a 
tranquillity that belied the order of the change. This slowness of response and lack of 
ability to read, interpret and make sense of reality meant that the key subsystem was 
unable to perform its function of strategic learning on behalf of the organisation. 
The situation was further exacerbated by the quality of the'holding environment' 
provided by the Board. The Board was dependent upon the CEO and unable to 
manage its own task and boundaries. The Board became dependent in its relationship 
with the CEO and while not hostile to the Director's group, neither was it able to 
provide critical support and challenge. Thus, the 'top team' were further exposed to 
the environment and the consequent impact on learning was impaired. 
412 
Regressive dynamics did unfold in the system of the Board and the Executive 
Directors in the form of pairing, the CEO taking on the saviour role, scape-goating 
and manic denial being enacted. Any strategic learning was negated. However, the 
outcome was not conclusive in that a temporary 'holding environment' of the CEO, 
Deputy CEO and the Chair of the Board provided a container and channel for the 
strategic apex as a whole to have the space to adjust to the transition. It is suggested 
that this 'holding space' was functional as part of both group's transition and one 
concludes that defensive dynamics per se need not negate learning - providing they 
are temporary and are in service of a transitional space. Klein, 1975, makes a similar 
point that realising the transitional object is a symbol or is temporary makes it 
acceptable. It is when the transitional object is substituted 'as if it were real that it 
becomes dysfunctional. 
7.2 Was the 'top team'able to manage its task and boundaries? 
How well does the 'top team' manage itself? The inferences from the discussion is 
that it does not share a clear view of the task, its task effectiveness is poor, and the 
way external and internal relationships are managed do not provide the intended 
results. They are not a well managed team based on those criteria. 
The leader does attempt to compensate and in so doing takes on a role that has been 
construed as controlling. These dynamics undermine strategic task attainment. Thus, 
learning is hard to achieve as there is no containment for it and the drive on immediate 
short term goals means that there is insufficient capacity in the group to manage 
learning as well. 
7.3 Do the dynamics of the group impact on organisational learning? 
The dynamics of the group shows that it has the capacity to 'work' but much of this is 
at a low level. It does not address the higher order level of 'work', where learning is 
harnessed. Basic assumption behaviours are present in the group - 'fight', flight from 
reality, dependency, scape-goating and some pairing. 
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In addition, we do see a clear link between personal valencies, 'role differentiation' of 
members in the group and the internal dynamics of the group. These suggest 'role' 
rigidity is present and these dynamics serve self-limiting role and personal authority 
relations for group members and they sustain the difficult group dynamics construed 
in the 'group matrix. ' 
Thus, the group's dynamics do impact on learning in that it reinforces low levels of 
work, ego defences and social defences as a subsystem. 
These were also supported by wider systemic dynamics as evidenced in the wider role 
of the CEO outside of the group, acting as the 'knight in white armour' for the 
hospital. The 'pairing' role of the CEO and the Deputy Director, the inadequate 
'holding environment! of the Board and the systemic scape-goating of the finance 
Director suggests that these dynamics were not constrained to the group alone. This 
further suggest that the 'pair' plus the Chair of the Board was insufficient to provide a 
space for learning because of excessive defensive routines against the fear of 
annihilation: life or death of the hospital. 
7.4 Is there strategic organisational learning at a high level? 
In the case of Gladding, we see that the organisation does not support systemic 
learning. 
There does not appear to be evidence to support the notion of strategic learning. 
Neither is there data to support double loop learning. It appears that where learning 
may occur at the individual, group and subsystem level of the strategic apex that they 
are undermined by defensive routines. Such routines take the form of ego-defences, 
group myths and social and systemic defences which impair leaming. 
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7.5 Additional insights 
Not all of the propositions are shown to hold. Turbulence does seem to impact on the 
organisatioWs ability to learn as does the quality of the 'top team's' 'holding 
environment' and its ability to manage itself. However, there are some further insights 
that are noted. These are: 
The prevalence of organisational defensive routines also carries considerable 
weight. Much more than expected and these may help to explain more why the 
system was unable to attain strategic organisational leaming through its 'top 
team'. 
The response to the turbulence in the environment may be as important as the 
envirom-nent itself The capacity for strategic management teams to manage their 
own task and boundaries will impact how they scan, interpret, act and review and 
learn from their interactions with the environment. 
Temporary systems arising from defensive routines, can provide the much needed 
space for task attainment in the short term. Thus, an authoritarian or dependency 
leadership may paradoxically provide some temporary value to the organisation. 
The level of awareness required to understand one's personal history and dynamic 
is not within the expected bounds of most managers and as such it suggests that 
the re-enactment of compulsive routines are likely to be played out in 
organisational settings - especially those in crisis. 
The systemic dynamics of the wider systems appear to be more powerful in 
understanding the impaired learning of this system than the internal dynamics of 
just the 'top team'. 
These emerging themes provide additional insights for this study. 
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Cases in organisational dynamics 
Chapter 14 - The 'top team' that stayed the same - 
a case study of organisational routines 
1. Introduction 
This case study is about a 'top team' in a local authority, operating within an 
environment of macro changes and complete turnaround in culture to a position of 
trying to seek stability and continuity. They were working with the tensions of trying 
to control costs, performance, outputs, gain consistency of practice and standards, yet 
at the same time retain the buzz, excitement and sense of achievement that came from 
the recent past of managing crisis, change and cultural realignment. 
Information about the setting of the case, the initial contact and entry and the key 
players is provided in this section. The organisational and group dynamics form the 
bulk of the rest of this chapter with analysis of the presenting data. 
1.1 Background information 
Tuthering Local Council operated within a metropolitan area. It had a variety of 
nationalities in its area and a wide band of social groupings. This was reflected also 
by an immense mix in environment from high rise, municipal flats and estates to large 
expansive green lands and Grade II listed buildings. Iffiere were also high levels of 
social deprivation in the east part of the area compared with a very affluent 
community on the west. It was an area of contrast and a multiplicity of cultures and 
different social values and mores all co-existing. 
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Some of this mix can be understood in terms of the authorities formation. It was the 
product of the Local Authority Act and reorganisation in 1974, which corporatised 
local government. It brought together smaller boroughs together under larger scale 
local councils. The argument at the time was that bigger authorities provided greater 
scale economies and as the provider of public services this was efficient and a good 
use of public funds. 
One of the consequences of this was that Tuthering Local Council had two 'old' town 
halls that were used as head offices for two of the departments with a 'civic centre' in 
the middle of the area being the main town hall. The latter was the place where the 
CEO and the Director of Policy and Strategy both had their offices. 
The formal organisational structure was a based on traditional local authority lines 
with the fifty-seven, elected officials (or Members) running the council through sub- 
committees'-. These in turn reported to a main Resource and Development committee. 
The latter was run by the Chair or 'Leader' of the council and supported by the CEO 
and the Director of Finance. The other sub-committees were run by their respective 
departmental Chairs and supported by their service Directors. There were five main 
committees: Finance, Welfare Services, Planning, Contracts and Education Services. 
Other ad hoc and special projects committees were set up on the basis of need. 
The council had a large Labour ma ority with less than 10% representing other i 
political parties - Tuthering Council magazine, April 1996 
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Figure 14.1 - An overview of the structure 
Elected party - Labour 
Leader of the Council 
Committee Chairs 
CEO 
Departmental Directors2 
Service-led Departments 
Units and teams supporting/providing public service(s) 
I Departmental Directors were accountable to the CEO through the line and excutive 
management structures as well as to their committee Chair through the political 
management of the authority. 
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The authority had approximately 11,000 staff at the time of study, with about 120 
senior managers running it. The senior management figure reflected a lower number 
than most authorities. Based on the preliminary studies by the researcher the figure 
was typically 200. 
1.2 Initial contact 
The process of gaining entry into this organisation followed from the selection criteria 
and methods outlined in chapter 10. As a local authority with a previous high, public 
profile a direct letter to the CEO was something they were used to and that was the 
initial contact. An interest to take the matter forward was followed by a telephone 
conversation and then a meeting with the CEO, in his office. 
The office was wood panelled, with only enough space for the CEO's desk and a 
wooden meeting table. If there were more than ten people in the room it was 
crowded. We met around the table with morning tea. 
The office was in the Town Hall, which was off the main high street. The entrance to 
Town Hall building was a large, automatic glass door which led to a very large, high- 
ceiling but secured reception area. You could not physically proceed into the rest of 
the building unless the security locks were released to let you in. There was a large 
clock on one side. This had stopped and was reading ten past ten. It stayed that way 
for over a year. 
Below the clock was a huge brass-plated plaque of all of the council leaders that had 
taken office since the 1940s. On the other sides of the reception there were no other 
solid walls, just glass walls looking out to the side of the building and the staff car 
park at the back. The receptionist and security guard would greet all visitors with 
'Yes, can I help you' in a way that could be a little off-putting and they were often on 
the telephone having conversations with another colleague in the building. 
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The meeting with the rest of the Directors was scheduled several months after the 
initial meeting with the CEO and this took place in the CEO's office. There was some 
dissent by two members of the group of seven, but the CEO made a strong case for the 
research to go ahead and wanted to know what was the source of their objections. The 
counter arguments did not hold water with the CEO and the rest of the members of the 
group were positive or at least curious. Thus, the research went ahead. 
Letters of confirmation were exchanged and a final briefing meeting was held with the 
CEO and a policy aid who was to be the point of contact and liaison. After the initial 
part of the research, the group observations, the contact point was changed to the 
Director of Policy and Strategy (DPS). 
1.3 The key players 
The research was undertaken with the 'top team'. The key players were as follows: 
" Chris Hinds, CEO 
" Paul Harris, Director of Finance 
" Fred Jones, Director of Welfare Services - including housing and social services 
" Ben Chandra, Director of Planning - the physical environment 
" Peter Atkins, Director of Contracts 
" Janet Taylor, Director of Education Services 
0 Charles Tews, Director of Policy and Strategy 
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2. The organisation and its environment 
This section addresses the research question: 
Question one: Are the dynamics of the 'top team I influenced by the 
conditions of the environment? 
Theory suggests that the answer should be yes. But we are concerned with two 
specific sub-questions: 
9 Is the environment turbulent? 
Does the context of the organisation provide a 'holding environment' for 
organisational learning? 
Z1 Is the environment turbulent? 
An analysis of secondary data including articles, background papers and minutes 
suggested that there was a general context of change and uncertainty. This was 
characterised by a number of trends. 
There was the political drive for increasing the competitiveness of local 
authorities through Compulsive Competitive Tending (CCT) Act 1986. 
There was a move to take public services out of the realms of public provision 
and change the role of local authorities. Authorities were no longer there to 
provide but were to be 'Enablers', according to Nicholas Ridley, MP, (Gyford, 
1991, Clarke and Stewart, 1998). This meant a change in roles, structures and 
relationships with 'customers' and 'partner' agencies. It also provided a different 
paradigm for working where 'commissioning bodies' took over the role of service 
managers and different parts of the department could be both client and provider. 
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The Conservative government was committed to reducing public expenditure. 
Thus it introduced a series of efficiency drives starting in 198 1, along with rate 
capping and local government restraints through the mid 1980s and actual cuts in 
expenditure during the years that followed. The main cuts were between 
financial years 1981-82 and 1989-90 and they were in the order of 6-7% in real 
terms, with some growth for a year of two per cent for 1990-1991. This was 
followed by a further 1.5 per cent cut in real terms between financial year 1991 - 
1992 and 1993-4 and an estimated relaxation of cuts for 1994-1995. Since then 
the government has found it difficult to keep its expenditure commitments 
without its active privatisation programme (Flynn (1993) HM Treasury - Public 
Expenditure Analysis to 1994-95, Cmnd 1920) 
Several legislative acts have impacted on the provision of services in housing, the 
Children Act 1986 and in the case of this authority changes in funding 
arrangements for both special urban projects and monies from Europe. This 
required new intemal structures, processes and procedures to meet the criteria of 
central goverm-nent (or its agent) and the expectations of local people. 
There have been greater operational pressures put on the council to meet new, 
tight time tables if they were to take advantage of the new and varied distribution 
channels for funding. Examples quoted at management meetings were CCT, the 
need to develop a housing strategy, HIP allocation (Housing Improvement 
Programme), the authority's Community Care Plan and its bid and management 
of 'Regeneration' funds. 
Finally, there were political pressures to have an image of being 'Squeaky clean' 
both as an authority and as part of the Labour party's leadership aspirations in 
national politics. These were sentiments most voiced by the Chris Hinds, CEO, 
and Fred Jones (Welfare Services) 
These main features of the national, regional and local environment suggest that most 
of the 'turbulence' was during the mid 1980's between 1983 and 1990. It was during 
this phase that most of the legislation was introduced, most of the cuts were 
experienced and the political polarities were most apparent between central and local 
government and especially between the Conservative and Labour local authorities 
(Widdicombe Report, 1986). 
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In addition to these external trends the Directors identified three other key issues that 
concerned them. 
9 Budgetary and financial resources 
Agreeing priorities in relationship to the changing environment 
Managing public expectations 
2.2.1 Budgetary and financial resources 
* Quotes on these based on the first interviews 
"Budget and financial resources are an issue as is the future of local goverrunent. " 
Fred Jones (Welfare Services) 
"In the past we used certain government grants like the Urban Programme but now we 
have to use mainstream grants and prioritise. " Charles Tew (Policy and Strategy) 
"The introduction of CCT also concerns me. Where do you go if you have a 
reduction in funds? " Paul Harris (Finance) 
"... We have to make cuts but Members are not willing to do it on a long term basis. 
They only want to do it for one year. " Paul Harris (Finance) 
"I am concerned about not getting value for what we do. I am not against CCT per se 
but the regime concerns me. For example, the competition on Legal Services. We 
should have beat them on price or give it up - rather than scare off the competition 
with bureaucracy. " Ben Chandra (Planning) 
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2.1.2 Managing priorities 
With the changes in the environment it seemed hard to manage a clear set of priorities. 
"There's an inability to collectively agree key priorities and what the politicians 
want. " Charles Tew (Policy and Strategy) 
"We have a scatter-gun approach with people beavering at 13 separate priorities. " 
Janet Taylor (Educ. Services) 
"The organisation lacks clarity... There is a lack of a forum to discuss strategic 
issues. " Peter Atkins (Contracts) 
2.1.3 Managing public expectations 
Central government initiatives to 'privatise' public services and make them more 
'customer' focus represented a challenge for the Tuthering Council. 
"Innovation is frustrated by a fear of public reprisals and a drop in credibility. So they 
(the Members) don't want it (innovation) publicised or visible. " Fred Jones (Welfare 
Services) 
"It's the final leap to get the council to be focused on customer focus delivery, 
especially in the context of continuous declining resources. It is the management of 
cultural change. " Chris Hinds, CEO 
He emphasised the issue: "The Members thought more about the internal needs of the 
workforce than our public and customers. " 
"I am very concerned about the increase in public demands on services. " Paul Harris 
(Finance) 
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Peter Atkins makes a comparison with the health service. "Generally people see 
doctors and nurses as positive - maybe not management. I'd like us to be seen as the 
health service of local government by the public and worth protecting. " 
2.1.4 Was the environment turbulent? 
The external environment continued to change for the organisation. However, the 
most 'turbulent' times would have been between 1983 and 1989: when the deepest 
cuts were made; when the greatest number of significant Acts were introduced that 
had an impact on local government; and it was the period when the leading 
Conservative party was still in its zenith and it held the political ideology of the time: 
anti-left wing and anti-local government on the basis that they were inefficient 
(Gyford (199 1), Flynn (1993), Isaac-Henry and Painter (199 1) and Isaac-Henry et al 
(1993)). 
Therefore, during the period of study - 1995 and 1996 - funding was not as 
unpredictable, many of the rate capping regimes had been relaxed or jettisoned, the 
authority knew the processes to obtain the re-routed central government funds, and the 
funding crisis of the mid 1980s were largely under control bar some exceptional 
items. The environment was not a place of large scale and unpredictable change at the 
strategic level. Nonetheless the organisation did continue to respond to more 
immediate environmental demands such as meeting the various funding strictures, 
time scales and procedures as well as managing customer expectations and demands. 
Thus one concludes that the strategic and macro-political environment was no longer 
'turbulent'. However, the operational and 'market' environment was reported as 
demanding (customers and funders) and this was expressed in the difficulties of 
managing competing priorities. Therefore one infers that the operational and 
managerial agenda was more pressing than the strategic one and that the environment 
per se would not be an inhibitor to strategic organisational leaming. 
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2.2 Does the context of the organisation provide a 'holding 
environment'for organisational leaming? 
The context of the organisation or its 'holding environment' as described in chapter 8, 
includes the values, culture, leaderships and facilitative structures. 
This section will briefly examine: 
* The history of the organisation 
* The values and culture of the organisation 
* The strategic task 
* The strategic leadership role 
2.2.1 The history of the organisation 
The organisation's history and its context is best understood in terms of its political 
journey and the impact that has on the 'holding environment'. It begins with a brief 
overview of the main epochs in the organisation's history from the mid- I 980's until 
the period of study. See table 14.1 (below) which gives the story at a glance. 
The organisation had experienced a number of changes since the mid 1980's, as they 
had moved from being a council that was oriented towards the employees and the 
nature of the service, through to be being more public service oriented and finally 
being more customer oriented. This shift had been accompanied by changes in the 
culture and politics of the council from a traditional left-wing Labour council, which 
was dominated by public service unions and where the notion of management was 
ignored, to a more progressive 'New Left' authority. 
Chris Hinds, CEO, reported: "... Management systems did not exist or were abused. 
Anything went - discipline was not there. People challenged everything and refused 
to do things. We had a demoralised management group. They were not given the 
authority to manage by the politicians and the then CEO was not willing to impose 
discipline. " 
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During that early period a number of property investment decisions had also been 
taken by the politicians and the then CEO and his management team. These decisions 
were to have a long term and negative impact on the revenue streams of the authority. 
In fact, it left a large and rising debt that was a constant point of debate between the 
succeeding CEO, Members and senior staff. 
The authority then went through a period of being a'hard' left council in the mid- 
eighties. 
"Tbe housing department was a hot bed of trots, " said Charles Tews (Director of 
Policy). 
The change in tide of the thinking and the realisation of the changes in the 
environment saw the appointment of the current CEO in the late 1980's. Chris Hinds, 
the then new CEO, was committed to managing change and making the authority 
more effective but this was against a backdrop of no formal support or ownership 
from the political leaders. 
After Chris's appointment, the years leading up to the mid- I 990s were marked by 
considerable pressures on the council from central government. During that time the 
council experienced a change in funding relationships with central government 
including real reductions and cuts. This happened over a period of seven years reports 
the CEO and the Director of Finance. 
"There was a shift in funding initiatives from a set 'allocation' in the Urban 
Programme to 'competitive' central government funding schemes such as the City 
Challenge and the introduction of various types of competitive tendering processes 
that made gaining funds as much as a feature of the 'market' as it was about need. " 
Chris Hinds, CEO. 
These pressures were mainly a result of central government initiatives to control 
public sector costs (see above section). However, it meant a complete rethink and 
orientation for the authority. 
427 
Thus, the organisation experienced a number of internal changes that mirrored the 
changes in the external environment. One of these was a change in the management 
structure. Although there was a squeeze on staffing there were few redundancies 
mainly due to freezing of vacancies, some early retirements and a transfer'pool' for 
staff who were under-employed. During that period the CEO reported that the local 
authority had lost its 'middle management'. "Good people are the backbone of the 
infrastructure but we replaced them with junior and inexperienced staff through this 
middle management programme at the local university. " 
The change in management structure occurred in two phases. Initially, it was a large 
management team of 23 first and second tier senior officers. In 1992/3, the team was 
reduced by more than half to be a team of 10 major directorates, then finally to seven 
in 1994. These later changes were supported by the politicians who seemed to accept 
the reality and force of central government's political agenda. They supported the 
CEO and the management team that were charged with implementation. 
The Members' response to the changes were also a sign of a political shift in thinking 
from the traditional Labour Left. The nature of the organisational and political culture 
changed again and was said to be a Blairite-led Labour council by the mid 1990s, Paul 
Harris (Director of Finance). 
But all of the Directors agreed that there seemed to be, "A fundamental shift in the 
psyche of the organisation. " 
In summary, the process of transition for this authority was both hard and long, which 
started with a loss in confidence in the previous CEO in the mid-eighties and the 1989 
local elections, through to the mid 1990's. It seemed to have three clear epochs with 
some sub-phases. The clearly marked ones were: a period of traditional, employee 
focused Labour policies aimed at the working man and woman (early 1980's); a 
period of public service orientation and a recognition of the value of public service in 
economic and political terms (mid 1980's to late 1980's); and a period of public 
sector managerialism and customer service (early 1990's) (see table 14.1 for a 
summary). 
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The organisation appeared to have made a major shift in management structure and 
organisational culture. It also began to lose the press image of an irresponsible 
authority to one that 'was doing great things' (an independent panel member on local 
government). 
However, the internal political context proved to be a challenge for the authority and 
that is discussed in the next section. 
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Table 14.1 - The key eras in the Council's history 
Driving force 
Leadership 
Enviromnent 
Values 
Strategy 
Skills 
Structure 
Staff at the top 
Style 
Systems 
Period I Early 
1980s 
Keep the workers 
happy 
Leader of the 
Council 
Relatively stable 
'The workers 
matter' 
Single provider - 
monopoly supplier 
Political 
Large departments 
Large management 
team and senior 
officers 
Focus on political 
relationship 
Bureaucratic and 
ineffective 
Period 2 
1989/90 
Manage for 
survival - in crisis 
Chris Hinds CEO 
Turbulent 
'The service 
matters' 
Turnaround 
strategy - including 
cuts 
Managerial and 
influence 
In transition - 
special project and 
ad hoc groups 
Reductions made 
Period 3 
1995 
Managerial realism 
plus political 
agenda 
Chris Hinds and 
Leader of the 
council 
Quasi-market 
forces 
'The "Customers" 
matter' 
'Mixed economy' 
of partnerships and 
provision 
Turn policies into 
reality 
Large directorates 
but more focused 
units 
Slim-lined 
Focus on crisis here Mixture of 
and now corporate 
management and 
political 
Budget focused - Focuson 
devolved to front- management 
line managers systems and 
politics 
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2.2.2 The organisational culture 
The data about the organisational culture came from the interviews with the directors 
and it addresses question 1.2- specifically: Does the culture support organisational 
learning? 
There were a number of typical quotes about the culture from the interviews. 
While there was acknowledgement of improvements over the years there was still an 
overriding sense that people operated in a blame culture, where if things went wrong 
the usual reaction was to find someone to blame. 
"It still operates as a blame culture... Ifs a cock up and blame culture rather than what 
did we learn, so every one keeps their head down, " said Tews (Director of Welfare 
Services). 
He also observed: "We have not made the cultural change from administrative to 
management to strategic management. The centre (Finance and CEO's office) has 
made the changes but not the (service) directorates. " 
"It is an environment of (political) conflict, " says the CEO. In addition, he adds: 
"There is too much departmentalism and a culture of blame. It isothers': deflecting 
responsibility. There is also too much us and them but there are signs of it 
improving. " 
Janet Taylor, Director of Education Services, says: "It's a blame culture. Appraisal 
reward tends to be a kick in the shins. Its effect is to reduce risk - there is non around 
- and job and work are a very ritualised arrangement. " 
She goes on to acknowledge that risk does take place and people 'work close to the 
wind'. However, "There is a fear of being caught... It's a function of a local 
govenunent culture. " 
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"It's a knee-jerk culture here, " says Paul Harris, Finance Director. This he puts down 
to the style of the political leadership, which he sees as over consensual and 
ineffective. 
"Thus, critical decisions do not get made when they need to be and then its a rush or 
reactive response all at the end. " Harris argued that this then impacted negatively on 
the management team. 
That said he acknowledged that: I was going to say that it (the culture) was chaotic 
but it is moving from a culture of inertia with powerful extreme blue collar union 
power... to now a performance culture but not yet shed the baggage. So there are 
certain things that hang on. " 
"Four years ago the organisational focus was internal. Now it is half open (uses open 
gesture with his hands). What it means to be open and outward looking? (Opens his 
hands) Is to ask and involve the service users in the process and measure and tell the 
people where we are failing. Open up the organisation. " CEO. He went on to add: 
"The culture change is towards the customer. The customer is first. " 
"There is a schizophrenia in the organisation, " comments Ben Chandra, the Planning 
Director. "There is fear, " he continues, "not stalking the corridors but there's tension 
and mistrust. Openness. How? " 
Janet Taylor talked of how the political leadership managed the culture and the impact 
on the organisation. 
"The leader manages things on a territorial basis... It's 'spider-web' management - 
feels like a fly vibrating on a web - constraining, controlling and no power. This is 
how it's organised politically, despite a (Labour) majority and it's mirrored in the 
organisation. " 
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There were also some Directors who their colleagues thought would not change. 
"... People like Paul (Finance) are happy with the old way of doing business, ' said 
Charles Tews (Policy and Strategy). He went further and suggested that: "In the top 
management team there is a mirror image of the Directors internal customer approach 
to the rest of the organisation. For example, Paul only employs 'East Tuthering boys', 
the 'toughies', a mirror image of himself. " 
The Director of Contracts, Peter Atkins, saw things slightly differently from the rest 
of his colleagues. 
"Now [we're] a delivering culture of delivery and achievement on the good side and 
this is being welcomed. Most colleagues and staff want to be known as competent 
and do the job well. There's a desire to achieve. " 
There are four main inferences that are drawn from the accounts about the 
organisational culture: 
The organisational culture was changing but there was considerable evidence that 
while it had changed in its values and espoused aspiration, it had not entirely 
changed in some of its behaviours. 
9 There were still a number of attitudes and practices that were invested in the old 
ways of working due to political alliances, power bases or resistance to 
innovation. 
e It was generally agreed to be a culture of blame, low levels of acknowledging of 
good work and one where it was better to keep one's head down. 
The political agendas of the leadership still provided an important backdrop to a 
system seeking to adopt performance management approaches and quality based 
customer service standards. It created a tension that was seemingly unreconcilable 
at the time of the study. 
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2.2.3 The strategic task 
The task of the organisation is important for its rationale and strategic approach. In 
chapter 4 of this thesis Miller and Rice (1967) are quoted as stating that: "The primary 
task is to survive. " Thus, both what the organisation does and how it does it is 
important as part of providing what Hirschorn. (1988) and Stapley (1996) describe as 
the 'holding environment', or conditions for the strategic apex to work well. 
* Quotes on the task 
"On the strategic task, some want to be told what to do so that they can have a 
strategic approach. " Fred Jones (Welfare Services). He added: "The leadership do 
not talk about the strategic, external stuff. " 
"There's no strategic thinking here and people just get stuck into opposing the 
government. " Charles Tew (Policy and Strategy) 
"Political and managerial interfaces are not based on consensus as the Leader does not 
want it. No priorities are defined. Woolly objectives are set so most of the 
management of change is driven by the Policy and Strategy unit. " Charles Tews. 
The CEO argued: 'At times there is a perceived vacuum in that leadership and there is 
no collective leadership... there is a void that is filled by people like myself. " 
Janet Taylor (Education) felt that there was a lack of leadership on task. "They feel 
that there is no vision or leadership from the top or the team (management) and thus 
there is a sense of demoralisation and people cannot get excited. " 
Ben Chandra (Planning) was more direct: "There is a lack of strategic direction. Even 
when there is agreement to take things forward the Strategy Group (Members-officers 
group) does not work" 
Peter Atkins (Contracts) commented: "Sadly, they don't give us clear direction... No 
criticism of the leadership - they are doing their level best to carry the Group (Labour 
Group) but there are no real clear policies that can be turned readily into strategic 
targets or programmes. It's hard to find them. " 
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Thus, there is a clear inference that the strategic task is not clear and the political 
leadership does not provide the vision or direction that the Directors would like for 
themselves and the organisation. 
2.2.4 The strategic leadership 
The data about the strategic leadership comes from the interviews with the Executive 
Directors and the discussion in the management group meetings. By 'strategic 
leadership' we are looking at the role of the elected Members group and its 
relationship with the Executive Directors, or management group. Do they provide the 
conditions for learning? 
The central question is how do they manage their own boundaries and themselves? 
Internal dynamics 
The political and internal organisational conflicts of Tuthering Council were central to 
understanding its internal rationale and dynamics at the strategic apex of the 
organisation and its implications for organisational learning. Thus the accounts look 
at: 
a Political joumey of the organisation 
e Leadership and political style 
e Internal conflicts 
* Changing nature of national politics 
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The polificaljourney of the organisation 
Tews (Policy and Strategy) put it as: "The organisation is characterised by political 
complexity. " 
The first signs of the most marked political changes were in the May 1990 elections 
which produced different politicians. 
The CEO's view was: "The Left [of the Labour majority] was ousted and the New 
Left wanted to sort the problem out and they [the Members] began a programme of 
real recovery for this council. With the foundations laid they started with financial 
resources. They [the Members] took a radical approach and devolved budgets to 100 
people and set systems to monitor and control money and set in some early warning 
signs and routines to rectify and resurrect difficulties - e. g. planning processes. " 
"They also established relations with the trade unions. They also considered how to 
communicate internally and externally. " CEO reported. 
The 'Labour Group', the internal party political think-tank, was analogous to the 
leadership of the local authority. Given the party's overwhelming majority it might be 
expected to operate from one voice. Yet this was not the case. The political majority 
seemed to create a problem and this was mainly felt to be a lack of leadership, a 
question of political style, internal fighting between different sections of the same 
political ideology and the changing nature of politics nationally with the Labour 
party's new brand of politics as expressed by Tony Blair and the new National 
Executive Council (NEC). 
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Leadership andpolitical style 
The political leadership was carried by Tom Dicks (Leader of the Council). He had 
been in leaderships since 1988 and led on a consensual basis. During the late 1980's 
and early 1990's, this style was felt to be appropriate both by Members and Directors. 
But now it was seen as ineffectual and inappropriate for the leader, the leadership 
group of Members, the 'top team' and the organisation as a whole. 
Jones of Welfare Services said: "The direction (for the organisation) is not clear and 
sometimes I keep them (political leaders) clear of my stuff. We also need a clearer 
political lead and direction - say through a sub-committee. No actually I'm wrong. It 
should have been in R and D . 913 
"The leader gives his Chairs (of committees) too much of a free reign. " Tews 
(Director of Policy and Strategy) 
The CEO's analysis was: "At times* I perceive a vacuum in that leadership as there is 
not collective leadership... There is a very bright, intellectually supreme individual, 
incise brain and a very good political operator (referring to the leader of the council). 
Performs brilliantly on the political stage but does not perform up-front leadership or 
pull in his colleagues - he's fearful of being an up-front leader. If I had those 
attributes, I'd have no hesitation to provide such an approach. He does it on 
occasions. But he leads through manoeuvring. But there is no one in the group (of 
Members) providing vision and direction. Of the fifty-seven of them there is no 
leadership and the vacuum is filled by officers. " 
3 Resource and Development Committee - usually the main spending, powerful and 
therefore a high prestige committee in local authorities 
437 
Charles Tews (Director of Policy and Strategy) said: "We have among the most 
shrewdest Members. The leader is the cleverest politician in local government. He 
manages in a regal presidential style and gets through 30 reports in 15 minutes. The 
last session on policy resources he did in 12 minutes... He has an incredible mind and 
memory and uses these as power. " 
Tews continued: "The leader, he knows what to do and when not to play. He loves to 
win and the competition... There are thirty new Members... and they all have a great 
deal of affection for him. " 
Paul Harris (Director of Finance) felt that the leadership was: "... Trying to be 
consensus but it was not really. It's partly a style of the leader and partly how he got 
in. Tom the leader got in 1987/88; a change from Norma Gravesend (the ex-leader of 
the council and a Labour traditionalist) and there was a divide between the left-right 
split in the (Labour) majority - partly down the middle. To get a'majority'in the 
Labour group you needed to operate consensually. The changes in 1990 and 
reinforced in 1994, reinforced his position and he could have gone forward but 
retained that style and that was inappropriate. It was made worse in 1994 they had a 
50 odd majority to 57. So had a paranoia about it. " 
Harris continued his analysis: "He (the leader) believed, if so many un-working hands 
- as there was no opposition and scope for back benchers was limited - he thought 
better create jobs for them or else they would plot against him. So he generated loads 
of committees - and chaos - and a range of power bases leaving a boiling marass 
below him. " 
"Three years ago (1992/3) there was a leadership challenge - previously a contest of 
ideology. Not now - as most are Blairish - it would all be about style and lead to 
personality based politics. Its the worse (Members) leadership battle we've been 
through and people are split. The legacy is still there... He did not need to fight all he 
needed to do was change his style. Chris and Charles would agree wholeheartedly 
with that analysis. " (Paul Harris, Finance) 
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Ben Chandra (Director of Planning) described the political leadership as: "Two 
separate minds in different directions. It leads to a botchedjob. " Chandra argued that 
the political leadership was: "Implied - not agreed - not strategic nor long term. " 
Peter Atkins (Director of Contracts) comments on political leadership were: 
"Traditionally - over twenty years - there was more blue in certain areas (refers to a 
map on his wall with Tory wards coloured blue and Labour ones coloured red). Now 
there was such a large Labour majority that all the Members want ajob. There are 
lots of splits and subgroups and not on political issues. There is no real direction. " 
Atkins reflected that : "Maybe its not a lack of policies - there are no end of policies. 
But there are mechanisms for decisions, to consider decisions, to reconsider the 
decisions, and reconsider the reconsidered decisions... yet they will do something else 
when it gets to a (real) decision. " 
Thus there is a lack of clear policy direction, the leader of the council is unable to gain 
full support from his colleagues and there are a number of splits in the Labour 
majority that impact negatively on the strategic direction of the authority. 
Internal con icts Ifl 
We also see from the discussion above that there are a number of internal conflicts 
among the Members. These are not the usual ones between political parties and their 
opposition, but are conflicts and tensions that are apparent within the political 
majority - within the Labour party. These seem to be a broad variety. They include: 
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Differences in political and ideological orientation 
There appeared to be at least three sub-groups of Labour politicians: the 
traditionalist Labour and union-based party politicians; the new managerialist, 
New Left politicians a la Greater London Council and these were embodied in 
other Labour left councils such as Sheffield, the West Midlands and the Inner 
London Education Authority (before abolition). The third set is the Blairite 
politicians who would aim to take people to the 'New Jerusalem' and operate 
from a policy agenda of partnership with the private sector and accept the role of 
capitalism. 
These differences showed themselves in political allegiances on issues such as 
education services or policies on housing and how to handle budget cuts. 
9 Differences in political alliances 
These differences and conflicts did not necessary follow strict political ideology 
and we saw this in relationship to those for Tom Dicks (the Labour leader and 
leader of the council) and those for the Labour opposition leadership challenge. 
Even those from a different political persuasions (within the Labour party) still 
supported Tom as an individual even though not necessarily supporting his 
politics. As the CEO reported the new Members (over half of the council) 
supported the leader even though they were more likely to be Blair supporters at 
the national level. The outcome from these complex alliances was to make 
decisions unpredictable. Harris described the leadership as: 'political chaos'. 
"The brightest articulate Members are alienated from the leadership because 
they are not happy with the leadership style. This underpins a lot of the 
problem, " stated Harris (Finance). 
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9 Differences in political contribution to the council 
The council moved through changes in political persuasion from 1979, through 
the period of 1989/90 and again in 1994. Each epoch brought with it a dominant 
political orientation and contribution to the change of the organisation. Those 
before 1988 were seen as not managing the authority but letting it be led by the 
unions and political dogma. Those up to 1990 were seen as passive supporters 
of change but much of the responsibility being left to the CEO. 
In 1990, Members were seen as clearly taking on the challenge of change and 
the latest Members were seen as part of the New Jerusalem' of Labour policies 
associated with Blair. These 'groups' all co-existed. 
o Mistrust among Members 
There appears from the above accounts that there were concerns within the 
political leadership body about their colleagues. The leadership challenge was 
seen as one of the hardest battles in the council's political history and it may 
reflect some of this mistrust and hesitancy in the political leadership. 
These conflicts were dynamic and changing. They help to explain the unstable 
dynamics of the strategic apex and the critical part that politics plays in this 
system, even though there was such a large majority. 
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* The changing nature of national politics 
Finally, the overall changing nature of the political landscape and its impact on 
the Labour party suggests that the national executive was aiming to meet a 
broader range of voters than traditionally sought. This has meant the authority 
consciously holding the national Party lines in order not to be a press target or 
scapegoat as the Labour party prepared its strategy and communications as it 
planned for a general election then predicted to be at the end of 1996 or by May, 
1997. It was also known by two of the Directors that Tom Dicks, leader of the 
council, was preparing to stand down for the next local elections. 
2.3 Does the context support organisational leaming? 
I 
The history of the organisation demonstrated that at some level the organisation does 
learn as it has adapted its style and structures to meet the demands of the environment 
and thus the organisation certainly changed from 1989 to where it was in 1995 (see 
table 14.1 above) 
The espoused intentions have certainly changed and everyone of the Directors agreed 
that there had been a change in the organisation's psyche. However, there also 
appeared to be a deeply held assumption within the organisation that a political model 
of organising was superior to a managerial one alone. These seemed to be mostly 
held among Members and key players in the management team. 
The strategic task of the organisation was unclear and the internal political infighting 
ran paradoxical to the relatively known environmental requirements and the huge 
political majority. Thus,, the internal context made for an unstable and uncertain 
'holding environment' which was determined by personality politics, complex 
political dynamics and unpredictable power-based alliances. 
Thus one concludes that the 'holding environment' was unable to sustain its function 
and the accounts suggest that this has a negative impact on task attainment, potential 
learning, motivation and morale. A culture of fear, innovation being 'played down', 
dysfunctional political dynamics which distorts and undermines legitimate role 
authority may also reduce the capacity for strategic organisational learning. The task 
is submerged to defensive routines. 
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Analysis of the organisational environment and context 
This first part of the case study addressed the question: Are the dynamics of the 'top 
team' influenced by the conditions of the environment? This analysis considers the 
joint impact of the external and internal dynamics on strategic organisational learning. 
In looking at both the nature of the environment and the organisational context the 
narratives seems to suggest that there are contradictory forces at play and these both 
impact positively and negatively on strategic organisational learning. The forces are 
highlighted and analysed in more detail in this section. 
During the period of 1985 - 1990, the organisation operated in a turbulent and ever 
changing environment. In the case of this local authority there was evidence of an 
organisation that was constantly renewing itself and responding to the changes most 
markedly in 1988/89,1990,1994 and again in 1996. There was evidence that the 
strategic apex was continually in a state of flux and dynamic change in response to the 
environment. Thus, while the environment has been rapidly changing, it does not 
seemed to have impacted so negatively as to undermine the organisation's boundaries, 
adaptability and its relationship with the outside world. 
The system seems to demonstrate appropriately managed boundaries as evidenced by: 
its recognition that change was required for continual survival; changes in its political 
and executive culture and structure, which have changed in response to these external 
demands; and how it has provided some stability in the leadership and strategic apex 
as shown in the joint longevity of tenure of both the Leader of the council and the 
CEO. 
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Thus, the management of the council's boundaries with the external environment and 
its relatedness to that by the strategic apex of the system has prevented the difficulties 
of a turbulent environment impacting negatively on the survival of the organisation or 
its apparent learning. This has been shown in its improvement in performance, 
changes in cultural aspirations and structure and a mind-shift from inward looking to 
an external orientation. It was also demonstrated by the acknowledgement by the 
expert panel that the authority had changed the way it worked and presented itself and 
by the fact that the authority was no longer treated as a 'loony left' authority by 
central government. There was a case to suggest that organisational learning did take 
place in this system. 
However, the management of the external boundaries were not equally matched with 
the same quality and consistency of management of the internal boundaries and task. 
The political majority, rather that creating stability and ease of management, proved to 
be just as unpredictable as might be seen between different political parties. 
The political direction, strategy and leadership of the organisation was not as clear as 
desired by some Members and the Directors. Some of this may be explained by the 
differences and factions that existed in the body politick on the basis of ideology, 
alliances, role in the history of the organisation and political positioning vis a vis the 
new politics of the left. There were several comments made on these points by the 
accounts discussed above. However, these differences make for an internal systemic 
context which lacked task focus and direction; which was unpredictable; which 
operated on'knee-jerk' reactions; and which seemed to undermine its management of 
the external boundaries. 
Thus, there was a paradox or contradiction in the system which evidence suggests that 
while it was able to manage the external boundaries and undergo transformational, 
whole system change, it was more difficult to complete the changes internally. 
Thus, the internal context of the elected Members collectively did not appear to 
provide a 'holding environment' for the 'top team'. 
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Several comments about the 'blame culture' and 'things left over' support the 
contention that the deeper level cultural changes were not complete and that internal 
dynamics prevented the system from fully capitalising its strategic organisational 
learning. 
An analysis of these seemingly contradictory outcomes from a processual perspective 
provides us with an understanding of the environmental context and it provides a clear 
analysis of the historical landmarks in the journey of the organisation's change. It 
would explain the internal context of apparent strife as a feature of the political 
differences - identified above - and suggest that these would continue to be played 
out in order to establish the new power dynamics and base of the organisation. This 
would be expected from a complex adaptive social system. 
A psychoanalytical perspective adds to the analysis the possible latent reasons for 
understanding this contradiction. Based on the exposition of organisational dynamics 
in chapters 7 and 8 above, it would suggest, within an object relations framework, that 
the following propositions may hold. 
i) That the conflict and residual strife is a function of unconscious object loss 
through the different transitional states of change and the system's attempt to 
establish a new identity through object constancy. (The contradiction may be a 
form of 'work') 
ii) that the elected Members as a group may represent the fractured and'schizoid' 
nature of the strategic apex which was symbolised by a number of unresolved 
conflicts. 
iii) That these conflicts are contained by the leader of the council, Tom Dicks, who 
provides some consistency, stability and containment along with the CEO. 
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iv) That the conflicts are also bounded and therefore contained by the demands of the 
external environment and the management of that interface by the leader, 
supported by his colleagues and senior officers namely the CEO and the Finance 
Director. 
In examining these propositions, it is argued - from an object relations framework 
discussed in chapters 6 and 7- that organisational members invest and identify with 
the organisation as an intemalised structure, a series of relationships and 'culture' in 
their minds. These are formed through projective identification and introjection and 
are the basis of organisational commitment, challenges to authority, identification and 
the like with the organisation. These are the object relations. 
During periods of transition, individuals and groups have to change these 
relationships and will tend to re-experience primary object loss which is argued to be 
rooted in childhood memories and experiences of separation (see chapter 6). In 
periods of object loss there is bereavement, rage, anger, feelings of emptiness and 
panic. Thus, the internal strife of the organisation may be a result of this phenomena 
as these feelings are acted out. These we see in conflicts between groups and the 
attempts of these groups to find affiliations to political sub-groups and objects of 
constancy. It is 'as if the group seeks to 'forge' itself through the process of 
disintegration and then re-formation and thus establish a new identity, sense of self or 
new object. Once it was a traditional Labour council, then a hard left one, then a new 
left and so on. Thus, these'changes in the psyche'of the organisation have been 
positively acknowledged by the responses of the outside world but they have also left 
internal relationships as unhealed rifts, open and unresolved. In practical terms how 
does a hard left member contribute to the New Jerusalem agenda when they do not 
believe in it. It is notjust about politics and power bases. It is also about object 
relations and managing separation, loss and new forms of interdcpcndcnt 
relationships. 
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The outcome of these unresolved internal transitions ( four over a period of a decade) 
may help explain the 'schizoid' (Ben Chandra! s description), 'knee-jerk' nature of the 
organisation. The system was said to make intelligent elected Members unable to 
work collectively. It lacked clear direction and the leadership was only partly 
authorised as there may have been some continual ambivalence which remained after 
each successive transition and change. It suggests latent issues have been continually 
buried and unaddressed. This recursive pattern made for an unstable internal 
organisational context and it may be a feature of a systemic and repetitive routine due 
to its hidden nature. Thus, anxiety and panic were acted out and projected onto others 
in the system -'a culture of blame', 'put on to someone else', which comes from the 
Members - rather than understood, owned and managed. 
It is further suggested that there were two elements that appeared to stop this internal 
process from totally undermining the strategic apex. The first of these was the role of 
the leader of the council. He appeared to hold the role of object constancy. This was 
evidenced partly from his longevity in the role despite the clear changes in political 
character of the organisation over the ten years. Secondly, even the (Labour) 
'opposition' had an 'affection' for him and this was directly an emotional response to 
the individual not a political or ideological one. Thus, it is argued here that the leader 
carried some of the object constancy. (Note the glowing admiration that is given him 
by the Directors, especially the CEO). 
The glowing descriptions of the leader by the Directors may suggest some admiration 
or idealisation. This may imply that the leader was taking up the role of'basic 
assumption! leader of dependency and where the leader is perceived to be omnipotent. 
On theoretical grounds, it was argued above that basic assumption motifs would tend 
to be micro-states of the group, and this implies that it would be less stable as a role at 
the macro level especially enduring the eight year period of the leadership. However, 
the question that may apply is: Is the leader a'transitional object'rather than one of 
object constancy? 
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A transitional object provides the 'space' to play and test out new relationships and 
environments. It is the temporary object that is used to provide a bridge during 
periods of transition. The typical example is the rag doll or comfort blanket for the 
child (see chapters 6 and 7). The council had three transitions during the period of the 
leader's tenure and each time he provided the base, space and 'holding environment' 
for the strategic apex to manage the boundary of the external environment. Thus, it is 
suggested that the leader may have been acting as a 'transitional object' during a 
period of several transitions and that the elected Members as a group never quite 
reached the new state as it was frequently changing. Moreover, as the quality of the 
changes in the external environment became more manageable, then we saw the 
leader as object being challenged, in 1994, with the view of replacement and the 
system moving on. Yet this did not take place. Thus, there appears to be some 
ambivalence to the leader and it appears that he may well take on a number of 
systemic and unconscious roles on behalf of the strategic apex. There is a case to 
suggest that in fact during each transition he was a transitional object. His longevity 
may be explained by the frequency of changes and the secure base that he provided in 
role. 
Secondly, it also suggests that an additional role that the leader of council seemed to 
hold is the one of 'container': limiting the impact of all the anxieties and being a 
temporary holding environment. In his consensual style there was an opportunity for 
all to contribute in the broader debate and running of the council. Yet at the same 
time there was evidence to suggest that he is direct, is good at managing processes, 
has a quick mind and will exercise power. Thus, retention of Tom Dicks as the 
leader in the 1994 leadership challenge may reflect a number of things: dependency, 
fear of loosing the 'good' object of the leader, fear of retribution and guilt if the leader 
were to be replaced, a transitional object or the appropriate use of the facilities of the 
leader as a holding environment. Further data may help deepen our understanding of 
these processes in the rest of the case. 
Finally, the external management of the boundaries may have also provided a 
functional distraction or sublimation of the inner conflicts within the strategic apex. 
Both Members and senior officers put their energies into creatively managing crisis 
and change and have become rather good at it. It is suggested that the attention to the 
external boundary and reality prevented the possible implosion of the inner conflicts 
and rather than be a difficulty it was a source of sublimation and creativity. 
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3. The Group and task 
Question two: Is the 'top team'able to manage its boundaries and task? 
This section addresses the above question. Here the focus moves from the boundary 
between the team and its context and environment but to the 'top team' of executive 
Directors themselves. After looking at the main features of the group it will look 
more deeply at three related sub-questions: 
2.1 Does the team hold a common view of its task effectiveness? Is it effective? 
2.2 Is the leader's role facilitative to task attaimnent (and therefore leaming)? 
2.3 Are the boundaries of this 'top team' optimally bounded? 
The key feature of the group 
The 'top team' of this local authority was bom out of transition and change. There 
were 23 people in the original group and this was cut down to seven in the early 
1990s. This was experienced as traumatic by some and it meant a considerable 
increase in the size of directorates and more complex reporting relations. 
The group members were in a narrow age band of 42 - 50 years old. Most of the 
group members have been in the authority for over a decade and some longer. There 
are a wide range of experiences and personal agendas within the group. 
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The Group Members 
The group under study had seven members. These are as follows: 
Chris Hinds, CEO Started work in the equalities field before joining the authority 
over ten years ago as a senior housing officer. Chris Hinds then moved on to be Head 
of Housing Services and was appointed to the CEO post in 1989. Chris is 
'charismatic', driven by vision and values and can be very 'up-front': not afraid to 
voice a view. 
Paul Harris, Director ofFinance Joined the authority in 1976 and worked his way up 
to Director of Finance. He purports to support organisational. change and is a 
powerful member of the group due to his aggressive personal style, his formal role in 
the group and his political acumen and relationships. 
Fred Jones, Director of Welfare Services - including housing and social services 
Worked with the CEO as deputy when Chris Hinds was Head of Housing. He is 
dedicated to the services he runs but is increasingly becoming disillusioned with local 
government, as it appears to loose its public service values, and with the authority as 
its j ourney to acceptability seems to compromise Fred's core values of openness and 
democracy. 
Ben Chandra, Director ofPlanning - the physical environment Manages 
environmental services with a dedicated team of staff. His offices are a couple of 
miles from the town hall but more than match it in terms of quality and aesthetics. He 
is seen as slightly aloof, ambitious and an aspiring CEO. 
Peter Atkins, Director of Contracts Has worked in construction and related industries 
for most of his working career. His directorate is not phased by CCT, contracting and 
value for money imperatives as these are industry norms. His offices are the far 
eastern side of the borough, furthest of all the Directors from the Town Hall.. This 
distance also seems to symbolise some of his isolation from the rest of the group. 
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Janet Taylor, Director ofEducation Services Previously a senior teacher and then 
moved into the management side several years ago. She has been in the authority for 
a year and is the newest member in the group. Thus, much of her energy is geared 
towards establishing her role and order in the group. 
Charles Tews, Director ofPolicy and Strategy Reminisces about the good old days. 
Charles Tews has been in the authority since the early 1980s. He has other local 
government experience to draw upon and generally sees the authority as not being 
very strategic. He is an affable individual but is often the butt of mild hostility from 
other group members. 
"It's a small management team compared to others. So we carry dual responsibilities 
compared to others. It prevents sectional groupings compared to my own team... It 
makes it more open, " remarked Jones (Welfare Services). 
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3.1 Does the team hold a common view about its task effectiveness? Is 
it effect? 
The group task 
The group's normative task was to provide a corporate and strategic focus for the 
Tuthering Council and to turn policies into programmes of strategic implementation. 
Thus, the group's task was to provide a corporate and strategic agenda to the council's 
policy goals. This was not an easy task as there were many strategic tasks (at least 13 
priorities) and some of these were not at all clear. The articulation and 
implementation of the strategic task of the organisation by the Members has already 
been stated as unclear and lacking direction. But the strategic process task of turning 
the organisation round did seem to have clarity. It was initially taken up by the CEO 
in 1989, and then Members bought into it later when the changes became generally 
acceptable as the way forward for the authority. Thus there were dual tasks: one on 
content and the other on process. The lack of clarity on content seemed to be 
compensated by the drive and clarity on process. The first one was managed by the 
leader of the council and politicians, the second by the CEO and the management 
group. 
Yet there was agreement about the efficacy of the management group in its strategic 
task. It was poor. 
Fred Jones (Welfare Services) said: "Most things we agree seem invisible. There is 
no collective ownership of decisions. Our management meeting agendas are too long 
and tedious and not focused. Not much, too little on critical issues. Papers are tabled 
or circulated so late that we cannot consult and the decision making is on the hoof 
An agreed set of operating rules and processes are required for team effectiveness. " 
Janet Taylor (Education Services) stated: "... It doesn! t mean we work together as a 
group. Matters are brought to the management group, we agree, but do not discuss to 
the point of recognising all of the implications of what is nodded through. " 
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She added that the management group was: "Virtually irrelevant... the management 
group is not a force to be reckoned with. " 
Paul Harris (Finance) said: "We are not particularly effective at providing an efficient 
service to the public. That's what we should be here to do. " 
He added: "We do not deal with issues as a group and so we are dysfunctional and we 
do not have a debate about the issues. Thus, I have great difficulty in that context. " 
Yet there were periods when the group excelled. 
"Colleagues are very flexible at dealing with chaos and crisis and pulled together and 
in fact put themselves in the firing line to help reduce the damage. It reflects the 
professionalism and qualities as people do not want to let colleagues look stupid - that 
is the council generally, the Chair (of the committee under discussion) and the chief 
officers generally .... There 
is a sense of pulling together in cases like this. " Janet 
Taylor, (Education Services). 
"In the culture of this authority, it is a reasonably effective group - enormous 
willingness to engage in complex issues openly. Prefers lots of energy - especially by 
the CEO and people get into a slip stream. " Charles Tews (Policy & Strategy). 
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Thus, while the group was unable to effect the content task, things did change. But it 
appeared not because of the group working corporately. It is suggested that the 
changes were a result of the CEO driving through his agenda and him working closely 
through one to one relationships. These were especially with Paul Harris (Finance) a 
power base within the group, Fred Jones (Welfare) a close colleague from working 
together in the past and Director of the largest allocations in the council, and Charles 
Tews (Policy) supporter, with strategy ideas and possibly the person who took some 
of the flack on behalf of the CEO - note the comments about the policy unit in the 
earlier accounts. 
The CEO felt that: "We are focused on service delivery and can take the cuts 
compared to our neighbouring authorities, " which he names - one Conservative, one 
hard left Labour and one effectively hung council - i. e. it had a slim majority. 
The group appears to be less effective than it would like to be and explains it by the 
lack of strategic clarity, unresolved issues in the organisational context and its own 
internal group effectiveness capability. It seems to work best in a crisis. 
3.2 Is the leader's role facilitative to task attainment (and therefore 
learning)? 
The role of the leader features as high in the theoretical approach to understanding 
groups in this thesis, especially how they provide the conditions for task attainment 
and learning. Information was obtained from each of the Directors about Chris Hinds. 
The role of the CEO 
Chris Hinds tried to operate in a spirit of corporateness, while at the same time 
generate enthusiasm and commitment to the changes. 
"Chris is very open... as CEO has charisma and style and better than when was 
Director of Housing, " says Fred Jones (Welfare). He continued: "Chris is a good 
leader. He is quite an interesting character. Needs reassurance and is dependent upon 
Paul Harris and this is a weakness. They think they run the organisation. " 
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He reflected: "I previously worked as Chris's deputy and so have a good relationship. 
But now things have changed since Chris had moved and is more distant. The CEO 
has trust and confidence in me but not give sufficient attention. Perhaps there needs 
to be a deputy CEO? It's not good for a CEO to stay longer than two years but Chris 
stayed longer than most thought. Here, five or six years. " 
Charles Tews agreed with the Fred Jones about the relationship between the CEO and 
Director of Finance. "The CEO is dependent on Director of Finance so there is a fear 
to open up. " 
Tews (Policy and Strategy) continued: "The CEO spends the next two days trying to 
get round things - time on issues and detail - even when they are not strategic... He 
gets more loyalty than judgement and more than he deserves. Lots of energy. 
Charismatic and likeable. Momentum is better than not addressing the issue. CEO is 
very direct. Sometimes reactive. But often relies on a small number of people to pick 
up the pieces. " 
"Not feel that he feels comfortable for the management group to take things through. 
The agenda is very long. Cabinet responsibility is not taken seriously enough. People 
go off to do things - but not (the things) discussed. " Janet Taylor (Educ. Services) 
She continues that the CEO was, "A bit of a Tigger [from Winnie the Pooh]. I have 
lots of time for the CEO compared with one I once trusted. Chris is a breath of fresh 
air. Gets excited both when shouting at people and when enthusiastic. " 
Paul Harris (Finance) said: "The CEO is a centralist... to Chris's credit Chris will 
stand up to the Members. The CEO wants to be and is to a large extent a leader - 
wants to be friendly; wants to be involved even if the ethos of the organisation - 
officers and Members is not in tune so it creates conflict that need not be there. The 
CEO talks devolution and empowerment yet the CEO is the biggest centralist and so 
is the leader. " 
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"Chris does his best to help to work corporately - making good effect. Sets good 
example but unsure why the CEO tolerates the Director of Finance as it gets in the 
way. The general direction is right. But I might be too optimistic about corporate 
working. They protect and keep everything they have at committee level. " 
The CEO is seen as a charismatic leader with centralist tendencies. He is dependent 
upon others to get the work done: as power brokers, admirers or those to pick things 
up after he has created the big picture. 
Is his role facilitative? He was the lead internal change agent for the changes from 
1989/90 to the time of study. He has a clear vision about where he wanted the 
authority to go and has helped to shift the culture. He has taken up his role authority 
in managing hard cuts and reducing the senior management cadre. Moreover, there is 
evidence that he manages the political relationships well and that supports 
containment against some of the Members internal conflicts. The strategic systems 
that he is driving through along with an espoused style of corporate working seeks to 
provide some of the facilitative structures for task attainment and learning. However, 
this is reduced by his own personal style which can seen as uneven handed between 
each of the Directors, bullying or remote. Thus, in conclusion it appears that the 
leader of the management group both provides and undermines facilitative structures 
for learning. 
3.3 Are the boundaries of the 'top team'sub-system optimally 
managed? 
The management of group's boundaries is important in that it provides containment 
and supports task attainment and leaming. Here we look at the intergroup 
relationships with the elected Members. In section 1.2 above it suggests that the 
elected Members did not provide the task clarity or boundary management for 
organisational leaming. The focus is to see how that relationship is managed by the 
Directors. Accounts are taken mainly from the interviews with the Directors. 
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3.3.1 Formal relationships 
The formal relationships between elected Members and the management team was 
through the directorates with Directors reporting to their political Chairs of 
committees on policy agendas as described in the 'Background' section above. 
Officers prepared, presented and recommended papers to these committees based on a 
process of talks with their Chair of committee, work in the directorate, discussions 
with management group and day to day feedback from staff and customers. All of the 
Directors reported good relationships with their Chair of committee with the 
exception of Janet Taylor of Education Services. 
The formal reporting mechanism was through the main committees: Resources and 
Development (general resource and strategic committee) and the service committees - 
for example Contracts, Environment. This was supported by working parties, 
serviced by senior officers; a regular 'Core Group' meeting of the Leader of the 
council, the Chair of Finance, the CEO and the Director of Finance; the Members' 
conference (run two or three times a year to cross fertilise ideas); and a loose 
relationship between the strategic task groups and Members' interests. 
There was still a perceived lack of communication between the management group 
and Members. 
However, when interviewing Ben Chandra, we were briefly interrupted by his Chair 
of committee, who entered the room and agreed some papers for completion with Ben 
that arose out of a meeting the night before. In resuming the interview Ben said: 
"Here is an example of co-operation arising from a meeting last night and Chairs put 
forward a motion to be completed by 12 noon today. " 
Thus, it appears that relationships can vary. 
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3.3.2 Informal relationships 
On the informal relationships, feeling and views about the relationships Members and 
Directors covered a range of opinions. 
The CEO reported: "At a collective level the management group see Members as 
unreasonable and unacceptable. They are dreadful, bullying and not strategic. 
Unpleasant human beings! But when you get underneath it, when compared to 
politicians in other authorities, these Members are very favourable. Some in 
neighbouring authorities are terrible (these are then named), where they (officers) are 
deferential to Members. Here we try to treat Members with mutual respect. " 
Ben Chandra (Planning) felt: "The management group have been criticised for not 
working corporately by Members but they probably fear it at some unconscious 
level. " 
Peter Atkins also agreed: "The management group meetings are quite useful in terms 
of information exchange. In terms of decision making at corporate level - very little 
impact. (He reflects) The level of change has been great but we don't make corporate 
decisions. " - 
Paul Harris (Finance) comments were: "A large number of Members do not have any 
respect for chief officers (the Directors) and have an expectation to work us and run us 
down due to envy, jealousy and poor communication. " , 
Peter Atkins (Contracts) said that the problem between Members and senior officers 
was partly to do with false assumptions about roles and personal dynamics. 
"There is an clement ofjealousy. Officers are born with a silver spoon in their 
mouths - at least I'm told so by my mum and dad (laughs). Members see officers as 
frustrating their desires - as Members do not have a full understanding of the 
requirements of implementation. They do not have a clear enough understanding of 
the roles between Members and officers. " (Peter Atkins) 
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3.4 Analysis 
The management group's immediate context was its relationship with the elected 
Members. The relationship between individual Members and their senior officers 
were generally good with the one exception of Education services. As an inter-group 
relationship it appeared to be unstable due to: differences in role expectations; unclear 
management of role boundaries; unconscious dynamics of envy, mistrust and 
resentfulness when Members felt dependent or frustrated by officers; and conflicts and 
differences among the Members spilling over on to Directors, who became targets as a 
way at getting at their committee Chair-person. It is also suggested that this happened 
consciously as part of the political nature of the organisation and unconsciously as 
part of unresolved conflicts that were discussed above. 
Finally, Members unconsciously may be using the management group as a scapegoat 
as they collectively collude in a social defence against the required changes and 
operate 'as if there can be a split between the functions of leadership and 
management. The desire to keep the organisation run purely on political lines against 
the need to be also managed may be: a forrn of object loss; a social defence; or a 
reaction against a reduction in authority and power to the CEO, managerialism or the 
management group. The management group was also a possible body to blame (in 
line with the culture) for confronting the elected Members with all the changes and 
upheaval. In the psychoanalytic framework used in this thesis, these may be seen as 
manifestations of a deeper defence against anxiety due to separation, loss and the fear 
of survival itself. 
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Can the team manage its boundaries? 
A tentative conclusion to the question of the 'top team's management boundaries is 
that while there are attempts to manage one to one relationships with Members, the 
group is unable to successfully manage it boundaries with elected Members as a 
whole. The implication for strategic organisational leaming is that it will be impaired 
because: 
* The intergroup relationships at the strategic apex are not well managed 
- it is power-based, where power is asymmetric between officers and Members (in 
favour of Members) and among each group. 
- it is politically driven, and therefore deeper level motives are the drivers for 
change over task. These motives are unpredictable and their complex 
consequences serve to distract systems from learning. 
0 It lacks facilititive structures 
* Sharing that does take place is in isolation or is localised and is often distorted due 
to personal or political agenda 
e The culture of blame discourages a climate of inquiry. 
Thus, it infers from the discussion that the 'top team' is unable to manage its task and 
boundaries and this has negative implications for strategic organisational learning. 
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4. The Group and its internal dynamics 
Question three: Do the intemal dynamics of the 'top teamimpact on 
organisational learning? 
This section addresses the above question by exploring the key internal dynamics of 
the team in order to answer two further sub-questions. These are: 
" Does the team display examples of 'basic assumption' motifs over 'work'? 
" Do individual valencies reinforce difficult group dynamics? 
4.1 Does the team display examples of 'basic assumption'motifs over 
'work' 
There are three areas that help us understand the dynamics of the group in considering 
'basic assumptions'. 
These are: 
The roles and relationship of each Director as seen by other members of the group - 
the source of this data is from the first interviews using the interview schedule. 
The dynamics within the group as understood by members within the group - the 
data also comes from those same first interviews. 
The dynamics of the group based on scoring statements against basic assumption 
theory (see Appendix 1) using the Group Analysis Grid and content analysis of text 
of latent themes. 
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4.1.1 Roles and relationships 
In understanding the dynamics of the group a first level analysis suggests that group 
roles are formed and that these may be significant in understanding the impact on 
organisational learning. 
The following provides an account of how each member is seen by their colleagues. 
The CEO's role was discussed in 2.2 above and thus he is not included here. Ben 
Chandra's input is not included as he said that he did not trust the group and was not 
prepared to comment on any one. This is discussed further in sub-section 5 (below) in 
my personal reflections. 
Each group member received some common themes about their perceived roles from 
their colleagues. 
Paul Harris 
"Paul is in the slips -a safe pair of hands. Conservative, an anchor, bright and plays 
the role of destroyer: "This is all crap". Thus, he is the crap detector but needs to be 
able to understand what it means as it can represent a wide range of feelings. " Charles 
Tews (Policy and Strategy) 
"Paul is a centralist - into control, " said Fred Jones (Welfare services). He continued: 
"Paul is seen as a powerful player in the council. He is an obvious (power) point. He 
retains it in the financial role and also because he keeps himself remote and keeps a 
distance. He retains a rude and unpleasant style at times. If you get close to him it is 
harder for him to do that. " 
"Of the people mentioned so far, Paul, is perceived as the powerful one. Money and 
because I do not stand up to him as much or as frequently as others. " Chris Hinds, 
CEO. 
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"He's a bit of a bully boy - with a pecking order. Its a bit like in the nursery. " Janet 
Taylor (Educ. Services) 
"The Director of Finance mystifies Finance and says it is hard to give a clear picture. 
No strategic financial options are given. Paul is a very shrewd financial manager and 
would fix it. The District Auditor now sees the authority as being managed well but 
what about the financial strategy? " Charles Tews (Policy & Strategy) 
"The CEO and the Director of Finance tend to have the power at the moment. " Peter 
Atkins (Contracts) 
Thus, Paul Harris, the Finance Director, is seen as a powerful bully, who operates to 
his own rules and who is closely connected to power bases within the council. // 
Fred Jones 
"Fred, if committed, has a lot of energy but tends to stand on the outside and we get 
the critical side of him. " Charles Tews (Policy and Strategy) 
"I have a lot of time and respect him. I feel sorry for him as he always looks beaten 
but I also want to drop him off a tall building. " Janet Taylor (Educ Services) 
expressing her frustration with his lapses in energy. 
"People see Jones as committed to service improvements, developing a variety of 
management performance standard e. g. IS09002 on estates management and 
managing his directorate well. He is also seen as patient, " said the CEO. He 
continued: "... As he worked with me (before) so he will ignore my anger and will 
work through it. " 
He was also seen as one of the power brokers in the management group due to fact 
that he had the biggest department and therefore was a big spender of resources and 
because of his links with the CEO suggested Paul Harris (Finance). 
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Fred Jones of Welfare Services was seen as the committed idealist and up-holder of 
public sector values. He can be the critic but this is shared with Ben Chandra. 
Powerful in his way but maybe understated due to his personal presentation. 
Ben Chandra 
"He is remote from the others - he withdraws - more recently opening up as working 
closely on a development brief and trying to attract money from the private sector. " 
CEO 
"Ben will put up an issue that tends to support his personal plan to be the next chief 
executive - for example he was one of the last three (short-listed) for another 
authority. " Charles Tews (Policy and Strategy) 
"Ben is not trusted - the Director of Finance and Chris (CEO) do not trust him. He 
does not have their patronage. " Fred Jones (Welfare Services) 
"Ben tends to take risks that land him in a better position. " Janet Taylor (Educ. 
Services). She added: "He was once censored by the Management Group for 
lobbying but I was not there when they said it. " 
It was felt that Ben Chandra! s management style needed to have a tighter'grip' on the 
situation especially if considering large capital projects said Chris Hinds, CEO 
"Fewer people rate him than they should as he is an intellectual. " (CEO) 
"He has an aura of cfficiency so he can become a chief executive somewhere. I have 
concerns about standards and compare his quality of decision-making. But he has an 
iron fist of beautiful planning process... He gets things done and has saved other 
officers in times of difficulties. " Paul Harris (Finance) 
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Ben Chandra, Planning, is perceived as aspiring, 'self-centred' and ambitious. He is 
clever but his style yields resentment and mistrust. People see him as grooming 
himself for a CEO post. He tends to stand outside of the group and therefore is seen 
as aloof. 
Peter Atkins 
Peter was seen as another outsider. Of him people said: 
"Peter had become the whipping boy - he's the person who gets picked on -I try not to 
do it but he becomes the management group victim... Paul Harris does it too. " CEO 
"Peter never knows what is going on. " Fred Jones (Welfare Services). The same 
view was shared by the CEO. 
"Peter seems a dull boy - managing blue collar: he tries to bluff then does not deliver 
and this has a cry wolf syndrome. " Charles Tews (Policy and Strategy) 
"He uses words to hide weaknesses, " said the CEO and "He's a doer... rather than a 
thinker. " 
"I have lots of time for him. But Members set too high an income target for him. " 
Janet Taylor (Educ. Services) 
Peter Atkins, Contracts, has been labelled the 'dull' member of the group. He is not 
taken seriously and is used as an easy scapegoat within the group. 
465 
Janet Taylor 
Janet is the newest member of the group and is often in battles with people to retain 
her authority in the group. She has been in conflict with Paul Harris (Finance). 
Charles Tews also noted: "... The conflicts between Janet and Fred... and the Members 
keep on beating up on Janet on the under 5s provision -a spill-over from the 
Members. If sa reactive and emotional response over a corporate one. " 
"Janet is more open Minded. If it helps - good and engaged. If it doesn't fit she will 
say so. She speaks plain language. " Charles Tews 
"She is new and brings a freshness... It's good to have a woman on the management 
team. " CEO 
"She is establishing herself and position and pecking order in the team. " CEO 
The CEO and the Director of Policy and Strategy were the only two colleagues to 
comment. 
Janet Taylor, Education, is the new person on the group and is treated and seen as 
such. 
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Charles Tews 
"I've known him for years. But he is totally ineffectual. Dodt believe he ever had the 
capability to do the job. But what was thejob? He did a deal withthe CEO about 
roles. He is very process orientated. Nice plan irrespective of the fact that it is a load 
of bloody rubbish. Itsaproblem. " Paul Harris (Finance) 
"Charles is an irritant... Fond of him, but he 'switches people off. I have told him that 
but unsure where to go next. " CEO 
"People get fed-up with him and are turned off. " Fred Jones (Welfare Services) 
"I resent the job-work creation schemes that Charles Tews makes - so he get a bit of 
stick as a consequence. I must say I mistrust the (Policy and Strategy) unit... and if I 
had to pay, I would not use it. " Janet Taylor (Educ. Services) 
Charles Tews, Policy, is seen as an'extra! to the group and whose value is seen as 
small. 
Thus, there seems to be clear roles and perceptions of each of the management group 
members. 
Each group member had fairly consistent messages from each of their colleagues, who 
had worked together for over five years and some had known each other longer. 
Thus, some validity can be given to the way they were each perceived and 
experienced. 
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4.1.2 The dynamics of the group as understood by its members 
How did the group understand its own dynamics. Data from 1.2 and 2.1 suggests that 
the group does not see itself as an effective team and a number of reasons were given. 
However, the internal dynamics are given less attention by the group. These are 
explored further in the following descriptions. 
The dynamics of the group were complicated by the political environment in which it 
worked. However, there were some shared views about how they worked together as 
a group based on the interviews with each Director. 
The two areas discussed are: 
0 The key subgroups and 'splits' within the management group 
0 The conflicts and intra-group dynamics 
Groups within the group 
The mixture of roles and relationships seemed to have generated sub-groups among 
the Directors. There were four main subgroups. 
The main core group was in fact a pair: the CEO and the Director of Finance. 
They often led formally and informally the process and decision-making of the 
management group and the relationship and agenda for the leader of the council 
and the Chair of Finance in the'Core groupand in informal conversation. The 
CEO was seen as being 'dependent' upon the Finance Director and this seemed to 
hold a number of connotations, which were mainly negative. 
The second group was that of the CEO, Harris (Finance), Jones (Welfare) and 
Tews (Policy). These covered most of the strategic resource issues and the 
relationship was based on one to ones with the CEO and among themselves, but 
rarely as an operating group of four face to face. 
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The third group was an extension of the second and included Janet Taylor and 
Peter Atkins. They were not in the decision-making process but were part of the 
implementation. They also were supportive of the CEO. 
There was also an 'outsiders' group. Ben Chandra was a clear outsider. This was 
where he put himself and also how he was positioned by the others in the 
management group. Peter Atkins was another outsider but for different reasons. 
However, with the announcement of Tom Dicks preparing to stand down, an 
unexpected and recent alliance had emerged between Chandra and Jones, whose 
Chairs were in alliance to influence the election of a new leader. 
Conflicts and dynamics 
The CEO felt the management group was unhealthy. 
"How can you make decisions in an environment of conflict. This is an underlying 
problem in the team - plus our own behaviour, which is negative. " 
Hinds (CEO) added: "There is too much personalisation of issues in the management 
group. For example in service standards I can tend to pull out service failures: it 
could be said in a depersonalised way. " 
Janet Taylor (Education) describes conflict between herself and Paul Harris (Finance) 
over the role of education: "I found the management group unhelpful. Paul said he 
couldWt see a role for education and I had to put him down and fought those bully boy 
tactics to establish a pecking order. " 
Paul Harris views were similar about the management team. "Shallow and hostile" 
were his first remarks about the team. He continued: "We undermine each other and 
there is point scoring to build empires... We don't operate as a core. But also we dorft 
have any support of the group, perhaps I am part of the group? " 
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Ben Chandra said of the management group: "Not draw upon experiences in their 
past. There was low trust, game playing and service by service responses, " as 
opposed to a corporate response. 
Resentments were also caused by different members of the group being treated in 
different but discriminatory ways. Peter Atkins was always being shouted down and 
picked on, Charles Tews was a source of frustration and ridicule and Paul Harris was 
the one who always did what he liked. The CEO admitted that Paul Harris did get 
less of a steer than other management group officers. It was characterised by Charles 
Tews (Policy): "Paul is above the rules - as seen by the group - and this leads to 
resentment. " 
"The three [Fred, Paul and Charles] have the closest relationship with Chris [CEO]. 
Whereas Ben Chandra is on the outside and Peter Atkins is not seen as a champion - 
more a technocrat. There is an unevenness of treatment. " (Janet Taylor) 
The dynamics of the group in the observed meeting seem to have some structural 
dynamics that were observed to repeat themselves constantly and these are discussed 
in the next sub-section. 
4.1.3 The dynamics of the group based on the Group psychodynamics 
The data for this section is based on the Group Analysis Grid and the content analysis 
of the group's discussions. 
Tracing the micro-dynamics of the groups suggests that the group spent just over half 
of its processes on task related dynamics and the rest of the time in a dysfunctional 
manner (see table 14.2). 
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Table 14.2. The key dynamics in the group 
Total W1 w2 w3 w4 FL Fi DP CP CID Und 
853 62 286 78 14 28 252 69 25 74 28 
100% 7% 34% 9% 2% 3% 30% 8% 3% 1% 0% 3% 
The group spent half of its time in the process of 'work' and a third of its time in the 
state of 'fight'. 
A further analysis of the breakdown of work between level work one, where the 
contribution is more a personal reflection, to level work four where the group is 
thinking outside its existing framework, 79% of the'work' activity in the group was 
level 2 (65%) or level 1 (14%). Thus 21% was geared to active problem solving 
(18%) or contributions out of the existing framework (3%) (see Appendix 10.2 for 
further breakdowns by session). 
A further examination of the group's dynamics suggested dominant modes of activity 
in the group for each member. For example, the CEO often operated in a questioning 
and 'fight' mode, usually to push the agenda and raise the nature of debate, quality of 
thinking and confront Directors on their thinking and actions. 
Charles Tews, Policy, was often in an oppositional role in relationship to the CEO, 
asking awkward questions and making suggestion that were counter to the CEO's 
flow of thinking and direction. This frequently, led to the CEO berating Tews and in 
cases swearing at him. Yet both the CEO and Tews had the highest proportionate 
contribution of level 3 and 4 'work'. 
Paul Harris, Director of Finance, tended to be more circumspect in his contribution 
and tended to push his own agenda. Ben Chandra tended to be the quietest member of 
the group. And there were examples of the new member, Janet Taylor, Education, 
being pushed to demonstrate her value and membership to the management group. 
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Peter Atkins, Construction, often had deputies in meetings and tended not to be 
associated with strategic inputs. 
Three modes of working often operated in the group from the pattern of dialogue. 
These were: 
41 A dominant pattern of 'fight' over ideas, territory, positioning or defensiveness. 
Periods of'worle, mainly at level two where business was being progressed and the 
meetings were going well. Tbere were one or two exceptional meetings where the 
group was on a roll of strategic and creative ideas building on each other and 
supporting each others contributions. 
A collective and seemingly defensive response to the considerations of the 
Members and this seemed to tap into two underlying issues. The first was the 
critical and sometimes fearfulness of the Members. The second was reflected in a 
debate about authority and allegiances to the CEO or to the Members. 
Short extracts of some of the issues are below and are also presented in Appendix 
10.3. 
The group appeared to work on an emotional swing between 'fight' and low levels of 
'work! and these seem to be reinforced by the dynamics and roles that members had 
both taken and were given in the group. 
It was acknowledged that some of the tensions and conflicts were imported from the 
Members. But there was also a feeling that the power base within the group was on 
the axis between the CEO and the Director of Finance. The earlier quote by Peter 
Atkins (Contracts) seemed to capture the sentiments of the group. 
"The CEO and Finance tend to be the overriding power base at the moment... That's 
where the power and politics lies. " 
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4.1.4 Does the team display examples of 'basic assumption'motifs over 
'w o rk'?. 
Group members seemed to have adopted specific roles in the group and these were 
generally agreed by their colleagues. There was a socially agreed perception that 
Charles Tews was a 'pain in the arse'. Janet Taylor was lightweight. Paul Harris and 
the CEO were the heavyweights or power brokers. Peter Atkins was the group's fool 
and Ben Chandra was driven by self-serving ambition. 
The dynamics of the group was represented by 'splitting' in the form of various sub- 
groups, conflicts that were not openly managed, uneven handedness - favourites and 
fools - bullying and a macho culture was also dominant. There was mistrust in the 
group, particularly expressed by Ben Chandra, and publicly unexpressed resentments. 
Many of these conflicts and differences had become undiscussable, despite the group 
using a team facilitator for two sessions during the course of the study. This hidden 
nature, with conflict unresolved and tensions not addressed was more characteristic of 
a group in the earlier stages of development, than a group that had been together for 6 
years. Thus it is suggested that these dynamics were structural and systemic. 
The group did have a balance of 'work' and basic assumption motifs of 50: 50. 
However, the quality of the work was of a personal and low level (79%) and the level 
of 'fight' interactions were about a third. 
Thus, taken together, the data seems to infer that basic assumption motifs were 
influential in the group. 
Fear, conflict, 'fight' behaviours and narrowly defined group roles reduced both the 
quality of work in the group and the opportunities for learning. 
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A systemic analysis of the Group 
The group's dynamics were a pendulum of level two work and 'fight' and hostility. 
The energy that the CEO held could be used constructively for creative thinking and a 
buzz in the management group or it could be turned on people by shouting at them. 
There were structural and collusive roles and relationships that seemed to be present 
with Charles Tews and Peter Atkins being used as scapegoats and whipping posts and 
Ben Chandra! s intellect being under-utilised - with him being kept as the outsider and 
him retaining that role. 
The CEO was often operating in fight mode, however this was often in service of 
progressing the meeting, asking questions to get his Directors to think through items 
or taking the occasional paradigm shift. In some ways, the CEO provided the group 
with an energy and'elan'that many commented upon and that was apparently lacking 
in the group. 
The group also showed some signs of dependency but this was not a significant 
preoccupation. In managing these internal dynamics, and being internally focused, it 
can undermine the management of boundaries and let the external context impact and 
take over the inner world of the group. At one level there was some evidence of this 
in that the Members in-fighting and loose policy agenda did impact negatively on the 
management group. This further led to their under-boundedness. Moreover, the 
tensions and multiple agendas of management group members did appear to 
undermine corporate working and directorate-led agendas seemed to be more 
important. 
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Thus, the role of 'crisis management', 'constructed chaos' and 'knee-jcrk' reactions 
begins to have more significance. Thus, it is suggested that as the management group 
was effectively excluded from the strategic decision-making and policy agenda, then 
there were few structures to unite them - until the recently introduced strategic, 
corporate processes. Thus, it was usually a crisis which brought them together and 
raised some of that'Dunkirk spirit'. It was the crisis that made them feel better 
because they usually pulled it off against all odds and it made the council and 
colleagues'look good'. It was acknowledged by most Directors that their actions 
were not strategic and most crises were avoidable because 'you could see the signs'. 
But there seemed to be a pay off with the crisis approach. 
The implication of this process, in this case study, is that strategic leaming can be 
undermined. The systemic and dysfunctional dynamic was that the group missed 
strategic opportunities for learning because of its own dynamics and that of its 
political leaders. These crisis at the strategic apex provided the opportunity to 'rally 
together'as a group and'save the day'. This provided a'buzzand became a substitute 
for the strategic task. There was no shared strategic leaming from the crisis as those 
in power - the CEO, Finance Director, the Leader and the Chair of R and D- did not 
see it as important. The rest of the management group and committee Chairs were 
excluded from the discussion. 
The other payoff about the crisis was that it provided a distraction from the difficulties 
in the management group. Thus, the process continued and there was a systemic loop 
of a habitual and collusive routine of anti-task behaviour and it impact was most 
likely to be anti-leaming. 
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In summary, the group operated in a difficult organisational environment and was not 
privy to the strategic agenda: partly because there was a lack of explicit leadership and 
partly because those in power restricted access to that agenda. Moreover, the group's 
internal dynamics were characterised by tensions, conflicts and a group acted 'as if' it 
was in its early stages of development. The combined effect of these external and 
internal dynamics established a complex set of defensive and collusive routines that 
served to undermine the group's strategic learning. 
4.2 Do individual 'valenciesreinforce difficult group dynamics? 
This section explores how the manager's context, history and inner conflicts and 
drives help throw light upon how they took up their roles in the strategic forum of the 
management team. 
Each of the Director filled in a personal profile inventory and this was used as a tool 
for personal and existential exploration through an in-ýdepth interview held in August, 
1996. The details of this process are in chapters 10 and II of the research 
methodology. 
The following accounts are taken from the second, in-depth one to one interviews 
with each of the Directors, the outcome from their Firo-B data4, the comments from 
their colleagues (used as feedback and dialogue) and a written note including key 
points from each of the sessions. 
4 Firo-B score for each element ranged from 0-9. In identifying self scores Directors 
were asked to score themselves as high, medium or low. These were used as a 
comparative to the scored marks where 0-2 was low, 3-6 was medium, and 7-9 was 
high. High, medium, low is the format that will be used to report the scores, which 
also made sense to the respondents. Explorations followed the participants' interests 
and tended to explore differences in expectations or extremes in high or low (9 or 
zero). Raw data for each of the Firo-B scores are in appendix 10.4 
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The outcome froin looking at the individual accounts is to answer tile LILiestion, what 
impact do individual 'unresolved' memories or conflict have on tile oroup's dynarnics 
The individuals - history, role context and inner drives - the intemal 
dialogue 
Chris Hinds (CEO) 
Chris Hinds was 45 and one ofthe youngest members ofthe , -, rOUp. 
Tlicrc had been a L- 
rapid rise in role froin senior wellare officer to UFA) in the space ofthree to I'Mir ycars 
and this was a source of both admiration and envy (See aCCOUnts about CFO by 
colleagues above). 
Chris experienced a degree ofisolation duc to tills rapid rise and as part ol'being ill 
the role. The isolation was disguised by keeping people out and a personal 
management style ofoccasionally ShOLIting at people and asking - especially fellow 
Directors - awkward questions. 
In a different environment Chris wondered whctlier his personal style inay have been 
different: in the role of I lousing Director Chris reported a style that \ýas warmer %%it Ii 
colleagues. 
"It was a much morc lonelierjob now. - 
His Firo-13 scores are shown below. 
Firo-B Scl 1, Firo-11 Sel I' I'll-0-11 Sel I' 
score assess- score ýIsscss- Score zisscss- 
ment illelit Illent 
Express- Medium Low I ligh I ligh V. low MedIL1111 
ed 
Low Low-Mcd Low klcd-lo\\- LON\ Med-lmý 
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Table 14.3 Firo-13 Scores I'or Chris I linds 
The conversation centred on the issues of control and affection (in the form of 
recognition). The current role required the CEO to 'have more control. ' While usually 
a trusting person the organisation was not one where that could be a safe assumption. 
"One tends to get scars.... leaving one less trusting. " He added that it was no longer 
appropriate to go for lunch with the lads and that the role of CEO was: "Isolated, 
exposed and lonely. " 
Control was important as, "You can't rely on people. The history of Tuthering is the 
data for that (see section I above). Therefore you need to have control. " Chris 
reported that power, status, money and being the CEO of a large organisation was 
more about recognition and the drive to be a 'substantial achiever at the personal 
level'. "I want to be the best. " 
Further exploration of this drive revealed the importance of recognition and how these 
achievements were aimed to push out self doubt, anxieties about confidence and 
critical selfjudgement. 
Chris was able to trace these feelings and doubts back to when he was aged 16 and 
leaving school, when there were many self doubts about competence, academic ability 
and intellectual prowess. Thus, the need to be recogniscd and reassured was 
significant. 
Analysis 
Chris's personal presentation was one of a charismatic and generally confident 
individual. In the CEO role, the management group was led from the front and Chris 
also attempted to manage the boundary between the management group and the 
elected Members. Chris was however, caught by personal doubts and anxieties 
despite the external successes that have been achieved both in the role and for the 
authority. 
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The need for recognition may be expressed in Chris's cultivated admirers - both in the 
management group and from elected Members - the dependency needs on Paul Harris 
(Finance) and to a lesser extent, Charles Tcws (Policy & Strategy), and the internal 
drive to think big and sometimes not pick up the points of detail. Thus, change, 
innovation, managing crisis and being part of the inner group of the authority's 
decision-making all served this internal need and countered some of the doubts that 
continued to exist. 
It is thus suggested that the CEO's 'Tigger' type qualities and outward confidence hid 
an internal need to be recognised, appreciated and loved. The CEO's role was one of 
isolation and the context of the role did not promote trust, reaching out or openness. 
Thus, the internal drive expressed itself in ways that made contact with the people 
through disagreement, 'fight' behaviour, managing messiness and crisis. Chris 
operated with an inner group and felt it important to paint the big picture, relying on 
others to implement - e. g. Charles Tews. This personal dynamic appeared to be a 
combination of the needs of the group context, Chris's personal history and inner 
dialogue. It suggests a mutuality of needs being met between the group and the CEO 
in role. 
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Paul Harris (Finance) 
Paul Harris was 49 and was the longest serving oil-icer of'thc authoritv (t\\elltN' years) 
and one of the most powerful members ofthe group. I le was very attuned to the 
political sensitivities and complexity ofthe authority and managed his houndaries 
well with his Chair ofcornmittee. 
His Flro-B score is below. 
Table 14.4 Firo-B Scores for Paul I larris 
Express- Low Low High I ligh V. Loxý Low 
ed 
Wanted Low Medium Medium I, O\N Medium Med-I 11"'ll 
The key issue in the conversation was 'control'. Paul I larris \k as % cry much a person 
in control and was not diffidem in owning that part ot'his character. I le ýýas aware of' 
his interpersonal impact oil others mid would use this as a way ol'inaintaining power 
over others, a psychological edge. I le said that: -Control was very high. Yes. It's tile 
flip side of a lack of trust. " 
While acknowledging control as a part ofliis hasic character Paill said that the 
environment had made that more prominent -C'Specially Over tile last five \'Cars. 
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score assess- score lissess- Score ilssells- 
nient Illent Iliclit 
"I need control. I don't like surprises -and don't want chaos. " He said that the drive for 
control was to keep the authority on financial track and was not to fill the power gap, 
as he knew his colleagues had felt to be the case. Compared to other authorities he 
had worked in, the political instability at Tuthering was greater than most and this 
made him even more controlling. He saw himself as the stability in the organisation 
in a political context of informality and unpredictability. Harris felt that the CEO did 
not always acknowledge this role in him and, "If I were not around Chris would 
panic. " 
Further exploration revealed that Paul's inner dialogue ran: "If there is no control then 
things will fall apart and there is chaos, " and that was uncomfortable, led to 
uncertainty, tested trust and was something that had to be defended against and 
protected. 
Analysis 
Paul Harris saw himself as someone who lacked trust in those around him and 
acknowledged that he was controlling. This was confirmed by his colleagues 
assessment of him and his direct nature was sometimes experienced as bullying, rude 
or off. Paul was aware of this style and used it as part of his defence. 
His core concern was to prevent chaos and to provide a stable basis for the 
organisation and for himself. He was unable to trust the role authority placed in the 
CEO or the leader and thus worked on the basis that he had to do it himself He was 
instrumental in most of the strategic initiatives and the significant resource decisions 
in the authority. The controversial budget process - to be discussed later - also had 
Paul's involvement and that basically ran contrary to the agreed consultative 
procedure to be controlled and decided by the Leader of the council, the Chair of 
Finance, the CEO and Paul Harris. But it was said by many of his colleagues that: 
"... The numbers were done on the back of an envelop by Paul IV' 
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Thus, his need for control was said to come from a fear of'chaos and a lack oftrust. 
This impacted negatively on the management team as the others were oftcti ICR Out 01' 
the loop, were not trusted with intbrination and the group as a whole IOSt the Input and 
opportunity lor learning. In Summary, his bLlll\'Illg persona \ýas a del'ence against 
chaos which reinforced the role that Paul I larris took aiid removed the onus ol'the 
others to take responsibility for their roles in the group's task, risk and its learimig. 
Fred Jones (Welfare Services) 
Fred Jones was one of the oldest members ofthe group at aged 50.1 le had worked 
his way up the organisational ladder, like the CF0, and he liad the lar-gest directorate tý 
in the council. I le felt that things were still led by tile centre ind \ýas not bappy \ý ith 
the style and culture of the organisation. 
FI ro -B Sel F Firo-B Sell' 
score 
Express- Mcdium 
ed 
Wanted Low 
Illent 
assess- score kisscss- 
High 
Illelit 
MedlUill Mcd]Lllll 
Medium MedILIM 1\, IedILlill 
1.11-o-B Sell' 
score ýIssess- 
ment 
McdILIIII 
IlIgh kled-Low 
Fred did not have an issue about control, like SO111C 01111S COIlCa"Lics, but It (11CI See"' 
that lie like to be liked and approved of. III his Personal, school and 1`1111111y history lie 
grew up in a culture where emotions and feelings w-ere not expressed and so that 
became his normal way of relating. This softened a little at university but that 
dominant approach still persisted. Ile was aware that in niany ways tile management 
group syrnbolised, -That more distant way ofrelatino to each other. " 
"People are nervous about expressing and eniotionalk supportility others. It is the 
same here. It is not a warm group... Chris (CF0) is tile most expressive and that is 
healthy. " 
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'Fable 14.5 Firo-B Scores for Fred Jones 
"One's past culture catches up on you and you fall back on those models and 
stereotypes of how senior management should operate - hard nosed, unfeeling, hard 
bastards that people tell us about in industry - the IBMs. But I don't see myself in that 
role. But we do repress emotions in this environment. " 
Fred believed in the value of teams and was often helping others. He felt he had 
reached his ambitions given his age and he did not want to be a CEO. He was aware 
that some of his colleagues saw him as empire building but he did not relate to that: "I 
don't feel I'm guilty of that... each directorate is seen as a thiefdorn anyway. " Neither 
did he feel threatened by the prospects of being thrown out if something went wrong, 
unlike in the earlier days of his career as he believed in the value of his work to the 
authority and the lessons he'd learned along the way. 
"Mind you I won't give up... in the things I believe in. I was stroppy as a child and 
even though was beaten over the head I still came back. " 
Stability was important to him and this was born out in his longevity in the job, some 
of friends had been with him for decades, he lived in the same area for as long and he 
had a great attachment to the job. "The job is all consuming. " Someofthis 
attachment came from a reaction to always being on the move as a child due his 
parent's work. However, Fred also noted his disappointment in the group that was not 
very close despite its stability. 
Fred Jones saw himself as a'worker' as opposed to an innovator and felt that: if you 
stick with it, it will payoff. "You have to have a long term perspective, eventually 
you'll get there but because it takes a long time you also need some quick successes 
but keep the focus on the strategic, on the long term. It takes time to change any 
organisational culture. " 
"We have an unstable political environment.. but we have a culture where we're good 
at fire-fighting but not so good in a planned environment. Its not so exciting or buzzy. 
Extremely tiring. But hard to work in a planned environment. " 
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Analysis 
Fred Jones was very committed to his work and the authority. He presented himself 
as a 'values' led manager, who was determined and persistent. He found the 'hard- 
nosed' leader a difficult role to take on. He accepted the uncertain nature of the 
organisational and group context and seemed to act in two ways: on one hand he 
enjoyed the buzz and excitement of managing critical and crisis situations; at the same 
time he worked methodically and painstakingly to create stability and a large 
monolith in his part of the organisation -a possible locus of stability. In fact he says 
it was difficult to operate in a planned environment. 
These seemingly contradictory actions may be seen as a political strategy to gain a 
greater share of resources. This may have been plausible in the past but we see here 
an established member of the management group and of the authority who no longer 
needs to fear loss, competition or the need to be acquisitive. By his own account he 
has reached his own aspirations in career terms. 
A further explanation to these contrary actions may be a form of personal coping and 
defence mechanism - described as 'reaction formation' - where the fear of continual 
change (from the childhood past) is warded against by working in a way that creates 
stability and a structure. The latter then provides the space and order to allow the 
creativity and fire-fighting that may be valuable but may also be the repetitive pattern 
of the past that is compulsively enacted at an unconscious level. 
It is suggested that this unconscious personal management system provides the group 
with a mechanism of support. It provides some of the much needed stability and 
certainty in the group's context of uncertainty and unpredictability and it provides 
creativity and a solid base to give strategic input. Fred is also able to hold a number 
of working and relationship boundaries with all the other directorates and Directors. 
Thus, while sometimes cynical and critical, he provides an important lynch pin in the 
management group that supports some of the intentions of the CEO. 
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Ben Chandra (Planning - Physical Environment) 
Ben Chandra started the personal interview by noticing how tile isolation ot'llis 
offices (frorn the main Town Hall) and his desire to stay, clear ofthe political battles 
were reflected in his isolation with regards to the management group. I le wislied to 
stay outside of the group and this was very intensely expressed by Ills personal desire 
I-or an arms length relationship with the rest oftlic group. "I find people, dicy are 
hard to work with. " He also observed that lie was not as 'bound in' ýIS SIlOLlId be and 
that, "The council had also ascribed me the role... I sit as an OutSILIcr. " 
Ile thought of the relationship with the management group as a inetaphor ot'his 
physical work. Ile remarked that in his work lie had: -To build a %\all as \vell as 
protect it. It was also better being outside the building. " Several references werc 
made to the fact that you could not make a team work unless there ý, vas trust. "I'llis 
work with the consultant is not going to solve thinos... it (the Inanagenlent team awav 
day) was like a dreadful weekend. " 
Fable 14.6 1, iro-B Scores for Bcn Chandra 
I le lound the context of the tearn did not provide tile encouragement to break tile C- 
boundaries and make contact. People did not socialisc outside ofthe management 
group, there was the culture ofbiarne, perlormance ýýas still. judged by directorate 
rather than corporate work and the lack ofcommunal '\\atcring holes' all Incant it \\, as 
di Cficult for Ben to integrate Into tile management Lý1-01.111 or the organisation bcý ond 
his own directorate, where his team worked well. 
Express- Low MCdiLlIll V. 1 I igh Mull 'NIC(IIIII11 Z7, 
ed 
Wanted Low I ligh V. Lo\ý 1,0\\ V. I MeCIRIIII 
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nient illeilt nicilt 
The areas of concern were control and the 'isolation'. His self assessment of the 
desire to be included and to express and receive affection was greater than the scores 
from the Firo-B questionnaire. He suggested that some of the differences could be 
explained by his work role being different from his more outwardly going social life. 
Ben was the youngest member of the group (aged 42). He was ambitious and by his 
own acknowledgement highly motivated. Accounts from his colleagues suggested 
that this put some of his colleagues off him. Moreover, when things got slowed 
down or frustrated then he would withdraw and this routine also reinforced his 
isolation in the group. He was ambivalent about gaining more authority because in 
his view as you went up the corporate ladder, you had less control rather than more. 
Yet at the same time he had applied for a CEO post. 
He too used control as a defense. "If people respect you then perhaps control falls and 
similarly maybe you! re prepared to accept some control? " What he wanted from the 
centre was support, clarity of role, decisions when required and direction when 
necessary. He continued to see the role of his directorate as more enjoyable and 
rewarding work than the corporate working. 
Analysis 
Ben presented himself as the outsider and from the beginning of the interview his 
analogy with his office and the picture of the brick wall marks this as an interesting 
symbol of 'the outsidee. His desire to remain 'outside' was reinforced by the 
management group, the culture and context of the organisation, how he was perceived 
and his own personal frustrations and occupations which caused him to purposively 
withdraw and appear aloof. Ben expressed that he found it hard to relate to others in 
the team and that working on his own directorate, in what the CEO called an "airy 
fairy" service, was more comforting: a sort of retreat from reality. He said that he 
found it difficult to trust members in the team and that this fear of being hurt by team 
members suggested a possible defence against making contact or intimacy. This 
personal occupation was reinforced by and supported the group matrix. 
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Peter Atkins (Contracts) 
Peter Atkins was aged 48.1 Ic was aft'able and articulate about IIIS SCIWICC Mid the 
political workings of the authority. Peter liked to have clear boundaries and workitio L- 
relationship but was not focused on controlling behaviour. I le felt that to work in ýi 
transparent way was good and that stopped others trying to second o Liess \ý liether 
there was another agenda or not. 
Tablc 14.7 Firo-B Scores l'or I'ctcl- Atkins 
Firo-13 Sel I' Firo-B Se I I' Firo-B SC If 
score assess- score ýIsscss_ Score ýIsscss_ 
ment 111clit Ilicilt 
Express- I ligh Medium I ligh I ligh Medium Mcd*ILIIII 
ed 
Wanted V. Low Low Medium MedlUill Medium NlecliLlill 
lIctcr's sell'asscssmcnt and the scores were very close. 
From our conversation it seemed that Peter felt it important to be liked and to recel%'C 
recognition. Ile did not expect people at work to love him, but certainly wanted their 
respect. Ills working assumption was: 'kvork oil tile basis ol'being open'. -What yoll 
see is what you get - no ganics, " lie said. I le %ýcnt on to say about his style that: 
"You'll know its coming - you'll get the knite In the clicst. " 
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Peter also declared that he had high working standards. Some of that may be a 
product of the industry where high specifications were the norm. Peter felt that: "I 
always wanted things to be done right. If decorating - not overly fussy but workman 
like. Not Rolls Royce but a good professional job. " Thus, some of these standards 
were a part of his internal dialogue and another part a product of his training and 
professional experience as a mechanical engineer. He also felt a high sense of 
responsibility to get things right. He said: "If there is flack, I'll take it; if its success, 
I'll put the others up front. " 
Finally he made repeated remarks about being recognised - for his competence, for his 
style, for his openness and fairness, for his standards. Yet on exploring these issues 
ftirther he admits that it was hard to accept praise and he was probably a little shy. 
Yet the management group members saw him as dull, boring and the'idiot'of the 
group. Last in the pecking order. 
(It was also interesting to note that the researcher forgot he had a meeting with Peter 
Atkins, and spent the time gathering informal information from the CEO and Charles 
Tews because he thought he had some extra time unallocated - see personal insights 
below in section 5) 
Analysis 
Peter Atkins presented himself as open and transparent. He liked to be liked and 
wanted to be openly recognised for the work he did and the way he did it. He found 
praise difficult, and in the management group meetings and individual meetings 
notions of conflict were avoided. 
However, the management group did not provide Peter with any of these things. 
Instead he was the source of ridicule and humiliation. Note the remarks made by his 
colleagues and how he was used by the group as a scapegoat. Far from getting what 
he wanted from the group he got the opposite. 
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In turn, it appeared that Atkins may have internalised some of this 'bad ob ect' role 
and in his deference to the group perpetuated the situation by his continued openness, 
transparency and his seemingly naivetd. His desire to be approved of and recognised 
seemed to open him up to more abuse by the group. It is suggested that he had a poor 
sense of himself. Moreover, at a deeper level, this self doubt provided the mechanism 
for successful projective identification and the interrialisation of the scapegoat role so 
that he became the object of disdain. 
The combined personal and group dynamic added to the structure of the group matrix. 
Janet Taylor (Education Services) 
Janet was 48 years old. Her general management style was to be open and generally 
inclusive. "You do not empower people by keeping them in the dark. By and large 
people around me are good with the exception of a few shits. " 
She felt that the organisation gave mixed messages: both the CEO and the Members 
said they wanted corporate working. First, she felt that there was little evidence of 
them doing that but secondly people where still judged on the performance of their 
directorate work and not on the work done corporately. Furthermore, these tendencies 
were aggravated by political and financial pressures and were seen as 'negative'. "It 
sets us against one another. A cave man approach - go out and get the sabre-toothed 
tiger. But this militates against corporate working. It varies from year to year but it 
tended to yield competition rather than collaboration. Trust is transient. " 
"They did not know me, " said Janet, referring to the management group. As the new 
member of the group she felt that people did not know her and in the management 
group away day she had felt that some of the feedback she received was misinformed. 
"This (process) was hurtful. I felt anger and hurt. I am unsure how to cope with this. " 
In addition, she felt that despite some excellent work with the Department of 
Education on the council's education strategy she only received appreciation from one 
colleague of the management group. It was not the CEO and non of the elected 
Members congratulated her and this was a source of resentment and disappointment. 
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Table 14.8 Firo-B Scores for Janet'Faylor 
Fl ro -B Self Firo-B Sel 1' 1"11-0-11 SCII, 
score assess- score assess- SC()I'C assess- 
ment inent Illent 
Express- Medium High Medium I ligh Medium High 
ed 
Wanted Vlow Med-I ligh Low Low Medium Low 
The sel Ilassessed scores were generally higher than the reported scores \ý ith the 
exception of 'affection wanted'. 
The inclusion and affection needs may be reflected in the point that Janct made that 
she liked to be a tearn player 
Janet Taylor felt that it was important to be fair. ']'his ývas repeated with small, 
elaborate and detailed examples twelve times. I ler personal and \\ ork experience "vas 
a litany of not being treated I'airly. In each ol'the cases cited when people were Linfair 
to her, circumstances would avenge her (one person actually died oCnatural causes in 
the bath) or restore her good name. Or she would learn several years later llo\N" well 
she was thought ofor that people did not think it was her I'ault. hi addition, not 
receiving accurate and immediate (or timely) tecdback in her personal and '. vork- 
history left her always trying to figLirc things Out and an iiitcriial message ot"not being 
good enough'. 
A year long sabbatical provided the temporary and necessary space rcqLIII-cd to make 
sense ot'licr past and to understand herselfaS IICIIIýg IIILICII more than lierjob. Balance 
and perspective was more central in her lil'e and \\hIlc the doubts \\ere still sometimes 
present they were not as gripping as bellore. 
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Analysis 
Janet Taylor presented herself as a new member of the group who was going to 
establish herself and not take any nonsense from her fellow male Directors. Accounts 
show that Paul Harris and Ben Chandra have both been in conflict with her and others 
see her as bringing a newness to the group as one not to be easily put off. 
However, her most difficult experience in the management group so far was the 
feedback she received from her male colleagues in one of the early away days. The 
importance of this event was the level of resonance it had with a past of being unfairly 
treated and not being given 'nurturing', fair treatment nor supportive feedback. This 
triggered those internal doubts and for some time was uncomfortable. 
At a political level, the group members may be trying to keep her in her place as the 
new member of the group and as a woman. She had demonstrated her capacity to 
engage and manage conflict and her earlier accounts showed that her political 
understanding of the group was good. Yet, irrespective of the content and intention of 
the feedback, it linked with a personal history that made the feedback near 
devastating, hitting older memories and repetitive routines. 
The group's pull to cement that particular projective identification and collusive 
routine was checked only by Janet Taylor's more centred sense of self, the quality of 
her reflective capacities after the sabbatical and a change in the balance of her 
personal significance from work to the true sclL It was these, by her own account, 
that prevented her being sucked into a group matrix that would have a negative impact 
on her personal well-being and the group. 
Her other symbol of stability was her belief in honesty, integrity and equality. These 
values were said: 'to go way, way back. ' 
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Charles Tews (Policy and Stratcggýv) 
Charles Tews was 48 years old and understood the dynamics ol'a politically driven 
local authority. I le had ambivalent feelings about the CF() and disl1kcd Paul I kirris, 
Finance, although they did work together on things behind the scenes. 
Tnblc 14.1) Firo-13 '-, cof-c,,, I'Or Clurics Tex-, s 
Firo-B Sell' Firo-B 
score assess- score 
ment 
Express- Medium II igh I ligh 
ed 
Sell' Firo-B Sell' 
assess- score assess- 
nient ment 
Medium Medium I ligh 
Wanted LOAN Medium LON\ McdIum McdMill Medium 
II is stated need to control was said to be out ol'a desire to uct thin"s right. I I't Ile 
project or initiative was his own then the anxiety and stress \ýas greater than il'it was 
someone else's pro j ect or ifit was a corporate or group pro ect. 111 111 envII-011111clit 
that had few things stable this was difficull. Charles complained oftceling very tired 
and tclt: "I arn always required to generate Illy 0\\ 11 CiltIlLISILISIll... having to make in\, I Z-1 
own judgements about success or lailure and going through lots of'scifasscssment. " 
I le reflerred to an article on burnout that lie was carrying at the time (I larry Levinson, 
1981, "When Executives Burn Out": I larvard Business Review Classic), and 
suggested this was what lie was experiencing. 
"The council has broad objectivcs which tends to yield low standards, \kllicll gives 
lower quality work and lower quality 01'Work-111C, this leads to IIICIItal CX11aUStIOI1 aild 
executive burn Out. " 
"Thus, you need to have control to compensate and set one's own standards 1`61- 
success or failure as the organisation doesn't give Ceedback. The political agenda does 
not equal managerial success. Management here tcrids to I'Ocus oil failUrCS not 
success... one is set up to fail. It becomes a self-Cull-illing, propliesý. - 
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Charles felt that he was so enmeshed in this mechanism that it was difficult to get out 
of the cycle of running like mad to stay ahead, getting into conflict as a result of 
different people's priorities and then taking the blame for not delivering. 
"It's like a chess game. You need to let them steal things they don't want so that you 
can manage your own stress. " 
Charles Tews hated failure. He set high internal standards and judged himself harshly 
on them. This was partly a result of his manual career and work in quality and 
assurance but some of it was also traced back to family ties. He expressed a fear of 
rejection if he failed and deep feelings of guilt. This was a strong internal message. 
Charles Tews also felt that he did not make the best use of his 'brain! and early 
academic opportunities. These were another source of his self critical nature and his 
desire to get things right. These thoughts were matched with high levels of personal 
integrity and a disdain for some of the political games that were played by the elected 
Members and some of his colleagues, namely Paul Harris. 
Tews was aware of the role he was taking up in the group and the dynamics between 
him and the CEO and the group as a whole. But he felt it was important for the team 
and saw himself as the 'intermediary' and 'bridge spannee between the CEO and the 
management group, despite the personal cost to him of taking up this role and his 
feeling of exhaustion and depletion. 
However, as these feelings of deflation were acknowledged by Tews, he found 
himself being more and more resentful and withdrawn, letting people take 
responsibility to be direct with and to take on the CEO regarding their own issues. He 
was tired of getting the 'beatings from the group'. 
"The council can either get it together and be corporate and powerful or it can 
fragment with the whole being less than the sum of the parts. " 
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Analysis 
Charles Tews' dedication to the council was great. He took on a variety of roles to 
make things happen at a corporate level but he had reached a point where he was tired 
and fed up of taking the responsibility for others - especially as it was at such personal 
cost and left him feeling exhausted. This shift was a recent one and it uncovered 
feelings of resentment and disbelief at the level of 'beatings' he had taken - especially 
from the CEO and that was emotionally hurtful. (See too earlier accounts about Tews' 
role in the group in section 2 above, where he was not appreciated nor valued for his 
work. ) 
His high personal standards and a desire to see things done right was a key driver. 
However, this was held with feelings of anxiety, fears of rejection and internal stress. 
The possibility of failure was intolerable. These inner drivers appeared to keep him 
going against a context of a group that possibly used him to take on the CEO and a 
broader political context of conflict, low standards, uncertainty and insufficient 
feedback. Thus, a group matrix of an individual's need to be perfect and his fear of 
rejection provided the group as a whole with a conduit to take on the group's own 
imperfections and that of the CEO. The role was emotionally tiring and draining and 
it was this realisation that began to dawn upon Tews. I feel bruised, knackered and 
bad. My health has really suffered. " 
The impending'bum out'was stopped short when Tews realised the impossibility of 
his task and stepped out of the structural role and began to operate and think 
differently in order to survive. Thus, a near personal crisis was needed to break the 
projective motifs that occurred in the group and realign the nature of the group's 
matrix. 
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4.3 Do individual 'valencies'reinforce difficult group dynamics? An 
analysis of the individuals 
Each individual's personal dynamic were presented from the in-depth interviews that 
explored their personal history, inner dialogue and context and meaning for each 
Directors. While each member had their own unique history, inner tensions and 
conflicts, they all fitted a role within the group that served some of the needs of the 
group. 
Firstly, the evidence does seem to support the notion that personal history will affect 
how people take up their roles. The several references to hurtful experiences provides 
an initial clue to the link between personal valencies and the ability to hold the role. 
The 'devastating' feedback, the need to control because of a lack of trust, the wish to 
be perfect or approved of were all factors that led to Directors over-playing some 
aspect of their characterology or accepting behaviours from others that were abusive 
or at least not developmental. 
Examples include: the role of whipping boy given to Peter Atkins (Contracts), the 
'outsider role co-created with Ben Chandra (Contracts), Janet Taylor (Educ Services) 
reliving wounds from the past when receiving that 'devastating feedback' and the 
'bum out' experienced by Charles Tews (Policy) as he tried to manage the attrition 
and conflict with the CEO on behalf of the group. The links to past experiences were 
often made or enacted unconsciously and were fuelled or diminished depending upon 
a number of factors. 
These factors seemed to be the context, role expectations, the impact of projective 
identification and how this served the unconscious motifs of the group (the group 
matrix) and the degree of personal awareness. 
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Context 
In most of the cases they talked of the context of uncertainty, elected Members being 
unpredictable, the culture of blame and the group being a cold or unfriendly bunch. 
Role expectations 
The combined effect of these was to reduce any element of trust, cause people to 
withdraw into themselves and their internal patterns of defence and self doubts to be 
more prominent. This process led to'role differentiation' and a diminution of role 
authority. 
Projective identification 
This is where the individual's 'valency' or 'primary process thinking' conjoins with 
unconscious needs of the group. Thus the inner world dialogue increases and 
dominates in such situations. In this case study, the are several examples where it was 
difficult for Directors to step outside of dysfunctional patterns. For example the CEO 
felt that he had to be perfect and these dyadic relationships would therefore be 
reinforcing. 
The group matrix 
The impact of these unconscious dynamics seem to occur much more in the group. 
Through the process of projective identification, these dynamics appeared to operate 
in all of the cases of the Directors. Each were given or had taken roles that matched 
the needs of the group while at the same time feeding their own unconscious pattern 
to get feedback, be perfect, be approved and in so doing they tended to undermine 
their own authority in role and skew their role contribution. 
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Second, while these dynamics were compelling they were not self sealing nor 
deterministic in this case. The key seemed to be in sufficient members of the group 
having self awareness and an ability to act differently in order to move out collusive 
group roles and retain their task related roles. For example, Fred Jones's personal 
pattern seemed to work for the group and in some way for him as it had the co- 
existence of the stability and the buzz and notjust one or the other. While he did talk 
of high levels of personal development awareness (and even compared the interviews 
to having therapy), it is not known whether his internal management system was a 
natural process of 'maturing' in the role or whether it was assisted by more active 
interventions such as personal therapy. However, he was not caught up by the need to 
prove anything. He had already reach his career ambitions, did not fear being thrown 
out and thus was less susceptible to some of these dynamics. From the accounts, he 
was seen as co-operative by his colleagues although a little idealistic. Co-operation 
means taking up a task related role in a complex system. 
Janet Taylor's and Charles Tews' personal awareness had stopped them from being 
completely sucked into the unconscious needs of the group. In the case of Janet 
Taylor she was able to draw upon her personal learning and reflection while on 
sabbatical and she was able to understand what was happening even thought the 
feedback was still experienced as difficult. In Charles Tews' case the near 'crisis' 
event of bum out brought the issues into clear profile and he stopped operating in that 
mode out of fatigue and depletion. These two cases worked contrary to the pull to act 
out their personal self doubts (inner dialogues) and were able to relate to the group in 
a different way. Their behaviour in the group changed. Janet refused to be bullied 
and Charles stopped taking the flack for other people and was more focused on task. 
These actions in turn were healthy for the group and individuals concerned. 
Finally, as part of the research process the CEO got feedback about his behaviour and 
patterns in the group (as did the whole group). As a consequence, Chris changed the 
way meetings were conducted, making more timely, appropriate and supportive 
interventions. These changes were noticed by the group (and the researcher in a 
review meeting). These actions and behaviours were reported to have continued after 
the core of the research but there were no systematic observations made of changes 
after the feedback to the group or duration of the impact. 
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In conclusion, it is suggested that personal valencies will impact on the difficult 
dynamics of the group and that they will impair people taking up their roles. It is 
likely that such dynamics may be difficult to eliminate all together and in this case we 
see examples of the group 'shifting' and individuals taking up different but facilitative 
roles for themselves and the group. The issues for individuals and groups is not so 
much that they can stop such dynamics occurring but that they can understand, 
recover and change the dynamics of the group as reported in this case study. 
S. Organisational learning 
Question four: Is the organisation able to attain strategic organisational 
learning at a high level? 
The purpose of this section is to address three sub-questions about the nature and level 
of strategic organisational leaming in the system and the impact of systemic defensive 
routines. The sources of data for the inquiry are varied: the responses to the first 
interview Q17 onwards), the dialogue and feedback sessions held during key stages 
of the research, the organisational questionnaire and a final review meeting with the 
CEO and the team together in October 1996. 
The three areas of inquiry are: 
" Is there strategic organisational learning? 
" Is such learning double loop? 
" Does the strategic leadership provide facilitative structures for learning? 
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5.1 Is there strategic organisational learning? Its nature and scope 
Organisational learning here refers to manner in which the strategic apex of the 
organisation - the management group and the elected leaders of the council - 
systemically understands how it interprets its environments, acts on its decision and 
systematically reviews and institutionalises its findings. It is based on the elements 
argued in chapter 5: scanning, detection and interpretation, taking action, reviewing 
and learning and countering organisational defences. 
5.1.1 Scanning and detection: 
The organisation moved from an internal focus in the mid to late 1980's to a focus 
that was much more external and customer oriented. The strategic apex provided 
evidence of scanning through benchmarking, seeking external validation processes 
and people made reference to what was happening in other authorities with 
considerable accuracy. (The accuracy can be confirmed as the researcher was 
undertaking similar work in two of the neighbouring councils. ) The authority was 
beginning to set in place processes to systematically and externally compare with 
other's standards, establish self auditing and increase its strategic scanning and 
detection of error. 
However, it appears that once into the system, these processes were either not 
followed through or in some way they fell off the strategic agenda because they had a 
lower strategic priority or became more operational. 
On detecting errors on strategic initiatives it appeared that the management group was 
less adept. The accounts below illustrate the point. 
"Only when we had lots of meetings and things started to focus on 6% cut and we had 
not information that we began to detect that things were going wrong. " Charles Tews 
on budget cuts. 
499 
"About half way through I detected that things were going wrong. The signs were a 
lack of commitment and what they (the management group meetings) were saying, " 
CEO on a new strategic initiative. 
"When the screws were turned on everyone fractured... we did not draw upon 
experience in the past, there was low trust, games playing and a service by service 
response (as opposed to a corporate one). " Ben Chandra on the same budget cuts. 
"I didrft notice anything. The first I knew was when I was called to an 8.30 am 
meeting by the Planning Director (Ben Chandra) and asked to salvage it (a strategic 
Members conference) by getting people to come to the meeting and persuading the 
CEO to cancel our management team meeting... " Janet Taylor on a strategy 
conference that nearly went wrong. The call to attend the meeting was at 4.30pm on 
the afternoon before. 
"Our investment programme was going off the rails (this was inherited property 
investments from the 1988 administration)... but we didn't notice it was a management 
team problem until the government announcement last week. " Paul Harris on 
managing part of their property investment portfolio. 
These examples of strategic initiatives going off their planned course suggest that the 
detection of error on large strategic initiatives was not easily captured. It seemed that 
the existing systems provided for lower level, routine scanning and one-off validation 
processes but the formal systems (and informal ones) were not matched to the 
requirements of the current environment and this reduced the first opportunity in the 
process of strategic organisational learning. 
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5.1.2 Taking action 
Once error has been detected taking action is necessary for learning to be encoded. In 
this case study the environment did not promote risk and gave little praise when 
things were done well. The accounts also suggest that only a small number of people 
were given the systemic authority to make things happen and that was the CEO and 
leader of the council, the Chair of Finance and the Director of Finance. Fred Jones, 
also had resource power and the patronage of the CEO. Overall taking action was not 
embedded in the psyche of the organisation and if they had poor scanning and 
strategic detection capability, then they may not able to act until it was too late. 
Finally, stifled innovation, the fear of getting it wrong or of being judged were also 
stated as reasons that may stop some of the Directors taking up their authority. 
In addition, it can be inferred that the crisis driven nature of the decision-making on 
strategic issues reinforced processes that reduced systemic and strategic organisational 
learning. 
For example, when the budget cuts process had gone wrong, it was the CEO, the 
Chair of Finance, the leader of the council and the Finance Director that took the 
decision and did so against the agreed (collectively among the management group and 
Chairs of committee), planned consultative process. 
"When we realised we were going to miss budget no steps were taken to deal with it. 
As it was specifically said, the management group was not to be involved not even in 
the priorities process. The CEO fed that into the management group directly from the 
leader. " (Peter Atkins) 
"When the budget process was changed there was a row between Paul and Charles, 
the row never went to the management group and the CEO resolved it. " (Peter Atkins) 
Other examples suggested that initiatives were saved by the 'last minute', by 'key 
personalities thinking on their feef and there were two examples of things simply 
coming 'unstuck! and no action being taken Oust consequences). 
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5.1.3 Reviewing and sharing of learning 
Those in the strategic apex seemed to avoid reviewing and learning. 
"... Keen to have a review and we have a review of the Strategic Projects and 
Investment process, but no one does very much. We don't go back and review them 
very much at all. Thus, we tend to make the same mistakes again, " stated Paul Harris. 
"The review of the projects is more critical. We tend to look at them and say that one 
went well or not rather than look at the process, " Tews said. 
"We tend to do things - go down a route and don't review where we have got to. " 
(Janet Taylor) 
"No evaluation! " (Ben Chandra) 
"A review has been raised - but don't know if a review will take place or not, " said 
Charles Tews. He added: "A whole host of things learned about project management, 
the consequences of putting things off until the last day. There is a propensity to put 
off decisions. " 
"At the moment the general lessons are still to be shared - still awaiting for it to be 
tackled. " (CEO) 
The strategic management does not engage in systematic and regular reviews. It 
understands the value of them but does not do them. All reported gaining personal 
lessons but these were not actioned collectively nor personally. 
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5.1.4 Is there strategic organisational learning 
Based on these accounts from the management group members, the chances of 
strategic organisational learning in this system is low. It had poor strategic detection 
capability for its context, its system members were unable to take authority, act nor 
systematically review their decisions. At best learning was left to individual 
reflection. 
In this case study, a deeper review of organisational learning was undertaken using the 
Strategic Organisational Learning Instrument (SOLI). The latter was developed as an 
output of the research but was not the purpose of this thesis. Thus, the details of the 
instrument are documented in Appendix 5. However, the key elements of the learning 
in the system based on 64 questions of all of the top senior managers is surnmarised in 
the table below. It is followed by a short commentary on how the results compared 
with the views of the 'top team'. 
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Table 14.10 
The view of the top senior management population on Tuthering's strategic 
organisational learning 
Scanning 2.880645 
Interpret 3.138710 
Take Action 3.154839 
Eval/review 2.658065 
Share 2.645161 
Org defensive 3.054839 
Systematic 2.951613 
These were the average scores from 64 senior managers from a total group of 100 who 
were invited from the CEO to take part in this part of the research. 
The scale marks were I-5 and the use of the Likert scaling was described in the 
chapters on research methods. Oppenheim (1966) suggests that the scale mark of over 
three (half way along the scale) would be necessary to consider the results as 
indicating a strong opinion of the whether in this case there was learning or not. 
On all of the scales of strategic organisational learning used in this thesis, there does 
not seem to be any taking place. 
Each of the scales do not report any notable differences from the views held by the 
Directors. However, it is hard to comment further without additional validation of the 
research instrument, which is not reliable based on an item analysis test. (See 
appendix 5 for further comment) 
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5.2 Is there double loop leaming? The role of defensive routines 
A defensive routine is a pattern of collusive behaviours and actions that serve to avoid 
difficult tasks, decisions and pain, and support the system of individuals and groups 
from confronting reality and the demands of the outside world. In this case study, 
these 'routines' operated at the individual, group and strategic apex of this system. 
At the individual level 
The ego defensive routines were supported by Directors inner dialogue and personal 
histories. These took the form of excessive personal expectations and critical self 
judgement representing the bad self object or critical inner parent. These inner 
feelings resonated with the demands of the external environment and this served to 
undermine - in varying degrees - personal authority. For example the CEO showed 
signs of dependency on Harris; Taylor was pained by feedback and temporarily 
knocked back; Tews verged on complete bum out; and Atkins' need to be liked 
overwhelmed his role authority. The impact of these however, was not the same for 
all of the members and as can be seen in the accounts of the individuals. The 
opportunity to take time out, reflect and gain self insight seemed to stop these 
processes being totally undermining. 
In the group 
The 'group matrix! provided a projective object to support old fantasies of self and 
sucked some into continuing to enact these unconscious roles in the group. The group 
had the 'scapegoat', 'the bully', the 'omnipotent' and 'envied leader', 'the outsider', 
'the fool', the political 'fox' and the 'new kid on the block' -a woman - who needed 
to be taught a lesson or at least kept in her place. This made the group a place where 
'there's no trust, sharing of information, mutual trust, shared purpose or no team and 
corporate purpose shared. ' (Ben Chandra). The group was also described as a cold 
bunch and generally it was not a supportive environment. It acted 'as if' it was a 
group still in its early stages of development and the role of the crisis was to 
momentarily bring its members together to tackle a problem but without the scope for 
strategic high level learning. 
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Systemic dynamics 
Within the strategic apex, the defensive routine seemed to be a defence against 
stability., The leader and Chair of Finance, and the elected Members operated in a 
way to maintain an unstable and unpredictable internal context. This may be a 
function of political differences but it was also tied up with unacknowledged and 
unresolved difficulties, object loss, and a search for a new identity or sense of 
organisational identity. In addition, it is argued that these routines stopped any one 
group gaining authority - no one could be authorised, and even the Leader of the 
council was an acceptable compromise. Moreover, the elected Members did not want 
the officers to be authoriscd whom they did not trust as a group and resented being 
dependent upon them and their skills. It was described by some as an envious attack. 
Thus, the system would always be in a state of unhealthy and anxiety provoking not- 
knowing, not being and not acting. This impaired double-looP strategic organisational 
because both external and internal learning capability had been undermined. 
Implications 
The general implication of these defensive routines, which operated at multiple levels, 
was that they reinforced each other. 
At the individual and group level 
The group matrix of unconscious and projective motifs appeared to be present and 
these were evident in the self defeating enactment's by individuals and the group as a 
whole - e. g. scape-goating, blaming - and their own accounts of self limiting dialogue. 
These motifs were 'broken! in three individual cases due to the capacity to reflect and 
gain higher levels of self awareness, insight, learning and thus act differently from the 
collusive pulls. These interventions suggested important and fairly quick shifts for the 
individuals but the impact on the group seemed to be less immediate. 
5 This seemed to be a form of 'reaction formation' -acting opposite to what you really 
want 
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The group's context 
Was also unstable and this may suggest why the group as a whole was more 
entrenched in its behaviour due to the context. This environment also promoted a 
defensive routine of blame, crisis management, knee-jerk reactions and 'constructed 
chaos'. The data for this modus operandi is great and it suggests that these processes 
were endemic and systemic, and served some other unconscious motif. In this case it 
seemed to be a culture of counter-dcpcndency and a fear from explicitly authorising 
any one to 'lead' - be it the leader of the council or the CEO. Both operated with their 
allies'behind the scenes'and their role authority was rarely managed explicitly. Yes 
the CEO did have frantic shouting bouts, but this was hardly an example of managing 
role. 
Systemic dynamics 
These underlying themes worked in a way which prevented the strategic apex from 
gathering data and correctly detecting and interpreting its meaning. Even if detected 
the group demonstrated little active strategic management of the issue preferring to 
operate in a crisis mode, where the apparent pay off was to bring together a loose and 
underdeveloped group and create a buzz that was missing elsewhere in the system. 
Finally, while individuals gained learning they rarely acted upon it and the system as a 
whole was poor at systematically reviewing, sharing and institutionalising its learning. 
5.3 Does the strategic leadership provide facilitative structures? 
Given these dynamics, is the strategic leadership (or strategic apex of the 
organisation) of the management group and the Chairs of committees able to provide 
structures and conditions for strategic organisational. leaming? 
The impact of these dynamics was that learning in this system was of a low order - 
level one at best; it was habitual; and the leaming was fragmented by defensive and 
collusive routines. Yet some strategic learning did take'place as the group and 
organisation had undergone a cultural mind-shift. 
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In this case, learning took place in response to the changes in the external 
environment between 1990 and 1994/95 and it did appear to be double loop learning - 
level two. The organisation had a mindset change, there were structural changes and 
there had been a system change from one equilibrium point to another. This change 
was mainly led by the CEO. However, the current internal mechanisms have been 
slower to adapt to the more subtle environmental changes and the learning appeared to 
be lost or fractured: not bedded down. 
Thus, based on the accounts of the Directors, strategic organisational learning does 
not appear to have continued and does not meet the criteria of 'level two' learning 
discussed in chapter 5 above. The strategic apex of the management group and the 
committee Chairs do not seem to have provided the facilitating structures for 
continual strategic organisational learning. 
There appears to be a splitting in the process of learning -a kind of "schizoid 
learning" where the external demands have been so compelling that the rate of 
response has been greater than the internal change at a deeper level, where issues 
remain unresolved. Thus, 'learning' is 'adaptive' rather than deeply held. This may 
explain the continuation of a process of 'not learning', which has become recursive 
and so there is a cycle of undermining strategic learning within the organisation. 
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6. Personal insights 
In the spirit of self reflective inquiry and a 'clinical' approach, this section records 
some of the key experiences and dynamics, I experienced in the role of researcher. It 
describes some of the feelings and thoughts about various aspects of both the 
organisation and the process and concludes with additional personal insights. 
Experiences and reflections will cover: 
9 The environment and context 
The leadership within the system 
The team of Directors 
Individuals in the system 
The research process 
Personal insights and learning 
6.1 The environment and context 
My initial experience of the environment and context is described in the entry process 
in section 1.1 above. It was not the most friendliest of places but it had the feel of a 
once great place which had now become a little faded. 
I experienced three main feelings about the system. These were: 
The organisation felt fragmented with several sub-cultures in each of the 
directorates which were located in and around four or five main sites in the 
district. This geographical dispersion gave a sense of autonomous units with each 
Director trying to meet their own targets and act'as if kings in their own castles. 
9 The organisation had a fairly relaxed atmosphere in all of the buildings on the 
different sites. There was a quiet efficiency. As people did not always know who 
I was I got the standard reception in all of the buildings. These tended to be 
effective and courteous but curt - not too friendly but neither unfriendly. Non of 
the 'have a nice day' ethos, which I found in other local authorities. It seemed to 
be bureaucracy at its best: a well run, humming machine rather than a turbo- 
charged one. 
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Elected Members were ever present in the minds of the Directors. This was in the 
one to ones, the management group meetings, their physical interruptions in 
meetings or when people had to take calls from Members. They were visible also 
through pictures and information pamphlets and material about 'your ward 
councillor's' on the walls of some of the offices. 
Thus, my experience of the organisation in relationship to its environment was one of 
calm and operational effectiveness. It did not seem to be under threat from the 
environment, which did not appear as turbulent. The 'dynamic' element in the system 
was more the role of the elected Members and their ever presence in the system. It 
did not feel chaotic more like quiet co-operation at best or plotting in some instances 
between the Director and Chair. I did not experience the system as chaotic. 
There was one exception when towards the end of the research (November 1996) 1 
was asked to change role and act as a process consultant. The request came out of a 
crisis of mis-management and poor communication so it was to happen 'next week'. I 
declined, pointing out what seemed to be another defensive routine. Charles Tews 
accepted the point and the session was replanned and they used their usual consultant. 
However, in those series of many telephone calls I could see and feel how easy it was 
to get caught up with a minor crisis that arose out of poor planning, agendas not yet 
fully negotiated or opportunism. Thus, I concluded that the environment was not 
chaotic as a system nor turbulent. However, operational issues could easily spiral into 
strategic or political issues where priorities and differences had not been resolved. It 
was this element that made the organisation more like a mine field: its unpredictable 
internal nature. 
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6.2 The leadership within the system 
Most of my contact with the leadership of the organisation was with Chris Hinds, the 
CEO. He was very taken by the research process and we would have several 
unscheduled or long chats in his room about him, his role, the team and organisation. 
I experienced him as a likeable and a very energetic CEO who wanted to see things go 
well. On reflecting on my relationship with him, it seems that there was mutual 
respect and I had taken on a confidante role without either of us realising. On my part 
I admired what he had done to turn the organisation around as it did have a terrible 
reputation both in the national press and with DoE (who I worked with extensively) 
during the mid 1980's. Thus, he was some idealised change agent for me. 
On his part I listened without judgement, was an outsider and was from a business 
school. He no doubt ascribed many projections onto me based on his own accounts of 
academia. 
My earlier experiences of idealising the CEOs in the other case studies raised my 
awareness to seeing the other side of the CEO, where he could be a bully and 
insensitive. 
6.3 The team of Directors 
My first meeting with the team was touched upon in section 1.1 above. It was a 
curious start. The meeting was held in the CEO's office and the management group 
was huddled around the table. Some members made a point of tUrrUng their backs to 
me and the same spoke in a way that I simply could not hear despite being less than 
four feet away. The two people who were not in favour of the research but never 
actually said were Ben Chandra (Planning) and Paul Harris (Finance). Any comments 
of objection were confronted head-on by the CEO and before long the decision had 
been made. Thus, there was not the level of trust made with the whole group from the 
beginning. However, after two management group meetings, I was just seen as 
another person in the room (like the secretary to the group) and most of the time 
people spoke audibly. 
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The real break through of my relationship with the group started with the one to one 
interviews, after the non-participatory observations had ended . They all enjoyed the 
interviews and were very open, with the exception of Ben Chandra. Three people had 
G extra sessions' and the relationship was cemented when I worked with their process 
consultant to give the group the feedback during the first feedback and dialogue 
session. They found the data and interpretations valuable and whole heartedly signed 
up for the rest of the research process. Ben Chandra also took part in the second in- 
depth interview even though it was voluntary. 
I had learned a lot from the NHS Trust study (see chapter 13, section 6, on personal 
insights and learning)and applied it to working more actively with building 
relationships with the group. 
In the end, the relationship with the group was very good and it was satisfying to see 
large and small changes in people's behaviours and the way the team worked arising 
out of the research. 
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6.4 Individuals in the system 
My experience of most of the individual team members among the Directors 
concurred with that of their colleagues reports (from the first interviews) and their 
areas of interests in the second one to one, in-depth interviews (see sections 3.1.1 and 
3.2 respectively). The CEO, Chris Hinds, I have already made some comments about 
him as a key player. However, three other people stood out for me. These were: Paul 
Harris (Finance), Ben Chandra(Planning) and Peter Atkins (Contracts). 
They stood out because in some ways they were 'outsiders' and it did not seem to 
bother them. Paul Harris was reported as the most disagreeable member of the group. 
He was politically astute, a bit of a bully and wanted the CEOs job. Hewasthemost 
openly hostile to the research process - the non verbals were clear. Yet in the one to 
one meeting he was engaged, open, clear about how he was seen by others and had 
strongly held views about how the council was to be run and was led by his own 
personal, professional and political (small p) convictions. He was delighted with the 
work we did on the Firo-B and was a full contributor in all the review meetings. I was 
struck by him for several reasons. Firstly, he knew how he was perceived but did not 
care and continued to work on what he saw was an important agenda for the council. 
Secondly, he was much more open and engaging in the process in private than he was 
in public, and this grew over the time of the research. Thirdly, he was also leaving the 
council to retire and it was fitting that the third and last review was days before be left 
(October, 1996). This had a sense of commitment and completion for all concerned. 
Paul Harris also provided an additional challenge as he was physically a big chap and 
clearly could have stopped the research if he wanted. The challenge for me was to 
stay with it: not return like with like in the early days nor run away. This, I believe, 
was achieved on my part. I do not know what changed for him - talking to the 
neighbouring authorities about me, the fact that he'd made the decision to retire 
during the life of the research or some other personal change. The change was 
remarkable and rewarding to experience - whatever the reason. 
Ben Chandra had boxed himself out the group and the group had at the same time 
rejected him. It was the degree to which both he and the group had co-constructed 
this situation and the difficulty of moving forward. Having run twenty four 
interviews with Directors in this research project and several more times with others, 
Ben Chandra was the only person to be so closed. 
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On my part there may be the sense of rejection by Ben and that is why he is on this 
list. Putting that aside, there was a sense of mistrust, which he spoke of frequently, 
and hurt. These were the feelings that he projected and this was an additional 
reminder to respect the boundaries and sensitivities of co-respondents. 
Peter Atkins was seen as another outsider. He was referred to as the whipping boy, 
dull, the fool. He seemed so oblivious to the way his colleagues saw him and lived in 
a different world of operational reality. His offices were the furthest from the Town 
Hall and on the periphery of the district. 
I also experienced these feelings of Peter being on the periphery. I forgot I had a 
scheduled meeting with him to do his Firo-B. I had not had anothcr meeting. In fact, 
I'd finished the earlier meeting 20minutes before hand. Instead I wandered off around 
the building to see Charles Tcws or catch the CEO. Peter had made a special trip 
from his offices to the Town Hall for the meeting so it was doubly difficult. I 
returned to find him waiting in the room. It was embarrassing and painful as he just 
said 'Lets start in the 20 odd minutes we have left and rearrange for the rest. ' I felt 
terrible. 
However, I also thought that I had internalised the system's value of him over the 
importance of the CEO and Charles Tcws and colludcd with an unhealthy dynamic 
within the organisation. That was a powerful lesson for me. 
6.5 The research process 
The research process is described in detail in chapters 10 and 11. The area that is 
touched upon here is retaining the integrity of the research process. In this case study, 
I was able to carry out all the aspects of the research process. Thus, a full and shared 
understanding was developed with the management group. We had three 
review/dialogue sessions and two of those were supported by their external process 
consultant. The level of contact was frequent and thus the continuity and relationship 
was sustained. This case study benefited from the lessons of the other studies so the 
integrity of the research process was maintained by keeping to the task and delivering 
things as promised. But I would give significant weight to managing the relationships 
with the individuals, the group as a whole, and other parts of the system. I would 
argue that without these the task would not have been completed. 
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In practical terms it meant regular calls to the CEO to keep him up-to-date with the 
schedule, knowing the dates of all the meetings, the names of all relevant secretarial 
staff, doing walk about when in the area, thank you letters and cards - all the things 
you would expect from good client service. 11is part of the process I feel needs to be 
emphasised for researchers taking this approach in organisational research at a 
strategic level as it may seem as too "consultancy". Yet in my experience it was vital 
to actively manage the relationship in order to fulfil the research task -especially given 
my lesson in the NHS case study in chapter 13. 
My additional thought was a little disappointment with the poor reliability of the 
organisational questionnaire having reworked the data over and over again. Another 
set of results in a new organisation or deeper within the same one would have been 
helpful along with a test retest procedure. 
Personal insights and learning 
The process of engagement with Tuthering council has been rich with learning and 
insights. Thus, I am choosing to be selective on the top key themes that emerge from 
my reflections. 
My identification with the notion of a strong, clear thinking and courageous 
change agent (the CEO) was high. I enjoyed our cosy chats and liked the role of 
confidante. This relates to my inner preferences to be in the circle of influence 
but not necessarily front things. I feel that influence is more important to me than 
power; and recognition and achievement more important than fame or glory. 
This helps in the research or consultant role but may provide personal challenges 
in a more proactive leadership role. 
My relationship with the group was a steady process of gaining trust and meeting 
commitments - delivering on promises. My natural tendency and the way I had 
construed the role suggested I should stay on the boundary and be emotionally 
'distant' as the researcher. However, both the research process and earlier 
learning in the NHS Trust case study (chapter 13) helped me realise that active 
engagement, initiated by me, was required to build the relationship and therefore 
gain greater insights into the reality of the people I worked with on this exercise. 
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The role of the external agent provides an important catalyst to start personal, 
group and systemic learning. It allowed people to reflect, process their 
experience, share their personal and collective experience in the group and 
understand the wider systemic processes. Thus, the one-to-one's and the review 
processes/dialogue sessions were critical in furthering understanding but also 
creating the forums for articulating where learning was not happening, why it was 
not and what people wanted and could do about it. Thus, the research process 
itself was a model of learning. 
I am reminded about the ethical nature of this research approach and the 
importance of respecting personal sensitivities. 
Finally, managing the relationship with such management teams is critical for 
building trust and increasing levels of access. 
7. Conclusion 
The case material suggests that there were a number of dynamics that impact on 
organisational learning. In particular this thesis suggests that history, inner processes 
and context at the various levels are all important and has put a number of 
propositions and questions for exploration. 
The first question concerned the impact of the environment on the 'top team' and it 
explored the relationship between the turbulence of the environment and the 
organisation's ability to learn (at the strategic level) 
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7.1 Was the environment turbulent? 
In the case of Tuthering local council, it was found that the organisation operated in a 
turbulent environment between 1988/89 and 1995. Strategic organisational learning 
was seen to take place as the environment demanded it for survival. Thus, the 
outcome was opposed to expected as a paradigm shift did take place alongside 
functional task-related learning. It is suggested that such a change was compelling for 
the organisation to survive and that may be the most significant factor. The CEO was 
authorised to change the council against the natural inclinations of senior management 
and elected Members. 
However, during the period of study, the organisation was not operating in a turbulent 
environment. Thus, while the external environment continued to make operational 
demands on the council it was not large scale, unpredictable change. Thus, during the 
period of study, any reduction in strategy organisational learning would not have been 
attributed to the external environment. 
7.2 Was the 'top team'able to manage its task and boundaries? 
How well does the 'top team' manage itself? The inference from the discussion is 
that the team was unable to manage its task and boundaries. Accounts suggest that 
this was due to a lack of clarity and collective ownership, low levels of trust and 
difficult group dynamics among the management group. This impacted negatively on 
the group's learning and its capacity to facilitate organisational learning as the 
strategic subsystem. Information from scanning was not properly used, action was 
prevented because organisational agents did not feel authorised, reviews were seldom 
held and learning was kept localised or in people's heads rather than shared. 
The leader did attempt to create the conditions for learning but his style and the 
broader systemic dynamics of the elected Members prevented his interventions from 
having any lasting impact on strategic learning. 
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7.3 Do the dynamics of the group impact on organisational leaming? 
The dynamics of the group displayed shows that it finds it difficult to 'work'. Over a 
third of its interactions were 'fight', there was splitting and scape-goating in the group 
and a number of its members were seen as 'outsiders': all characterising the support of 
these difficult dynamics. 
In addition, we do see a clear link between personal valencies, 'role differentiation' of 
members in the group and the internal dynamics of the group. These dynamics 
suggest group members do enact roles on behalf of the group that serve personal 
unresolved tensions and the group's 'basic assumptions'. This case showed, however, 
that task related roles could be taken up with some form of intervention- planned or 
otherwise - that raised managers awareness and provided them options to take on 
authorised roles rather than 'act out' their familiar scripts. 
These recursive processes were also carried out in the group's holding environment by 
the elected Members. Here the accounts suggest a politically turbulent context, where 
the internal environment was demanding and the systemic dynamics in this local 
authority seemed to offset the benefits of the relatively changing but known 
environrnent. In contrast the Members were unpredictable and worked on the basis of 
personal power and alliances of interest rather than strategic task. They continued to 
generate an internal context of crisis, fear and difficulty. It is argued here that these 
were the most powerful and dysfunctional dynamics and were the dominant defensive 
routines to undermine strategic organisational leaming. Thus, while the 'top team's' 
dynamics were not task focused, its broader context appeared to carry greater 
influence regarding the negation of strategic organisational leaming. 
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7.4 Is there strategic organisational teaming at a high level? 
In the case of Tuthering, we see that the organisational context did not have a'holding 
environment' for systemic learning, but some personal learning was apparent. 
While there is evidence to suggest that strategic organisational learning is possible in 
this system and at level two, the internal systemic dynamics after the crisis seemed to 
have continually undermined it. It also highlights the contingent and elusive nature of 
organisational learning upon environment, context, time and defensive routines at 
different levels. 'Adaptive' learning seemed to characterise this case study over 
during the period of the research. 
7.5 Additional insights 
Not all of the propositions are shown to hold. Those that do suggest that the internal 
dynamics of the 'top team', its relationship with the elected Members and its 
organisational context are important to understanding strategic organisational 
learning. However, it also challenges the idea that the environment is all explanatory 
and that more may have to do with how the strategic apex responds to the 
environment and manages it rather than the environment per se. However, there are 
some further insights that are noted. 
The net impact of these dynamics was that the organisation had learned adaptive and 
compliant behaviours to meet the needs of the external world but had not seemed to 
have internalised the further changes and to 'hard wire' the learning into the 
organisation. Thus, leaming was probably in the realms of level zero or at best level 
one as evidenced by people's account about the culture of blame, the secrecy and 
centralist leadership modes of the leader of the council and the CEO. In addition, 
there were the poor intergroup dynamics and the multiple examples of defensive 
routines. These impaired optimising strategic organisational learning. 
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The emerging and additional insights from this case study are: 
Turbulent environments do appear to impact on the organisation's ability to learn. 
However, the direction can also be positive and not negative as originally 
proposed. This may be a special case when facing situations of survival and turn 
around strategies are the only answer. However, in this case, there was a positive 
relationship between the two. 
It appears that while learning can take place in response to demands from the 
organisation's environment, unless the learning is integrated and internalised as 
part of an internal shift in culture then such learning is 'adaptive' and can become 
another form of defensive routine. 
The prevalence of organisational defences appears to carry more weight than 
expected. They also help to explain the difficult systemic and group dynamics for 
the management group and the reductive and recursive patterns that undermined 
any strategic organisational learning. 
It seems that if the quality of the 'holding environment' of the group - its context - 
is poor and it has its own internal strife, then it is unable to act as a channel for 
strategic organisational learning for the system. 
If the conditions are difficult -a changing environment, not a good enough 
holding environment and an ineffective team - then a subgroup may effectively 
provide the temporary space to secure task attainment in the short term. Thus, 
temporary systems ari 
' 
sing from defensive routines, can provide the space for task 
attairunent in the short term. 
Managers who can make sense of their experience and their contribution to 
defensive routines can 'give up' collusive role behaviour and take up task related 
roles in and on behalf of the group. 
These emerging themes provide additional insights for this study. 
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Chapter 15 - What are the conditions for strategic 
organisational learning: lessons and conclusions 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this final chapter is to address the question: What is the impact of the 
dynamics of 'top teams' on strategic organisational leaming? It is based on the review of 
literature in the relevant field, the results of the research process and the findings and 
conclusions from the three in-depth case studies'presented in chapters 12-14. 
There are three areas that this chapter will cover: 
e What are the lessons and conclusions that arise from the content and analysis of 
the three in-depth case studies? 
What are the lessons and conclusions that arise from the research process? 
What are the implications and areas for further development in continuing the 
understanding of organisational learning and the role of 'top teams'? 
What were the findings from the case studies? 
These three in-depth case studies looked at the common areas of. 
The environment and context 
The nature and character of each management group, directors or 'top team' 
Individuals in the system 
The nature of defensive routines 
The degree of strategic organisational learning 
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A summary of the key points from each of the cases is presented table 15.1 
Table 15. 
Context 
External 
Internal 
History 
Conflicts1politics 
Group 
Context 
Case study 1 
Ellismoore District 
Council 
Environment 
manageable 
Changing political 
landscape lead to 
unstable and 
uncertain context 
Stable political 
leadership until 
1992, Cosy and 
compliant culture 
then change 
'Middle' political 
group leading to 
conflict and 
leadership vacuum 
Case study 2 
Gladding NHS 
Hospital Trust 
'Turbulent' and 
competitive NHS 
environment 
Poor relations with 
DHA, RHA, DSS 
Lacking Board 
input 
Competes with 
other local Hospital 
Medically-led 
hidden by open and 
friendly culture 
Little internal strife 
CEO main player 
Weak Board and 
lacks leadership 
Case study 3 
Tuthering Council 
Environment driven 
by operational 
demands 
Political and 
cultural change. 
Leadership lacking 
and unstable 
Significant 
restructuring and 
change of image 
from loony left to a 
f smart' council 
Political conflicts 
among the Labour 
majority 
Poor political 
leadership and 
intergroup relations 
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Poor political 
leadership and 
intergroup relations 
CEO attempts to 
manage boundary 
History 
Dynamics 
Roles 
Individual 
Context 
History 
Case study 1 
Ellismoore District 
Council 
Several changes in 
CEO and group 
membership, 
smaller 
Conflict, Ba FF, 
low'work, 
scapegoating 
Case study 2 
Gladding NHS 
Hospital Trust 
Set up to meet 
Trust status 
demands. 
Relatively new 
'Work' with less 
'basic assumptions' 
CEO strong figure, 
Finance Dir 
exported 
Carried out on Roles taken up on 
behalf of the group behalf of the group 
Themes of 
projective 
identification so 
match co-create 
6group matrix' 
Projective 'group 
matrix' conjoins 
with individual 
valencies 
Family history 
significant 
Childhood and 
school experiences 
featured as early 
memories 
Personal Feelings of Feelings of 
Conflicts isolation and isolation, not 'good 
inadequacy enough', not loved 
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Case study 3 
Tuthering Council 
Much change but 
anchored by 
longevity of 
Leader's, CEO and 
Fin. Director's 
tenure 
Dominated by 
'fight' but some 
leads to high levels 
of 'work' 
Scapegoating and 
'outsiders' also 
evident 
Collusive roles 
broken in three 
cases - increasing 
role authority 
Group focus of 
projective 
identification but 
not deterministic 
Histories varied but 
authority figure (a 
parent) a common 
feature 
Inner doubts, self 
punishing and not 
good enough act as 
drivers 
Organisational 
learning 
Defensive 
routines 
Strategic 
Organisational 
Learning 
Case study 1 
Ellismoore District 
Council 
-avoid strategic task 
-defense against 
uncertainty 
-CEO acts as 
projective object 
Underbounded 
system 
Learning for 
individuals but 
fragmented for 
system 
Case study 2 
Gladding NHS 
Hospital Trust 
CEO & deputy act 
as 'transitional 
object' and reduce 
impact of defensive 
routines 
Little learning, no 
reviews. 
Strategic decisions 
made ad hoc 
524 
Case study 3 
Tuthering Council 
Defense against 
ordinariness 
Preference for crisis 
Strategic 
organisational. 
learning in 1991 but 
not sustained 
Double-loop 
strategic 
organisational 
learning not take 
place during study 
2. What were the conclusions from the case studies 
Based on the case material, the original opening propositions are re-examined, 
reformulated or enhanced. 
Revisiting opening propositions 
The first proposition: organisation and the impact of the external environment 
If the environment is turbulent, then organisations' ability to learn will be reduced to 
single loop learning. 
Theory suggests that a turbulent environment impacts negatively on the organisation's 
ability to learn where the context is rapidly changing because it impinges on the 
boundaries of task and territory and creates uncertainty and ambiguity, which in turn 
creates anxiety. The impact is to undermine task attainment and learning at the strategic 
level - the boundary between the organisation and its environment is diminished. Where 
organisations are 'over-bounded' they become closed to effective scanning and therefore 
leaming. Where organisations are 'under-bounded' learning may be lost or fragmented. 
From the three case studies, all of the organisations were operating in a changing 
environment. The extent of the changes and the predictability of the changes seemed to 
be the most important factors. In the case of the first organisation, the change in the 
external environment was low and predictability was medium to high. The difficulty was 
that the council had moved from a Conservative authority, stable for over a decade, to a 
new, left wing authority literally, over night. This generated considerable uncertainty 
both for the leaders of the 'new' political administration and for the 'top team' and it took 
them away from the strategic agenda (this is discussed later, see section on revising 
propositions below). Thus it was not the environment per se that impacted on strategic 
organisational. learning. 
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In the case of the second organisation, the changes were led by the organisation, as 
opposed to being imposed, compared with cases one and three. Here the directors of the 
hospital trust knew they were in a competitive environment and, while the scale of the 
change was large, the expected period of transition was long. The predictability of the 
change was manageable in the minds of the strategic leaders, yet, on looking at the data, 
the directors group/ 'top team' seemed to cut off from the reality of the financial 
information, cut off from the requestsPdemands' of the regional and health authority and 
demonstrated a degree of 'over-boundedness' in relationship to the environment. There 
was little evidence of learning. What learning there was tended to be localised and did 
not take place at the strategic level. 
In the situation of the third case study, the environment was changing but, at the time of 
the study, it appeared that the scale of change was less compared to seven years ago. 
Then the organisation did experience the trauma of change in redundancies, several 
restructuring events and a mind-shift in culture and politics. While the changes during 
that period were experienced as difficult, it appeared that they had learned something 
from it and were about to be much more adept and adaptable to current changes in the 
environment. This also led to reframing of how they saw the changes, which during the 
study were seen as fairly predictable and manageable. 
This organisation did not seem to be over-bounded but more under-bounded at the 
strategic apex of the elected members and the 'top team'. The way they saw and 
experienced the scale and predictability of change was that these were not problematic. 
The potential for learning was great and the authority now saw change as an exciting and 
desirable state. The ordinariness of a relatively predictable environment later became 
more of a problem. Thus, the organisation and its relationship to its environment 
provided the potential for learning and some did take place in the form of a strategic and 
integrated process including corporate planning, performance appraisal, partnership 
projects with a wide range of agencies, and considerably better relations and credibility 
with the government, the public and the press. 
However, in this case, it seemed that the internal dynamics were more of a problem than 
the external environment and this is discussed below (see revising propositions section 
below). 
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In drawing any conclusions it appears from looking at these cases that it is the scale and 
predictability of the changes that impacts on leaming. If the scale is too great and the 
predictability too low this suggests an impact that is negative on the organisation and 
reduces learning. 
In the first case study, the scale of change was low and the external environment was 
known. However, these elements of stability were offset by the difficult dynamics of 
elected members' politics. 
In the second case, the environment was 'turbulent'. The organisation became over- 
bounded and stopped relating appropriately to the external environment. In the third 
case, scale and predictability seemed manageable and systemic organisational learning 
had taken place as evidenced in the institutionalisation of strategic processes. However, 
this was restricted to 'single loop' learning as indicated by the development of efficacious 
management systems. 
Thus, one concludes that both the scale and predictability of change do have an impact on 
strategic organisational learning but that the external environment had less impact than 
expected due to other contextual and organisational. dynamics. 
Proposition two: if the 'top team's' boundaries are poorly managed then its ability 
to achieve task and learning will be limited 
The ability of the group to manage its own boundaries would impact on its capacity to 
learn. Where boundaries were poorly managed - i. e. it was either too closed or too open - 
then the system had less chances of learning. Underbounded systems are characterised by 
loose goals, multiple agendas/ 'occupatiorf , rivalry and difficulties with authority. 
Groups that are overbounded are characterised by very specific goals, authoritarian 
authority relations and object identification and dependency basic assumption motifs. 
Such groups are likely to constrain their learning to single-loop if efficient, or working in 
a stable holding environment; or defensive or dysfunctional learning in a turbulent 
holding environment. 
In all of the cases the ability for the group as a whole to manage its boundaries seemed 
difficult. The demands of the internal context, the lack of holding environment, internal 
disagreements about the task effectiveness, values and trust levels in all of the groups 
meant that they were unable to hold their boundaries. 
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In the first and second cases the group was split between 'followers' and 'desenters' and 
the additional anxiety, driven by the importation of issues and anxiety from the Elected 
members, led to divisions within the group. The latter was also true for the third case 
study. 
These contextual dynamics did impact negatively on the 'top team' in all cases. 
In drawing any conclusions the impact of the context on the ability of the group to 
manage its boundaries and its task were evidently negative. However, this can be 
qualified. 
The system's ability to create new internal configurations appeared to be present in each 
of the cases and the reason that it is difficult to draw any stronger conclusion is that the 
limits of that variety are unknown and is itself a learning process. The only point that can 
be made is that the greater are the conditions for learning - the 'space', the 'holding 
environment', the 'container' - the more likely that the system will be able to respond 
dynamically and be self-designing. 
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Proposition three: if there is a predominance of basic assumption motifs then 
learning will be impaired 
In the situation of case studies one and two the group had similar group characteristics. 
They were led by leaders with similar styles, both groups showed 60% of group modes 
that were in'work!, with 10-20% in basic assumption fight. Of the 'work' that the groups 
did in those two systems, it was of a low level. Both groups also had examples of strong 
sub-groups within them, some clear scapegoats that were actually exported - three in the 
first case and one in the second. There were also strong positive and negative projections 
onto the leader. 
In the third case there was more engagement within the group through a high degree of 
basic assumption fight (30 %), and 'work' at 54%. The quantity of 'work' was lower 
than in the other two cases and the quality of 'work' (level 3 and 4) was not high. 
There does not appear to be an unequivocal relationship between 'work', 'basic 
assumption' and strategic organisational learning. It could be due to many things. For 
example: 
o There is no relationship between them 
* Each of the cases are of a special nature 
e The relationship between them is complex 
* The relationship is affected by other factors 
Further exploration of these propositions may help clarify the relationship. 
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Proposition four: if role holders are unable to contain their anxieties then they will 
undermine their own role authority 
If role holders are unable to contain their anxieties and primal memories then these are 
likely to contaminate their role and boundaries. In environments which do not provide 
sufficient holding, these form a'group matrix'that hook individuals' inner worlds and 
make for rigid role definitions of members within the group. This occurs through a 
process of projective identification, transference and repetitive defensive routines. 
There was considerable evidence from the 20 in-depth personal interviews that directors' 
personal history, inner dialogue and conflicts impacted on the group. The accounts were 
of childhood memories, family relationships, old messages in their heads about how they 
should be, or would like to be, experiences at school or university. These personal 
accounts provided a rich and deep understanding of the people involved who took up a 
strategic role in a'top team'. 
Ilie most striking and common theme that appeared to be relevant for each of the group 
members was the relationship between their individual fear, anxiety or valency and how 
this was enacted in the group to create a group matrix that led to structural role rigidity in 
that 'top team'. 
This is not to say that directors were not effective in their role or even when they worked 
in other groups within the same organisational setting. However, in the 'top team', 
unconscious and recursive dynamics appeared to provide members with structural and 
rigid roles and it reduced their role authority. 
Three of the directors were able to understand these recursive and dysfunctional 
dynamics thanks to periods of reflection, crisis and emotional 'maturity' through 
considerable self development and a programme of self awareness. These three were in 
the same organisation - case number three. Another three in case study one also seemed 
to find a 'secure base' of understanding and insight, through having strong ties outside of 
work with the family and sharing a contentedness to continue to work in the same 
authority and in the same role; no longer ambitious to move to the nextjob. The only 
common factor is that all six were in their early 50's and there may something here that is 
common relating to the age and stage of life. 
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More generally, in drawing any conclusion, the in-depth personal interviews suggest that 
unconscious personal dynamics and conflict do play a part in the way that group members 
take (or are given) a role in the 'top team'. These roles seem to mirror the valencies of the 
individual and, in the case of the three scapegoats in case one, they all shared the theme 
of grandiosity and flamboyancy. 
These collusive and unconscious dynamics are difficult to identify and change in the 
management or leadership role and often the group matrix and dynamic will reinforce 
them rather than provide an opportunity for learning. 
Thus, it is suggested that this proposition has some face validity in the context of these 20 
in-depth interviews. 
Proposition rive: doubic-loop, strategic organisational learning is difficult to attain 
because of organisational defensive routines 
These are in the form of ego defenses, basic assumption activities in group and 
disruptive systemic dynamics in the strategic apex, including the role of the Board/elected 
members. These defensive routines help to explain the difficulty of organisational and 
strategic learning. 
The core of this understanding lies with the dynamics that the individual brings to play 
and the anxieties that are enacted, relived or phantasized by the organisational actors in 
the social system. It is argued in this thesis that the process that creates such activities 
and relationship is 'projective identification' and other forms of ego defenses. These 
were argued in full in chapters 6 and 7. 
Thus, the data from each of the three cases provides some initial validity to the 
proposition as stated. 
Developing ideas and further research 
The above propositions were discussed in terms of their original formulations. This 
section revisits those propositions that provide additional input into developing our 
understanding of organisational dynamics and the link between top teams and strategic 
organisational learning. 
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Proposition one 
In all three cases, the external environment seemed to have less impact than the internal 
context. This was particularly the case in the two local authorities. In the situation of the 
health care trust, Gladding, the external environment was psychologically 'fended off. 
However, the striking feature of all three was that the internal organisational context and 
especially the role of the management committee/Board/elected members had more 
impact on the 'top team' than the external environment. The impact seemed be on three 
counts: 
" The extent to which the Board/elected members provided strategic leadership with 
clarity of the strategic task 
" The extent to which the Board/elected members provided a good enough 'holding 
environment' to allow the conditions for task attainment and learning for the 'top 
team' 
" The extent to which the intergroup dynamic between the 'top team' and its 
Board/elected members was functional or poor 
Thus, a revision of the original proposition suggests that there should be a second part to 
understanding the impact of the environment on organisational leaming. It suggests that 
the role of the Board is a significant aspect on whether strategic organisational learning is 
attainable. 
If the Board can provide a proper 'holding environment', then it is likely that 
strategic organisational learning would follow. 
In all the cases this remains a valid question. However, in these cases the lack of a proper 
'holding environment' did fuel recursive defensive routines which impaired strategic 
organisational learning. 
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The case study material suggests a number of developments on the original propositions 
and two are the focus of this section. 
Proposition six (following two) 
The role of the 'holding environment' has taken on a greater significance in the 
development of the model proposed in chapter 8. First, it has been identified as a key 
'provider' for learning within systems but, secondly, it suggests an additional proposition 
that has arisen from the case material - especially the case study two and three (Gladding 
NHS hospital trust and Tuthering local council). 
The additional proposition suggests that where the policy leadership does not provide a 
'container' role, for whatever reason, then a sub-system will take up that role in service of 
the wider needs of the organisation. In the case of the first organisation it was the CEO 
who attempted to take up the 'container' role, in the second case study it was the CEO, the 
Deputy CEO and the Chair of the Board, and in the third case it was the quad of the CEO, 
the Director of Finance, the Leader of the Council and the Chair of Finance. 
Thus, from these three case studies the following conclusions are drawn. There is some 
evidence to suggest that the containing role of the Board on behalf of the 'top team' can 
arise from other sources and that an alternative holding structure may emerge. This is 
consistent with systems theory that organisations can adapt to the demands of the 
environment - denoted as "autopoiesis". 
It is suggested that such a structure may be temporary and functional as long as it remains 
temporary. Psychoanalytic theory would suggest that a'transitional object'provides the 
'space' for managing the transition of loss and change. Once it becomes equated with 
reality, or becomes the object of primary relatedness or'object constancy', then it can 
become part of an institutionalised defense. 
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Thus, the additional proposition implies that: if there is a lack of a holding 
environment by the Board, then this may be substituted by an alternative 
temporary structure, which provides containment and acts as the environment or 
'space' for learning. However, if this structure becomes permanent then learning 
will be impaired. 
In practical terms such a temporary 'holding environment' needs to be within the 
strategic management group and organisationally may be in the form of a strategic task 
group, a flagship project or a high level, task focused committee. 
Proposition seven (following four) 
The notion that personal history impacts on role performance seem to carry some validity. 
However, the data from the cases also suggests that rigid roles and the spell of the 
dysfunctional dynamics can be broken. These break-throughs are seen especially in cases 
one and three and to a lesser extent in the reaction of David Larson (HR Director in 
Gladding) to the idea that he could simply ask for feedback, which developed further 
insight for him in his in-depth interview. Thus, an additional proposition, based on the 
experience of seven people out of twenty, is that the roles are not fixed. Personal 
transformation, reflection and a secure base seem to be the three elements that help. 
Thus, if role holders are exposed to personal rcflcction they are more likely to learn 
and gain self insight and thus contradict their rigid group role and the self limits 
they put on their authority. This would be consistent with theory on individual 
learning (see Schon (1983), Kolb (1976) and Kim (1993)). 
Those that only had a secure base seem to able to cope with change but there was no 
evidence that there was also self learning or insight -a precondition for changes in the 
group matrix. 
534 
3. What were some of the key lessons from the research 
process 
In drawing on the wider learning from the research process a number of conclusions are 
drawn. It suggests that while the research process and methodology were congruent 
with the theoretical underpinning and the research strategy, there were still a number of 
limitations that existed. These are discussed in detail in appendix 8.4. However, the key 
elements are summarised in this sub-section. 
It is helpful to consider these research issues under four sub-headings: the entry process, 
the data collection, the research process itself and the role of the researcher. 
The entry process 
In taking an in-depth case study approach, the entry process has to be managed with great 
care in order to gain access to quality data and working relationships with the key players 
within the organisation. Thus, attention has to be paid: 
to the organisations that are selected so as to avoid bias or other unusual 
circumstances 
gaining support from the CEO or relevant senior sponsor who will open doors and 
make it happen 
provide something for the organisation. so they get value out of the process and a 
clinical research perspective enables that to take place 
Data collection 
The research strategy and approach for this thesis were qualitative. Thus multiple sources 
of systematic data collection increased the quality and verifiability of the information as 
well as allowed for triangulation. The methodology was further helped by methods and 
instruments that had: 
relevance and meaning to the participant in the research - e. g. the personal interviews 
and the group system dialogue sessions provided additional feedback and data for the 
researcher 
a high degree of reliability - including consensual and face validity through to high 
correlation statistics for inter-rater reliability on the group observations, the scales on 
Firo-B, the pilot results of the strategic organisational. learning questionnaire 
535 
allowed scope for interpretative inferences to be made from self as an instrument, 
thick description (in the entry phase of each case), and themes that arose from the 
content analysis of the group observations 
Learning from the process itself 
The research process provided a comprehensive approach that could be used for other 
intensive research studies or a more focused form of clinical research intervention (See 
Edmondson (1996) and Beer& Eisenstat (1996)). The key learning points were: 
relationship management in this type of research is as important as the research itself 
as it is the basis of the research 
the duration of the research could have been longer so as to understand the longer 
term dynamics of the system 
The research role 
The research role is demanding and requires a greater degree of personal involvement 
with the organisational actors participating than 'traditional' approaches. Thus the use of 
the cannons put forward by Wertz (1986), supervision, working in a team and using other 
audio-technical aids will all help in taking up the role. 
Areas that could be developed 
There are three areas that lend themselves to further development from this research 
approach 
The research could be based on a single organisation with embedded cases within it. 
Thus, gaining a richer picture of the organisation and some of the different 
perceptions as well as other intergroup dynamics beyond the top team and the Board 
A longitudinal study could be carried out so as to understand the long term dynamics 
of such organisations and increase confidence in the outcomes of the research 
Working with a group of researchers trained in the methodologies would further 
increase the consistency of the research and broaden the number of cases or increase 
the depth of the data 
These are the key lessons from the research process. 
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4. What are the implications? 
This section looks at the implications of these findings and conclusions. It addresses the 
following questions: 
How do they compare with other studies? 
What is the contribution of the thesis? 
Comparisons with otherstudies 
The three cases provided detailed information about organisations in the public sector that 
have been experienced rapid environmental change and inadequate task and boundary 
management at the strategic apex. 
The general themes relate to defensive routines and applying these reformulated 
propositions and conclusions may have some validity as reflected in other similar studies 
in organisations - for example Obholzer and Roberts (1994), Miller (1993), Diamond 
(1994 and 1986), Hirschhorn (198 8), Menzies (1960), Miller and Rice (1967). 
The importance of the external environmental factors has been seen to exist in the 
literature and has been applied to both public sector and commercial organisations. 
However, the elements that are particularly interesting from these case studies are the role 
of the 'holding environment', the importance of a 'transitional space', the application of 
the 'group's matrix' and the conjoined dynamic between the individual and the group. 
One of the main topics of inquiry in the psychoanalytic literature is the role of the 
individual. The ground covered in this thesis would concur with an object relations 
perspective. It shares a common understanding of the intrapersonal dynamics of the 
individual and extends its domain of understanding of the individual in an organisational 
setting. The concept of role, (Miller and Rice (1967), Miller (1989), Czander (1993), 
Hirschhorn (1988), Colman and Bexton (1985)) is not a new concept and that approach to 
understanding people in organisations supports the view of this thesis. Other work on 
leaders' role and the projective object that they represent also supports the findings of this 
research (Kets De Vries and Miller (1984), Kets De Vries and Miller (1986), Zalaznik 
and Kets De Vries (1984), Bion (1961)). 
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Thus, the work and some of the propositions are supported and validated by similar 
studies and writings in the field. However there are a number of developments and 
insights that this thesis offers to contributing to our understanding of organisations. 
The contribution of this thesis. 
The contribution of this thesis is mainly theoretical as it provides a psychoanalytical 
framework to understand and uncover relationships that are not always explicitly 
apparent. 
The thesis does so in the following ways. 
1. The thesis argues that strategic organisational learning is undermined by 
systemic defensive routines. Most theories understanding of these defensive routines 
have been cognitive or behavioural. This thesis suggests that unconscious 
psychodynarnics provides a way of understanding these organisational processes. 
This level of in-depth analysis provides a different and integrated analysis of 
understanding the difficult and repetitive nature of recursive and collusive routines. 
In summary, the thesis provides an analysis as to why organisational systems, in 
the strategic apex, find it difficult to achieve high levels of organisational learning 
2. The most common element of the three case studies was the impact of the systemic 
and organisational dynamics of defensive routines. These were the political and 
psychological enactments that took place within the context of the groups under study. 
In all cases these difficult and defensive routines were endemic. Thus, the thesis 
provides an analysis of deeper level dynamics that help explain the source of 
systemic defensive routines. 
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3. The thesis provides a framework of understanding organisational systems and group 
dynamics from a psychodynamic perspective. It takes an object relations approach 
and integrates it with concepts from group analysis. This allowed an expanded 
understanding of the concept of 'valencies' as described by Bion (196 1) and suggested 
that the 'social glue' between people in a group occurs at the social, group, 
interpersonal level and intrapersonal level. 
Group analysis coined the term the 'group matrix, which recognises that social, 
conscious and political as well as unconscious and processes of projective 
identification take place in groups. Thus, groups are not only understood from a Bion 
perspective, which focuses on the mental life of the group, but they are also seen as 
complex systems that operate at both the boundary of social reality (e. g. when 
everyone describes Peter Atkins in Tuthering council as weak) and unconscious life. 
The accounts from each of the original 25 directors showed that people held social 
roles as well as unconscious roles in the group. Thus, the thesis offers an expanded 
notion of understanding groups from a psychodynamic perspective. 
4. The application of the concept of the 'group matrix' helps to explain the 'role rigidity' 
that was identified in this study and why it was difficult to step outside this collusive 
web without a'space' for reflection -a key element for leaming, which allows one to 
step outside the web and see the reality of the situation. The concept of the group 
matrix provided an enhanced understanding of the dysfunctional and repetitive 
dynamics of groups and the undermining of individual role authority. 
5. Furthermore in considering the nature of the group matrix in organisations, it suggests 
that the familial dynamics and constructs may be enacted in organisational settings at 
the unconscious level and that this phenomenon has not always been accepted in the 
domain of organisational behaviour. This is an area for further exploration. 
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6. The thesis provides an in-depth and systematic analysis of groups in context. The 
majority of work in this field is based on consultancy interventions, therapeutic 
groups, psychodynamic learning groups - like the Leicester conference - or systemic 
(group) family dynamic. There is very little systematic, in-depth clinical research of 
work of teams in organisations. Exceptions include: Menzies (1960), Guerin (1995) 
and Hirschhorn (1989). Thus, the thesis is contributing further detailed data and 
to the discussion of a psychoanalytic approach and its application to 
organisations. It concludes that such an approach does have a role in understanding 
organisational dynamics. 
7. The third implication of the 'group matrix' is that these deeply held and unconscious 
projections may need to be understood at both the individual and group level and that 
group intervention therefore needs to be at both levels. In taking a clinical approach, 
research collaborators learned ('on-line') through the research process how endemic 
and underlying were their personal valencies and how these were reinforced in the 
group. Only by their personal learning and insight and that of the systemic nature of 
the issues in the group could the group matrix then move to something more related to 
the reality of the external world. This certainly was evidenced in the third case study. 
8. The case studies also throw further light on the limits of the organisational model 
presented in chapter 8. 
The implications for organisational analysis suggest that the 'modemist' and systems 
based theories of organisations are an insufficient account of how organisations may 
operate. It was argued in chapter 8 that a model of organisations may be seen as 'a 
complex system'. However, the features displayed in each of the case studies suggest 
that a further development to understanding organisations is to see them as complex 
adaptive systems. This does not negate the view that organisations are seen within a 
systemic conflict framework. It does help distinguish the nature of the organisation's 
dynamic from a psychoanalytic and systemic perspective and further our 
understanding of its possible causes. 
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Complex adaptive systems are dynamic, emergent, unpredictable and have distributive 
authority. The three main features of such systems are: 
" They are open dynamic systems 
" They are made up of interacting multiple agents, where the outcome of their 
interactions are unpredictable 
e They exhibit emergence and self organisation, where authority is distributed 
(See Stacey (1993), Waldrop (1992)) 
In all three cases there were examples of these features taking place and this may 
provide a further deepening of our understanding of organisations. Complex adaptive 
systems are not necessarily chaotic. More often they have recursive and regular 
patterns that can be discerned. However, it is the actual outcome of these that are less 
predictable. 
The implication is that such organisations often operate in a state of 'unknowing' but 
act 'as if' they know. This false sense of reality is the main aspect of organisational 
delusion and, it is argued in this thesis, is the source of anxiety and organisational 
defensive routines. 
However, this does not imply that learning does not ever take place. As argued in 
chapter 5 and seen in the case studies, organisations do 'learn' habitual routines and 
defenses against task and learning. However, those organisations that are able to 
operate on the boundary of chaos and routine are the ones that face reality and are 
most apt to learn at higher levels. Organsations able to operate in this state of 
'dynamic equilibrium' are also able to reach a state where the internal configuration is 
an optimal response to the external demand. This would concur with the notion of 
optimal boundedness in organisations and this seems to be a critical element in 
attaining organisational learning at the strategic level. Confusion and chaos take place 
when the external demands become excessive and the organisation's system is no 
longer able to respond adequately and functionally. There was little evidence of such 
a state operating in these three cases. 
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Thus, the notion of equilibrium in this model is seen as changing and temporary, 
requiring organisational flexibility and agility (Pascale (1990)) over a sense of 
permanency, which seems to run contrary to attaining double loop strategic 
organisational learning. 
9. Finally, in the cases presented, the application of the 'holding enviromnenf or space 
provides an introduction as to how systems begin to learn. 
Thus, the thesis supports more recent contributions on the role of the 'holding 
environment' in organisational life (see Stapley, 1996). 
5. Final statement 
Finally, a clinical approach in many ways was as demanding, if not more so, as more 
'traditional' research approaches. The psychological engagement, the continual reflection 
and self questioning and the importance of the research relationship and process of 
involvement draws upon a range and depth of experiences and skills that are not called 
upon in other designs. It is a valuable and worthwhile approach for this type of doctoral 
enquiry. The process has provided an opportunity for personal and professional growth. 
For others considering similar research approaches, it is highly recommended that mutual 
support is provided and some form of clinical supervision is also used as another base 
point for checking throughout the research process. 
******* 
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Appendix 1: Coding verbal interaction in groups 
The framework for coding the verbal statement is based predominantly on Thelen et al 
1954. Additional material has been included from Wheelan et al, 1994, Guerin, 1995 and 
Bales 1970. 
This note covers two areas: 
* The unit of interaction for coding 
9 The scoring process 
The unit of interaction for coding 
Thelen et al (1954) is used as the framework for this thesis as it has informed similar and 
later studies based on a Bion psychoanalytical understanding of groups - Karterud (1989), 
Karterud & Foss (1989), Wheelen et al (1994), Geurin (1996). 
In Thelen's original methodology each verbal statement was rated according to the 
behaviors expressed in Bion's analysis: namely fight, flight, pairing, dependency and 
work. These were rated by the Behavioural Rating System about the group's 
emotionality and that was the most basic information about the group. 
This process has been refined in two ways. Firstly, based on Bales (1970), the basic unit 
of analysis is the 'act' or simple sentence. The sentence may be declarative, inquisitive, 
exclamatory or imperative. Each sentence would contain a verb and its subject can be 
explicit or implicit. Statement such as 'What', 'For sure' and similar communications 
can be treated as a unit as it conveys meaning. 
Secondly, Guerin (1995) provides some useful distinctions about the nature of the basic 
unit of analysis, especially in the case of complex sentences and ambiguous statements. 
A complex sentence is one that combines fragments of a communication by 'and', 'or', 
'but', or a pause and the speaker moves to another point vAthin the governing thought. In 
the case of complex sentences, these are broken down into simple sentences 
Geurin (1995) proposed twelve basic guidelines to maintain consistency in unitizing and 
scoring statements. It can be said that eight of these were used with confidence in this 
thesis and are listed below: Furthermore, the categories were reduced because the 
distinctions used by Geurin at the micro-unit of sentences are not in keeping with Bion's 
original intent in understanding emotionality. According to Karterud & Foss (1989): 
"The phenomenal units that Bion called basic assumptions are definitely not isolated 
statements". This thesis follows that approach. 
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Elliptical sentences These are treated as sentences without an expressed subject and 
predicate 
Examples may include: 
"Smile'Y (Imperative) (One unit) 
"Great! "/ (Exclamatory) (One unit) 
"How? "/ (Interrogative) (One unit) 
False starts This is when a statement is started but not completed. If the essential 
meaning is conveyed then it can be scored. Otherwise it can not be scored. 
('Unclassified' in the scoring system of this thesis. ) 
Examples include: 
Charles: "These things ..... I hate when Chris does that" (One unit: "I hate when Chris does thaf ') 
Charles: "These things undermine me especially ... LI hate when Chris does that" (Two units: "These things undermine me ... / and "I hate when Chris does 
that" 
Interruptions These are scored again providing the meaning of the statement is clear. 
Otherwise it is "Unclassified" 
Charles: "I feel it will not work because... " (One unit) 
Chris: (Interrupting Charles) "You have no basis for that at all" (One unit) 
Aftirmations and Negations These are treated as separate units 
"Yes/ I agree" (Two units) 
"No/ I totally disagree" (Two units) 
Phrases Common phrases such as "OK .... .. I suppose so", "You know" are treated as 
separate units. 
Compound sentences Compound sentences made up of two independent clauses are 
treated as two units. 
Examples may include: 
"The review was critical about the cleanliness of the borough/ but there was also 
some good news" (Two units) 
"Please could you speak up/ I did not hear what you said" (Two units) 
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Interjections and exclamatory sentences Interjections and exclamatory sentences are 
treated as one unit. 
Examples may include: 
"Bloody hell" 
"Gee" 
"Whoa! " 
These would each be one unit 
Assertions Assertions followed by a question is treated as a separate unit 
Examples include: 
"You seem anxious about the numbers/.. are you saying we are going to make a 
loss this year? " (Two units) 
"This will happen in the next two weeks/ won't it? " (two units) 
Where Guerin guidelines have not been applied it was due to their subtleties and the 
context of discussion. 
Scoring of verbal statement 
The scoring method is based on Thelen et al Behavioural rating scale and captures the 
emotional and behavioural expressions of* 'work', 'fight, 'flight', 'dependency' and 
'pairing'. It also includes 'counter-dependency' and 'counter-pairing'. Items that could 
not be scored were denoted 'Unclassified'. 
Fight Fight statement express hostility, aggression and often challenge. It may include 
attacking, rebuking, punishing, blocking, dividing (the group) warning, threatening, 
expressing hostile resistance, self aggrandizing (at the expense of others), scapegoating, 
ridiculing. Examples of some of the more common exchanges are as follows. 
Attacking, depreciating the group 
"We seem to be stuck in a rut again. It happens over and over again. " 
"Aren't we ready to go on? We have wasted enough time already" 
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Attacking specific members 
"I think he'll do anything to further his careee' 
"What the ******* do you think you're doing? 
"You've completely got it wrong" 
"I hate to point it out but you are in a majority of one" 
Blocking the group 
"I can't understand why we are doing any of this" 
"I cannot go forward as I do not feel there is trust within the group" 
"I do not think its worth doing, but go ahead" 
Setf aggrandizement at the expense of others 
"I feel a responsibility for the group. I just can't sit back and let the group 
flounder" 
"My sensitivities told me 12 minutes ago that we didn't need to do this" 
Pro ected hostility Y 
I know I arn the scapegoat. I rather enjoy if'= I will volunteer to be the 
scapegoat 
Pairing 
Pairing statements express warmth, intimacy and supportiveness. The pairing 
constellation may include expressions of intimacy towards individuals, friendliness, 
unusual responsiveness, side remarks to another, expressions of commendation, 
enthusiasm and warmth directed to the group as a whole. Here are some common 
examples suggested by Thelen et al (1954) using research material from the cases in this 
thesis. 
Expressions of warmth, intimacy and supportiveness 
"Harriet, she is really a good un" 
I do admire Chris's style. He's a raimnaker' 
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Support of another person's ideas 
"I think, Ginny, you are right" 
"I'm with Chris on this one" 
Expression ofcommitment and warmth directed at the whole group 
"It was good how we dealt with meeting today" 
"We are really making progress" 
"I really got a lot out of our session yesterday" 
Dependency 
Dependency statements express some reliance on some person or thing external to the 
membership. The dependency constellation may include appeals for support or direction 
from the leader, looking for the leader approval, undue attention to the leader, expressing 
reliance on some outside authority, structure, procedure or tradition. It may also include 
expressing group weakness, fear of trying things. The following are examples: 
Appealsfor support or direction 
"I don't know what is the correct way" 
"I'd feel better if you (the leader or basic assumption leader) tell us what to do" 
"We need some input here" 
Reliance on structure, procedure, tradition 
"It's no different from public complaints (procedure) 
"How do we usually take these matter forward" 
"why don't we appoint a chairman" 
Reliance on outside authority 
"Are you objecting to the principle that the leader says you are not the visible face 
of your service? " (also BaFi) 
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Expression of weakness or inadequacy 
"I'm confused. Where do we go next" 
"We're in a mess again. How did we get here? " 
"We never seem to make a decision' ' 
Flight 
Flight statements express avoidance of the problem or withdrawal from participation. 
The flight constellation may include: light-hearted humour, tension releasing laughter, 
trivia dominating a conversation, phantasy, off the point comments, over- 
intellectualisation, and comments out of context emotionally. 
Examples of flight include: 
Withdrawal or lessened involvement 
This is usually expressed by silence and in this form it cannot easily be rated. However it 
can also take the form of expressed boredom 
Humour, phantasy, tension releasing laughter 
The group may engage in an off the point discussion about what the Elected 
Members will do after the elections 
The group may take make light hearted puns at the leader's expense in their 
absence 
The group spends undue time on irrelevancies not germane to the agenda 
Statement which askfor clarification 
"What was that? " 
"Can you repeat that statement? " 
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Counterdependency 
Counterdependency are those statements that assert independence from the leader, 
authority from members of the group. The key characteristic of this category is the 
communication diverts the communication and direction from the formal authority. The 
intent of the speaker is take some form of control within the group. 
The purpose of this behaviour is to demonstrate (in varying degrees) a rejection with 
authority, compared with 'fight' statements, which are designed to challenge or confront. 
Examples may include: 
Asserting independenceftom the leader 
"I'd like to suggest a different process" (after a suggestion by the leader) 
"The CEO is being unreasonable expecting us to do that" 
Assuming a directive role 
"I have a view, just listen to what I have to say" 
I think we should use the other office, instead of the CEO's room all of the time" 
(two statements here) 
Seeking supportftom other group members 
"Are you with my proposal (rather than the leaders) 
"Are we directors are we mice? " 
Counterpairing 
Counterpairing statements intend to keep the group distant, dis-organised and off task. 
The group climate is cool, lacks stimulation, and comments within the group drop dead. 
There's is little or no spark. 
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Detachment or withdrawalftom the group 
"I cannot contribute as I do not trust the group" 
"I feel a bit out of it today" 
Smug or pompous 
"The authority I just worked for did everyffiing really well" 
I use to teach this stuff so no need to explain" 
"Well, I am differenf' 
Work 
Work describes task directed behaviour. It is intentional, direct, relates to reality and 
seeks to solve problems, progress the decision-making and process of the group, provide 
or receive information. When groups are at their best work can also take the form of 
individual and group insight and learning. 
Thelen, Stock et al identified four levels of work. The highest being level four. Each of 
these are briefly described. 
Level one level work 
This level of work is personally orientated and is an expression of what might be 
happening for the individual rather than the group as a whole. An observer watching one- 
level work feels that it is an expression of the individual need and that it interrupts the 
flow if the group. 
Examples include: 
I sort a feel to free associate - so nobody stop me" 
"I feel very anxious about what might happen" 
I am still thinking about the exchange we had half an hour ago" 
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Level two work 
This level of work involves maintaining or following through on the task the group is 
working on. It may be that the group is taking time to define the task, take care of 
'house-keeping', provide information. An observer would feel that the activities were 
group related but routine. 
Examples might include: 
Setting up processes 
Assigning responsibilities 
Building on each others contribution in a matter of fact way compared with 
pairing which is more emotionally connected. 
Level three work 
Three-level work is group focused work which usually has new ingredient. It is 
characterised often by problem-solving activity, a new method to attack a problem, the 
visualisation of goals, the reality checking of an idea. The content is task focused and 
tends to move the group on from one group task to another. An observer would feel a 
group that is energetic, group orientated and has purpose and direction. 
Examples may include: 
"What principles are we applying in coming to this conclusion? " 
"Have we got to the point where we do not express our feelings in this group? " 
"So we have agreed the first three steps, what are going to do with the last part of 
the process? " 
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Levelfour work 
Four level work is creative and insightful. It usually involves insightful interpretations by 
group members on behalf of the group and infuses meaning and relevance to present 
problems. The series of events leading up to this activity may occur during a single 
meeting or be the results of a series of meetings. An observer would feel group that is 
insightful, creative and exciting. 
Examples may include: 
"The processes in this group are often a mirror of what is happening among the 
elected members. What can we do to change it? " 
"We are functioning too smoothly and this keeps us from getting into things we 
need to get into. We don't want to disturb the smoothness yet we have a feeling 
of void. " 
Unclassified 
These are statements that cannot be heard, are unintelligible, incomplete or the content of 
the underlying message is not clear. 
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Appendix 2- Group Analysis measures 
The test of reliability for the group observations is based on the measures used 
Schutz (1952) and more recently by Karterud and Foss (1989). 
Karterud and Foss use four measures: 
Persons coefficient of correlation, r. This index tells how close rater A and rater 
B have come in terms of rating the total amount of say 'fight' activity in a group. 
The main drawback with this index is that the two raters may obtain a high Y but 
score different statements as 'fight'. 
Overall Agreement This is agreement as a percentage of total number of units. 
This is the approach that was used in Schutz (1952). The measure is an index of 
the total number of statements that the raters agree upon over the total amount of 
statements. For example if 401 statements were agreed on fight out of 485 fight 
statements then the index would be 0.85. A refinement and more accurate index 
is one based on specific act by act agreement. 
Specific agreement This is the agreement as a percentage of the mean of the 
different number of rated units in that specific category. For example rater A 
classifies 189 statements as emotionally charged while rater B classifies 149 
statement as emotionally charged. The mean is 169 and the total number of 
agreements is 123. Thus, the specific agreement is the estimation of the total 
emotionality 123: 169 =. 73 
Kappa. (Po - Pc) / (100- Pq) Po = calculated agreement. Pc = chance agreement. 
This index corrects the bias of chance agreement 
The use of overall agreement was used in the reliability testing of the Group 
Analysis Grid discussed in chapter 10 
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Appendix 3 The interview questions 
Research Interview Schedule Date: 
Confidential 
1. Name: 2. Title: 
Dept.: 
4. What the key issues currently affecting organisation both external and internal factors? 
5. What impact do these have on the organisation? 
6. What do you see as the organisations /team's task and strategy? Examples of policy 
papers, discussions or other evidence would be helpful 
7. How would you describe the political leadership of the organisation? (Who leads it, 
what is the nature of the leadership and where is there opposition) 
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8. Describe the relationships between the Board/members and the chief officers. Please 
give specific examples (Majority and opposition party if appropriate) 
9. Describe the relationship among people in the management team 
10. How effective would say are the management team meetings? Why? 
11. How would you describe the leadership of the management team 
12 What roles do you see played in the management group and by whom? 
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13. Where do you see the power in the group? (who has what fonn, how is it exercised 
what are the coalitions) 
14. Describe the relationships between the departments by level of management. (Please 
give specific examples) 
15. How would you describe the organisational culture: what is it? how dominant is it? 
How does it come about? 
16. How is change managed in the organisation: politically, corporately, by departments 
and by individuals 
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17. Can you think of critical incidents over the last six months where events have gone 
far from planned? 
Describe it? What was it and how did it come about? 
18. How did the organisation detect things went wrong? 
19. How was it dealt with? Why? 
Was it dealt with be existing procedures or were new procedures developed to 
meet the demands 
20. Were any lessons drawn from the event? What were they? 
Were these shared or institutionalised in any way. Give examples 
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21. Who else was involved in this process? 
What was their role 
22. Any other comments ...... thank you 
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Appendix 4 Reliability and construct validity for Firo-131 
This appendix looks at three areas of the Firo-B 
The dimensions and definitions of the Firo-B personal questionnaire 
The reliability of the instrument 
The validity of the instrument 
The dimensions of Flro-B 
The fundamental interpersonal dimensions of the FIRO theory are Inclusion (I), Control 
(C) and Affection (A). These are behaviourally defined as: 
Inclusion This reflects the interpersonal need to establish and maintain satisfactory 
relationships with people with respect to interaction and association. Positive 
connotations include "mingle, communicate, belong, companion, comrade, interested'. 
Those not so associative may be described as 'isolate, outsider, outcast, lonely, detached , 
withdrawn. ' 
Control This is the need to establish a satisfactory relationship with people with respect 
to control and power. Control behaviours refer to decision-making process between 
people. Its positive connotation is 'power, authority, influence, leader, ruler'. Aspects of 
negative control in this schema include 'rebellious, resistance, follower, submissive, 
henpecked'. 
Affection This is the need to establish and maintain satisfactory relationships with others 
with respect to love and affection. Some terms that connote positive affection are 'love, 
like, personal, intimate, friend, close'. Aspects of negative affection are connoted by the 
terms 'cool, dislike, hate, emotionally distant, rejecting'. 
The other aspect of this scale is the direction of the behaviour between people: what the 
individual expresses to others and what the individual wants from others. The expressed 
behaviour is that which is directed towards others. While the wanted behaviour is what 
you would like from others. 
'Taken from Shcutz (1978) 
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Reliability 
Coefficient of Internal Consistency 
The coefficient of internal consistency is the measure based on the internal analysis of the 
data obtained on a single trail. It is the measure the indicates the degree to which the 
items are homogeneous or measuring the same thing. The usual test for internal 
consistency is the split-half method, where the measure is the correlations between the 
two halves of the test. However, since the Firo-B scales are all Guttman scales, which are 
essentially ordinal, reproducibility is the appropriate measure of internal consistency. 
According to Oppenheirn a coefficient of 0.9 or more is acceptable. 
Reproducibility of Firo-B scales 
Scale Reproducibility Number of subjects 
Inclusion expressed (1c) 0.94 1615 
Inclusion wanted (Iw) 0.94 1582 
Control expressed (Ce) 0.93 1554 
Control wanted (Cw) 0.94 1574 
Affection expressed (Ae) 0.94 1467 
Affection wanted (Aw) 0.94 1467 
Mean 0.94 1543 
The reproducibility is very high and consistent over all samples. These scores are the 
coefficients for internal consistency for Firo-B 
Coefficient of Stability 
Coefficient of stability refers to the correlation between test scores and the scores after a 
lapse of time. This is an important measure as interpersonal orientations are presumed to 
be stable. Based on the sample study of Harvard students over a one month period 
(except for Ae and Aw which were taken after a week), the mean coefficient for the six 
scales is 0.76. 
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The test-retest results of Firo-B scales 
Scale Stability No of Mean Test Mean re- Standard Standard 
subjects test error Test error re- 
Test 
Ie 0.82 126 5.21 5.00 1.90 2.19 
lw 0.75 126 3.88 3.42 3.20 3.30 
Ce 0.74 183 3.14 2.94 2.22 2.19 
Cw 0.71 125 4.44 4.58 1.91 2.13 
Ae 0.73 57 3.42 3.19 2.43 2.71 
Aw 0.80 57 3.95 3.54 2.74 2.88 
Validity 
The validity of the Firo-B has been examined in three ways: content validity, concurrent 
validity and internal inter-coffelation of scales 
Content Validity 
This is determined by showing how well the content of the test items samples the class of 
situations or the subject matter about which conclusions are drawn. If the theory 
underling the use of Guttman scales is accepted, then the content validity is a property of 
all legitimate cumulative scales, and therefore of all Firo-B scales, Schutz (1978) 
Concurrent Validity 
Concurrent validity is evaluated by the extent to which test scores correspond with 
existing validated measures or instruments. The validity area refers to the studies which 
attempt to demonstrate differences, on the basis of the new measuring instrument , between already existent groups, or between individual with already known attitudes. 
Since 1958, when the test was originally published, research on Firo-B has taken place in 
a wide variety if fields - e. g. Human relations workshops, exploration of clinical work 
with individuals, interpersonal development and experimentation with group 
composition. The studies show differences among occupational groups are striking and, 
for the most part, consistent with occupational stereotypes. These differences help to 
clarify the meaning of the concepts behind the measures. A fuller explanation is in part II 
of Schutz (1978) 
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Intercorrelation ofscales 
The intercorrelation between the Firo-B of scales obtained from a sample of 1,320 
subjects is shown in the table below. There is a significant correlation between e and w 
for Inclusion and Affection and a smaller but statistically significant correlations between 
the scales of I and A. Thus, Firo-B does have some non-independent scales and this 
reduces its construct validity. 
Intercorrelations among the Firo-B scales 
le Iw Ce Cw Ae Aw 
Ie 0.49 0.12 0.08 0.47 0.27 
Iw 0.06 0.06 0.24 0.24 
Ce 0.07 0.19 0.31 
Cw 0.22 0.22 
Ae 0.42 
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Appendix 5 The item analysis for the strategic organisational 
learning inventory (SOLI) 
The dimensions of the strategic organisational Icaming inventory are discussed in chapter 
5. They include the following scales: scanning, interpreting, reviewing, sharing the 
learning, taking action, countering defensive routines and systematic problem solving. 
The initial pilot questionnaire was undertaken with a group of mature, part-time, public 
sector, MSc students. Thus, the group was representative of the group used in the case 
study. 
The S OLI questionnaire took the form of a Likert scale, -with each of the named scales 
having six items. Thus, there was a total of 42 items. (The original form is reproduced in 
appendix 5.1. ) An item analysis was undertaken for internal consistency/ reliability. It is 
a procedure to measure the extent to which the items within the instrument "hang 
together" and are all measuring the same thing. The procedure measures the correlation 
between each item (question) and the sum of each respondent's total. If the correlation is 
high then it means that the item is measuring the same as the whole. (See Oppenheim 
(1966) 
This procedure was carried out with the pilot study of 10 respondents. 
The results are reproduced below for each item 
The results of the item analysis 
(Q = question number: r= the correlation) 
Scan Interpret Act Review Share Defend Solve 
QrQrQrQrQrQrQr 
1 
. 55 2 . 74 3 . 28 4 . 85 5 . 75 6 . 74 7 . 
32 
8 . 70 9 . 77 10 . 74 11 . 20 12 . 67 13 . 84 
14 . 70 
15 . 66 16 . 50 17 . 46 18 . 05 19 . 90 20 .5 21 . 
71 
22 . 54 23 . 43 24 . 70 25 . 71 26 . 92 27 . 64 28 . 
42 
29 . 04 30 . 60 31 . 57 32 . 67 33 . 90 34 . 77 
35 . 70 
36 . 06 37 . 89 38 . 47 39 . 49 40 . 46 41 . 78 
42 . 78 
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The correlations for each question/item provided information about questionnaire's 
reliability. A number of the questions were dropped so that the questionnaire was 
reduced and each scale only had five items (leading to a new total of 35 questions/items). 
The choice of items to delete was based on three criteria. 
All those with a correlation of 0.75 were accepted without qualification. This figure 
seemed acceptable given the low level of sophistication of the instrument and the 
scores of other and more rigourously tested instruments 
There was a need to retain five items in each scale so ajudgment had to be made. So 
where items were in the region of 0.5 they were accepted provided the others items 
were acceptable in a scale. 
There were a number that had a low correlation and these were rejected or the 
question was reworded, simplified, changed within the scale under measurement. 
Items (questions) rejected outright were 3,7,11,18,29 and 36. Others rejected due 
to the high correlations in the scale were 20,23 and 40. 
The outcome was a revised questionnaire and this is reproduced in appendix 5.2. 
The face validity of the revised questionnaire appeared high in that the indications from 
the text comments of the questionnaire and the low means across all of the scales 
suggested an organisation not open to leaming. However, on the basis of 64 returned 
questionnaires from a population of 100 (64% response rate) a further item analysis 
indicated that the SOLI questionnaire was 'reliable'. 
The size of the group in the final case study was greater than the pilot this may explain 
some of the great differences in results. To take account of this an analysis was 
undertaken by sub-groups: the level the respondent was in the senior management 
hierarchy. However, this did not yield any clear patterns of explanation. The other 
explanation is that the pilot group was unrepresentative and biased as learners and open to 
learning. Furthermore, they were all from different organisations whereas the people in 
the case study were all from the same organisation and the divergence of experience may 
be also a possible explanatory factor. 
The lesson is that in undertaking a similar exercise more time would be planned in to use 
a test retest or a split half test as a measure of reliability. These are more commonly use 
and would be adopted along with an item analysis in any subsequent study. 
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Appendix 5.1 The original strategic organisational learning inventory 
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organisational Qumtionnaire 
Organisational Quesidonnaire 
This is an action research instrument used for the purposes of learning; only. 
(D Nflchael Jarrett, April, 1996 
Organisational Questionnaire 
Confidenfi, d 
Workshop Questionnaire 
0 M. lauett, 1996 
7he aim ofthis questionnaire is to increase our colkefive understanding of 
organisadonallearningý 7h ere are no right answem 7hankyou 
Section I Primary data 
Name: S*HC- I LA Degree of strategic role: H/M/L 
Orgardsation: r4EFALTKMýý Type of Organisation: 
at4s ýý PGA M-f UK& 
Size (FTE) 
Primary task of the organisation: 
ý, CRJ V C=P, -f ot-- HGqc7-f)cAR-e 
Section II 
Please indicate the three most important strategic issues currently facing your 
organisation and say why they are important. 
tq E t4 -I A L- RG A Aw S7 
&r 1-14 W)NC, F7 iVtq-Al CIAL bqLJ9A/CC- , jOjPUC, 4j7oNS 
f(14 C-LQ to C S64VICC C07Z 
t-7. , -ru eztt, (C- 1. MýW HOLK-Tal %, 1j"ACUeAC 
Section III - Please indicate on the attached form the extent to which you 
Strongly Agree (SA) 
Agree (A) 
Are Undecided (LJ) 
Disagree (D) 
Strongly Disagree (SD) 
with the statements in the Mowing section 
7ý-t 
I 
Organisational Questionnaire C M. JarreM 1996 
1. We have an effective Manag=ent Information System that consistently pro-, ides 
timely, complete, relevant, speedy and accurate information. 
2. Informal sources of information are the most reliable 
3. Takirg- risks is actively avoided 
4. We are slow to identify when a strategic plan is 'drifting' 
5. Teamwork is central to the way we work 
6. The, organisation is marked by frequent bouts of ritual humiliation of staff 
7. Using statistics to make a case is seen as hostile in this organisation 
8. Strategic analysis using techniques like SWOT, the Boston Matrix and the like is 
actively carried out by all the management board 
9. We have a history of realising; the intentions of our strategy 
10. Our senior management group demonstrate a high level of conunitment to 
managing change 
11. Our criteria for assessing ., smices are clearly understood and consistently applied 
by 
all those involved. 
12. We cannot seem to learn from our mistakes 
13. We work in a 'blame culture' of recrimination and 'put downs' 
14. AU our data for decision-making is based on facts - not rumours 
15. Bench marldng is an important tool to support organisational development and 
changge 
16. We are too quick to draw conclusions in this organisation 
17. Things take a long time to be implemented, if at all 
18. Strategic reviews are regularly held involving the senior manag=cnt tearn and the 
board 
19. Examples of good practice take are widely disseminated 
20. The organisation is bureaucratic 
21. The history of the organisation is documented and celebrated 
22. We use a wide range of sources to gather our infonnation 
Orgamsaftonal Questiomaire IYL Jarretk 1996 
23. A thorough risk assessment exercise is rarely undertaken on strategic issues 
24. To6 many people get invohed in the implementation processes 
25. Our professional staff are best placed to judgp the quality of service to our 
beneficiAries 
26. Lean-dng is shared between deparunents across the organisation 
27. What we say is what we do 
28. We have a fixed set of criteria to evaluate solutions to solving problems 
29. We operate in a turbulent envirorunent 
30. Diversity is valued. 
3 1. This organisation. enjoys experimentation 
32. Consultation and participation take up too much time, money and hassle for the 
same results. This view is widely held in the organisation. 
33. Ile organisational cult= is friendly, open and supportive 
34 There is no explicit conflict in the organisation 
35. There is a readiness to re-examine and reassess existing procedures 
36. We see ourselves as a system that is able to manage complex, chaotic and messy 
organisatio, qal dynamics that arise from managing change 
37. 'Me organisation. is sensitive to the changes and trends in its enviromnent 
3 S. People act before they think 
39. Program objectives for evaluation are set well in advance 
40. Our local area networkle-mail facffity is under-utilised 
4 1. People seem to keep all the important facts and details about their department in 
their heads 
42. Mind-mapping, fish-bone and other techniques are a complete waste of time and 
will shortly be replaced by another management fad 
-3 
Appendix 5.2 The revised strategic organisational leaming inventory 
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Appendix 6 The clinical researcher -job skills, knowledge and 
aftributes 
The relevant attributes of the clinical researcher are discussed fully in Loman (198 8). 
The key characteristics are noted below and they are under three headings: job skills, job 
knowledge and personal attributes 
e Job Skills 
a) Ability to establish relationships of trust, acceptance, warmth and concern 
b) Ability to diagnose a clients condition, to gather and interpret evidence from a 
variety of sources, to use oneself as a diagnostic instrument 
C) Ability to communicate at the level of the recipient, to give and receive 
feedback in minimally threatening ways, to help others acknowledge 
ownership of their own ideas and feelings 
d) Ability to execute a well-developed sense of timing, especially when working 
under stress 
e) Ability to be pragmatic, empathizing the applied and practical nature of the 
behaviour 
f) Ability to work under conditions of high stress, high uncertainty and 
ambiguity, high frustration, loneliness and professional isolation 
* Job Knowledge 
a) Organisational. and interpersonal dynamics 
b) Principles of change and changing 
c) Individual personality dynamics 
d) Ethics 
e) Standards of professional practice 
9 Personal Attributes 
a) Cognitive complexity 
b) Interpersonal competence including 
- Openness and honesty 
- Awareness of and control over one's own personal psychological 
defenses 
- Self awareness and self acceptance 
a) Moderate needs for affiliation, achievement and power 
b) "Helping" orientation 
c) High need for personal competence 
d) Comfort with intuitive methods 
e) . Imagination and cognitive flexibility 
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Appendix 6.1 
Firo-B raw scores for Michael Jarrett 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) 
Expressed (E) 335 
Wanted (W) 025 
Sum (E+W) 
35 10 
Diff (+ or -)(E-W) 
3 I 
Sum (I+C+A) 
I 
7 
Total sum 
18 
Total difference 
4 
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Appendix 7 Key issues in local government 
The purpose of this overview is to provide an additional context for the case studies. It 
provides a back drop for understanding local government in particular and the public 
sector more generally. It is based on the early exploratory study undertaken by the 
researcher with local authorities in 1992 (See Jarrett (1992b and 1992c) and a review of 
the relevant literature. 
Local Authorities and the Management of Change 
An understanding of the organisation and management issues facing local government 
can be understood by first looking at the various pressures and influences that are 
currently impinging upon it. Thus, the first section of this appendix looks at the nature 
and magnitude of the changes leading up to and during the period of study. It is followed 
by a syntheses of the key developments that seem to be emerging in terms of the 
organisational and management development needs. It then briefly concludes with the 
challenges facing local goverriment in particular and by extension the public sector 
Key changes facing local authorities since 1985. 
Since the beginning of Thatcher's political and economic model, there has been a 
considerable change in the political, cultural and economic terrain. We have seen the 
breakdown of the consensus politics of the 1960s and a drive towards individualism and 
the power of the market. 
Flynn (1990) states: 
".. the argument goes, the consensus crumbled because of the failure of economic policy 
to produce full employment and because the public services themselves lost the 
confidence of the public. " p7 
Flynn also quotes Nicholas Deakin (1987) who argues: 
".. that in the course of the 1970s the consensus on both economic and social policy was 
shattered by the introduction of Milton Friedman's ideas about economic policy and by 
the ideas of such bodies as the Institute of Economic Affairs on the role of the welfare 
state. " p7 
The key economic goals were to reduce inflation through the reduction of public 
expenditure, overmaning and waste. The political and cultural imperatives were to 
change the nation from dependency to being independent, from collective to individual 
action, from public to private provision, and not least from labour to capital. 
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Those sixteen years saw a change in the role of local government from corporate planning 
bodies (during the re-organisation of local authorities in 1974) to competitive bodies in 
social markets driven by Thatcherite economics. 
The fundamental belief held by the Conservative government since 1979 was that local 
authorities wasted resources and caused inflationary pressures upon the economy. 
Therefore the expenditure of authorities needed to be controlled and that authorities 
should be more exposed and responsive to market factors. 
Thus, authorities experienced less grant allocation from central government; were 
subjected to more financial controls; had to respond to a range of legislative changes 
challenging their traditional roles; and have had to 'contract out' specified services so as 
to become more 'competitive'. Authorities were undoubtedly facing a turbulent 
environment and having to face new challenges (Flynn (1990), Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities (1990), Bell (1990), Gutch et al (1990), Issac-Henry & Painter 
(199 1), Cochrane (199 1) and Stoker (1989) 
The First Phase 
The first part of the Thatcher administration (1979 -86) lay the foundations of the new 
economics in the form of- 
a) monetarism, which focused on controlling the supply of money as a ward against 
inflation 
b) privatisation to increase competition and reduce waste in the public sector. This took 
three main forms: the, literal privatisation of nationalised agencies e. g. British Telecom, 
British Airways, National Freight; the increase in competition for public services - for 
example in the national health; and the use of contracts as a way of 'contracting out' 
public services. 
c) employment legislation to reduce the power of the union and their role in what was 
described as cost push inflation due to unreasonable wage demands. 
It is fair to say that in the public sector, central government had a direct impact on labour 
strength by cuts to public sector organisations and more direct action as shown in the 
miners' strike. In the private sector, things were somewhat influenced by economic 
recession and thus unions were more compliant. (MacInnes (1987) 
d) a political message and style that was dubbed by Hall (1985) as 'authoritarian 
populism'. It worked on the basis of popular appeal to the ma ority with strong leadership j 
and control from the centre. It was the leadership and direction that appeared to address 
the needs of the populous as it was a time of uncertainty, poor economic performance and 
an unfilled political gap. 
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These foundation stones created the enviromnent for what was to be experienced by local 
authorities as a different renaissance. 
The Impact on Local Government 
The full implications on local government did not really start to have an impact until the 
second half of the 1980s, with the first range of changes in the re-structuring of local 
government. There were widespread legislative changes, which are mentioned throughout 
the discussion below. 
However, the first to have a maj or impact was the Local Government Act (19 8 5), which 
saw the abolition of five Metropolitan County Councils and the Greater London Council 
in 1986. The abolition of the Inner London Education Authority was delayed until April 
1990. 
These changes took away the first tier of local government. It meant less infrastructural 
support for economic and social initiatives beyond the district level as well as more 
functions for metropolitan districts and London boroughs. In addition, it also led to the 
development and use of non-elected bodies to take over some of the roles and functions 
of local government - for example joint committees and boards I ike the Docklands 
Development Corporation and other quasi-autonomous non-governmental agencies 
(qangoes) like the Training and Enterprise Council (TEC). 
Secondly, in line with legislative changes the was the increased centralisation of central 
government power: through changing the law, using non-elected bodies which were 
directly accountable to central government and undermining local authority power. 
"Central government has far more direct control over local government in 1990 than it 
did in 1980. " (Gutch et al (1990)) 
Thirdly, there was the introduction of a new philosophy: a new public sector economics, 
which was based on efficiency, effectiveness and economy. The key arm of the 
government here was the Audit Commission. 
The Audit Commission undertook a number of audits of local government's and central 
government department's efficiency, effectiveness and economy during the late 1980s 
and it found most of them wanting. 
604 
Remarks from one of the Commission's reports summaries some of the key issues: 
" Local authorities are no longer regarded as necessarily the only, or best, 
providers of their traditional services. An implicit belief in the ability of large-scale 
public bureaucracies to solve social problems has been replaced by skepticism, doubt and 
willingness to experiment with other methods. There were louder calls for more 
responsive structures and more local flexibility. And as the consensus has broken down, 
so national and local politics have become more polarised, creating new tensions within 
local authorities themselves. 
"In any period of uncertainty and change, the well-managed organisation 
survives more successfully than the rest. That will be true of local authorities in the next 
decade. " (Audit Commission 1988). 
Finally, Local authorities have not been passive or unresponsive to some of these 
pressures. They responded with varying degrees depending upon resources, management 
capability and working practices, local political control and decision-making and 
organisational capacity and processes. Among the areas they have taken up generally is 
the need to understand the customer, management development and the need to consider 
contracts and be more flexible. These areas are explored section 2 below. 
Local Government Funding 
Local government was also affected by the restructuring of public sector finance. The 
level of support from central government declined from over 61% in the 1978n9to an 
estimated 48.4% in 1985/6 (Upton (1989) p49). Moreover, local councils' ability to raise 
local revenue had also be undermined. Firstly, through rate capping and'penalties' in 
1984 to 'charge capping'with the introduction of the Community Charge, under the 
Local Government Act, 1988. 
Initially, some authorities engaged in creative accounting to maintain the level of revenue 
expenditure. They would capitalised revenue expenditure on housing repairs (from the 
Housing capital grant) and thus reduce the call on revenue. 
In addition, authorities would supplement their main programme expenditure via other 
earmarked programmes. For example, areas designated as 'special' under the Inner Areas 
Act (1976), could use Department of Environment Urban Programme funds for 
economic, social and environment/housing projects. The seven areas of most social and 
economic deprivation were chosen. These were Birmingham, Liverpool, Newcastle & 
Gateshead, Manchester, and the London Boroughs of Islington, Lambeth and Hackney. 
These were designated as 'Inner City Partnership' areas and they received substantial 
sums ranging from 10 million to 20 million per year under the scheme. 
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Others, designated as 'Inner Area Programme' authorities received smaller sums of 2-4 
million pounds per year and included Nottingham, Tower Hamlets, Leicester and Hull. 
They now total about 40 in total. 
These authorities were able to use the programme to support some of their strategic work 
and projects that may have been undertaken by main programme expenditure. While the 
sums of funds were not large in comparison to each authorities' main expenditure there 
were more discretionary power about how the money was spent. For example, 
renovation of streets in the inner areas of Leiecester and Birmingham were first funded 
under the Urban Programme. Later such 'enveloping' schemes were taken on by other 
parts of the Department of Environment (DOE). 
Another earmarked fund that was used to replace main expenditure was in the field of 
education. Authorities would used funds under section II of the Local Authority Act 
(1966), which provided funds from central government to provide services and education 
for'Commonwealth Immigrants'. 
The fund was reviewed by a Home Office Scrutiny team in 1990 and it demonstrated that 
the fund was being abused and used to support mainstream expenditure. Thus, the 
scheme has now been substantially revised and some of the 80 million-pound fund will 
be channeled through the TEC, thus reducing the level of that specific fund through local 
authorities. 
There was a case for the funds to be more targeted for its purpose and abuse was taking 
place. However, it demonstrates the methods that authorities have undertaken to secure 
other funds in the face of a declining revenue base. 
Finally, some authorities used other approaches to fend off the pressures of cuts by 
engaging in private investment schemes. Hammersmith and Fulham were a case in point 
where they lost money on the investment market but were not liable because the courts 
judged that they had acted illegally. In addition, a number of authorities were caught in 
the closure of the Bank of Commercial Credit and Investment, losing nearly 100 million 
pounds. Are these examples of local authorities taking more risks under increasing 
pressure? Is it simply poor financial judgment and advice or are there other factors at 
play? These are questions that go beyond the scope of this study. However, they indicate 
some of the range of pressures that authorities were experiencing which during the 1990s 
implied reductions in staffing and services. 
The community charge then formed the main local revenue source and with the 
introduction of the uniform business rate it meant a reduction in authorities income base. 
In addition, it was argued that the replacement of the General Related Expenditure (GRE) 
grant with the Standard Spending Assessment (SSA) will not compensate (Gutch et al 
(1990). 
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The SSA figure is determined by the Government and not the local authority, thus the 
authority has little or no control over its final budget. The inadequacy of the 
government! s ability to get the figures correct were shown by the revision of SSA-based 
expenditure figures for 1990/91, leading to extra cash being given to every authority in 
the form of a rebate of 140 pounds per head in community charge payer. 
As Flynn (1990) notes: 
"Only the community charge and fees and charges for services are now set by local 
authorities. Their other income is all controlled by central government which may also 
limit community charge levels. " p46 
The Use of Contracts 
Graham Mather of The Institute of Economic Affairs argued at the AMED conference on 
the public sector (1992) that the only way forward for local government was based on a 
contractually model of exchange and provision. The model was also extended to the 
NHS. 
The goverm-nent carried through its philosophy of 'markets' to public services by the 
introduction of contracts. There were four main ways by which contracts became part of 
local authority speak: - 
a) Under the Local Government Act 1988, the government introduced Competitive 
Compulsory Tendering (CCT), where local authorities were legally obliged to tender out 
work in'defined activities'. These were: refuge collection, cleaning of buildings, other 
cleaning, catering for schools or welfare services, other catering, maintenance of grounds, 
and the repair and maintenance of vehicles. The management of sports and leisure was 
also included later. (Fielding & Gutch (1989) 
Thus, contracts were legally imposed. 
The overall impact or success of the legislation has been mixed, depending upon the 
service, the political persuasion of the authority and its relationship with central 
government. Some authorities in some departments did well, while others floundered. 
For example, Direct Labour Organisations (DLOs) were better equipped as they came 
from a culture of contracts and work specification. Cleaning and catering also had 
similar traditions. But there are fewer examples of outcomes in the parks and vehicles 
maintenance. 
For example, while Lambeth were publicly suffering organisational difficulties during 
1990/1, their DLO was organising seminars, restructuring the work force and jobs, and 
providing training so that the DLO could successfully compete. 
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Similar initiatives had taken place in Camden, where the first contract for refuge 
collection was won by Camden staff. The contract was put out for re-tendered under the 
legal direction of the Environment Minister as the contract was said to been won in a way 
that was "uncompetitive". The contract was subsequently won by a French company 
1991. 
b) The Community Care legislation and the Griffiths report encouraged and allowed the 
use of contracts. Again the purpose here was to reduce the role of local government as 
'monopoly' providers. 
Under this initiative the were no legal obligations but a potential opportunity or threat 
depending how it was viewed by the authority. The Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities surveyed its member and five key members of the Association of County 
Councils to seek their response to Community Care. Firstly, they had grave reservations 
about the use of tendering and felt that such methods were only appropriate in the private 
care market e. g. residential homes for the elderly. 
Secondly, they explored and found acceptable uses of other forms of contractual 
arrangements in the form of grants and service level agreements (SLAs). 
Finally, they felt that specification and monitoring was key in maintaining quality and 
equality in service delivery. 
Their conclusions on contracts were: 
".. that this does not, of necessity, mean a diminution in the role and influence of local 
government. Rather, it offers a fresh opportunity for achieving a three-way partnership 
between service users, providing organisations and local authorities. " 
The study went on to add: 
" The challenge now is to ensure that the various alternatives and additions to publicly 
provided services are of a nature, quality and reliability that make them appropriate to the 
needs of those using them. The move towards contractually defined services provides 
both an impetus and means of meeting that challenge. " AMA (1990)p48 
Thus, while qualified, the Association urged its members to see the opportunities that 
contracts offered and to see it as a positive challenge. In addition, there was an 
acceptance of a different role for the local authority which moved away from'monopoly' 
provider to 'enabler'. 
c) The other general influence and key theme to the contracts school of thinking was the 
need to increase competition and markets. Thus, the idea that contracts could be applied 
to any service (maybe bar the MOD) was no longer sacrosanct. 
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d) With the increasing devolution and decentralisation in authorities along with steps 
towards greater management accountability and the use of cost centres, the notion of 
'internal' markets and customers had also gained currency. Thus, departments across 
authorities could have contracts in the form of budget transfers or service level 
agreements (SLAs). For example, a central training unit which had previously run 
courses on behalf of departments from a central budget allocation, would now have to be 
led by the department by their willingness to pay for courses or advice. 
This reflected a fundamental change in power and new relationships both structurally and 
in the (small p) political processes of organisations. 
Decentralisation Vs Fragmentation 
Authorities under pressure to respond were under-going a number of their own changes in 
values, strategy, structure and service delivery. They are having to work out the conflicts 
and tensions within their organisations. 
The direct pressures that they faced at the delivery end were different from those they 
faced from central government but were no less important. 
Some of the following pressures are useful examples: 
The values of 'excellence' have become part of the local authority language. Imported 
from the private sector model of Peters & Waterman's (1982) 'In Search of 
Excellence', there was a new managerialism that permeated certain authorities or 
departments. Organisations were 'values' led. The approach was much in line with 
the 'markef perspective. 
In Gloucestershire County Council, a classic and much quoted case, they call it the 
'Gloucestershire Style'. There it involves: 
"Serving our customers, Partnership, Involving people and Service Review" (Webster, 
1990)pl4 
These compared very closely with the beliefs outlined by Peters and Waterman that the 
best-run or 'excellent' companies are value-driven and that shared vales, leadership, 
strategy, staff support and training are among the keys to success. 
Many other authorities took on this approach in varying degrees. But such an approach 
needed to be critically assessed. What values are being used? How does the'excellence, 
model of the private sector compare with those of public service and how does it capture 
its distinctiveness? Moreover, many of the companies in the original study have 
performed rather badly in the late 1980s. 
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What does it say for the generality of the 'excellence' model and how applicable is it to 
local authorities in England. These are some of the questions that need to be addressed. 
'Quality'has gone hand in hand with excellence, albeit from different origins. It is 
part of what Terry Hanafin, Chief Executive of the London Borough of Lewisham, 
calls: 
"Converting a'Closed Council' into and'Open Authority'.. Breaking the organisation out 
of 'old think! into 'new think"' (Harafin (1992). 
It means the authority has had to change it views and cease to see issues merely from a 
'providers' view and see it from the 'market' or 'customers' view. 
Quality is about: 
11 a service that does as intended and is responsive to the needs of the user" (Stewart & 
Walsh (1989) 
It forms what has been described as the whole 'service package', which includes four 
inter-locking parts. These are: -- The core service characteristics e. g. the provision of 
meals for the elderly. Already there are service specifications in the nutritional value. - 
The physical environment - Is it delivered or do you need to go to the nearest community 
centre? Is the centre near? What is access like there? How welcoming is the physical 
space? - The personal relationship - Is the service provider helpful, courteous, - 
communicative? - The power relationships? Are the rights of the user/beneficiary being 
infringed? What are the steps for redress? For example do 'clients' have access to their 
own records? Is there a complaints procedure? (Jarrett et al (199 1). 
In developing quality in the 'town hall' there has been a need to develop a strategic 
approach. In addition, it has had to fonn part of the culture, with support, supervision 
and training. 
Customer and user involvement has also been another trend. Some see it as part of the 
local authorities role to Promote community development as the local agent (AMA 
(1989) 
While others are more pragmatic. Calls for'Getting Closer'to the public and finding out 
their views and needs is seen as crucial for the effective use of resources and good service 
delivery. 
" As local authorities face mounting pressure, both internal and external, councillors and 
officers may find it useful to take a fresh look at the reasons for getting closer to the 
public. The provision of 'service for the public' is certainly a challenge; however, it also 
offers a potential solution to some of the major problems currently being experienced in 
local government. " (LGTB (1987))p4 
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The political imperative is clear. 
"As local government moves into the 1990s and adjusts to a series of major changes in its 
role and operation, learning is given added importance. At one level learning about what 
the public thinks and wants can play a key part in helping the authority manage change 
rather than defensively responding to it. More significantly, many of the changes which 
are happening are going to demand a more sophisticated appreciation of the public's 
view. " (LGTB (198 8))p 11 
However, it is also important to acknowledge that some moves towards decentralisation 
may be driven by the use of new technology and micro-computers in authorities or 
managerial imperatives. (Hambleton & Hoggett (1984)p2) 
There is considerable scope for the development of user involvement. A national survey 
of social services departments suggest that user involvement is a 'practical, achievable 
policy'. Twenty-nine percent of all respondents (49 % response) had written policies to 
involve service users. (Beresford & Croft (1990)). 
The main methods of involving users goes beyond the market-type survey of 'Getting 
Closer to the Public' but involve: advisory groups, committees and forums; user/self 
advocacy groups and committees; management steering groups/committees; consultation 
meetings and planning, project or service development groups. 
These suggest new types of relationship that will have to developed with the public and 
provide new management challenges. However, of these, consultation meetings were still 
the main form of involvement (70%) with only 12% of those involved in a direct say. 
Some of the changes have come from the community. Both voluntary organisations and 
community groups have been campaigning and lobbying for improved service delivery or 
involvement in the decision-making or service provision. 
Examples of good practice can be found in Gloucestershire County Council (Webster 
(1990), Richmond (LGTB, (1988), and some of the Urban Programme area like 
Nottingham and Newcastle where they have set up consultative mechanism as part of the 
urban Programme. 
But the country-wide the situation was far from perfect; even when consultation had been 
suggested it has been facile rhetoric; inadequately organised with unclear objectives and 
outcomes. (Berry (1988), Prashar &Nicholas (1984). 
In some cases consultation and involvement has even been a negative experience for local 
groups, with the notion of community development being little more than a misguided 
fantasy. (Croft & Beresford (1988)). 
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Consultation was part of a then recent trend with positive and negative connotations: 
".. decentralisation per se has no necessarily association with user control and there is 
widespread evidence that proximity does not necessarily lead to integration. " (Bames et 
al (1990))pl38 
Thus, there is still more work to be done in this field and forms part of the range of new 
skills and attitudes that the authority will have to acquire to provide good public service. 
Greater Accountability of managers' actions, functions and budgets have also 
generated yet another force in the gestalt of local government structures. Metcalf 
(199 1) argues that the drive for greater accountability has taken shape in the form of 
closer line management supervision, delegation, divisionalisation, budget tools of 
management and a greater use of privitization methods e. g. contracts. 
He rightly raises the concern that with the increasing divisionalisation, comes specialism, 
which might lead to a'blinkered' approach. This could lead to what Ashford and Lee 
(1990) call 'bureaucratic rationality', which is the 'old think! -type of organisation that the 
authority is struggling to change. In addition, in periods of uncertainty and change 
organisations can move into defensive behaviour or habitual routines and may, contrary 
to requirement, become more centralised or even 'stuck! (Ashford & Lee (1990), Argyris 
(1985). 
Conversely, there are trends towards decentralisation in local authorities. Some of thesc 
initiatives forrn part of the new public sector ethos of knowing the customer; others are 
simply the wishes of Elected Members; while others come from a more community 
development perspective. These were popularised under the slogan of 'Going Local' e. g. 
Walsall Borough Council, which was one of the first authorities to experiment with the 
introduction of 32 neighborhood offices between 1980 and 1982. 
The motivation for decentralisation varied from council to council and was a complex 
function of history, political ideology, community expression and culture, the 
organisational culture, practice and relationship with the community. In most cases it 
was by Labour councils e. g. London Boroughs of Camden, Greenwich, Hackney, 
Hargingey, Islington, Lambeth, Lewisham and Richmond-upon-Thames, and the 
Metropolitan Districts of Sheffield, Manchester and Birmingham. (Widdicombe (1986)) 
There were a variety of types of 'decentralisation! and these seemed to revolve around the 
decentralisation of decision-making and the decentralisation of services. Further 
discussion of this area can be found in Gaster (199 1) and Hambleton & Hoggett (1984). 
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In addition, it has been noted that Conservative local councils do not tend to go for 
decentralisation. (Widdicombe (1986)). However, it would be misleading to conclude 
that decentralisation means a socialist ideology. It has been shown throughout this 
discussion that radical right views could also subscribe to decentralisation as a means of 
giving consumers/users choice in the social market. 
The question of the future development and structure of local authorities must also lie in 
its identity and role, which forms the final point in this section on local authorities and 
the management of change. 
The role of local govemment 
The role of local government had been fundamentally challenged. We saw it earlier in 
the Audit Commission report (Audit Commission (1989) and a number of reviews of 
local government have driven the point home. The most significant was the government's 
enquiry into the conduct of local authority business, the Widdicombe Committee. 
The report recognised the value of local govcrrunent - particularly its three attributes of. - 
" a) pluralism, through which it contributes to the national political system; 
b) participation, through which it contributes to local democracy; 
c) responsiveness, through which it contributes to the provision of local needs through 
the delivery of services. " (Widdicombe (1986)p47 
On the continued viability of local government, the report stated: 
" There will always be a need for the local delivery of services. There are, however, 
means other than local government through which local services may be provided,. 
and it needs to be considered what distinguishes local government from other public 
sector local institutions - such as health authorities, water authorities, electricity boards, 
or indeed local offices of Government Departments. " p52 
The report while recognising the political value of local government challenged it role as 
provider and implicitly its democratic function in comparing it to other'public sector 
local institutions'. 
The implied suggestions was to take the situation back to the years when services were 
carried out by local corporations (both public and private). It was 1835, under the 
Municipal Corporations Act, that procedures were consolidated so that decisions could be 
taken by, or on behalf of, the whole council. Are we to go back to the nineteenth century? 
613 
While it was not the explicit intention of the committee that England should go back to 
those inefficient days of public service, in ideological terms the answer may be yes. 
This was characterised by Nicholas Ridley's view that local authorities should become 
'enabling' councils. He argued that authorities should cease to be universal providers and 
that they should help other agencies to provide services. This challenges the traditional 
assumptions of authorities being 'self-sufficient', providing standardised services and 
being monopolies. 
He states: 
" Authorities will need to operate in a more pluralist way than in the past, alongside a 
wide variety of public, private and voluntary agencies. It will be their task to stimulate 
and assist these other agencies to play their part instead of, or as well as, making 
provision themselves! (Ridley(l 988) quoted by Cochrane (199 1) p283 among others) 
This residual view of local authorities as 'enabler' is also held by the govemment. 
"In the Government's view local authorities' role in the provision of services should be to 
assess the needs of their area, plan the provision of services and ensure the delivery of 
those services. There are also fields in which local authorities will continue to have 
important regulatory functions and providing roles. But councils should be looking to 
contract out work to whoever can deliver services most efficiently and effectively, thus 
enabling the authority to be more responsive to the wished of their electorate. " 
(Department of Environment (199 I)p2). 
Thus, authorities would'enable', regulate and provide minimal services. A very 
libertarian approach. 
Many authorities have accepted the argument as demonstrated by the'Getting Closer to 
the Public'ethos and the AMA response to Community Care. 
But are there any altematives? 
Clarke & Stewart (1988) argue that there is an alternative. They put forward a much 
'broader view. They argue that it is right for traditional values to be challenged and it is 
appropriate for authorities to respond to changes in the economic, political and social 
envirom-nent. 
They state: 
"Freed of the assumption of self-sufficiency and the need to produce all it does directly, 
the enabling council can define its role not by the services it provides but by a broader 
agenda of concerns. " p5 
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They go on to say: 
"Enabling does not rule out direct provision, if that provision is the most appropriate 
means of delivery a particular service ... It will use a variety of methods. " p6 
Such methods include: contracts, partnership arrangements with other agencies, giving 
grants to voluntary organisations to provide, using regulatory powers, provide advice and 
guidance and creating forums for discussion. 
They call for authorities to take on "new thinking" which needs them to "break away 
from the constraining organisational assumptions that limit a council's role to the direct 
delivery of services. " It is acknowledged that it will be more difficult than it sounds due 
to organisational thought, structure and processes. 
Their approach is based upon meeting the needs of the community and working broadly 
on a liberal interpretation of the government's view. 
Gyford (1991) goes further in interpreting the meaning of the 'enabling' council. He 
argues that it should be much more transformatory and radical in its approach and in 
practice. However, he is short on practical examples of how things may actual make a 
difference in practice from the Clarke & Stewart model. 
Cochrane' review article provides a socio-economic and political analysis using a quasi- 
Marxist framework. He argues that authorities are part of the wider restructuring of the 
economy - part of post-Fordist western economic development. Thus, the move from 
standardised, producer-led output (Fordist) to a more flexible and specialised production 
method (post-Fordist), where production units are smaller (decentralisation? ), output is 
customer/market-led and managerialism is in its ascendancy, is a natural part of the 
present restructuring. 
He sees a number of competing roles/models for local government of the future. These 
are: 
A redefinition's ofEnabling Authority 
This moves away from Ridley's view to an agency that is service orientated, strategic and 
coordinated to work against fragmentation and which has a managerialist approach. The 
author is critical of Clarke's and Stewart as the aspirations of their contribution are far 
fromreality. In addition, such an approach was met with some justified cynicism as it 
does not fundamentally challenge the formees argument. 
Authorities could become the 'residual politics of welfare' where concerns of equity, 
collective provision of core services and community development could be relegated to 
'urban regeneration' to attract private sector providers or the business sector more 
generally. 
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Post Fordists approaches 
Such approaches of high-tech managerialism and specialisation are seen as too 
deterministic, which is a general criticism of Marxist-type analysis. Secondly, the 
analogy with the private sector was not seen as sustainable beyond the superficial because 
they are operating with different'modes of production', the political process and social 
values are explicit and more significant variables in the public sector. 
"The concept of the citizen-consumer suggest additional values such as equity, equal 
opportunities and, of course, representation and participation themselves. " Editorial 
RIPA (1988) p122. 
Cochrane does not elaborate on these points. However, to treat welfare as acommodity' 
is analytically inconsistent. In Marxist terms, both a 'price' or consistent exchange values 
and equality of rights and power in the exchange process are required (Catephore (198 9)). 
These two principles are rarely applied: due to imperfections in the so-called social 
welfare 'markef and the lack of attention to user control (in all its forms) even in areas of 
best practice i. e. in social services, let alone authorities more generally. (Barnes et at 
(1990), Berrisford & Croft (1990)) 
Post-fordism with a human face is explored through 'regulation theories', which considers 
the institutional and social norms along with the strategic conduct of agencies of 
influence e. g. central government, local government, businesses unions etc. - that operate 
to address the inherent conflicts within society. 
How far has local government been able to 'regulate' post-Fordist Britain by using 
voluntary groups, awarding contracts to their previous employees is uncertain. In 
addition, he notes from the literature (Stewart (1983) and Stoker and Wilson (1986) that 
there are internal conflicts within authorities, with 'competing professional ideologies' 
and 'a rather more complicated picture of organisational politics within local authorities. ' 
(Cochrane (1991)p288 
Thus, regulation theories may not provide us with any more insights but they do raise 
further points of inquiry regarding the internal conflict and change discussed earlier. 
He concludes: "Regulation theory is such a protean beast and the trouble with concepts 
like it, Fordism and post-Fordism .. is that they overly flexible and insufficiently 
specialised. " (Crochrane quoting from Sayer (1989p 666)) 
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Business and Enterprise models 
He argues here that trends are moving to a broader change in polity where we will have 
an enterprise state. In addition, there is a marked increased in the involvement of 
business in 'partnership' initiatives but also how authorities (of all political hues) have 
embraced such initiatives including non-elected Urban Corporation, TECs, the new DoE 
City Challenge money, and other local economic development initiatives previously 
scorned when undertaken by the GLC's Greater London Enterprise Board. 
Local authorities have also taken on the language or 'excellence' and the business sector 
and talk about business plans and mission statements. 
He looks back mischievously and states: 
"It is tempting, perhaps unfairly, to look back at some of the managerial and academic 
enthusiasm which greeted the first wave of corporate planning in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, as attempts were made to transfer ideas from the private sector directly into the 
local government system, and to remember how modest the changes actually turned out 
to be. " (Cochrane (1991)p285) 
Local Corporation 
The above model leads the author to consider the corporate role of the public sector; 
being an active interventionists in the stimulation and development of the local economy, 
through campaigns, advertising and marketing and high-light the authorities specialty 
attractions to attract income and investment. 
He concludes: 
"Local politics in the 1990s will increasingly need to be analysed in terms which 
acknowledge a new set of power relations, reflected in an increased emphasis on 
public/private partnerships; which partner is dominant in particular cases may still be an 
open question, but that will be the question which matters. " p299 
Finally, Young (199 1) offers a similar range of models based work in the social services 
departments. While his approach is different, in that he is considering the alternatives to 
traditional administrative models of 'post-war bureaucracy', the commonality with the 
other contributors is that it addresses the role and behaviour of local government. It also 
provides a useful framework for developing the role and models of local authorities. 
Four approaches are suggested: the residual model, the defensive model, the business 
model and the responsive model. 
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Organisation and Management Issues in Local authorities 
The extent and impact of the external environment lead to internal conflicts, tensions and 
change within authorities. 
Some of these relate to the organisation. Others to the process and conduct of 
management. 
This section looks at some of the organisational and management issues that arise from 
the changes currently experienced by local authorities. 
Organisational Issues 
Organisational issues include role, structure, strategy, and control mechanisms. These 
are, in many ways, variables that are concerned with the organisation and its 
environment. 
The role of organisations was discussed above. Similarly the main current determinant of 
structure in organisation has also be covered, by the extent to which they are centralised, 
localised or deccritralised. Here we are interested in looking at how these factors link 
with strategy. 
Strategy 
The search for strategy within local authorities seems to be poorly developed. The state of 
the art among practitioners is reflected in a rather basic introduction to strategy by Clarke 
& Stewart (1991). Here they provide an ABC to strategy and encourage local authorities 
to consider undertaking a strategic approach. The extent to which a strategic approach is 
undertaken at all appears to be low LGTB (1990). Such approaches have been refined 
within local government but do not seem to have increased in complexity (Flynn & 
Talbot, 1996) 
Most of the notions of strategy come from the traditional models e. g. Johnson & Scholes 
(1989), Porter (1986 in Asch& Bowman (1989)). Thus, there is not much that is public 
sector specific (See Bryson (1988 asanexception). Moreover, discussions on strategy 
still seemed to be linked to purpose ( Clarke & Stewart (1988), Issac-Henry & Painter 
(1991) and structure (Mintzberg (1989), Hoggett (1991). 
It is argued here that one of the qualities of public sector strategy is the explicit inclusion 
of the elected members and the political process: particularly the relationships and roles 
of chief officers and members. How far these have an impact on each other and the 
strategy of the organisation will be one of the questions this research will address. 
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Organisational Structure 
Mintzberg (1989) argues that where the environment is dynamic and rapidly changing 
that the structural response is to centralised or move into 'ad hocracy'. The former is 
appropriate where the environment is simple, but where it is complex then the latter is 
urged. 
He also specifies that the nature of specialisation in the task and the formalisation of 
behaviour in the organisation of the activity are also important. When the environment is 
dynamic he suggests that formalisation is inappropriate and that an 'organic' form of 
behaviour and structure are more appropriate. 
However, he cautions that when there is an external threat - i. e. where the environment is 
hostile - then the organisation! s decision-making should be centralised. Thus, where the 
organisation is faced with a rapidly changing but hostile environment there is a tension 
between centralisation and decentralisation. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), from a contingency approach, also support the basic view 
that internal mechanisms need to be consistent with the demands of the external 
environment. The tension of specialisation ('differentiation') and co-ordination 
('integration') are resolved by the nature of the formality in the co-ordination mechanism. 
In fact, their study suggests that the 'high performers' operating in more diverse 
environments used a wider range of co-ordinating functions and that they did not solely 
rely upon formal methods. 
Flynn (1990) adds three further elements to the analysis: the need for detailed scrutiny of 
the work, risks associated with failure, and the need to gather appropriate information and 
consensus in decision-making. 
a) the need for detailed scrutiny of the work - where the work is complex it is more 
difficult to have centralised control mechanisms. It would have to focus more on 
outcomes rather than process. Thus, accountability and evaluation would emphasize 
effectiveness. 
b) risks associated with failure - some activities have enormous consequences if process 
undertaken to carry them out breaks down. The fire service is used as an example. Here 
a hierarchical centralised structure is required so that each f irc-f ighter knows there pre- 
defined role and will respond to the chief fire officer. They will not have a discussion 
about the best approach but will follow orders. 
c) the need to gather appropriate information and consensus in decision-mak-ing - How far 
is there agreement about the way services should be provided? Flynn suggests where 
there is uncertainty between outcome and process then centralisation is needed. Ile 
provides one example of this but does not convincingly establish the argument. 
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While the additions are useful, in the last two cases, there appears to be some conflation 
in the examples used by Flynn between process (how things get done) and who decides. 
Flynn (1990) summaries the determinants of centralisation: complexity of environment, 
external threats, level of non-routine work, task complexity, risks associated with failure 
and consensus of approach 
The analysis is refined in the form of four areas that can be subjected to decentralisation. 
They are based on the basic economic questions of what to produce? For whom? flow 
much? In addition, the is a question as to how far individual managers and units should 
have discretion over their spending budgets. 
Thus, Flynn looks at the degree of de/centralisation on the basis of- service design, 
distribution, volume and budget discretion. From this we could develop profiles for 
organisations e. g. schools have a centralised national curriculum, with volume also being 
defined centrally. However, they have discretion over their budgets and theoretical 
freedom about who the service is for, within the age group. However, the individual 
school's 'market' is heavily influenced by locational factors and thus remains imperfect. 
The analysis concludes with developing the concept of the learning organisation. 
Organisations are sensing and learning organisations and are not just about resources 
allocation. 
Argyris (1977), Argyris and Schon (1978), Garrett (1990) and Pedler (1990) are among 
the several contributors that talk about the learning organisation. Argyris was one of the 
first to introduce the concept when he put forward the view that organisations first needed 
to be able to do things better. (See chapter five for a fuller discussion on learning 
organisations) 
Control Mechanisms 
As authorities are faced with a variety of structural and strategic choices they will need to 
be able to monitor and evaluate the extent to which they are meeting the objectives or 
resource targets. 
Control and accountabifity are important features of the new Public sector economics 
(Flynn (1990), Metcalf (1991) and Hoggett (1991) all raise it as a significant variable. 
Hoggett explores the range of strategies of control: starting with pre-capitalist and 
moving through increasing complexity to technical, bureaucratic, professional and finally 
post-bureaucratic control. (see fig 6). 
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He argues that other forms of control are no longer appropriate and that post-bureaucratic 
methods are feature of the future. Thus, the control mechanisms in public sector 
organisations will be characterised by decentralised controls within specified strategic 
boundaries. This means new organisational forms in practice and need new for new 
management skills. 
Management Issues 
The complexity of managing new organisational forms, processes and change requires 
that local authority managers have a range of different skills. Managers will have to 
change. In the past they were: means driven, based on narrow concepts of 
professionalism, administrative, ad hoe, opportunistic, patchy, no clear targets, no 
accountability and operated as if in a monopoly. (Department of Health (1990)). 
Management for the 1990s will need to be: ends directed, consumer sensitive, targeted 
services, devolved, involve quality, work with cash limited budgets, entrepreneurial, 
accountable, work with business plans and purchasing/provider split. (Department of 
Health (1990)). 
In addition, managers will need to work with a range of internal markets (Hoggett's 
internal decentralisation) and external partners and agencies (Hoggett's external 
decentralisation). 
A study of senior social services managers (LGTB (1989)), identified the need to develop 
social services managers, as well as local authority managers more generally. The key 
areas of work were concerned with: 
a) the task - the purpose of service, size of the task and its organising and resourcing 
b) structure - how far would management be devolved and what level of support and 
accountability would exist 
c) process - working within a political framework and developing partnerships and 
alliances through multi-agency work. 
Stewart (1986) emphasizes and argues that managers will not just need skills to do: but 
also skills to influence and change as they become the managers of processes and 
uncertainty. 
Walker (1991) takes the idea a stage further and explores the explicit link between the 
political process, chief officers and the leader of the council. There is the need to manage 
the interface between the explicit political process, the management function, albeit 
loosely defined at this stage, and the organisation and delivery of the service. By nature it 
is a political process. 
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Thus, the nature of the management agenda is notjust to do with managing resources. It 
must also concern itself with issues of accountability, managing processes and groups, 
working with uncertainty, political and influencing skills and strategy. 
The political dimension 
The political dimension needs particular highlighting as a management issue. Not least 
as forms a crucial character of local authorities but also because it forms part of the 
current debate on the role of members (Department of Environment (1991). 
There are eight elements of the political map that have been identified so far. These will 
need further exploration. However, at this stage it is important to record them. They 
form two dimensions: formality and organisational locus. 
Formality is concerned with how formal or informal arc the political processes within the 
authority. Organisational locus concerns the extent to which politics is within the 
organisation (among officers), among officers and members, among members or between 
the authority and central government. 
Conclusion 
The challenges facing the public sector are great and requires a change in the way 
agencies like local authorities see their role, position themselves strategically and develop 
new configurations to meet the demands of the environment. In addition, it suggests that 
leaders and managers of local authorities and public sector agencies will have to increase 
their repertoire of management skills, political sensitivities, personal resilience and 
capacity for learning. 
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Appendix 8.1 Examples of field notes to case study one - 
Ellismoore District council 
Here are some extracts from the file notes kept in aj ournal during the research 
Entry 
11.15 7 February 1993 
I was briefed by Judi but was supposed to have been briefed by Colin. The papers that I 
was to get beforehand were just being given to me so not been able to read them and 
feeling a little anxious. 
As I joined the meeting of the others I note there is much hilarity (is this nervous 
anxiety? ) and possibly some task avoidance. 
Reflections on the initial meeting 
Starting with Judi. Feeling the need to secure her agreement and approval. 
Generally she is welcoming and helpful. When we first met in the foyer I was aware of 
feelings of familiarity (counter-transference) of being met by the local minister who leads 
me through this large building (like a church) and walks through as if he is the guardian. 
I'm aware of the tension of wanting to gain closeness and still maintain the 'outsider' role 
so not commenting too much or trying to influence what was going on or on what people 
said. 
(I will need to work out an acceptable relationship with Judi as she'll be the main contact) 
I recognise I will have an impact by being here and decide I will need to work- with it to 
fully take up the role (of clinical researcher) 
I am seeking to become the 'silent insider' so no one gets unsettled. I need to cross the 
boundary to make the link but at this stage no feedback. 
Theleader 
15 February, 1993 
CM's (Chris Maccini) authority is accepted and CM takes up the role. I note my positive 
counter-transference towards Chris and must be aware and careful (as it may be seductive 
idealisation). Look for the negative aspects and behaviours too. 
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Comments about the group 
29 March, 1993 
Is Francis playing to the crowd? His behaviour is slightly challenging of Chris 
A presentation to the Board is experienced by me as the individual seeking approval 
somewhat grovelling. 
Chris invokes strong feeling in me and wonder whether this also happens for the group? 
Both strong positive and negative feelings 
I notice some sort of pattern of clothes wear and colour. Is there some sort of psychology 
of shirts/blouses? Harold Mattews (DHSS) usually wear blues. Francis (Finance) 
usually wears a white shirt. Anne Marks (Admin) always wears a stripy business-type 
blouse - like a legal executive would. Trudy (Education) tends to wear blue. Judi white 
or blue/greys and Leon varied according to the situation, mood, day of the week by his 
own admission. 
There seems to be a gender thing in the air. Note that women may be asked to repeat 
things; are ignore or challenged more. 
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Appendix 8.2 Results of Group observations based on the 
Group Analysis Grid 
Total Group scores 
Grand Total 791 47 302 76 8 62 161 65 46 0 0 24 
6% 38% 10% 1% 8% 20% 8% 6% 0% 0% 3% 
Totals % wl w2 w3 w4 FL Fi D P CID CD Uncl 
Toni 9% 71 9 19 1 1 6 27 4 3 0 0 1 
Colin 29% 233 8 111 31 3 16 33 15 8 0 0 8 
Anne 10% 80 2 36 7 1 3 22 7 0 0 0 2 
Judi 6% 45 3 22 5 0 3 6 2 1 0 0 3 
Trudy 2% 15 0 8 3 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 
Francis 22% 171 12 51 15 2 11 48 18 9 0 0 5 
Geoff 6% 48 3 11 1 0 7 8 9 8 0 0 1 
Harold 5% 39 3 8 8 0 2 7 5 6 0 0 0 
Leon 2% 19 1 11 1 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 
Other 9% 70 6 25 4 1 12 9 4 6 0 0 3 
Analysis of Group scores by session 
Ellismoore District 
Council 
Date: 8 Feb 1994 
Session 1 Time 9.30 -11.00 
W1 w2 w3 w4 
Toni (Tech Serv) 2 5 1 
Colin (CEO) 1 8 2 
Anne (Admin) 4 3 
Judi (Policy) 1 3 1 
Trudy (Educ) 
Francis (Fin) 2 3 5 
Geoff (Environ) 4 1 
Harold (DHSS) 1 1 
Leon (Leisure) 4 1 
Other 1 3 1 
Total 124 8 35 15 
% 6% 28% 12% 
FL Fi D P CP CD Un 
cl 
3 11 
1 6 4 3 
1 2 1 
2 2 
1 5 4 1 
3 1 31 
2 
2 4 1 
3 23 28 82002 
2% 19% 23% 6%2%0%0%2% 
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Session 2 
Date: 8 Feb 1994 Time 11.22 - 13.00 
W11 w2 w3 w4 FIL Fi D P CP CD Un 
cl 
Toni (Tech Serv) 3 4 1 6 1 
Colin (CEO) 2 26 5 3 12 11 
Anne (Admin) 10 1 10 1 
Judi (Policy) 2 4 1 3 2 
Trudy (Educ) 
Francis (Fin) 3 9 2 4 15 32 
Geoff (Environ) 31 
Harold (DHSS) 2 1 1 
Leon (Leisure) 1 
Other 5 5 1 4 2 1 
Total 164 15 60 9 0 13 49 49005 
% 9% 37% 5% 0% 8% 30% 2%5%0%0%3% 
Session 3 
Date: 8 Feb 1994 Time 14.15 - 15.07 
W1 w2 w3 w4 FIL Fi D P CP CID Un 
cl 
Toni (Tech Serv) 2 1 1 6 111 
Colin (CEO) 19 6 1 8 112 
Anne (Admin) 7 1 4 2 
Judi (Policy) 8 1 1 21 
Trudy (Educ) 
Francis (Fin) 15 5 1 5 72 
Geoff (Environ) 1 
Harold (DHSS) 4 1 2 1 
Leon (Leisure) 3 1 
Other 4 2 1 1 13 
Total 120 2 38 18 2 6 28 15 8003 
% 2% 32% 15% 2% 5% 23% 13% 7% 0% 0% 3% 
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Session 4 
Date: 15 Feb 1994 Time 9.30 -10.50 
W11 w2 w3 w4 FL Fi D P CP CD Un 
cl 
Toni (Tech Serv) 
Colin (CEO) 28 15 4 5 7 3 2 
Anne (Admin) 9 3 3 2 
Judi (Policy) 
Trudy (Educ) 
Francis (Fin) 1 22 3 1 18 4 2 1 
Geoff (Environ) 3 7 3 7 6 4 
Harold (DHSS) 1 2 4 1 3 3 
Leon (Leisure) 1 2 1 1 
Other 4 2 1 1 3 
Total 193 6 74 25 0 11 37 22 11 007 
% 3% 38% 13% 0% 6% 19% 11% 6% 0% 0% 4% 
Session 5 
Date: 15 March 1994 Time 9.32 -11.03 
W1 w2 w3 w4 FL Fi D P CP CID Un 
cl 
Toni (Tech Serv) 4 8 1 4 31 
Colin (CEO) 4 21 2 2 3 21 
Anne (Admin) 
Judi (Policy) 2 
Trudy (Educ) 2 1 
Francis (Fin) 4 8 4 114 
Geoff (Environ) 
Harold (DHSS) 1 1 14 
Leon (Leisure) 
Other 3 1 1 1 
Total 96 13 44 20 4 13 87005 
% 14% 46% 2% 0% 4% 14% 8%7%0%0%5% 
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Session 6 
Date: 29 March 1994 Time 9.40 -10.53 
W11 w2 w3 w4 FIL Fi D P CP CID Un 
cl 
Toni (Tech Serv) 
Colin (CEO) 19 12 1 2 31 
Anne (Admin) 26 2 3 2 
Judi (Policy) 5 3 1 
Trudy (Educ) 6 3 1 2 
Francis (Fin) 14 1 2 2 2 
Geoff (Environ) 
Harold (DHSS) 3 1 
Leon (Leisure) 2 
Other 6 1 2 1 1 
Total 94 3 51 73 5 6 8 9002 
% 3% 54% 7% 3% 5% 6% 9% 100%0%2% 
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Appendix 8.3 Overview of personal inventories 
All of the directors were invited to fill in Firo-B form, a 16PF questionnaire and an 
MBTI. The discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of each are presented in 
the research chapter above (Chapter 10). 
The first table shows the responses to each of the questionnaires by all the directors. The 
subsequent tables show the scores for each of the six remaining directors for each 
inventory. 
Table 1. The rate of response 
Firo-B MBTI Catell 16PF 
Colin Maccini V 
Anne Marks X 
Judi Patch X 
Francis Craig 
Harold Matthews 
Leon Davids 
ToniJohns 
Trudy Lukes 
Geoff Brown 
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Appendix 8.4 Lessons and conclusions from the research 
process 
This appendix reviews the research process and highlights the key lessons. 
The research design was appropriately suited to the theoretical, philosophical and 
methodical aims of the work and supported its inquiry. 
The final design fell within a qualitative research approach in terms of its orientation, 
methods and the instruments used. The research included the participants in the process 
of the research and was undertaken over a year but fell short of a truly longitudinal study. 
It drew upon the work of other researchers and thus was not without a tradition of 
practice and guidelines that promoted good research practice from a qualitative 
perspective and these were used through out the research. The instruments used in the 
research were generally reliable with construct validity falling short compared to face or 
content validity which appeared to be good.. 
The research process described in chapter 10 was consistent with the research aims and 
paradigm. 
This note covers two areas: 
a Research Issues 
a What could be modified 
Research Issues 
In drawing on the wider learning from the research process a number of conclusions are 
drawn. It suggests that while the research process and methodology was congruent with 
the theoretical underpinning and the research strategy, there are still a number of 
limitations that existed. These are discussed in what follows, with comments on how 
these were dealt with and an assessment as to the degree of reliability one can place on 
the research. 
It is helpful to consider these research issues and limitations under four sub-headings: the 
entry process, the data collection, the research process itself and the role of the researcher. 
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The entryprocess 
The entry process looked at the actual selection of case material, the problems of access, 
and co-operation and the contracting process. 
i)Selection of the cases 
The process of selection as outline in chapter 11, left a small group to choose from in the 
final pool. Thus, there is an issue of selection bias in the organisations that were finally 
included. Do they have a greater interest and openness to learning and inquiry than do 
the three that started the process and then terminated the process. It is likely that the three 
eventually included do have a greater predilection for internal inquiry and thus there is 
some bias. However, as recorded in the cases there were still subjected to internal group 
dynamics and provided a source of learning. Another three or different cases may have 
generated a different set of learning but it is not possible to say. 
In all the three cases the CEO and another director were sponsors of the research from the 
outset; in the three organisations that pulled out, the initial interviews or discussions did 
not include the CEO and that may be indicative about how one may have to approach 
such research in the future. It may be necessary to go straight to the CEO and develop a 
research sponsor who supports and champions the notion and independence of 
organisational research. 
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ii) Access 
Generally access is a difficulty in such studies that aim to capture real systems as 
reflected in the discussion on case selection in the previous sub-section. (See too Yin, 
1993, Sommer & Sommer, 1991, Wheelan et al, 1994, Guerin, 1995, and Bell, 1987). It 
is difficult to persuade organisations of the benefits that accrue from such research against 
the costs of time, possibly money, inconvenience, uncertain outcomes and the possibility 
that the team or organisation may come out looking less than perfect. The issue of 
confidentiality, being personally identified or saying things against the organisation or 
boss make such a process one to be avoided from the organisation's point of view. The 
researcher may also be seen as an agent who the CEO can get information about other 
team members. All these issues were addressed and had to be overcome before each 
study started. 
Thus, once in the organisation, that was only the beginning. Getting open access to 
records, conversations, meetings and people's stories was just as important. Itisawell 
recognised problem in research of this nature that full and 'open access' is not always 
attainable. In this research a considerable amount of open access was given by all three 
cases - including notes, minutes, background papers, attendance of board meetings, 
meeting board members (not for the pilot) and 'off the record' conversation. The only 
major constraint was that top team meetings were not tape-recorded. 
iii) Co-operation and contracting 
In general terms all three case teams ( and the individuals within each team) were co- 
operative. They did not object to the researcher being in the room, they made time for 
meetings and even some of the cynical members in the end provided informative 
interviews. The general lessons for gaining co-operations were: 
" Gaining support from the CEO and another top team member 
" Providing a presentation of the issues and needs facing public sector organisations, 
demonstrating an initial understanding of their experience and views about their 
current predicament and showing that the research may help to address some of their 
issues. This is also consistent with a clinical perspective. 
" Demonstrating possible benefits to the top team, the individual and the organisation 
through feedback at key stages in the research 
Making the contract with the whole group and not just the CEO 
Retaining confidentiality of the organisation and individual but making it clear that the 
material would be a source of academic and research publication 
Involving the team in key decision points about research timing, who might respond to 
receiving the organisational questionnaire, how might the feedback support existing 
top team activities and strategy away days. 
Developing a relationship with the group and individuals in the 'clinical' researcher 
role 
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These actions are worth noting for other similar studies. 
The cases provided enough interest for the research to take place and again echo some of 
the broader principles of a clinical approach (Schein, 1996). 
Data collection 
i) Verbal veracity 
An assumption that was taken for granted in this research was that what interviewees said 
had validity - i. e. it was truthful as they understood it. As the research took a 
constructivist perspective, this assumption was both reasonable and appropriate. Thus, it 
does not take differences in narratives as an intentional ploy to deceive the researcher, it 
is more a signifier of differences in experiences and personal orientations. In the 
interview material, cross verification, exploration of meaning and consensual validation 
provided a rich source of reliable data. However, in the organisational questionnaire such 
differences in meaning and understanding are not subjected to further or additional 
scrutiny and thus it may have less reliability. 
ii)Access to unconscious material 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on understanding the role of conscious 
and unconscious dynamics in groups. The notion of defensive routines and dysfunctional 
unconscious dynamics in groups has been crafted in a tradition based on the "Tavistock 
approach" and the research instruments have good validity at the group level. However, 
the data from the individual personal (second) interviews were not necessarily taping the 
unconscious- neither was there an explicit contract to do so. The material in the 
individual interviews attempted to uncover pre-conscious thought which was out of 
every-day awareness but was easily accessible with simple questioning and recollection 
of past memories. It tapped the 'inner dialogue'. Trying to understand the internal 
dialogue and the messages and drives in the mind are accessible but deep meaning and 
exploration of neurosis, for example, was neither sought nor given. Thus, when 
interviewees said, for example, that they do not remember, that was noted but not probed. 
Thus, while less of the material in the personal interviews was 'unconscious' it was often 
of preconscious content and that was sufficient within the research inquiry and ethical 
principles in social science and qualitative research acceptable for this type of research 
and within the code of conduct of the British Psychological Society, (198 8) and the 
Academy of Management Code of ethical conduct, (I 992). 
iii) Contamination by suggestibility 
Wertz (1986) argues that in taking a clinical approach, like psychoanalysis, there is a 
danger that in 'the interpretative' process that it leads to suggestibility of reality. In 
psychoanalysis this has always been a difficulty, but there are checks and balances to 
counter such contamination and some of these were adopted in this research. 
633 
Firstly, the use of clinical supervision, personal development work and group 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy were all served to counter intrapersonal, researcher bias. 
The subjectivity of the researcher could be scrutinised and examined and this helped to 
avoid the clinical researcher from leading or suggesting 'reality' to the client or research 
participants. Note some of the personal reflections in the file notes of the researcher. 
Secondly, in the individual sessions, the feedback was a summary of what was said plus 
an exploration and identification of the internal message, dialogue or pattern of 
behaviours. These were surfaced by the interviewee with the clinical researcher acting as 
the projective screen, mirror and reflector of what had been said. The process did not 
involve deep interpretations or a substitute for psychoanalysis. It was in the form of a 
role analysis , which aimed to explore: how does what you bring from your experience impact on how you take up your role as a leader, as a director in this organisation? 
Thirdly, the group feedback and 'interpretations' were open to all to examine and 
reinterpret and offer alternative interpretations. If it did not 'ring true' then the 
discussions that emerged provided greater clarity and opportunity to understand. Such 
feedback was given as working hypotheses and understanding to date with the view of 
developing further insight rather than it being delivered as a truth, or the only truth - far 
from it. Thus, the research process became one of an iterative exploration of'reality'. 
These additional processes and the manner in which the research process was conducted 
reduced the possibility of suggestibility. 
iv) Method of recording group data 
Comment has already been made on the data collection method of the groups in chapter 
11. In undertaking such research again the use of a tape recorder would be considered. 
However, that is the ideal and in reality the research itself often puts people off from 
being involved, even more so when they are being recorded. In the original studies using 
this methodology a tape recorder was not used (Thelen et al, 1954, and Thelen & Stock, 
1957). The same was also true of later studies (Karterud, 1988 & 1989, Karturud & Foss, 
1989). 
Thus, another alternative maybe the use of two trained' observers $scoring' directly and 
comparing notes after wards as they did in the above studies. Direct scoring by two 
observers would increase the statement by statement inter-rater reliability but the loss of 
narrative may loose the thematic and emergent issues that were not always so apparent in 
situ. (Again see the file notes on the musings of the group). Such trade-offs can be 
necessary but methods to overcome weaknesses should also be developed to increase the 
validity and reliability of the research process. 
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Learningftom the research process 
i) Working in context 
Much of the earlier work on groups was undertaken in controlled laboratories and the 
context and reality of organisational groups were ignored or poorly researched. It has 
been suggested that natural groups, where members will meet again, behave differently 
from those pulled together for research purposes only (Shaw, 1981, Katz, 1978, Shapiro, 
1975, Worchel et al, 1975 as quoted in Wheelan et al p30) In taking a case study 
approach and working in context this generates a range of difficulties that need to be 
incorporated into the research process. It is neither possible nor desirable to control all of 
the variables in this research design. Case organisations, facing similar issues with 
working top teams are among the issues that have been taken into account. The reality of 
each team and its organisational context and culture will be different and that can be a 
rich source of difference for understanding what elements of the cases may be from the 
same and what may be different. Long, 1992, makes the same point in her analysis of 
small groups. 
ii) The difficulties of intensive research approaches 
Wheelan et al (1995) argue that research designs like the one undertaken in this thesis are 
more likely to reflect the reality of the group. However, the research is both extensive 
and intensive and requires considerable input both from the participants in the research 
and the researcher. In working on this type of project the use of several researchers or a 
research team would have reduced some of the logistic difficulties of data management, 
managing the different stages of the research with different case organisations and 
working through the case organisations more rapidly. Such an approach is evident in the 
groups studies above: for example Thelen et al, 1954, Wheelen at al, 1994, Kartcrud & 
Foss, 1989. 
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iii) Timing 
The research was over a twelve month period in all of the cases. During the research 
period the groups had changes in context and group membership. As a case study 
approach, these changes have been used as a means of categorising the cases particularly 
the membership of the group: one group several members left and the group fragmented; 
in another group two or three left (including a long term secondment) but the core of the 
group remained; and the third group remained constant throughout the study period. 
These differences were among the main topological differences and were used as a means 
of comparison. 
The final point is that natural groups are not often at their inception. Thus, it is hard to 
track the stage of development constantly over time. In this thesis the period over which 
group observations were taken was typically three to four months depending on the 
regularity of top team meetings. It not was possible to discern states of group 
development progression. (See Long, 1992) 
The role of the researcher 
The role of the researcher is one of collaborative inquirer. The clinical approach requires 
a different set of guidelines and protocols from 'traditional' or 'quantitative' approaches 
but the former are no less exacting. Through out, comments have been made on how the 
clinical methodologies are supported by supervision, insights by the researcher, training 
and negotiation with the research participants about the process, and the reality of the 
experiences that all parties bring to increasing understanding of group dynamics and its 
impact on strategic organisational learning. 
Wertz (1986) suggests that the researcher has to have an attitude and ability to be close 
without loosing boundary - free floating attention, non-judgmental, unprejudiced 
openness (See also p 121 of Menzies (1969) on interpretation of what one discovers in this 
process) 
These are among the requirements of the clinical researcher in role. 
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What areas would be modified? 
Two area are discussed in this sub-section to improve the research process. 
* The processes that could have been improved within the current design 
9 Area for development in the research design 
Research elements that could be improved 
The research design proved a consistent and reliable method to collect the data across 
different organisations and settings. 
It is easier to learn from hindsight and from the discussion in this appendix there are a 
number of improvements that would be made to this work if undertaking the work again. 
These include the following: 
i) - Use of audio equipment 
In this type of research which relies heavily on the spoken word of meetings, the use of a 
tape recorder would have been helpful. The use of a tape recorder for the management/top 
team meeting would have made the task more manageable, less tiring and more reliable. 
In the original studies by Stock et al (1954) and later by Karterud (1988,1989 and 
Karterud & Foss, 1989) tape recorders were not used. However, a well developed 
research team and developing methodology meant that they could use two researchers in 
the room. In Guerin, 1995, and Long, 1992, they both used tape recorders. The former 
tracking three short meetings of technical groups and the latter following a 
psychoanalytic group, which Long was also a member. The former is more in tune with 
this study but the level of seniority of the group, and therefore the nature of the strategic 
content, and the number of observations were lower than this study. 
It may be that the use of a tape recorder cannot be compromised if working alone and that 
in itself generates another difficulty which is it may reduce access. Taped material would 
then be transcribed and would be more transparent for all to see and analyse. There are a 
series of trade-offs to made here and the consequences of each need carefully considered. 
However, the use of three independent group specialist to score the notes of a meeting 
against Thelen et al methodology and where they did so with a high level of overall 
agreement with the researcher did add some assurance of the methods consistency and 
reliability. 
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ii) Use of NUDIST, 
After the pilot and half way through the analysis of the second case, the researcher was 
introduced to 'NUD. IST' a computer aided qualitative research tool that could help 
quantify the number of types of statements or key words from word processed text. 
NUD. IST stands for the handling of Nonnumerical Unstructured Data using Indexing, 
Searching and Theorising to determine structures and relationships between qualitative 
data sets. Some of the second and all of the third case material was analysed using 
NUD. IST.. Where NUD. IST was used on notations of scripts, it was very helpful and did 
add to the quality of the analysis because you could search for 'what ijr questions and 
explore areas not 'obvious' from the responses in the interviews. However, it is further 
cautioned that searches need to be led by the research questions as it could be easy to over 
whelmed with data and meaningless associations between text variables. Many 
additional searches were explored using this computer aided tool with little extra value. 
In conclusion its value is more in speed and ability to manage a complex volume of text. 
It is certainly no substitute for thinking. 
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Areas that could be developedfurther 
i) Single case study of vertical groups 
In undertaking the design again there is a strong argument for the single case study with 
embedded cases of other groups within the same organisation. Thus, analysing groups at 
the board/elected member level, the top team level, cross function strategic 
implementation task groups may have provided further depth and a better picture of the 
organisational. context and it would be another source of comparison between groups, so 
that the context was the constant variable. Furthermore, it may have allowed more of a 
longitudinal study staying within the same organisation for longer. It would not have 
been any less deep in terms of the level of analysis. 
ii)A longitudinal study 
There was scope for the study to be more longitudinal. Under the original research 
design it may have needed more resources, just because of the longevity of the research 
process. Under the single case with embedded cases it may have been possible with the 
existing resources as there would have been less inter-faces to manage and each 
embedded case would contribute to understanding the whole. 
iii) Use a small group of 'clinical' researchers 
Much of the research that has taken this approach has used more than one researcher. 
During the case of the National Health service another researcher was involved and this 
added to understanding the common themes of the organisation at the strategic level. As 
the researchers did not both observe all of the groups the comparison could only be 
general and an opportunity was missed, mainly due to availability and the times of 
meetings than by design. 
The use of three or four trained clinical researchers, as in many of the group studies, 
would have contributed to the efficiency and quality to the research process. 
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Overall the thesis broadly met its research goals and provided a complex answer to the 
question: what is the impact on organisational learning of the dynamics of the top team. 
What could he usefully transferred to similar studies? 
There are a number of lessons that could lend themselves to similar studies and these are 
briefly recaptured. 
The key lessons from the entry, negotiation, contracting and study process provide 
guidelines for developing good long term research relationships and cooperation from 
people in the organisation 
A case study approach provides depth and allows the study of social systems in 
context 
A variety of methods of data collection should be used to gain increasing face validity 
and triangulation of the data 
Intensive methods support the qualitative and case study approach. These need to be 
managed otherwise one can risk the difficulty of information over-load. 
* Three tools can assist in the data collection and processing. 
The use of more than one researcher using and sharing an agreed set of 
protocols 
The use of taped material so that it can be transcribed 
The use of NUD. IST as a way of organising and analysing text data 
A clinical methodology can help gain assess to the more subjective experience of the 
participants. However, this should be supported with clinical supervision, training in 
the use of psychoanalytical approaches to organisational analysis, personal growth 
activities and self reflection 
It is concluded that organisational researchers seeking to explore and understand their 
phenomena of interest within the context of 'real time' organisational dynamics would 
find such a research approach a consistent and reliable process to use as a start. The 
approach has external and internal integrity and validity and is flexible enough to meet 
the needs of the particular topic of enquiry. 
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Appendix 9.1 Examples of field notes to case study two - 
Gladding (NHS) Hospital Trust 
Here are some extracts from the file notes kept in aj oumal during the research 
A misunderstanding 
24 January, 1996 
(I had pulled together a leaming case study for British Association of Medical Managers 
based on some of my work at Gladding and let them have a copy having piloted it with 
MSc public sector students at Bristol University's SAUS) 
I have just received a note from Dr James on the research process at the trust. My initial 
feeling on first glance is worry... (it feels critical). But looking at it again I realised that 
the concept of 'case study' meant different things and thought I'd ring James this week 
rather than write a letter which may appear defensive. 
I was also concerned that the case could be identified (a point raised in his letter). But 
after my initial reactions I did not think about it too seriously. 
26 January, 1996 
On my answer machine today I received a message from James. Ile says: 
"Want to follow up letter of last week and the Firo-B things... one or two things uncertain 
about, where's the whole study going? Not clear about it myself. Maybe come and talk 
to the CEO again and maybe give me a ring some time. Thank you. " 
My anxiety goes up and feeling that the whole project is at risk and its not going to 
happen. 
I return James' call immediately and talk through each stage of the process - the purpose 
of different case studies etc. I offered to go to the Trust on 8 February, but he says that's 
too soon (but he does say any other dates). 
He also states that he doesn't need (further) feedback, as they agreed to be guinea pigs but 
some of his colleagues are more involved. I ask him if he would send a note to his 
colleagues to help the process. No he says. 'Send a note putting the main points of our 
discussion. I could put it on the internal e-mail but it would be better coming form you 
so you can say what you wantP 
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We agree the main points (James summarises our discussion) and I say: 'I'll do it. ' Call 
ends. The letter went out today. 
My reflections 
My interpretation of these events is that there is some anxiety in the system and Dr James 
is carrying it for the CEO (and maybe HR too? ). He's both written and followed up with 
a call within a week. While distancing himself from the comments he probably holds 
some of them as well. So note how he suggests I write up the stuff. Tbus, there are 
probably feelings of exposure and vulnerability. 
This further implied feelings of confusion (about the research process) and abandonment 
after the last feedback session was actually described. (Recall the conversation at the end 
when we went through that loop of them trying to get me back and me resisting. ) 
I feel they are seeking a 'holding environmentTsecure base' and reassurance. Feel that's 
fine for the system - as they are going through lots of changes - for Geoffrey, for Dr 
James in his liaison role with the others who I feel very positive about them all. Also 
from my own point of view I would like to see the work completed. 
Loosing touch 
11 March, 1996 
I've noticed that the NHS project has fallen off - both in my mind and the minds of the 
people involved in the research. They have not returned the Firo-Bs that they made so 
much of (last when we met on 16 November, 1995). Only two of the possible seven 
people have responded. 
I recall the anxiety expressed by Dr Jarnes (see previous file note) and have only just 
connected with the fact that I was seen as a container and friend in the role. 
The feedback was valuable (when we last met) but I recall it was experienced as 
exposing. I did follow up on the Firo-Bs and the initial case material but not the 
transcription of the taped conversation. I haven't had time to check it (or some 
unconscious motivation). 
Thus, I may be perceived as taking something away and abandoning them. Furthermore, 
changes in the management team may also be making them shaky and my withdrawal 
may be unhelpful right now. 
Letters and requests (that followed this reflection) to contact Dr James or Geoffrey Hands 
(CEO) should have perhaps come earlier and not just rely on the unanswered phone 
messages I'd left. It may be useful to visit the organisation this month to regain contact? 
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This does not feel like a knee-jerk collusion or enactment - more a recognition of 
stopping ftirther learning by the system withdrawing (I have to test this) 
Reflection 
In an attempt not to be consultant to the group or 'reassurer', I have perhaps gone the 
other way and in so doing put the research relationship at risk. 
Further, the projection of 'saviour' or 'holding environment' (they are not the same) is to 
be handled sensitively so as not to collude with the former but to hold the latter. 
My sudden sense of 'bereavement' must be experienced by them and reflects some 
projective identification 
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Appendix 9.2 Results of Group observations based on the 
Group Analysis Grid 
Total Group scores 
Grand Total 
Totals % 
Geoffrey 
(CEO) 
Dr James 
David 
(HR) 
Harriet 
(Ops) 
Ginny 
(Contracts 
Gary (Fin) 
Jean 
(Nurs) 
Fred 
(Qual) 
Graham 
(IS) 
Other 
36% 
17% 
11% 
17% 
15% 
982 102 317 148 
10% 32% 15% 
wl w2 w3 w4 
282 31 ill 39 
131 19 29 18 
87 10 18 22 
133 13 41 25 
118 17 46 17 
19 68 112 101 80 10 5 20 
2% 7% 11% 10% 8% 1% 1% 2% 
FL Fi D P CP CD Un 
cl 
5 15 30 31 13 115 
1 9 20 13 13 405 
0 4 18 4 8 021 
6 6 11 10 15 213 
0 8 8 9 11 011 
9% 72 5 29 9 0 3 8 11 6 0 0 1 
7% 58 4 16 2 2 2 7 15 6 1 0 3 
4% 34 1 4 15 5 1 4 2 2 0 0 0 
1% 8 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 
7% 59 2 19 0 0 20 6 6 4 1 0 1 
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Analysis of Group scores by session 
Gladding (NHS) Hospital Trust 
Date: 18 May 1995 
Session I Time 13.50 - 15.30 
W1 w2 w3 W4 FL R D P CP CD Un 
cl 
Geoffrey (CEO) 9 28 12 2 5 8 9 6 1 
Dr James 7 7 6 3 5 5 4 1 
David 6 4 8 5 1 1 
(HR) 
Harriet (Ops) 5 7 8 3 2 2 3 3 11 
Ginny (Contracts) 6 14 6 3 3 2 2 1 
Gary (Fin) 1 4 1 1 4 1 
Jean (Nurs) 1 1 5 1 
Fred (Qual) 1 2 10 
Graham (IS) 
Other 11 4 1 2 
Total 266 36 77 51 5 18 25 31 18 203 
% 14% 29% 19% 2% 7% 9% 12% 7% 1% 0% 1% 
Session 2 
Date: 18 May 1995 Time 15.45 - 17.10 
W1 w2 w3 W4 FIL Fi D P CP CD Un 
cl 
Geoffrey (CEO) 12 30 17 1 4 12 12 6 2 
Dr James 5 4 2 1 1 7 2 41 
David 3 8 12 4 12 2 4 1 
(HR) 
Harriet (Ops) 5 9 5 2 2 4 5 
Ginny (Contracts) 5 17 5 4 2 3 6 1 
Gary (Fin) 4 9 5 3 4 3 
Jean (Nurs) I 1 1 2 3 1 
Fred (Qual) 2 5 5 1 4 2 2 
Graham (IS) 
Other 3 2 1 1 
Total 309 35 79 52 8 19 46 32 28 523 
% 11% 26% 17% 3% 6% 15% 10% 9% 2% 1% 1% 
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Session 3 
Date: 13 July 1995 
Geoffrey (CEO) 
Dr James 
David 
(HIR) 
Harriet (Ops) 
Ginny (Contracts) 
Gary (Fin) 
Jean (Nurs) 
Fred (Qual) 
Graham (IS) 
Other 
Total 
Session 4 
Date: 20 July 1995 
Geoffrey (CEO) 
Dr James 
David 
(HR) 
Harriet (Ops) 
Ginny (Contracts) 
Gary (Fin) 
Jean (Nurs) 
Fred (Qual) 
Graham (IS) 
Other 
Total 
Time 14.10 - 4.00 
wl w2 w3 w4 FL Fi DP CP CD Un 
cl 
5 10 316321 
3 10 6 1 2 3 1411 
7 1 3 2 21 
1 12 1 1 4 6113 
3 1 21 
1 3 5 3 21 
131 10 45 12 1 12 18 14 10 306 
8% 34% 9% 1% 9% 14% 11% 8% 2% 0% 5% 
Time 14 . 05 - 15.50 
wl w2 w3 w4 FL Fi D P CP CD Un 
cl 
10 53 10 2 6 10 10 113 
2 8 7 4 2 372 
1 6 2 1 1311 
15 6 2 4 2311 
6 15 6 1 3 43 
9 2 2 111 
1 4 1 1 13 
1 
1 5 8 23 
276 21 116 33 5 19 23 24 24 038 
8% 42% 12% 2% 7% 8% 9%9%0% 1%3% 
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APPENDIX 9.3 Another Gladding Trust Executive meeting 
It was a hot Tuesday afternoon and the directors were having one of their regular 
fortnightly meetings. The room was stuffy and the agenda long but spirits were high as 
reflected in the level of humour expressed in the group from time to time. The group had 
spent much of the early part of the meeting exchanging information about their areas of 
responsibilities and were about to discuss the need to benchmark with other hospital 
trusts. Ellen, who worked in Ginny's Directorate hadjust completed an impressive 
presentation on the benefits of bench marking: why it was timely now, the process, who 
might be involved and she gave reassurances about the credibility of the company they 
could use and how confidentiality was to be maintained. 
Geoffrey: Any questions? 
Dr. You said we've been involved with this company on a pilot basis with nine 
other trusts. How long has this been going on for? 
Ellen: About six months... 
Jean: Yes, what sort of people get involved? Is it business development people, 
quality, contracts staff or what? We have some things we would be interested to have 
examined: prices, waiting times, bed occupancy, bed throughput, % of day cases... 
Ellen: We can do that. What the company does is to provide information so that 
one can compare against the best and worse performer in the bench marking group. 
While there are sensitivities about confidentiality a lot of the information is actually 
public if you dig around. I mean the group (Exec Directors) could simply fund a research 
person to collate the data instead. 
On confidentiality, I know that some of our speciality managers are sensitive to 
sharing data with other local trusts but there are usually only about 12 'members' in a 
(bench marking) group. 
David: It's important to note that such company's do not tend to do trust-wide 
comparisons it tends to be on specific elements of performance. Also a lot of noise is 
made about the results. I heard on the grapevine that The King James' Hospital trust 
halved their outpatient through-puts but according to my colleague there, its just how 
they manage the appointments. So its hard to read to much into these things. 
Jean: I'd be interested to see how we compare with other local practices and am 
interested in collaboration. 
Ellen nods in acknowledgment and makes a note of it. 
Graham: We already have a lot of information on our computer systems that could 
be used for bench marking but it is not being used. 
Ellen: The problem with our system is that the data does not come in easily 
comparable chunks with other trusts. What this company has done is to use a 
methodology which draws on the work of the Kings Foundation; so its unlike the private 
sector bench marking methods. 
Gary: OK so how much is it going to cost? (the group laughs) 
James (Dr. ): Yes that's my question too (three or four others nod in agreement) 
647 
Ellen: E7,500 joining fee plus a subscription fee of E15,000 per year for the data 
and other facilities. Thus for year one the cost would be E22,500 and the minimum 
contract is three years. 
The group is silent for a moment 
Gary: If it can yield LIm. in income (or savings), then could see it as an 
investment. 
James (Dr. ): This is the same having one person in post for a year. 
Harriet: I can go with the principle and in theory it could be a valuable exercise, 
but I do have some concerns about it just giving us spurious results. 
Ellen: They can not solve all our problems and can only give us answers to the 
questions we ask - so we have to ask the right questions. I'm not sold on this company 
doing it but I prefer a company to it than it being done internally. 
David: I know some other people we can contact and see if we could get a good 
deal. 
Ginny: Yes, that would be good. We can get those addresses from you after the 
meeting. 
The meeting loses focus for several minutes with a number of smaller 
conversations operating 
Geoffrey: Please can we have one meeting and come back to the point under 
discussion 
Gary: Bench marking assumes that the present state is OK. Rather than looking at 
what we do, why we do it and how we should be doing it next time! 
David: Yes, might we not be better looking at Business Process Re-engineering as 
they have done in other hospitals. If Fred was here I'm sure he would agree. 
Harriet: I'd like to get more information about what my colleagues experience is 
of the company in other trusts. I think for us to engage in this exercise at all it may mean 
a change of culture. It will certainly highlight our weaknesses and maybe say how we 
could do things better. 
There is some final discussion on the detail of the company's consultancy process 
and the CEO begins to bring the topic to a close. 
James (Dr. ): Originally, I was quite enthusiastic but now I'm less convinced that it will 
yield the results we need. Shouldn't this be the job of the quality manager.... 
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Appendix 9.5 Firo-B scores for Gladding Hospital Trust 
directors 
Firo-B raw scores for Geoffrey Hands 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) 
Expressed (E) 492 
Wanted (W) 034 
Sum (E+W) 
4 12 6 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) 
46 -2 
Firo-B raw scores for Dr James Miller-Winthrope 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) 
Expressed (E) 453 
Wanted (W) 034 
Sum (E+W) 
48 
Diff (+ or -)(E-W) 
42 
Firo-B raw scores for David Larson 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) 
Expressed (E) 44 
Wanted (W) 30 
Sum(E+W) 
74 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) 
14 
7 
Affection (A) 
2 
5 
7 
-3 
Sum (I+C+A) 
15 
7 
Total sum 
22 
Total difference 
8 
Sum (I+C+A) 
12 
7 
Total sum 
19 
Total differcnce 
5 
Sum (I+C+A) 
10 
8 
Total sum 
18 
Total difference 
2 
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Firo-B raw scores for Harriet Quinn 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) Sum (I+C+A) 
Expressed (E) 5 4 3 12 
Wanted (W) 1 5 0 6 
Sum (E+W) Total sum 
6 9 3 18 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) Total difference 
4 -1 3 6 
Firo-B raw scores for Ginny DeVoil 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) Sum (I+C+A) 
Expressed (E) 4 3 3 10 
Wanted (W) 1 3 48 
Sum (E+W) Total sum 
5 6 7 Is 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) Total difference 
3 0 -1 2 
Firo-B raw scores for Jean Peat 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) Sum ([+C+A) 
Expressed (E) 6 3 4 13 
Wanted (W) 7 4 5 16 
Sum (E+W) Total sum 
13 7 9 29 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) Total difference 
-1 -1 -1 -3 
650 
Appendix 10.1 Examples of field notes to case study three - 
Tuthering council 
Here are some extracts from the file notes kept in ajournal during the research 
Entry 
28 February 1995 
These are my initial thoughts after attending the first meeting of the directors group plus 
briefings and all the run up to gaining entry. 
My thoughts are: 
The environment is driven by a financial imperative and within the broader context of 
change in local government 
* The strategic task is poorly defined 
e The political leadership is fragmented. No coherence 
e The top team does not appear to be effective as a group and have unresolved issues 
9 the leadership is in the right direction (the CEO) but is forceful 
The organisation is in transition with a culture of 'blame and fear' dominating and 
change weary 
9 Organisational learning is undermined. 
Interpretation 
The changing nature of the context and task leads to task anxiety at the strategic level . There are several responses but they do not seem to be contained. The strategic boundary 
is underbounded: authority is split, fragmented and there are personality dynamics. This 
is mirrored to some degree in the top team from its dynamics. 
In order to stop complete chaos, the CEO is mobilised to take a centralist position to stop 
it falling apart (The leader of the council does so also. These two form the anchor for the 
organisation). 
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Others experience this as disempowering and tend to hold own boundaries as a defensive 
response and thus a vicious cycle begins -a fall in trust, decreases communication, power 
experienced as centralist, openness falls etc. 
Thus organisation probably needs tight core, with 'variations in the regions'. 
Organisational learning is impeded as the system becomes bounded tight and the learning 
is undermined through defensive routines - there are no review, they do not see the signal 
nor do they respond (collectively) when they do. 
Organisational collusion? The 'nearly missed'meeting 
25 June 1996 
I had a meeting planned with Peter Atkins at I Oam. today. It was confirmed and it was in 
the diary. Yet I failed to turn up. I was already in the building (from 9-1 Oarn in another 
meeting) and finished on time. 
I went and asked to see Chris (CEO) (who was busy but happy to see me later) and spent 
time talking with Charles Tew about the organisational context and update and some 
personal stuff he raised with me. We finished at 10.30.1 then went back to the interview 
room to be met with surprise as Peter was waiting in the room. Why had I not been 
there?! 
I felt really awful and apologiscd. Yet wondered why this happened? 
I felt that it could reflect the system. Peter is the furthest away from the Town Hall and is 
perceived as the 'outsider' of the group. I felt that I had internalised this and 'forgot' him 
- outside of my sight view. (I also had an minor eye operation yesterday) 
I treated him as less important and was mobilised perhaps to be at the centre, with Chris 
and Charles. To be the confidante? To talk informally to them instead. 
I suggest this reflects the power dynamics within the system of the organisation. 
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Group observallonlinterpretation 
26 July, 1995 
The level of voice input is especially low today. It is 'as if' they want to hide what they 
are discussing. I also noticed their level of interaction with me. 
Chris and Charles are fine. There were two substitutes - people I had not met before. But 
Paul and Ben were not connecting with me at all. My phantasy was that they were angry 
with me for not maintaining the relationship and coming in only once a month. I thought 
they wish to keep me out. There was no chair put out (one usually is) and the hushed 
tones were significant. 
Interpretation 
I think it is something to do with not being close to them and it reminds me of the 
rejection of a child when parents go away. 
More group dynamics 
The Chris and Charles dynamic is a constant feature of the group. It is seen mainly in 
Chris who makes sarcastic comments to Charles and gives him verbal lashings. Charles 
returns with challenging language or comments on the process (which seems to annoy 
Chris). This goes on regularly. I interpret as a challenge to Chris's authority and a power 
struggle on behalf of the group and a direct attack at Chris's. Its Ba fight. 
Organisational note 
26 July, 1995 
I noticed at the reception, she calls up to the CEO's office and says: 'Michael Jarrett here 
to see Chris'. I wondered what this meant about authority, using the CEO first name in 
front of a visitor. It also reminded me of waiting to go to the headmasters office. 
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Appendix 10.2 Results of Group observations based on the 
Group Analysis Grid 
Total Group scores 
Grand Total 
Totals 
Chris 
(CEO) 
Fred 
(Welo 
Paul (Fin) 
Charles 
(Strat) 
Ben (Plan) 
Janet 
(Educ) 
Peter 
(Contr) 
Other 
48% 
7% 
9% 
18% 
8% 
7% 
2% 
9% 
853 62 286 78 14 28 252 69 25 74 28 
100% 7% 34% 9% 2% 3% 30% 8% 3% 1%0%3% 
wl w2 w3 w4 FL Fi D P CP CD Un 
cl 
380 9 152 40 9 5 127 16 11 209 
59 4 13 1 2 3 19 9 2 213 
68 8 24 6 0 0 21 3 2 112 
144 15 41 14 2 3 41 15 5 116 
63 3 18 6 0 3 17 12 1 012 
53 9 11 3 1 2 12 10 2 102 
13 3 2 3 0 1 3 0 0 001 
73 11 25 5 0 11 12 4 2 003 
Analysis of Group scores by session 
Tuthering Council 
Date: 31 May 1995 
Session 1 Time 10.35 - 11.37 
W1 w2 w3 w4 FL Fi D P CP CD Un 
cl 
Chris (CEO) 2 26 2 15 5 3 
Fred 1 1 5 2 11 
(Welý 
Paul (Fin) 1 2 1 
Charles (Strat) 6 12 16 5 2 
Ben (Plan) 3 1 2 3 1 
Janet(Educ) 7 5 25 21 1 
Peter (Contr) 2 1 
Other 2 1 1 
Total 149 17 51 5 02 46 12 6 127 
% 11% 34% 3% 0% 1% 31% 8%4% 1%1%5% 
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Session 2 
Date: 31 May 1995 Time 12.07 - 1.04 
W1 w2 w3 w4 FIL Fi D P CP CID Un 
cl 
Chris (CEO) 2 26 15 4 1 22 4311 
Fred 3 4 1 112 
(Welo 
Paul (Fin) 1 4 1 4 1 
Charles (Strat) 7 11 1 2 1 8 1211 
Ben (Plan) 
Janet(Educ) 3 1 4 41 
Peter (Contr) 
Other 2 8 2 1 6 11 
Total 172 15 56 20 6 3 45 11 7117 
% 9% 33% 12% 3% 2% 26% 6%4%1%1%4% 
Session 3 
Date: 28 June 1995 Time 11.45 - 13.10 
W1 w2 w3 w4 FL Fi D P CP CD Un 
cl 
Chris (CEO) 1 31 15 1 32 61 
Fred 3 4 4 
(Welo 
Paul (Fin) 4 11 3 10 111 
Charles (Strat) 1 7 4 9 43 
Ben (Plan) 2 9 1 3 9 5 
Janet(Educ) 2 3 21 3 411 
Peter (Contr) 1 1 1 2 
Other 2 6 6 1 22 
Total 227 13 71 26 1 10 70 26 6013 
% 6% 31% 11% 0% 4% 31% 11% 3% 0% 0% 1% 
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Session 4 
Date: 26 July 1995 Time 10.00 - 11.15 
W1 w2 w3 w4 FL Fi D P CP CID Un 
cl 
Chris (CEO) 3 50 2 3 26 323 
Fred 1 2 
(Welo 
Paul (Fin) 2 3 2 11 
Charles (Strat) 6 7 5 
Ben (Plan) 1 5 4 5 412 
Janet(Educ) 
Peter (Contr) 2 11 1 
Other 2 1 1 1 1 
Total 155 8 66 11 5 1 40 14 4006 
% 5% 43% 7% 3% 1% 26% 9%3%0%0%4% 
Session 5 
Date: 26 July 1995 Time 11.30 -13.27 
W1 w2 w3 w4 FL Fi D P CP CD Un 
cl 
Chris (CEO) 1 19 6 23 32 312 
Fred 1 4 3 9 212 
(Welo 
Paul (Fin) 1 5 5 1 
Charles (Strat) 1 5 9 2 1 13 
Ben (Plan) 1 1 
Janet(Educ) 
Peter (Contr) 
Other 5 8 1 4 3 11 
Total 150 9 42 16 2 12 51 62505 
% 6% 28% 11% 1% 8% 34% 4% 1%3%0%3% 
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Appendix 10.3 Extracts from the Director's group meeting 
Here is an except from the group's conversation on service sampling 
26 July, 1995 (from session 4 above) 
Chris: Let's discuss the principle and the procedure. Let's consider the principle first. 
Fred: Is this what members intended as they felt that senior managers and directors were 
out of touch. I thought they just want to see us out more. 
Chris: Yes. It is about those things but it is also about a critical and objective way. I go 
out to visits and say things there and then but it has limited value. This seeks a 
systematic approach. 
Keith (sub) I have some sympathy with Fred's comments. We have been pushing down 
responsibility and authority and now will have other things coming down possibly 
undermining the managers. It's not empowering 
Chris: But this is a way of monitoring performance systematically against criteria! 
Keith: We could service sample any number of customer interfaces 
Chris: But as we can see from these notes we can't (notes presented at the beginning of 
the meeting)... 
Charles (interrupts with raised hand): Can I make a comment? I'll claim some 
responsibility as there a number of models it is based on. There a snapshot, there's 
scoring.. 
Fred: Let's not go on about education 
Charles: if we have some stats.. 
Chris (to Charles): Aren't you staggered by the defensiveness by the group. We have 
clear standards on for example telephones, correspondence. Are you happy about these 
things working? (A question to the group). No. You are not. So let's pilotl 
Fred: We've been invited to discuss this. If so lets do so or otherwise... 
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Chris (interrupts) Are you objecting to the principle that the leader says you are not the 
visible face of your service? You lot. He wants me to manage an objective source within 
two months. Forget the leader! What's wrong with the proposaM (Chris is shouting 
now) 
Paul: This is a duplicate of other things we're doing and we're not focused on the 
customer part 
Chris: You sit here all honky dory and do **** all and think we do something! 1 
Fred: Not having a discussion here 
Chris; We'll run this pilot. I'll run it and show you! 
Fred: Lets go on to next business 
Charles: Lets be honest and get down to mechanics. Yes there is the commitment to 
quality. But we got a pick and mix. Here we have less than BS5750. It would be helpful 
if two or three field tested it and if it doesn't help we will tear it up. I'd prefer to have 
some field testing 
Chris: I want to see it moving. Avoid nonsense you made about anecdotal garbage. Let 
them take this framework. 
Charles: I don't believe members should be doing this. It's a management function 
Chris: It's no different from public complaints (procedure) 
Paul: Hang on Chris. We're trying to impose a pilot onto something that is not working. 
What we need to do is review the system 
Chris. Non of these arguments undermine the proposal on the table. 
Paul: It does as they have 
Chris: All of you said within this room that you have systems in this respect and it mccts 
the requirements of the District Auditor 
Paul: No way can make it in 7 days like correspondence.. 
Chris (interrupts): OK change to ten days. It does not conflict with the proposal 
The meeting goes on in the same vein for another 15 minutes Nvith all parties resolved to 
pilot testing the scheme in one of the local areas. 
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Appendix 10.4 Firo-B scores for Tuthering Local Council 
Firo-B raw scores for Chris Hinds 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) Sum (I+C+A) 
Expressed (E) 4 7 0 11 
Wanted (W) 1 2 14 
Sum (E+W) Total sum 
5 9 1 15 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) Total difference 
3 5 -1 7 
Firo-B raw scores for Paul Harris 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) Sum (I+C+A) 
Expressed (E) 2 9 0 11 
Wanted (W) 1 3 5 9 
Sum (E+W) Total sum 
3 12 5 20 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) Total difference 
1 6 .5 2 
Firo-B raw scores for Fred Jones 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) Sum (I+C+A) 
Expressed (E) 4 5 8 17 
Wanted (W) 1 4 8 13 
Sum (E+W) Total sum 
5 9 16 30 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) Total difference 
3 1 0 4 
Firo-B raw scores for Ben Chandra 
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Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) Sum (I+C+A) 
Expressed (E) 2 9 2 13 
Wanted (W) 2 0 0 2 
Sum (E+W) Total sum 
4 9 2 15 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) Total difference 
0 9 2 11 
Firo-B raw scores for Peter Atkins 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) Sum (I+C+A) 
Expressed (E) 5 7 3 15 
Wanted (W) 0 4 5 9 
Sum (E+W) Total sum 
5 11 8 24 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) Total difference 
5 3 -2 6 
Firo-B raw scores for Janet Taylor 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) Sum (I+C+A) 
Expressed (E) 5 5 3 13 
Wanted (W) 0 2 46 
Sum (E+W) Total sum 
5 7 7 19 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) Total difference 
5 3 .17 
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Firo-B raw scores for Charles Tews 
Inclusion (1) Control (C) Affection (A) Sum (I+C+A) 
Expressed (E) 5 8 4 17 
Wanted (W) 2 1 5 8 
Sum (E+W) Total sum 
7 9 9 25 
Diff (+ or - )(E-W) Total difference 
3 7 .1 9 
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